Justia Immigration Law Opinion Summaries

Eugenia Bautista Chavez, a native and citizen of Mexico, challenged the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order of removal based on her 2011 conviction for petit larceny under section 18.2-96 of the Virginia Code. The Board held that petit larceny categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude, rendering Chavez ineligible for cancellation of removal. Chavez argued that a defendant in Virginia could be convicted of larceny for taking property that he or she sincerely but unreasonably believed was abandoned, which falls short of the requisite mental state for a crime involving moral turpitude. She also contended that petit larceny for taking property of de minimis value does not constitute sufficiently reprehensible conduct to make out a crime involving moral turpitude.The Immigration Judge ruled for the government, reasoning that he was required to find that petit larceny was a crime involving moral turpitude under the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hernandez v. Holder. Chavez appealed to the Board, arguing that Virginia petit larceny did not require a culpable mental state and did not involve reprehensible conduct. The Board dismissed Chavez’s appeal, concluding that the offense required a culpable mental state and involved reprehensible conduct. Chavez then moved the Board to reconsider its decision, but a temporary Board member denied her motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Chavez’s petition. The court held that Virginia petit larceny is a crime involving moral turpitude because it requires an intent to permanently deprive the owner of property, which satisfies the culpable mental state requirement. The court also found that the offense involves reprehensible conduct, regardless of the value of the property taken. Additionally, the court rejected Chavez’s challenge to the authority of the temporary Board member who decided her reconsideration motion, citing its previous decision in Salomon-Guillen v. Garland. View "Chavez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Jathursan Thankarasa, a Tamil citizen of Sri Lanka, participated in a protest supporting Tamil rights and was subsequently arrested, beaten, and interrogated by the police. After his release, he faced continued harassment and threats, leading him to leave Sri Lanka with the help of a smuggler. He traveled through several European countries using a Sri Lankan passport provided by the smuggler but did not seek asylum in any of those countries. Before entering the United States, the smuggler gave him a genuine French passport belonging to another person, which he used to attempt entry. Upon arrival, he admitted the passport was not his and stated his intention to seek asylum.The Immigration Judge (IJ) granted Thankarasa’s application for withholding of removal but denied his asylum application, citing his fraudulent use of the French passport as an egregious factor outweighing his fear of persecution. The IJ reconsidered the asylum denial, as required by regulations, but again denied it, emphasizing the lack of family reunification concerns since Thankarasa had no immediate family eligible for derivative asylum benefits. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that the fraudulent entry was sufficiently egregious to outweigh his fear of persecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. The court found that the IJ properly considered the totality of the circumstances, including the egregiousness of the immigration fraud and the lack of family reunification concerns. The court concluded that the IJ did not abuse his discretion in denying the asylum application and denied Thankarasa’s petition for review. View "Thankarasa v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a husband and wife from Guatemala, sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision upholding the Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of their applications for cancellation of removal. They argued that their removal would cause "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to their U.S. citizen children. The IJ found that the petitioners did not meet this hardship requirement, despite finding them otherwise eligible for cancellation of removal. The IJ's decision was based on the conclusion that the children would not suffer the requisite level of hardship if the family relocated to Guatemala.The IJ's decision was appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ's findings. The BIA agreed with the IJ that the petitioners had not demonstrated that their removal would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to their children. The BIA reviewed the IJ's factual findings for clear error and found none, particularly regarding the health and well-being of the petitioners' son, A.B.M., who had experienced past trauma and had ongoing health issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court found that the BIA had legally erred by failing to consider key evidence, specifically a psychological report detailing the mental health status of A.B.M. The court held that the BIA must consider all relevant evidence in the record when reviewing the IJ's findings for clear error. The First Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the BIA to adequately consider the full record, including the psychological report, in its determination. View "Blanco Contreras v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Jordan Pulido developed an online relationship with a 14-year-old Croatian girl, I.G., and, with the help of his father, Roberto Jimenez, traveled to Croatia to have sex with her. They later brought her to the United States, where Pulido continued to have sex with her. Pulido was indicted on multiple counts, including using the internet to entice a minor, traveling with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, and transporting a minor for sexual activity. Jimenez was indicted for conspiring to transport a minor for sexual activity.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied Pulido's pre-trial motions to dismiss the indictment, suppress evidence, and exclude testimony. Both defendants were convicted on all counts after a nine-day trial. Post-trial motions for acquittal, a new trial, and a mistrial were also denied. Jimenez received sentence enhancements for exercising undue influence and having custody or supervisory control over I.G.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions on most counts but vacated Pulido's conviction on the enticement count, finding the indictment duplicitous. The court held that the enticement count was not harmless and remanded for resentencing. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Pulido's motion to suppress evidence from his electronic devices, holding that the border search exception applied. Additionally, the court found no fundamental unfairness in the translation irregularities during I.G.'s mother's testimony.For Jimenez, the court affirmed the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, finding sufficient evidence of his intent to transport I.G. for sexual activity. The court also upheld the denial of his motion for a mistrial based on Agent Garcia's testimony about his immigration status, concluding that the curative instruction mitigated any potential prejudice. Finally, the court affirmed the application of the sentencing enhancements for undue influence and custody or supervisory control. View "U.S. v. Pulido" on Justia Law

The case involves the detention and removal of Venezuelan nationals believed to be members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a group designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department. The President issued a proclamation under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) to detain and remove these individuals. Five detainees and a putative class sought injunctive and declaratory relief against their removal under the Proclamation, initially seeking relief in habeas but later dismissing those claims.The District Court for the District of Columbia issued two temporary restraining orders (TROs) preventing the removal of the named plaintiffs and a provisionally certified class of noncitizens subject to the Proclamation. The court extended the TROs for an additional 14 days. The D.C. Circuit denied the Government’s emergency motion to stay the orders, leading the Government to seek vacatur from the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the United States construed the TROs as appealable injunctions and granted the Government's application to vacate the orders. The Court held that challenges to removal under the AEA must be brought in habeas corpus, as the claims necessarily imply the invalidity of the detainees' confinement and removal. The Court also determined that venue for such habeas petitions lies in the district of confinement, which in this case is Texas, making the District of Columbia an improper venue. The detainees are entitled to notice and an opportunity to seek habeas relief in the proper venue before removal. The application to vacate the District Court's orders was granted, and the TROs were vacated. View "Trump v. J. G. G." on Justia Law

Muhammad Masood, a licensed physician from Pakistan, came to the United States in 2018 on a non-immigrant visa to work as an unpaid medical researcher. In 2019, he became radicalized by Islamic extremist content and planned to join ISIS. In March 2020, he was arrested at the Minneapolis airport with plans to travel to ISIS-controlled territory. A search revealed military and medical supplies, computers, and digital storage devices containing extremist propaganda. Masood pleaded guilty to attempting to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota adopted the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) and sentenced Masood to 216 months imprisonment, varying downward from the statutory maximum of 240 months. Masood appealed, arguing procedural errors in applying the terrorism enhancement, considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and alleged violations of his due process rights and right to allocution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found no procedural error in applying the terrorism enhancement, as the evidence supported that Masood's offense was intended to promote terrorism. The court also found that the district court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors and provided a sufficient explanation for the sentence. Additionally, the court determined there was no violation of Rule 32(i) or the Due Process Clause, as Masood and his counsel were given opportunities to argue and allocute before the final sentence was imposed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Masood" on Justia Law

A Salvadoran national filed two petitions for review of decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The first petition challenges the BIA's January 2024 decision upholding the denial by an Immigration Judge (IJ) of his applications for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The second petition challenges the BIA's March 2024 denial of his motion to reopen his administrative proceedings to seek a continuance or administrative closure while his U visa petition is pending.The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against the petitioner in May 2022 for entering the United States without inspection. An immigration court found him removable and designated El Salvador as the country of removal. The petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal under the INA, and protection under the CAT. The IJ denied his applications, finding that his proposed particular social group (PSG) was not cognizable and that he failed to establish a sufficient likelihood of harm if removed to El Salvador. The BIA vacated and remanded for further findings, but the IJ again denied relief. The BIA dismissed the appeal, affirming the IJ's findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA may have endorsed the IJ's use of an improper "ocular visibility" standard in evaluating the social distinction of the petitioner's proposed PSG. The court also noted ambiguity in the BIA's analysis regarding the scope of the petitioner's PSG. Consequently, the court granted the first petition, remanded for further proceedings, and dismissed the second petition as moot. The petitioner may renew his applications for withholding of removal and CAT protection on remand. View "Alvarez Mendoza v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Walter Aceituno, a Guatemalan citizen, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1989. In 2014, he pled guilty to drug-trafficking charges after being arrested in a sting operation involving the purchase of cocaine. His attorneys informed him that he would be deported as a result of his guilty plea, but did not explicitly state that he would be permanently barred from reentering the United States. Aceituno was deported in 2015 and later illegally reentered the U.S. in 2019, leading to further legal issues.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island granted Aceituno's petition for a writ of error coram nobis, allowing him to withdraw his 2014 guilty plea. The district court found that Aceituno's attorneys provided ineffective assistance by failing to inform him of the permanent reentry bar, and that Aceituno acted reasonably in not seeking earlier relief due to his ongoing efforts to reunite with his family through various legal means.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Aceituno's attorneys met the requirements set forth in Padilla v. Kentucky by informing him of the risk of deportation. The court found that the district court erred in concluding that the attorneys were required to inform Aceituno of the permanent reentry bar. Additionally, the appellate court determined that Aceituno's delay in seeking relief was unreasonable and that the equities did not justify the issuance of the writ. The court emphasized the importance of finality in legal proceedings and the lack of compelling circumstances to warrant coram nobis relief. The writ was quashed, and the petition was dismissed. View "Aceituno v. United States" on Justia Law

Monika Kapoor, an Indian citizen, faces extradition from the United States to India to face criminal charges. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York determined that Kapoor was extraditable under the bilateral extradition treaty between the U.S. and India. The Secretary of State issued a surrender warrant, rejecting Kapoor’s claims that she would likely be tortured if returned to India, which would violate the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Kapoor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the Secretary’s decision, but the district court denied her petition, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) from the REAL ID Act of 2005, which divested the court of jurisdiction to hear her claim. Kapoor appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court, stating that the Convention is not a self-executing treaty and that courts can review claims under it only as authorized by Congress. The court referenced the Supreme Court’s test in I.N.S v. St. Cyr, noting that Section 1252(a)(4) clearly states that claims under the Convention can only be raised in petitions for review of immigration removal orders and specifically bars judicial review of such claims in habeas proceedings, except in limited circumstances not applicable here.The Second Circuit held that this interpretation does not violate the Suspension Clause in the extradition context due to the longstanding rule of non-inquiry, which precludes American habeas courts from considering the anticipated treatment of an extraditee in the receiving country. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision, denying Kapoor’s petition. View "Kapoor v. DeMarco" on Justia Law

The appellants, Madhu Sudhan Kanapuram and Swathi Pillarisetty, are Indian citizens legally residing in the United States on temporary employment-based visas. They filed Form I-485 applications for adjustment of status to obtain EB-2 immigrant visas. Their applications were initially within the priority date cutoff, but due to a retrogression policy, the Final Action Date was pushed back, placing their applications outside the priority cutoff date. After waiting 19 months without a decision, they filed a lawsuit alleging that the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Department of State violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by unlawfully withholding and unreasonably delaying the adjudication of their applications.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the case, concluding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) barred judicial review of claims asserting delays in the adjudication of pending Form I-485 applications. The appellants then sought review of this dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review of challenges to USCIS delays in adjudicating Form I-485 applications because the statute grants the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and USCIS broad discretion over the adjustment of status process. The court concluded that the decision to delay adjudication due to the retrogression policy falls within this discretionary authority. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order of dismissal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the appellants' APA claims. View "SudhanKanapuram v. Director, US Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law