Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A child, A.M.S., was born in 2014 to A.M.N.L. (the mother) and T.J.S. (the father). A.M.S. has always lived with her mother, who has been her primary caregiver. Since 2020, the mother has been in a committed relationship with Q.O., with whom she had another child in 2022. T.J.S. has a significant criminal history, including domestic violence, and is currently subject to a 20-year order of protection obtained by A.M.N.L. against him. T.J.S. had limited visitation with A.M.S. under a parenting plan, but his visitation was suspended after a 2022 arrest for domestic violence. He made only a single small child support payment between 2022 and 2025, accumulating over $15,000 in arrears. In September 2024, the mother and Q.O. petitioned to terminate T.J.S.’s parental rights and for Q.O. to adopt A.M.S., asserting T.J.S. was unfit and had not maintained a substantial relationship with the child.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, appointed counsel for T.J.S., granted him a 90-day continuance to prepare, but denied a subsequent request for a further continuance. At the termination/adoption hearing, the parties stipulated that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply, and the court proceeded to hear evidence. The court found T.J.S. unfit, concluded he had failed to maintain a substantial relationship and had waived his parental rights, and granted the adoption.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in accepting the parties’ ICWA stipulation, in denying a second continuance, and whether T.J.S. received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court held that although it was error for the District Court to accept a stipulation that ICWA did not apply, this was harmless because the facts did not trigger ICWA. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in denying the second continuance and concluded that T.J.S. did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. The decision was affirmed. View "In re Parenting and Adoption of A.M.S." on Justia Law

A mother, a lifelong resident of New Mexico, traveled to Maine with her child, who has significant special needs, and became involved in a child protection proceeding after being found intoxicated with the child. The Maine Department of Health and Human Services sought and ultimately gained temporary custody of the child, who was first placed in New Mexico, then returned to Maine after New Mexico authorities declined to keep the placement. The Department developed reunification plans requiring the mother to engage in extensive services, which she completed successfully. A key point of contention arose over the Department’s requirement that the mother relocate to Maine for in-person supervised visitation and potential reunification, which she was unable to do due to her financial situation and the risk of losing her housing and support network in New Mexico.The Maine District Court held several hearings and, after finding that the mother “went above and beyond” the requirements of the reunification plan except for her failure to relocate to Maine, terminated her parental rights. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that she was unfit to parent, relying heavily on her inability to move to Maine, and concluded that termination was in the child’s best interest. The mother moved to amend the judgment, but the District Court denied her motion and she appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and concluded that the District Court erred by basing its determination of unfitness primarily on the mother’s inability to relocate, especially given her full compliance with all other reunification requirements. The Court held that the Department failed to prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence and vacated the judgment, remanding the matter for further proceedings, excluding consideration of the mother’s failure to relocate as evidence of unfitness. View "In re Child of Karen J." on Justia Law

A Canadian couple moved to Massachusetts with their two young children after both were granted E-2 non-immigrant visas to work at a family business expanding into the United States. Their move was described as a trial, intended to assess whether they liked living in the U.S. and to help launch the business. They left most possessions in Canada and maintained financial and familial ties there. After selling their Canadian home, they bought a condominium in Massachusetts. Over time, the spouses developed differing intentions about making the United States their permanent home. The father struggled to adapt to life in Massachusetts and expressed his desire to return to Canada, while the mother wished to stay. In August 2024, after the father traveled to Canada, the mother withdrew funds from joint accounts, changed the locks on the home, and refused to let the children visit their father in Canada.Subsequently, the mother filed for divorce in Massachusetts, and the father counterclaimed for custody and removal of the children to Canada. Temporary custody arrangements were made. The father then filed applications under the Hague Convention in both Canada and the United States, alleging wrongful retention of the children. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held a hearing and concluded that the mother’s actions amounted to wrongful retention under the Hague Convention, finding that the children’s “habitual residence” remained Canada. The court ordered the children returned to Canada.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision, applying clear error review to the findings of fact. The court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly identified Canada as the children’s habitual residence as of the date of wrongful retention. The court also rejected the mother’s defenses of “now-settled,” consent, and acquiescence, finding no clear error in the district court’s determinations. The judgment ordering the return of the children to Canada was affirmed. View "Giguere v. Tardif" on Justia Law

A married couple created a revocable trust during their marriage, transferring three properties into it. Both spouses were designated as co-trustees, sole beneficiaries, and settlors of the trust, retaining the right to amend or revoke it together. Following their separation and eventual divorce, they sold two of the properties and retained the third in the trust. Each party then asserted claims for equitable distribution of marital property. In a pretrial order, both parties stipulated that all necessary parties were properly before the court, that the three properties were marital property, and agreed on how the properties and proceeds would be divided.The District Court, Brunswick County, entered an equitable distribution order based on these stipulations. The defendant appealed, arguing that the revocable trust was a necessary party under Rule 19 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the trust was not joined. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to set aside the order. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s actions, holding that the trust was not a necessary party because, through their stipulations, the parties effectively revoked the trust. The Court of Appeals also found a clerical error in the order, remanding for correction.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed whether a revocable trust must be joined in an equitable distribution proceeding when all settlors are already parties. The court held that Rule 19 does not require joinder of a revocable trust in such circumstances, as a judgment against the settlors binds the trust without affecting others’ rights. The decision of the Court of Appeals was modified and affirmed on this basis. View "Face v. Face" on Justia Law

A married couple divorced after nearly twenty years together. During the marriage, the husband founded and operated a law firm as a sole practitioner. When the parties separated, they could not agree on how to divide the value of the law firm, specifically its “goodwill”—an intangible asset reflecting expected future client patronage. An appraiser, hired with the parties’ consent, determined that the law firm had significant value, consisting of both “enterprise goodwill” (attributable to the firm itself) and “personal goodwill” (attributable to the husband's reputation and skills).In District Court, Mecklenburg County, the trial judge accepted the appraiser’s valuation, distinguishing between enterprise and personal goodwill but classifying both as marital property subject to division. The court ordered the husband to pay the wife half the total value of the goodwill. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that North Carolina courts had not previously distinguished between types of goodwill and that all goodwill associated with a professional practice should be treated as marital property.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case to determine how personal and enterprise goodwill should be classified in equitable distribution during divorce. The Supreme Court held that only enterprise goodwill—value that exists independent of the practitioner and can be transferred to others—may be treated as marital property. Personal goodwill, which is inextricably tied to the individual’s skills and reputation and represents future earning capacity, cannot be classified as marital property for purposes of equitable distribution. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals on this point, remanding for proceedings consistent with its decision while leaving the treatment of enterprise goodwill undisturbed. The Court noted its holding is limited to equitable distribution and does not affect alimony considerations. View "Sneed v. Johnston" on Justia Law

A woman and her husband, after marrying, received a parcel of real estate from her parents, which they held as tenants by the entirety in Massachusetts. They planned and undertook substantial renovations, initially funded by gifts from the husband’s parents. When those funds ran out, the husband’s parents provided over $1.5 million more, which was later documented as a loan in a promissory note signed only by the husband, not the wife. The couple’s marriage deteriorated, leading to divorce proceedings. During the divorce, the husband’s parents obtained a default judgment against the husband (but not the wife) for the loan and secured a writ of execution against his interest in the property, which was recorded. After the divorce, the family court awarded the property solely to the wife, free from any claim by the husband, and clarified that it could not adjudicate the parents’ rights under the promissory note.Subsequently, the husband’s parents transferred their judgment to a family trust, which noticed a sheriff’s sale of the husband’s purported interest in the property. The wife sued in state court to stop the sale, the case was removed to federal court, and both sides sought summary judgment. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment to the wife, holding that the divorce and property distribution extinguished the creditor’s interest and that, even if the loan were valid, the wife was not jointly liable because the funds were not spent on “necessaries” under Massachusetts law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the district court’s prediction of state law concerning the effect of divorce on a creditor’s interest and remanded for factual findings on the validity of the loan as to the wife. The court also found that neither preclusion nor the state’s domestic relations exception barred the wife’s challenge, and that factual disputes remained as to whether the loan was spent on necessaries. The court affirmed, reversed, and vacated in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Cosel v. Wendt" on Justia Law

A man and a woman began a relationship in 2015 and had a child in 2018. Though they were never married, they lived together until 2024. After their separation, they informally shared custody of their child, alternating time with her. In 2025, the mother unilaterally moved to Colorado with the child, initially telling the father it was a temporary visit but intending to relocate permanently. The father responded by filing for custody, visitation, and child support, and sought emergency temporary custody due to the mother’s relocation. Both parents accused each other of substance abuse but drug tests were negative.The District Court of Park County held hearings and initially awarded temporary physical custody to the mother and joint legal custody to both parents, with regular drug testing and structured visitation for the father. At a subsequent bench trial, the court continued physical custody with the mother pending a final order. Ultimately, in its final order, the court found both parents fit and competent, but awarded the mother primary physical custody, citing the child’s enrollment in school in Colorado and the stability of the mother’s home as serving the child’s best interests. The father was granted substantial visitation, including four consecutive nights each month, alternating holidays, and eight weeks each summer. The court declined to award child support to either party because of the father’s travel costs.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s custody order for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the mother primary physical custody. The Supreme Court found the district court’s findings were supported by the record and that its decision reasonably balanced the child’s best interests and the practical challenges posed by the parents’ geographic separation. View "Swindler v. Bright" on Justia Law

In this case, organizations that represent indigent and low-income litigants challenged the widespread unavailability of official court reporters in California’s superior courts for civil, family, and probate proceedings. These organizations documented that, despite prior assurances, many indigent litigants appear in court and find that no court reporter is present, even when properly requested. As a result, such litigants are often forced either to accept repeated continuances—delaying urgent matters like domestic violence restraining orders and child custody—or to proceed without a verbatim record, which severely impairs their ability to seek appellate review.Previously, the Supreme Court of California had ruled in *Jameson v. Desta* that when a superior court does not routinely provide court reporters in civil cases but allows parties who can afford it to hire private reporters, the court must ensure that indigent litigants receive access to an official verbatim record. Despite this, the petitioners alleged and the courts largely conceded that a chronic shortage of court reporters had rendered this guarantee largely ineffective. Some superior courts responded by issuing general orders allowing electronic recording in certain cases involving fundamental rights, but these policies were limited in scope and not uniformly adopted.The Supreme Court of California reviewed this original proceeding and held that, under the in forma pauperis doctrine articulated in *Jameson v. Desta*, superior courts have a ministerial duty to provide indigent litigants, upon request, with meaningful access to an official verbatim record of proceedings in all civil matters. This duty includes using electronic recording if neither an official nor a private court reporter is available, notwithstanding statutory restrictions. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the respondent superior courts to comply with this obligation. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "Family Violence Appellate Project v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case involves a child custody dispute between the unmarried parents of a minor child. The father is a member of the Kenaitze Indian Tribe, and the child is eligible for tribal membership; the mother is not a tribal member. Both parents sought custody, but disagreed on whether the case should proceed in the Kenaitze Tribal Court or the Alaska Superior Court. The father first filed a non-emergency custody petition in tribal court but soon asked to withdraw it after reaching a temporary agreement with the mother. Afterward, the mother filed petitions for domestic violence protective orders (DVPOs) against the father in state court, receiving a short-term order. While the long-term DVPO was pending, the father filed a second custody petition in tribal court, and the tribal court notified both parties of a custody hearing. Later, the mother filed a custody complaint in state superior court.The Alaska Superior Court reviewed motions from both parties. The father argued that because he first filed in tribal court, the tribal court should decide the matter. The mother contended the tribal court lacked jurisdiction under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and that she did not consent to tribal jurisdiction. The superior court found the tribal court had exercised jurisdiction first and dismissed the state custody case, pending acceptance by the tribal court. The mother appealed the dismissal, and the superior court stayed its order during the appeal. The father cross-appealed the stay.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that the tribal court was the proper forum for the custody dispute because the father's petition was filed there before the mother initiated state custody proceedings. The court clarified that, when simultaneous custody actions are filed in both tribal and state courts, the court where the matter is first filed is the preferred forum. The court affirmed the dismissal of the state case and found the issue of the stay pending appeal to be moot. View "Mallette v. Adams" on Justia Law

Two individuals, who had been romantically involved and shared two minor children, ended their relationship in 2016. The mother was awarded legal and physical custody, with the father receiving parenting time under a court-ordered plan. Over subsequent years, the father’s parenting time was suspended due to his refusal or failure to provide negative drug tests, as required by court orders. He also accrued child support arrears and was imprisoned for criminal offenses between August 2023 and August 2024. In May 2024, while the father was incarcerated, the mother filed a complaint to terminate his parental rights, citing abandonment and neglect. The father alleged he was prevented from contacting the children due to changes in contact information and sought a contempt citation against the mother for not facilitating communication.The District Court for Seward County, Nebraska, presided over the termination action and the contempt request. The court found clear and convincing evidence that the father had abandoned the children for at least six months prior to the complaint and that termination was in the children’s best interests. The court also found the father had not exercised or attempted parenting time, nor paid child support during the relevant period, and that his abandonment both preceded and continued after his incarceration. The contempt request was denied, as the court found the mother was not in willful contempt.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the district court was the appropriate forum to hear the termination proceeding, that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of parental rights, and that the contempt issue was moot following termination. The order terminating parental rights was affirmed. View "Roth v. Marcoe" on Justia Law