Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Following the divorce of a mother and father in West Virginia in 2019, their agreed parenting plan allowed the father regular visitation with their young child, B.L. In July 2021, the mother sought a domestic violence protection order after B.L., then three years old, disclosed sexual abuse by the father both to her and in a Child Advocacy Center interview. The mother subsequently petitioned for modification of parenting time, alleging further disclosures and physical injuries upon B.L.’s return from the father's care. Investigations by Virginia’s child protective agencies determined the allegations were “unfounded,” but the mother and B.L.’s therapist continued to report concerns, leading to additional forensic interviews and referrals.The Family Court of Wayne County initially suspended the father’s visitation and appointed a guardian ad litem for B.L. After hearings in 2024, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the father sexually abused B.L., citing consistent disclosures in interviews and therapy, and awarded sole custody and exclusive decision-making authority to the mother, denying the father any parenting time. The father appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient and highlighting the “unfounded” findings by Virginia agencies.The Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the family court’s decision, determining there was substantial evidence supporting the finding of abuse and that the family court did not err or abuse its discretion.Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the Intermediate Court's ruling, holding that the family court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and its application of law was not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court also remanded the case in part, instructing the family court to comply with Rule 48, which requires mandatory reporting of suspected child abuse to Child Protective Services and the circuit court, regardless of prior investigations or jurisdiction. View "S.L. v. A.C." on Justia Law

After a district court terminated a mother's parental rights to her two children, the mother appealed the decision. The essential facts of the case are not disputed, and they were adequately summarized by the Kansas Court of Appeals. The district court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother was unfit under several statutory factors, that her unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, and that terminating her rights was in the best interests of the children.The Kansas Court of Appeals reviewed the district court’s decision and affirmed it. The appellate panel concluded that the record supported the district court’s findings regarding the mother's unfitness, the unlikelihood of change, and the children’s best interests. The mother sought further review, focusing her challenge on the finding regarding foreseeability—that her unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas granted discretionary review based on a summary petition under Supreme Court Rule 8.03A, which allows for summary consideration only if controlling authority is dispositive of the entire appeal or no substantial question is presented. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that the requirements for summary review were not met because no controlling Kansas authority dictated a different result, and the issues raised involved questions of substance. The court clarified that Rule 8.03A is not intended for full review of evidentiary sufficiency arguments and declined to consider arguments not properly presented through the summary petition mechanism. The Supreme Court dismissed the summary petition for review as improvidently granted, leaving the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the district court’s termination of parental rights undisturbed. View "In re J.N.N. " on Justia Law

Clarence Jackson was convicted for assault causing bodily injury after he struck eight-year-old W.W. several times with a leather belt while visiting the child’s home. Jackson, who is the father of three of W.W.’s half-siblings, occasionally visited the home but never lived there and had no formal custody or visitation arrangement. On the day of the incident, Jackson arrived unannounced, directed W.W. to clean his room, and, after a dispute, retrieved a belt from his car and hit the child. The episode was recorded by W.W.’s sister and reported to authorities. W.W. sustained bruises that were visible for several days.The Iowa District Court for Buchanan County, sitting in a bench trial, convicted Jackson. The court found that the corporal punishment defense did not apply because Jackson was not W.W.’s parent and, even if it did, his actions were unreasonable and abusive rather than corrective. Jackson appealed, challenging the application of the corporal punishment defense and the reasonableness determination. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that Jackson’s use of corporal punishment was unreasonable and declining to address whether the defense applies to nonparents.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed only Jackson’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge regarding the corporal punishment defense. The court held that Jackson’s conduct was not protected by the corporal punishment defense because the child’s mother did not authorize him to use a belt and did not place the child in his care at the time of the incident. The court further held that Jackson did not have sufficient care, custody, and control of W.W. to trigger the defense, and, even assuming the defense could apply, Jackson’s conduct was unreasonable under Iowa law. The court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The case involves two parents whose children were removed from their home after allegations of truancy, poor living conditions, physical abuse, and felony child abuse charges. After an unsuccessful improvement period, the parents stipulated to certain allegations and were adjudicated as abusive and neglectful. The circuit court initially granted them post-adjudicatory improvement periods, but they failed to comply with requirements, tested positive for cocaine, and missed a status hearing. Their improvement periods were terminated, and at the dispositional hearing, although there were motions to terminate parental rights, the court decided it was not in the children's best interests to do so. Instead, the children were placed in the temporary custody of the Department of Human Services (DHS), with limited visitation granted to the parents.Subsequently, the parents and their counsel did not participate in several permanency review hearings due to confusion about their roles and responsibilities after the initial disposition. Notices were inconsistently sent, and the parents were functionally excluded from key proceedings, including multi-disciplinary team meetings and decisions about visitation, which was eventually discontinued. The guardian ad litem later moved to modify disposition and terminate parental rights. The circuit court "reappointed" counsel and held a contested hearing where the parents argued they had not received proper notice. The court found a material change in circumstances and terminated parental rights, reasoning that the children no longer wished to be reunified and had bonded with their foster family.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court substantially disregarded statutory and procedural requirements by functionally excluding the parents and failing to make the statutory findings necessary for termination of parental rights under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6). The court vacated the order terminating parental rights and remanded for further proceedings consistent with statutory and procedural requirements. View "In re A.S." on Justia Law

A petition was filed against a mother after she failed to follow a safety plan, which was implemented following her recording of a video threatening self-harm while with her child, A.C. The mother admitted that her mental health and substance abuse issues impaired her parenting, and she was adjudicated as an abusing parent. She was granted a post-adjudicatory improvement period. Subsequently, she entered into an agreement acknowledging her inability to provide adequately for A.C. at that time, which led to a dispositional order awarding full custody of A.C. to her non-abusing father, while her parental rights remained intact. The circuit court ordered the parties to return one year later for a modification hearing.After a year, the Department of Human Services filed a motion to modify the disposition and requested termination of the mother’s parental rights. At the modification hearing, witnesses, including the father and a child protective services worker, testified. The father reported an incident involving suspected drug paraphernalia but also stated he had never suspected the mother was under the influence during visits. The CPS worker testified that nothing had changed with the mother since the initial disposition. The circuit court nevertheless found a material change of circumstances and terminated the mother’s parental rights.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, the mother argued the Department failed to prove a material change in circumstances, as required by statute, and challenged the circuit court’s informal policy mandating a one-year limit on the dispositional order. The Department conceded that no material change had been alleged or proven and confessed error. The Supreme Court of Appeals held that the circuit court erred by terminating parental rights absent proof of a material change in circumstances and found the circuit court’s policy lacked statutory support and improperly shifted the burden. The order terminating parental rights was reversed and the case remanded for entry of an amended dispositional order. View "In re A.C." on Justia Law

A divorced couple with two minor children disputed the terms of parenting time after the mother was awarded primary residential responsibility and the father was granted reasonable visitation. Following the father’s return to Fargo, visitation resumed on an every-other-weekend daytime schedule. In 2024, the father moved for contempt, alleging violations of the parenting plan. The mother responded, seeking to modify parenting time and require the father to undergo psychological evaluation. After hearings, the District Court denied the contempt motion, ordered the evaluation, and imposed a stepped parenting plan beginning with supervised visits.The father appealed, and the Supreme Court of North Dakota previously affirmed the contempt denial, the evaluation requirement, and the decision to modify parenting time, but reversed the stepped plan due to improper delegation of authority to therapists without defined standards. The case was remanded for creation of a court-supervised plan. On remand, the District Court denied the father’s motions for reassignment and parent-child communication, maintained existing findings, and revised the parenting plan to ensure the court retained decision-making authority over parenting time transitions, with therapists limited to recommending rather than approving progression.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the appeal from the amended judgment, holding that the District Court complied with the mandate by removing improper delegation to therapists and reserving approval for the court. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing, determined the revised parenting plan included sufficient standards and endpoints, and rejected renewed challenges to findings previously affirmed. The amended judgment was affirmed, and the mother was awarded double costs and $1,000 in attorney’s fees for the father’s frivolous challenge to previously resolved findings. View "Boyda v. Boyda" on Justia Law

A couple who were not married but had been in a long-term relationship petitioned to jointly adopt a young child. One petitioner was the child’s maternal grandmother, and the child’s biological parents had both consented to the adoption, relinquishing their parental rights. The couple had cared for the child since infancy, and the only obstacle identified by the district court to granting the adoption was the couple’s unmarried status.The District Court of McKenzie County, Northwest Judicial District, faced uncertainty regarding whether North Dakota law permitted two unmarried adults to jointly adopt a child. The court found no reason to deny the adoption except for the unresolved legal question of eligibility under the applicable statute. The district court noted inconsistent rulings among other district courts on this issue and certified the legal question to the North Dakota Supreme Court, staying the underlying adoption proceeding pending resolution.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the certified question. It interpreted section 14-15-03 of the North Dakota Century Code, concluding that the statute authorizes joint adoptions only by a “husband and wife together” and not by two unmarried adults. The court reasoned that the selective use of the term “together” for married couples, and its absence elsewhere in the statute, indicated legislative intent to exclude unmarried couples from joint adoption. The court declined to expand the statute’s meaning, emphasizing that such policy decisions rest with the legislature. The Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that North Dakota law does not permit two unmarried adults to jointly adopt a child. View "Adoption of T.J.W.-H." on Justia Law

After an incident of domestic violence, the petitioner sought a domestic violence protective order against her husband, alleging that he had forced her to resign from her job, leaving her financially dependent, and had subjected her to escalating verbal, physical, and psychological abuse. Following a particularly violent episode that resulted in her hospitalization and the respondent’s arrest, she requested not only protection from contact but also temporary possession of the marital residence, reimbursement for expenses related to the violence, exclusive possession of the parties’ dog, temporary spousal support, temporary use of respondent’s vehicle, funds to hire a divorce attorney, and the return of her personal property.The Family Court of Wood County held a hearing, during which the respondent consented to a protective order and some relief such as temporary possession of the marital home and reimbursement for care of the dog. However, the family court refused to consider the petitioner’s other requests, stating that relief like temporary spousal support, vehicle possession, and return of personal property should be addressed in a divorce proceeding, not in a domestic violence case. The court’s order reflected these limitations. The petitioner appealed to the Circuit Court of Wood County, arguing that West Virginia Code § 48-27-503 authorized such relief within a protective order. The circuit court affirmed the family court’s decision, declining to address property and financial issues in the domestic violence proceeding.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and held that West Virginia Code § 48-27-503 permits family courts to grant broad, immediate relief—including financial and property-related relief—within domestic violence protective orders, when requested and appropriate. The family court is required to hear evidence, exercise its discretion, and make findings of fact and law regarding the requested relief. The circuit court’s decision was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Riley v. Riley" on Justia Law

A married couple with two minor children separated, and the wife initiated dissolution proceedings. They reached agreements on parenting and property, specifying that child support would be calculated under Montana Child Support Guidelines via the Child Support Services Division (CSSD). The husband was to maintain health insurance for the children if available at a reasonable cost, and the parties would split tax exemptions. CSSD issued a temporary support order, but the wife later challenged the calculation, arguing it contained errors regarding parenting days, incomes, and health-insurance credits, and she requested recalculation and back support.After the Office of Administrative Hearings denied her request for review as untimely, the wife sought recalculation in the Montana Fourth Judicial District Court. The parties eventually agreed on key financial inputs, and several support calculations were considered. The District Court initially ordered support based on a worksheet not admitted into evidence, modified the tax and insurance provisions from the parties’ agreement, and declined to award retroactive support. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court remanded for more detailed findings.Following remand, the District Court clarified income, parenting days, and tax allocations, and maintained that the wife should enroll the children in Healthy Montana Kids rather than private insurance. However, the adopted support calculation continued to credit the husband for private insurance premiums, contradicting the findings. The court again declined to award retroactive support, finding both parents had met the children’s needs and had received family assistance.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the District Court’s child-support calculation did not implement its findings regarding health insurance and reversed that portion of the order, remanding for a corrected calculation consistent with the findings. The denial of earlier retroactive support was affirmed. The husband’s request for sanctions was denied. View "In re Marriage of Christofferson" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a maternal grandparent and a mother regarding court-ordered visitation with the mother’s two children. The children were previously removed from the mother’s custody and placed with the grandparent during juvenile dependency proceedings, but the mother later regained custody. After the dependency court terminated jurisdiction and issued final custody and visitation orders, the grandparent petitioned under Family Code section 3104 for visitation with the grandchildren, alleging a close relationship with one child. The mother opposed this petition, arguing the grandparent lacked a substantial relationship with the children, and subsequently requested attorney’s fees and costs incurred in opposing the petition.The Superior Court of Riverside County issued an interim order allowing limited telephone contact between the grandparent and the children and set a date for a long-term visitation hearing. The court denied the mother’s request for attorney’s fees and costs, determining it lacked statutory authority to grant such fees in a grandparent visitation proceeding. Specifically, the court concluded that statutory fee-shifting provisions in the Family Code, including section 7605, did not apply to petitions brought under section 3104.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the denial of attorney’s fees. The appellate court held that a petition for grandparent visitation under section 3104 is not a proceeding under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) and therefore does not trigger the fee-shifting provision of Family Code section 7605. The court also found that previous juvenile court parentage and custody orders were not UPA judgments, and that dependency proceedings are fundamentally distinct from UPA actions. The order denying the request for attorney’s fees and costs was affirmed, with each party ordered to bear their own appellate costs. View "Timothy S. v. Sarah H." on Justia Law