Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A police officer responded to a hotel where a mother, RN, was intoxicated and with her six-year-old son, JN. Due to her intoxication and the presence of a violent boyfriend at home, JN was taken into protective custody. RN tested positive for amphetamines and had a high blood alcohol content. The State filed a neglect petition, and JN was placed in foster care. The initial permanency plan was family reunification, and RN was required to follow a case plan that included maintaining sobriety and addressing her relationship with her boyfriend.The juvenile court held a shelter care hearing and placed JN in the State's temporary custody. RN made some progress but failed to maintain sobriety and continued her relationship with her boyfriend. The court extended the consent decree to allow more time for RN to comply with the case plan. However, RN missed drug tests, tested positive for methamphetamine, and failed to appear at a hearing, leading to the revocation of the consent decree and the adjudication of neglect. The permanency plan was updated to require inpatient drug treatment, but RN did not check into treatment until the day before the permanency hearing.The Wyoming Supreme Court previously reversed the juvenile court's order changing the permanency plan to adoption due to the lack of a reasonable efforts determination by the Department of Family Services (DFS). On remand, the juvenile court determined that DFS had made reasonable efforts based on the evidence from the original hearing and reaffirmed the change in the permanency plan. The court found that despite RN's bond with JN, her inability to maintain sobriety and provide a stable environment justified the change to adoption. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court's decision, finding sufficient evidence that the change was in JN's best interests. View "RN v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

A couple, who share one child, E.A., sought to modify their child support and custody arrangements following their divorce. The father, Mr. Builta, requested a reduction in his child support payments due to an increase in the mother, Ms. Guzmán’s, income and his own additional dependents. He also sought changes to the custody schedule and restrictions on Ms. Guzmán’s school visits during his custodial time. Ms. Guzmán sought sole legal and physical custody, citing Mr. Builta’s planned move to Maryland and his alleged misuse of tie-breaking authority in decision-making for E.A.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially ordered Mr. Builta to pay $1,736 per month in child support and granted joint legal custody with tie-breaking authority to Mr. Builta. The court later modified the child support to $1,644 per month, using the Holland method to account for the parents' increased combined income. The court found no substantial and material change in circumstances to justify altering the custody arrangement but made minor adjustments to the custody schedule and communication requirements.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the use of the Holland method for calculating child support but found errors in the trial court’s income calculations and procedural steps. The appellate court remanded the case for recalculating child support with correct income data. It also reversed the trial court’s changes to the custody exchange day and the restriction on Ms. Guzmán’s school visits, finding no substantial and material change in circumstances to justify these modifications. The court upheld the trial court’s decision not to alter the joint custody arrangement, emphasizing the child’s best interests and the parents' ability to cooperate despite their conflicts. View "Builta v. Guzman" on Justia Law

A mother sought to regain custody of her children, who had been living with their uncle and aunt in Canada for two years. The uncle and aunt opposed the return, arguing it was in the children's best interests to stay with them. Concurrent custody proceedings took place in Alaska and Canada, with Alaska ultimately asserting jurisdiction. After a custody trial, the uncle and aunt were awarded physical and legal custody of the children. The mother appealed, claiming the court made several legal and factual errors.The Alaska Superior Court found that it had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and consolidated the cases. During the trial, the court heard testimony from multiple witnesses, including the mother, the uncle, the aunt, and experts. The court found that the children were thriving in Canada and that returning them to their mother would be detrimental due to her erratic behavior and substance use. The court also conducted in camera interviews with the children, who expressed a preference to stay with their uncle and aunt.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody to the uncle and aunt, finding that the children's welfare required it. The court also found that the Superior Court correctly applied the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requirements, determining that the placement constituted a "foster care placement" and that active efforts had been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. The court concluded that the expert witnesses were properly qualified and that the evidence supported the finding that returning the children to their mother would likely cause serious emotional damage. The custody and visitation orders were upheld as not being an abuse of discretion. View "O'Brien v. Delaplain" on Justia Law

A mother sought child support from the father for their adult son, who has autism and receives government aid. The mother argued that the father, who earns a substantial income, should contribute to their son's support. The father contended that the son's receipt of government aid under the State Supplementary Program for Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSP) relieved him of any financial responsibility under Family Code section 3910, which mandates parental support for adult children who are incapacitated and without sufficient means.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled in favor of the father, interpreting Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 to mean that the receipt of government aid barred the mother from seeking child support from the father. The court also limited the attorney’s fees awarded to the mother, reasoning that the case presented a narrow legal issue that did not justify extensive litigation costs.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 only prevents government entities from seeking reimbursement from relatives for the cost of aid provided to recipients. It does not bar a parent from seeking child support from the other parent under Family Code section 3910. The court emphasized that the legislative intent behind these statutes was to prevent the public from bearing the financial burden of supporting individuals who have relatives capable of providing support.The appellate court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the appropriate amount of child support and to reconsider the attorney’s fees award in light of its ruling. The court clarified that the family court must now address whether the son is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means, and if so, determine the appropriate support amount. View "Marriage of Cady & Gamick" on Justia Law

The case involves Edward Wayne Reid, who was charged with two crimes against Jane Doe: assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and willfully inflicting corporal injury upon a domestic partner resulting in a traumatic condition. Jane testified that Reid grabbed her by the throat, applied pressure, caused her difficulty in breathing and swallowing, and made her feel dizzy. A deputy corroborated Jane's account, noting she reported seeing stars and feeling faint during the incident.The magistrate at the preliminary hearing found probable cause for the assault charge but dismissed the domestic violence charge, stating there was no evidence of a "traumatic injury." The People refiled the information with both charges, and Reid moved to dismiss the domestic violence charge again. The trial court granted Reid's motion, agreeing with the magistrate's assessment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing provided a rational ground for assuming Reid inflicted corporal injury upon Jane through choking, which resulted in a traumatic condition as defined by the statute. The court emphasized that the statutory definition of a traumatic condition includes impeding normal breathing or circulation of blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck. The court found that Jane's difficulty in breathing and feeling dizzy or faint met this definition.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order dismissing the domestic violence charge and remanded the case with directions to allow Reid to withdraw his plea to the assault charge. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the charge of willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition. View "P. v. Reid" on Justia Law

Miriam Penado sought a temporary order of protection for herself and her two minor children in Butte-Silver Bow County Justice Court against Daniel Hunter, the children's father. The Justice Court issued a temporary ex parte order of protection and scheduled a hearing. Subsequently, Hunter filed a parenting plan petition in Gallatin County District Court and moved to remove the protection order case to that court, citing a state statute. The Justice Court transferred the case and vacated the hearing. The Gallatin County District Court then referred the case to a standing master, who set a hearing and maintained the temporary order of protection.Penado filed a motion in the Justice Court to vacate the transfer orders, which was denied. She appealed to the Gallatin County District Court, which also denied her appeal, stating that any appeal should have been made to the Butte-Silver Bow County District Court. The District Court found that Hunter had properly removed the case under the relevant statute. At the subsequent hearing, the District Court granted a one-year order of protection for Penado and allowed Hunter visitation rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the removal of the temporary order of protection case to the Gallatin County District Court was proper under § 40-15-301(3), MCA, which allows either party to remove the matter to district court before or after the hearing. The court found that the statute's language and intent were to consolidate related family law matters in the district court handling the parenting plan. The court also determined that Penado's due process rights were not violated, as she had notice and the opportunity to participate in the hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's final order of protection. View "Penado v. Hunter" on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of parental rights of Brandi McCubbin, the adoptive mother of a child referred to as V.J.R. (also known as F.V.M.). The child disclosed to her biological mother that she had been sexually abused by her adoptive father, Charles Allen McCubbin. The biological mother reported the abuse to the police, leading to a forensic interview with the child, where she repeated her allegations and provided additional details. The child was subsequently taken into protective custody, and the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both adoptive parents.The District Court of Oklahoma County adjudicated the child as deprived and terminated the parental rights of the adoptive mother, finding that she failed to protect the child from shocking and heinous abuse. The court determined that the adoptive mother had knowledge of at least one prior accusation of sexual abuse against the adoptive father and failed to take reasonable action to protect the child. The court also admitted a DVD recording of the child's forensic interview into evidence, despite the adoptive mother's later objections on appeal regarding the lack of a separate hearing to determine the reliability of the child's statements.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the trial court did not err in applying the clear and convincing evidence standard rather than the heightened burden of proof under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), as the case did not involve a Native American child or family. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support the termination of parental rights, as the adoptive mother had constructive knowledge of the abuse and failed to protect the child. Additionally, the court ruled that any error in admitting the DVD recording without a separate hearing was harmless, as the trial court had made sufficient findings regarding the credibility and reliability of the child's statements. View "IN THE MATTER OF V.J.R." on Justia Law

Jacob Wilde and Mickayla Taggart, formerly married, are parents to a minor child, E.W. Following their divorce in 2018, Wilde was ordered to pay $143.07 per month in child support. Wilde later filed petitions to modify the custody arrangement and child support, citing Taggart's alleged incapacity and unemployment. Taggart responded, explaining her inability to work due to an autoimmune disease and requested child support modification based on the Idaho Child Support Guidelines.The magistrate court found that Taggart's income had been minimal since the petition was filed and imputed her income at minimum wage. Wilde's income was determined to be $58,240 annually. The court retroactively modified child support to $420.34 per month starting August 2019, creating an arrearage for Wilde. Wilde's motion to reconsider was denied, and the magistrate court reaffirmed its decision, adjusting the child support amount to $485.34 from June 2021.Wilde appealed to the district court, which affirmed the magistrate court's decision. The district court found that the magistrate court had substantial evidence to support its findings and did not abuse its discretion in making the child support modification retroactive.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the district court's decision. The court found that the magistrate court acted within its discretion, supported by substantial evidence of the parties' changed incomes. The court noted that Wilde had been aware of the potential for retroactive modification and had not disputed the child support calculations. The Supreme Court awarded attorney fees and costs to Taggart, deeming Wilde's appeal frivolous and without foundation. View "Wilde v. Taggart" on Justia Law

Ryan S. and Marie S. married in 2011 and have three minor children. They separated in 2019, and Marie was awarded temporary primary physical and legal custody. Ryan participated in supervised visits, which were terminated due to policy violations. In early 2020, the district court found Ryan unfit for custody, partly due to self-diagnosed PTSD, and allowed Marie to relocate with the children to California. Ryan's virtual visits were also terminated due to financial constraints. Despite his efforts to comply with custody evaluations and provide support, Ryan had not interacted with his children since June 2020.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County, terminated Ryan's parental rights, finding him unfit and concluding that he had abandoned and neglected his children, making only token efforts to support or communicate with them. The court applied NRS 128.107 and NRS 128.109, which outline factors for terminating parental rights and create a presumption that termination is in the child's best interest when the child has been placed outside the home.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that NRS 128.107 and NRS 128.109 were inapplicable because the children were in the custody of a parent, not placed outside the home under NRS Chapter 432B. The court concluded that the district court erred in applying these statutes and that the findings of abandonment, neglect, and token efforts were not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order terminating Ryan's parental rights and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to order the destruction of any amended birth certificates and restore the children's names. View "In re Parental Rights to L.R.S., J.M.S. and J.L.S." on Justia Law

Jose Cardona appealed a trial court order granting Karina Soto, the mother of his child, a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against him. The DVRO, which expired in November 2023, protected Soto and their daughter. The appeal was not moot despite the DVRO’s expiration because the finding of domestic violence created a five-year statutory presumption against Cardona’s custody of their daughter.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially granted the DVRO based on an incident where Cardona, while drunk, beat his current wife in the presence of their daughter, who he also slapped. Soto claimed Cardona had verbally abused their daughter and forced her to carry his gun on multiple occasions. Cardona admitted to the incident but denied ongoing abuse and claimed Soto was lying to gain full custody. During the hearing, the court interviewed the daughter in chambers without the parties present, and the interview was not reported or documented.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, found that Cardona’s due process rights were violated because he was not informed of the substance of his daughter’s testimony and thus could not respond to it. The court emphasized that while in-chambers interviews of minors are permissible, there must be safeguards to ensure the parent can respond to the testimony. The failure to make any record of the daughter’s testimony left the evidentiary basis for the DVRO unreviewable on appeal. Consequently, the court reversed the DVRO due to the due process violation, though it did not preclude future reliance on other evidence of domestic violence presented. View "Cardona v Soto" on Justia Law