Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Decedent and Burnsed were married in 1997, and in 1998, Decedent named Burnsed as the primary beneficiary of his life insurance policy. They divorced in 2002, and the divorce decree did not address the life insurance policy. Decedent maintained the policy until his death in 2017 without changing the beneficiary designation. Decedent's son and brother filed a lawsuit claiming the policy proceeds, arguing that South Carolina Probate Code section 62-2-507(c) revoked Burnsed's beneficiary status upon divorce.The Circuit Court denied Respondents' motion for summary judgment, holding that the statute did not apply retroactively and granted Burnsed's motion for summary judgment, finding the legislature did not intend for the statute to apply to divorces before its effective date. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 62-2-507(c) revoked Burnsed's designation because Decedent died after the statute's effective date, and Burnsed had no vested interest in the policy until Decedent's death.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision as modified. The Court held that section 62-2-507(c) applies to governing instruments executed before the statute's effective date if the decedent's death occurred after the effective date. The statute's presumption of revocation upon divorce applied to Decedent's life insurance policy, revoking Burnsed's status as the primary beneficiary. The Court concluded that the statute did not apply retroactively but prospectively from its effective date, effectuating Decedent's presumed intent. View "Estate of Meier v. Burnsed" on Justia Law

Grant Phillip Poppinga filed a paternity petition seeking custody, visitation, and support for his daughter with Arrianna Monet Wallace. Unable to locate Wallace, Poppinga attempted service by publication. When Wallace did not appear, Poppinga moved for a default judgment, which the district court granted, establishing his paternity and awarding him sole custody. Wallace later sought to vacate the judgment, citing errors in the service by publication and the default judgment. The district court denied her motion, and she appealed.The Oklahoma Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the sufficiency of the service by publication and the district court's denial of Wallace's motion to vacate. The court found multiple errors in the service by publication, including misspellings, incorrect nature of the suit, and untimely publication. These errors were deemed fatal to the court's jurisdiction over Wallace. Additionally, the court noted that the trial court failed to conduct a proper judicial inquiry into the due diligence of Poppinga's search for Wallace.The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the service by publication sufficient and in denying Wallace's motion to vacate the default judgment. The court emphasized the importance of due process, particularly in cases involving fundamental parental rights. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial court to reconsider Wallace's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and insufficiency of service of process, and to conduct further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "POPPINGA v. WALLACE" on Justia Law

Pat Doe filed a complaint for protection from harassment against John Costin on behalf of her two minor children, alleging aggressive behavior by Costin, including blocking their car at school. The District Court issued a temporary order for protection, which was later made permanent for the children but not for Doe. Doe did not request attorney fees within the required time frame.Doe later moved to modify the order, fearing that Costin might access the school after a no-trespass notice expired. The court modified the order to prohibit Costin from entering the school when the children were present and awarded Doe attorney fees. Costin opposed the modification and the attorney fees, arguing the motion was frivolous and untimely.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court found the appeal regarding the modified order moot since it had expired. However, it reviewed the attorney fees award, determining that the lower court erred in awarding fees for services provided before the motion to modify. The court vacated the attorney fees award and remanded the case for reconsideration of fees related only to the motion to modify. View "Doe v. Costin" on Justia Law

Marvin T. Jose Mateo filed a petition in the Hall County Court seeking to establish a minor guardianship for his 18-year-old brother, Tomas J. The petition also requested immigration-related factual findings under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Tomas had been in Marvin's care since 2019, and they had been living in Grand Island, Nebraska, since January 2022. Tomas was attending high school and planned to join the U.S. Marines after graduation. Marvin testified that Tomas' parents were in Guatemala and did not provide financial support.The county court denied the guardianship petition, noting that Tomas was already 18 years old and that Marvin had a power of attorney from Tomas' parents, which allowed him to care for Tomas without a guardianship. The court did not make the requested factual findings under the UCCJEA. Marvin filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that the court applied the wrong legal standard and failed to consider Tomas' best interests. The court overruled the motion, reiterating that Marvin had been able to care for Tomas without a guardianship and suggesting that the petition was filed primarily to obtain immigration findings.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the UCCJEA did not apply because Tomas was no longer a "child" under the UCCJEA when the petition was filed. The court determined that other Nebraska statutes gave the county court jurisdiction over the minor guardianship proceeding. However, the court found that the appeal became moot once Tomas reached the age of majority, as the relief of appointing a minor guardian was no longer available. The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that none of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. View "In re Guardianship of Tomas J." on Justia Law

Thomas Armenta and Tiffini Pateras began their relationship in 2012 and had a child, M.A., in 2014. They separated in 2017 and entered a child custody and support agreement. Armenta, a Chumash descendant, works at the Chumash tribal office and earns $114,000 annually, plus $5,000 monthly from the Chumash tribe’s general welfare program. Pateras filed a petition for child support and attorney fees in 2023. The trial court ordered Armenta to pay $448 monthly for temporary child support and $2,000 in attorney fees. Subsequent hearings led to a final order for Armenta to pay $1,053 monthly in child support and $5,000 in need-based attorney fees.The trial court ruled that the $5,000 monthly payments Armenta receives from the Chumash tribe’s general welfare program should be considered as income for calculating child support. Armenta argued that these payments should be excluded as they are not subject to federal income taxation and claimed they were need-based public assistance. However, the court found no evidence that the payments were need-based or restricted to low-income individuals.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that the payments from the Chumash tribe’s general welfare program are income for child support purposes, regardless of their tax status under federal law. The court emphasized that California’s child support statutes aim to ensure parents support their children according to their financial ability, and income is broadly defined to include various sources. The court also rejected Armenta’s claims regarding the need for an evidentiary hearing and the enforcement of a notice to appear, finding no procedural errors. The orders were affirmed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the respondents. View "Pateras v. Armenta" on Justia Law

David Paul Planchard was convicted by a jury of stalking Debra Doe and violating a protective order. Planchard and Doe had a relationship from 1997 to 2000 and had a son together in 2006. Despite a restraining order issued in 2020, Planchard continued to harass Doe through public Facebook posts from 2016 to 2023. These posts included threats, derogatory comments, and references to Doe's past trauma. Planchard also showed up at Doe's house in May 2023, violating the protective order.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found Planchard guilty of stalking and violating a protective order. The jury determined that Planchard's actions, including his Facebook posts and visit to Doe's house, constituted a credible threat and harassment. The court sentenced him to five years for stalking and a stayed term of six months for violating the protective order.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. Planchard argued that his Facebook posts did not constitute direct contact and thus could not be considered harassment under the stalking statute. The court disagreed, citing precedent that indirect threats and harassment through third parties or public posts can still meet the statutory requirements for stalking. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, noting that the posts were intended to harass and threaten Doe, and it was reasonably foreseeable that she would see them.The court also addressed Planchard's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding no merit in his arguments. The court concluded that the Facebook posts were relevant and admissible, and that any failure to object by his counsel did not constitute ineffective assistance. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "P. v. Planchard" on Justia Law

In this case, the paternal grandmother, Natasha Ray, was appointed as the temporary guardian of a minor child shortly after the child's birth in 2015, with the father's consent. Over the next five years, the child's parents, Anthony Lowman and Kayla Morgan-Smart, contested the temporary guardianship. The magistrate court found no grounds to grant a permanent guardianship to the grandmother and aimed to reunify the child with the parents through a phased visitation plan. Despite this, the grandmother was held in contempt multiple times for failing to comply with court orders regarding visitation.The grandmother appealed the magistrate court's decisions to the district court. However, neither she nor her attorney, Wm. Breck Seiniger, filed the required opening briefs. The district court dismissed the appeal due to the failure to file timely briefs and found no good cause for the delay. The grandmother then filed a new notice of appeal from a subsequent contempt judgment, but again failed to file the necessary briefs on time, leading to the dismissal of the second appeal as well.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and determined that Seiniger did not have the authority to represent the child, as he was never appointed by the magistrate court. The court also noted that the grandmother failed to challenge the district court's dismissal of her appeals in her briefing. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decisions to dismiss the appeals and struck Seiniger's petition to intervene and notices of joinder. View "Ray v. Morgan-Smart" on Justia Law

Dan Lee Gearhart and Kristin A. Marlar divorced in September 2018, with Gearhart ordered to pay monthly child support. Gearhart applied for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits for himself and his children, which were approved after the divorce, with payments retroactive to August 2018. The children’s benefits were paid to Marlar as their representative payee. Gearhart stopped making child support payments, believing the SSDI payments covered his obligation. In May 2022, Gearhart petitioned the magistrate court to credit the SSDI payments against his child support arrearage, effectively reducing it to $0.00. Marlar opposed this, arguing it constituted a retroactive modification of child support.The magistrate court credited the SSDI payments against Gearhart’s arrearage, eliminating his outstanding balance. Marlar appealed to the district court, which reversed the magistrate court’s decision, concluding that Idaho Code section 32-709 prohibited retroactive modification of child support. The district court remanded the case with instructions to deny the application of SSDI payments as a credit against Gearhart’s arrearage.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that Idaho Code section 32-709 did not apply to Gearhart’s petition because he was not seeking a modification of his child support obligation but rather a credit for SSDI payments already made. The court concluded that section 32-709(2) did not limit the magistrate court’s discretion to credit SSDI benefits against the child support arrearage. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to reinstate the magistrate court’s judgment crediting the SSDI payments against Gearhart’s arrearage. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal. View "Marlar v. Gearhart" on Justia Law

A child was born to Anthony Lowman and Kayla Morgan-Smart in 2015. The child's paternal grandmother, Natasha Ray, was appointed as her temporary guardian shortly after birth. Ray was later allowed to intervene in the parents' divorce action to determine custody once the guardianship ended in August 2021. Before the guardianship ended, attorney Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. was asked by Ray to represent the child, which he accepted without court appointment. Seiniger filed a notice of appearance in the divorce action, which the parents objected to. The magistrate court ruled that Seiniger could not represent the child as there was no motion to appoint counsel, it was unnecessary at that stage, and a neutral attorney would be appointed if needed.The parents reached a custody agreement and filed a stipulation for joint custody. Despite the magistrate court's ruling, Seiniger objected to the proposed judgment on behalf of the child. The magistrate court overruled the objections and entered a judgment consistent with the parents' stipulation. Ray appealed the custody judgment to the district court, joined by Seiniger. The district court concluded that Seiniger had no authority to represent the child and dismissed the appeal, characterizing Seiniger as an "officious interloper." Ray's appeal was later dismissed for failure to provide timely briefing.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the magistrate court acted within its discretion in rejecting Seiniger's representation of the child, as there was no motion to appoint counsel and it was unnecessary at that stage. The court also found that Seiniger's arguments were unpreserved and unsupported by sufficient authority. Consequently, the district court's order, including the decision to strike all pleadings filed by Seiniger, was affirmed. View "Lowman v. Morgan-Smart" on Justia Law

In 2015, the parental rights of H.M. and B.M.'s biological parents were terminated, and the children were adopted by their aunt, C.M. In 2019, the children were removed from C.M.'s home due to her substance abuse but were later returned after she completed an improvement period. In April 2022, new referrals indicated C.M. had relapsed, and the family was homeless. C.M. placed H.M. and B.M. in guardianships and entered a rehabilitation facility. DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition in May 2022. C.M. stipulated to substance abuse, and the court found the children to be abused and neglected. C.M. was granted an improvement period but failed to secure stable housing and employment and tested positive for drugs.The Circuit Court of Jefferson County held dispositional hearings and determined that C.M. did not substantially comply with her improvement period. The court placed H.M. in a legal guardianship with her foster mother, A.H., under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(5), and dismissed C.M. from the case, allowing only the GAL or DHS to seek modification of the disposition.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that C.M. failed to make sufficient improvement to be reunified with H.M. However, the court found errors in the dispositional order, specifically the dismissal of C.M. from the case and the provision for post-termination visitation at A.H.'s discretion. The court affirmed the decision to place H.M. in a legal guardianship but vacated the order in part and remanded the case for further proceedings to correct these deficiencies. View "In re H.M." on Justia Law