Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

S.W., a minor, was placed with foster parents A.E. and Ann.E. by the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (CYF) shortly after her birth in September 2020. In August 2022, CYF filed a petition to remove S.W. from the foster parents' home. The foster parents attended the hearing but did not seek to intervene. The trial court granted CYF's petition, and S.W. was placed with another foster family. The foster parents later filed a motion to intervene, which the trial court denied, stating they did not have standing as they had not requested S.W.'s return and had not achieved the status of prospective adoptive parents.The foster parents appealed to the Superior Court, which vacated the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the foster parents had standing as prospective adoptive parents based on the precedent set in Mitch v. Bucks County Children and Youth Social Services Agency. However, the Superior Court panel was divided, with one judge expressing doubts about the standing of prospective adoptive parents under the current law and another judge suggesting legislative changes to grant standing to all foster parents.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and determined that the issue of standing for prospective adoptive parents was moot, as the foster parents had withdrawn their motion to intervene and for S.W.'s return. Despite this, the court addressed the substantive issue due to its public importance. The court concluded that the legislative enactment of 42 Pa.C.S. § 6336.1, which states that foster parents and preadoptive parents do not have legal standing in dependency proceedings unless they have been awarded legal custody, abrogated the judicially created standing for prospective adoptive parents established in Mitch. The court reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that preadoptive parents without legal custody do not have standing in dependency proceedings. View "In the Interest of: S.W." on Justia Law

A woman, acting as guardian for her elderly father, moved him out of the house he shared with his fourth wife and later filed for divorce on his behalf, citing that the couple had lived apart for more than three years. The trial court granted the divorce, and the wife appealed. The man died while the appeal was pending, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot but affirmed the divorce decree.The wife raised three issues before the Supreme Court of Texas: (1) the man's death did not moot her appeal, (2) Texas law does not permit a guardian to sue for divorce on her ward’s behalf, and (3) living apart is not a ground for divorce when neither spouse voluntarily lived apart from the other. The Supreme Court agreed that the man's death did not moot the appeal because whether the marriage ended by divorce or by death substantially affects the wife’s asserted property interests.The Supreme Court of Texas did not definitively decide whether Texas law permits a guardian to sue for divorce on behalf of a ward. However, it held that, to whatever extent the Texas Estates Code may allow a guardian to seek a divorce on her ward’s behalf, it requires the guardianship and divorce courts to find that permitting the divorce would promote the ward’s well-being and protect his best interests. Because neither court made that finding in this case and, due to the ward’s death, neither can do so now, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment, vacated the divorce decree, and dismissed the suit. View "IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF BENAVIDES" on Justia Law

A child was born on May 30, 2017, to unmarried parents. The mother, A.D., believed Q.T. was the father, and he signed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Parentage (VAP) on June 1, 2017. However, a DNA test on July 6, 2017, revealed Q.T. was not the biological father. Despite this, the VAP was not rescinded within the statutory period, and Q.T. ceased contact with the child. Years later, the mother identified K.S. as the potential biological father through a DNA testing platform and filed multiple complaints to establish K.S. as the legal father.The Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court initially dismissed the mother’s complaints due to procedural issues and the existing VAP. However, after consolidating the sixth and seventh complaints, the court ordered genetic marker testing, which confirmed K.S. as the biological father. The court then rescinded the VAP, declared K.S. the legal father, and ordered changes to the child’s birth certificate.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the Probate and Family Court judge lacked the authority to override the statutory deadlines for rescinding a VAP. The statute of repose under G. L. c. 209C, § 11(a), establishes strict time limits for challenging a VAP, which had long expired in this case. The court emphasized the legislative intent to provide finality in parentage determinations for the stability and security of the child. Consequently, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the lower court’s judgments and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "A.D. v. K.S." on Justia Law

Christina DeBenedetti and Morgan Ensburg were involved in a marital dissolution case where the trial court assigned four of Morgan’s ERISA-governed retirement accounts to Christina through Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (QDROs). This assignment was to satisfy an award made against Morgan after the court found he breached his fiduciary duty to Christina, resulting in a loss of community property. The total amount ordered for reimbursement and attorney fees exceeded $2 million.The Superior Court of San Diego County initially issued QDROs dividing the community property interests in Morgan’s retirement accounts. After a trial on reserved financial disputes, the court found Morgan had mismanaged community property and awarded Christina $1,831,250 for her share of the lost assets and $230,000 in attorney fees. Christina later sought to enforce this award through new QDROs, which the trial court granted, assigning her 100% of Morgan’s remaining interests in the retirement plans.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Morgan argued that the QDROs did not relate to “marital property rights” and violated ERISA’s purpose of protecting retirement income. He also claimed the QDROs were invalid under California law and that the trial court did not value the retirement accounts. The appellate court rejected Morgan’s contentions, holding that the QDROs related to marital property rights, complied with ERISA, and that California laws cited by Morgan were either preempted by ERISA or did not invalidate the orders. The court also found that Morgan’s argument regarding the valuation of the retirement accounts was not raised in the trial court and could not be considered on appeal. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s orders. View "In re Marriage of DeBenedetti" on Justia Law

Shianna G. and Logan S. were in a relationship from 2017 to 2019 and had a child, R.A.S., in 2018. After their breakup, Shianna, who struggled with substance abuse, left R.A.S. with Logan while she sought treatment. Upon completing a 30-day program in January 2020, Shianna discovered Logan had moved and changed his contact information, making it impossible for her to reach him. Shianna relapsed, was arrested, and served jail time in 2021 and 2022. After her release, she continued to seek contact with R.A.S. but was unsuccessful. Logan filed a petition to terminate Shianna's parental rights in June 2023.The Fourth Judicial District Court in Elko County held a hearing and terminated Shianna's parental rights, finding clear and convincing evidence of parental fault on grounds of abandonment, neglect, unfitness, and token efforts, and concluded that termination was in the best interest of R.A.S. Shianna appealed the decision, challenging the findings and the admission of certain evidence.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and highlighted the differences between state-initiated and privately initiated termination petitions. The court emphasized the need for district courts to carefully consider the unique circumstances of private petitions. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court's findings of parental fault were not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, the court determined that Shianna had made significant efforts to contact R.A.S. and did not intend to abandon him. The court also found that R.A.S. was well cared for by Logan, negating the findings of neglect and unfitness. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court's order terminating Shianna's parental rights. View "IN RE: PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.A.S." on Justia Law

The Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) petitioned to terminate the parental rights of S.S. (Father) and J.S. (Mother) to their two children, D.S. and K.S. At the time, the children were removed from Mother’s custody, and Father was incarcerated. The children were placed with their paternal grandmother (Grandmother), who has cared for them since. The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights and later terminated Father’s parental rights, concluding that it was necessary to promote the children’s best interests, which were best served by Grandmother adopting them.Father appealed the juvenile court’s decision, arguing that the children’s best interests could be equally served by a permanent custody and guardianship arrangement with Grandmother, allowing him to retain residual parental rights. The Utah Court of Appeals agreed with Father, finding that the juvenile court’s decision was against the clear weight of the evidence and that the reasons for terminating Father’s rights were insufficient. The court of appeals reversed the juvenile court’s order.The Office of the Guardian ad Litem (GAL) petitioned for certiorari, arguing that the court of appeals gave insufficient deference to the juvenile court’s best interest determination and misapplied the standard of review. The Supreme Court of Utah agreed with the GAL, stating that an appellate court may reverse a juvenile court’s best interest determination only if it is against the clear weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court concluded that the juvenile court’s best interest analysis was supported by the evidence and that the court of appeals erred in overturning it. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, upholding the termination of Father’s parental rights. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law

Kyle Zittleman and ShanaLea Bibler were married in 2010 and had one child in 2012. They divorced in 2016, with a Wyoming court granting Zittleman primary residential responsibility. Bibler filed motions to modify residential responsibility and child support in 2018 and 2020, but Zittleman retained primary responsibility. Zittleman moved to North Dakota in 2019, and Bibler followed in 2022. In 2023, Bibler again moved to modify residential responsibility, citing her relocation, Zittleman’s alleged non-compliance with a judgment, and the child's worsening demeanor.The Morton County district court held an evidentiary hearing in 2024, limiting each party to two and a half hours for their case. Bibler used all her time before cross-examining two witnesses and argued this violated her due process rights. The district court found no material change in circumstances and denied her motion. Bibler appealed, claiming the time limitation and the court's findings were erroneous.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo for constitutional claims and under an abuse of discretion standard for procedural matters. The court found that the district court did not violate due process by limiting the hearing time, as both parties were notified and did not object or request additional time. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the time limitation.The Supreme Court upheld the district court's finding that there was no material change in circumstances. The court noted that Bibler's move to North Dakota, Zittleman’s adherence to the judgment, and allegations of alienation did not constitute a material change. The court also found that the district court did not err in omitting a best interests analysis, as it was not required without a material change in circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying Bibler's motion to modify residential responsibility. View "Zittleman v. Bibler" on Justia Law

Alyssa Baum and Justin Aldava have a child, H.A., born in Texas in June 2019. Baum and H.A. moved to Kentucky in November 2020 to escape domestic violence from Aldava. Baum filed for an Emergency Protective Order (EPO) and temporary custody in Jefferson Family Court, recounting an incident of domestic violence in October 2020. The court granted the EPO and later a Domestic Violence Order (DVO) after a hearing, despite Aldava not being served until April 2021. Aldava filed for custody in Texas, but the Texas court did not assert jurisdiction.The Jefferson Family Court held a hearing in April 2021 and issued a DVO, granting Baum temporary custody and prohibiting Aldava from contacting Baum and H.A. Aldava later moved to dismiss the DVO for lack of personal jurisdiction, which the family court denied. The Court of Appeals ruled that the family court lacked personal jurisdiction over Aldava and that the DVO could not impose affirmative relief, such as temporary custody or firearm restrictions.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that Kentucky courts could issue DVOs protecting petitioners and their children from domestic violence, even without personal jurisdiction over non-resident respondents. The court affirmed that Kentucky had temporary emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to grant temporary custody. The court also ruled that the DVO's restrictions on Aldava's firearm possession within Kentucky were valid and that entering the DVO into the Law Information Network of Kentucky (LINK) did not violate due process.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the family court's DVO in part, reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "BAUM V. ALDAVA" on Justia Law

Michael and Mallory Nay, guardians of JDV, sought to terminate the parental rights of JDV’s natural father, Michael Session, alleging he had left JDV in their care without support or communication for over a year, except for a few incidental visits. The district court granted the Nays' petition and terminated Mr. Session’s parental rights under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(i). Mr. Session appealed the decision.The District Court of Carbon County initially granted the Nays guardianship of JDV in 2021, with Mr. Session’s consent, and ordered the Nays to facilitate monthly visitation between Mr. Session and JDV. In 2023, the Nays petitioned to terminate Mr. Session’s parental rights, citing his lack of support and minimal contact with JDV. The district court found that Mr. Session had not provided financial support or maintained meaningful communication with JDV, deeming his few visits as incidental.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that judicial estoppel did not prevent the Nays and the guardian ad litem from arguing that terminating Mr. Session’s parental rights was in JDV’s best interests, despite their earlier stance during the guardianship proceedings. The court found that the Nays had fulfilled their obligation to facilitate visitation and that Mr. Session’s limited contacts with JDV were incidental and insufficient to prevent termination under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(i). The court also concluded that Mr. Session’s substantive due process rights were not violated, as the Nays had made reasonable efforts to facilitate visitation, and Mr. Session had failed to maintain a relationship with JDV. View "In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights To: Jdv, a Minor Child" on Justia Law

Estel Neven Zugg passed away in January 2021. Donna Katherine Finley filed a petition in September 2021, requesting the District Court to open formal intestacy proceedings, determine Neven's heirs, and appoint her as the estate's personal representative, claiming she was Neven's common law wife. Neven's sons, Austin and Kolby Zugg, participated in the proceedings. Katherine testified that she and Neven considered themselves married since 2016 and lived between North Dakota and Arizona, with occasional stays in Montana.The Fifteenth Judicial District Court held a bench trial in August 2022. Testimonies from Neven's friends and family indicated that Neven had ties to Montana but primarily lived in North Dakota and Arizona. The court found that Katherine and Neven did not live together in Montana, which does not recognize common law marriages from states that do not recognize them unless the couple resides in Montana.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, concluding that Katherine and Neven did not establish a common law marriage under Montana law. The court emphasized that a relationship begun in a state that does not recognize common law marriages must ripen by residency in Montana to become valid. Since Katherine and Neven never lived together in Montana, their relationship did not meet the requirements for a common law marriage in Montana. The court found no clear error in the District Court's findings and upheld the denial of Katherine's petition. View "In re Estate of Zugg" on Justia Law