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Mother has legal and physical custody of the child. Father was ordered to pay one-half of reasonable childcare costs. Mother sought an order, directing Father to pay one-half of childcare costs incurred while she attended a paralegal program. She was employed in a law office as a receptionist/assistant working 28 hours per week. Mother explained that since 2011, when she was laid off from a job due to government budget cuts, she had been unable to secure stable employment. She supplemented her income with public assistance. She anticipated that paralegal certification would provide the skills to secure permanent employment and become fully self-supporting without public assistance. Father argued that Mother was able to secure employment with her existing job skills and was not required by her employer to increase her skills, sp her decision to pursue paralegal studies was a personal choice unrelated to her “employment or to reasonably necessary education or training for employment skills.” The court denied Mother’s request. The court of appeal concluded that section 4062 applies “to a situation where a party is employed with marketable skills and is electing to improve their skills through education.” The statute’s plain language does not restrict “employment” or “employment skills” to current employment, or to general principles governing child support awards. View "Greiner v. Keller" on Justia Law

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Wife moved out of the couple's joint tenancy property and sought dissolution of marriage. The summons included an automatic Family Code section 2040 order, prohibiting the parties from transferring property without the other party's written consent or court order. "Before .... a right of survivorship to property can be eliminated, notice of the change must be filed and served on the other party.” WIfe subsequently created a Trust, naming Raney, as the trustee and the sole beneficiary upon her death. Wife recorded a Deed, stating that she severed the joint tenancy pursuant to Civil Code 683.2; it transferred her interest to Raney, as trustee. Wife notified Husband that she had terminated the joint tenancy. Raney, as trustee, sought partition by sale. Meanwhile, Wife died. The court of appeal affirmed that severance of the joint tenancy substantially complied with the notice requirement but that the transfer to the Trust violated the automatic restraining order. It reformed the Deed to severing the joint tenancy only, concluding that Raney, as personal representative of Wife's estate, is the owner of an undivided one-half interest and entitled to an order of partition by sale. Parties to pending dissolution proceedings are restrained from unilaterally eliminating a right of survivorship unless, in addition to the general. When the Partition Complaint was filed and served on Husband, Wife’s severance of the joint tenancy became effective to eliminate the right of survivorship. When WIfe died, her tenancy in common interest was her separate property and became part of her estate. View "Raney v. Cerkueira" on Justia Law

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Steve H. and Lucy A. were the parents of Donald, an Indian child2 born in April 2013. By the time Donald was born, Steve and Lucy were no longer in a relationship and Steve no longer lived in Anchorage. Donald lived with Lucy until the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) assumed emergency custody of him due to alcohol-related neglect shortly after he was born. Although Steve knew that Lucy had substance abuse problems, he left Donald in her care. When OCS took emergency custody of Donald in June 2013, Steve was “unreachable.” Donald was placed in a foster home. Steve appealed the superior court’s decision terminating his parental rights. He argued the superior court clearly erred in finding that he abandoned his son under the Child in Need of Aid (CINA) statutes. He also argued there was insufficient evidence to support termination, claiming that the record did not support the superior court’s findings that returning his son to his care would risk emotional or physical harm and that termination was in his son’s best interests. Because the superior court did not clearly err in making these findings, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision. View "Steve H. v. Alaska, DHSS, OCS" on Justia Law

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After a mother’s and father’s lengthy involvement with the Office of Children’s Services (OCS), based primarily on alcohol abuse, their parental rights to their two minor children were terminated. Both parents appealed, challenging the superior court’s admission of telephonic testimony and its perceived failure to consider guardianship as an alternative to termination. Because the parents were not prejudiced by the telephonic testimony and because there was no error in the court’s consideration of a possible guardianship, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the parental rights termination. View "Dustin V. v. Alaska, DHSS, OCS" on Justia Law

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In late April 2018, 15-year-old Jessica J. traveled from Iowa to Alaska to spend the summer with family friends. Jessica’s divorced parents shared legal custody; her mother, who retained primary physical custody, gave Jessica permission. Jessica’s mother then changed her mind and told Jessica to return home. Jessica’s mother booked several return flights for Jessica, the final on May 30. On May 30 Jessica’s mother reported to Iowa police that the Alaska family friends refused to send Jessica home; the police treated Jessica as a missing person. Alaska police located her at the family friends’ home and indicated she was “safe until [her] mother c[ould] pay for plane fare out of Alaska.” But the Iowa police still considered Jessica a missing person, and a week later Alaska police located her at a shelter, where she apparently had gone to avoid getting “the family that she was staying with in trouble if there were legal repercussions . . . for staying in Alaska.” Police transported her to a youth facility pending further legal proceedings. The Interstate Compact for Juveniles (ICJ) governed the return of juveniles who have left their home states without permission. The home state sought her return under the ICJ, and the Alaska superior court complied. The superior court found that it was not authorized to consider the juvenile’s best interests and that the requisition paperwork demonstrated proof of entitlement for her return. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order, holding that the ICJ authorized only the home state to consider a juvenile’s best interests in this context and that proof of entitlement was established in this case. View "Jessica J. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

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In 2015 the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took custody of three children due to the father’s substance abuse issues and the mother’s mental health issues. Both parents failed to make any meaningful progress on their case plans in the first year of OCS’s custody. But after moving to Washington in 2016, the parents made significant progress and actively engaged in a variety of services. At the time of the termination trial the father had been sober for two years, but OCS still had concerns regarding the mother’s ability to manage her mental health and the parents’ ability to safely co-parent all of their children at the same time. In June 2018 the superior court terminated the parents’ rights to their three children. The parents appealed, arguing the superior court erred by finding they failed to remedy the conduct that made their children in need of aid. They also argued that the court erred by finding that termination of their parental rights was in their children’s best interests. And the father independently argued the court erred by finding that OCS made reasonable efforts to reunite him with his children. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the superior court’s finding that the father failed to remedy his conduct was clearly erroneous, and reversed termination of his parental rights. Because the Court's resolution of the father’s parental rights could alter the superior court’s best interests analysis with regard to the mother, the Supreme Court vacated termination of the mother’s parental rights and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Marian V. v. Alaska, DHSS, OCS" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success in connection with their claim that ORR's restriction on abortion access infringes their protected right to choose to terminate their pregnancies. In 2017, the government instituted a policy effectively barring any unaccompanied alien child in the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) from obtaining a pre-viability abortion. The district court granted a preliminary injunction and the government appealed. Agreeing that the case was not moot, the DC Circuit affirmed and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying a class consisting of pregnant unaccompanied minors in the government's custody. On the merits, the court held that, under binding Supreme Court precedent, a person has a constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy before fetal viability, and the government cannot unduly burden her decision. Consequently, these controlling principles dictate affirming the district court's preliminary injunction against the government's blanket denial of access to abortion for unaccompanied minors. The court vacated in part and remanded to the extent that the preliminary injunction barred disclosure to parents and others of unaccompanied minors' pregnancies and abortion decisions. The court held that this portion of the preliminary injunction warranted further explication to aid appellate review. View "J.D. v. Azar" on Justia Law

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The respondents had several children together. Their youngest, a daughter, JF, was born in 2003. JF had spina bifida, and as a result, had trouble ambulating without the aid of a mobility device. Also related to spina bifida, JF has neurogenic bladder, and she must use a catheter to urinate. JF required medical care and supervision for her entire life. In October 2015, the petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (the Department), petitioned to remove JF from the respondents’ care. The Department alleged that the respondents had failed to adequately attend to JF’s medical needs. At a preadjudication status conference, respondents admitted certain things about their care of JF; these admissions allowed the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over JF. In taking the respondents’ pleas, the court did not advise them that they were waiving any rights. Nor did the court advise them of the consequences of their pleas. The court ultimately terminated respondents' parental rights to JF. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426 (1993), prohibited it from considering respondents’ claim that the trial court violated their due-process rights by failing to advise them of the consequences of their pleas. The Michigan Supreme Court held the Hatcher rule rested on the legal fiction that a child protective proceeding was two separate actions: the adjudication and the disposition. "With that procedural (mis)understanding, we held that a posttermination appeal of a defect in the adjudicative phase is prohibited because it is a collateral attack. This foundational assumption was wrong; Hatcher was wrongly decided, and we overrule it." It reversed the Court of Appeals, vacated the trial court's order of adjudication and order terminating the respondents’ parental rights, and remanded this case to the trial court for further proceedings. Because the trial court violated the respondents’ due-process rights by conducting an unrecorded, in camera interview of the subject child before the court’s resolution of the termination petition, a different judge was ordered to preside on remand. View "In re Ferranti" on Justia Law

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This case was an expedited appeal of a magistrate court’s termination of the parental rights of John Doe (Father) to his eight-year-old minor child (IW). John and Jane Doe I, the maternal grandmother and step-grandfather (collectively “Guardians”), filed a petition to adopt IW and terminate Father’s parental rights. Guardians alleged that Father abandoned IW and that termination was in her best interests. The magistrate court granted the Guardians’ petition, and Father timely appealed. Finding substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court's findings, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Does v. Doe" on Justia Law

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The juvenile court determined that mother was unfit and that it was improbable that child could be returned to mother’s care within a reasonable period of time, satisfying the requirements of ORS 419B.504. However, the court determined, the Department of Human Services had not established, as ORS 419B.500 required, that termination of mother’s parental rights was in child’s best interest. The court acknowledged that the department had proved that child had a need for permanency that could be met by terminating mother’s parental rights and permitting child’s foster parents, his maternal uncle and aunt, to adopt him. However, the court also found that child had an interest in maintaining his bond with his mother and her parents. The court suggested that child’s need for permanency could be satisfied by permitting his foster parents to serve as his permanent guardians and concluded that it was not in his best interest to terminate mother’s rights. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition. In an en banc, split decision, the Court of Appeals determined that child’s pressing need for permanency could have been satisfied if he were “freed for adoption” and that, although naming child’s foster parents as his guardians might mitigate the effects of past disruptions, “leaving open the possibility of a return to mother creates its own instability” and was a “less-permanent” option that was not in child’s best interest. As the division in the Court of Appeals indicated, this was "a close case." The Oregon Supreme Court did not adopt the reasoning of the juvenile court in its entirety, it agreed with its conclusion that, given the particular facts presented here, it was in child’s best interest that his mother’s parental rights not be terminated. The Court of Appeals was reversed and the juvenile court affirmed. View "Dept. of Human Services v. T. M. D." on Justia Law