Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between a paternal grandmother, who has permanent sole legal and physical custody of her two grandchildren, and the children’s biological mother, who retains visitation rights but no custodial rights. The grandmother alleged that the mother had engaged in repeated verbal abuse and threats, including an incident where the mother threatened to kill her. Based on these allegations, the grandmother filed a petition for a civil protection order (CPO) against the mother.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed the grandmother’s petition before the mother was served, finding it lacked jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the grandmother was not a "family member" of the mother under the D.C. Intrafamily Offenses Act, and therefore the alleged conduct did not constitute an “intrafamily offense” for which a CPO could be sought. The trial court rejected the argument that the parties were family members by virtue of the legal custody arrangement, concluding they were not related by blood, adoption, custody, marriage, or domestic partnership as required by statute.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether the Act’s definition of “family member” includes the relationship between a grandmother with legal custody and the children’s biological mother. The Court of Appeals held that, considering both the blood relationships each party has to the children and the legal custody arrangement, the two are “family members” within the meaning of the statute. The court thus determined that the Superior Court had jurisdiction over the petition and reversed its dismissal, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Allen v. Whitehead" on Justia Law

A mother gave birth to a child, M.P., in February 2023. In September of that year, the mother sought emergency care for M.P., who was found to be severely malnourished and developmentally delayed. Medical professionals determined the child’s condition was the result of neglect, not an underlying medical disorder. The Department of Child Safety (DCS) took custody of M.P., ultimately placing her in a medically fragile foster home. The mother was arrested, pleaded guilty to attempted child abuse, and received probation. DCS filed a dependency petition alleging that M.P. was neglected due to the mother’s failure to provide adequate nourishment and to protect the child from domestic violence. The mother participated in reunification services, but DCS remained concerned about her ability to safely care for M.P.The Superior Court in Pima County adjudicated M.P. dependent and later held a hearing on DCS’s petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), which authorizes termination for neglect. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother’s neglect placed M.P. at substantial risk of harm and concluded that termination was in M.P.’s best interests, noting the mother’s lack of behavioral change despite engaging in services. The Arizona Court of Appeals vacated the termination, holding that the juvenile court was required to consider the mother’s participation in, and benefit from, services at the unfitness stage, and that consideration of rehabilitative efforts was not required in the best-interests analysis.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona vacated the court of appeals’ decision and affirmed the termination. The Court held that, under § 8-533(B)(2), the juvenile court is not required to consider subsequent participation in services when determining parental unfitness, but must consider rehabilitation efforts in the best-interests analysis. The Court found that the juvenile court properly applied the law and that due process was satisfied. View "IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P." on Justia Law

A married couple residing in Colorado initiated divorce proceedings after the wife began a relationship with another man living in New Mexico. During the divorce process, the husband filed suit in New Mexico against the wife’s new partner, alleging alienation of affections and prima facie tort. The husband claimed the new partner maliciously pursued a relationship with his wife while she was still married, resulting in the loss of her affections and leading to their divorce.The defendant moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that alienation of affections was no longer recognized in New Mexico. The District Court denied these motions and allowed the case to proceed, including permitting extensive discovery into communications between the wife and her new partner. The wife, intervening due to the burdensome discovery, sought judgment on the pleadings, contending that Colorado law—which does not recognize and indeed criminalizes the tort—should apply. The District Court denied her motion, but certified the choice-of-law question for interlocutory appeal. The New Mexico Court of Appeals reframed the issue and certified to the New Mexico Supreme Court the broader question of whether the tort of alienation of affections should continue to exist in New Mexico.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico reviewed the history and policy implications of the tort. The Court concluded that the tort’s origins were rooted in outdated and patriarchal concepts, and that it conflicted with modern legal and public policy developments, including the recognition of no-fault divorce and privacy in marital matters. The Court expressly abolished the tort of alienation of affections in New Mexico, overruled prior precedent, and held that the plaintiff could not proceed on a prima facie tort theory. The Court ordered dismissal of the husband’s claims. View "Butterworth v. Jackson" on Justia Law

A mother surrendered her four-day-old twin sons at a hospital under Maryland’s Safe Haven Act, which allows parents to leave unharmed newborns at designated facilities within sixty days of birth, granting immunity from criminal prosecution and civil liability for the act of surrender. The mother left the twins with identifying information but did not disclose her identity, provide information about alternative caregivers, or express intent to return. Hospital staff found the twins healthy and notified the local department of social services, which took custody and placed them in foster care. The department later identified both parents through family contact and DNA testing. Mother participated in proceedings and argued that her actions did not constitute neglect under the Child in Need of Assistance (CINA) statute, and that Safe Haven Act immunity precluded such a finding.The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, sitting as the juvenile court, held a de novo hearing and found that the mother’s actions amounted to neglect, as the twins were left without a legal custodian or provision for long-term care, placing them at substantial risk of harm. The court denied mother’s request to award custody to the father and committed the twins to the department’s care. Both parents appealed. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the neglect finding, concluding that abandonment under the Safe Haven Act can constitute neglect if court intervention is required to prevent harm, and that Safe Haven immunity from “civil liability” does not shield against a CINA neglect determination.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. The court held that a parent who surrenders a newborn under the Safe Haven Act may be found to have neglected the child within the meaning of the CINA statute if the child is left without a legal custodian or provision for care, placing the child at substantial risk of harm. The court further held that Safe Haven Act immunity from “civil liability” does not preclude a CINA neglect finding. View "In re: B.Cd. & B.Cb." on Justia Law

The case involves two parents, Emily A. Bickford and Matthew A. Bradeen, who share parental rights and responsibilities for their child. They initially agreed to a shared parenting arrangement in 2013, requiring joint decisions on matters such as the child’s religious upbringing and medical care. In 2021, disputes arose when Bradeen alleged that Bickford involved the child in religious activities without his knowledge, while Bickford claimed Bradeen tried to prevent the child’s religious training. Both parents sought sole authority over the child’s religious upbringing. After mediation resolved most issues except religion and healthcare, the District Court held hearings and found that Bickford's unilateral decisions regarding religion and medical care caused the child anxiety and endangered her relationship with Bradeen. The court also found that Bradeen was more capable of making decisions in the child’s best interest.The District Court (Portland) modified the prior order, allocating to Bradeen final decision-making authority regarding the child’s religious upbringing (especially relating to Calvary Chapel Greater Portland) and medical care. The court used a best-interest standard for medical decisions and, believing strict scrutiny was required for religious matters, found a compelling interest in protecting the child from psychological harm. Bickford’s motions for post-judgment relief were denied, and she appealed, arguing constitutional violations.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and clarified that strict scrutiny does not apply to allocations of parental rights between parents, even in religious matters. The Court held that the best-interest standard governs such decisions, provided there is no religious bias. It found no evidence of religious hostility or abuse of discretion by the District Court and affirmed the judgment, upholding Bradeen’s final authority in the disputed areas. View "Bickford v. Bradeen" on Justia Law

A married couple separated after 18 years, and the wife petitioned for dissolution. The husband sought and obtained a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against the wife, based on her actions in 2020. The wife admitted to being convicted and sentenced for domestic violence against the husband, and a criminal protective order was referenced, though not provided. Despite the DVRO, both parties continued to interact, exchanging flirtatious messages and spending time together. The wife had not worked during the marriage, devoted her time to caring for the home and children, and lacked current marketable skills. Evidence at trial showed financial dysfunction and mutual misconduct, including the husband withholding funds and both parties admitting to drug use.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County conducted a trial on issues including spousal support. The court acknowledged the wife's domestic violence conviction and the DVRO, but weighed various statutory factors under California Family Code section 4320, noting the wife's lack of employment, her role as primary caregiver, and the long duration of the marriage. The court found the husband's withholding of funds constituted coercive control, recognized mutual dysfunction and reconciliatory conduct post-conviction, and determined that the section 4325 presumption against awarding spousal support to a convicted spouse was rebutted. The court awarded the wife spousal support for five years, denied retroactive support, and limited the support term due to the history of domestic violence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The Court held that the trial court properly interpreted and applied Family Code section 4325, allowing consideration of all relevant equitable factors, including those in section 4320, to rebut the presumption. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the judgment awarding limited spousal support. View "Marriage of Traweek" on Justia Law

A mother left her three-year-old son in the care of his father, despite knowing the father routinely drank to unconsciousness and exposed the child to unsafe living conditions. The mother was absent from the home for two months and made no effort to contact her child during that period. When relatives discovered the situation, they took the child to live with his grandparents. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) initiated a child in need of aid (CINA) case, and over several years developed case plans for both parents, focusing on sobriety, stable housing, and maintaining a relationship with the child. The mother resisted drug testing, did not complete mental health or substance abuse assessments, and inconsistently attended visitations.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Valdez, heard testimony from family members, OCS workers, and the mother during the parental rights termination trial. The court initially terminated the mother’s rights on the basis of abandonment, finding the child was left without care and the mother failed to maintain contact or remedy her behavior. After the mother appealed, OCS moved for reconsideration, arguing the facts also supported a finding of neglect. The superior court granted reconsideration and issued an amended order finding the child in need of aid due to neglect as well, emphasizing the mother’s failure to provide adequate care and her lack of progress on her case plan.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the termination of parental rights. The court held that the procedural error in granting reconsideration after the notice of appeal did not prejudice the mother and could be considered. Substantively, the court found no clear error in the findings of neglect and failure to remedy the conduct or conditions placing the child at risk, thus affirming the order terminating parental rights. View "Victoria W. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

The case concerns a petition filed by the Public Guardian of Santa Barbara County to establish a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act for K.L., who was alleged to be gravely disabled due to mental health disorders. K.L. was personally served with a written citation informing her of the proceedings. At a pretrial hearing, K.L. appeared remotely, and her attorney objected to the conservatorship, requesting a Zoom court trial. However, neither K.L. nor her attorney expressly waived the right to a jury trial, nor did the court or counsel explain the mechanics and significance of a jury trial or verify K.L.’s capacity to waive that right.The Superior Court of Santa Barbara County held a court trial, heard testimony, and found K.L. gravely disabled beyond a reasonable doubt. The court appointed the Public Guardian as conservator for one year, determined that the least restrictive placement was a locked psychiatric facility, and imposed various restrictions on K.L., including prohibitions on possessing firearms and operating a vehicle.Upon review, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, examined whether K.L. was properly advised of her right to a jury trial and whether her waiver of that right was knowing and intelligent. The appellate court held that a written citation alone is insufficient to establish a valid waiver without evidence that the proposed conservatee was fully informed of the right and its implications. The court concluded that the record lacked affirmative evidence of such advisement or waiver and found the trial court’s error to be reversible. The order establishing the conservatorship was therefore reversed. View "Conservatorship of K.L." on Justia Law

A divorced couple with a special-needs adult daughter became involved in a dispute over the calculation of child and spousal support. The father, after losing his high-paying job, sought to reduce his support obligations. The mother, who is the primary caregiver for their daughter and works part-time as an instructional aide and as an in-home caregiver for the daughter through the In Home Supportive Services (IHSS) program, objected. She argued that her IHSS payments should not be counted as her income in calculating support, and she contended that the father’s substantial assets and lifestyle indicated that his actual income was higher than reported.The Superior Court of San Diego County consolidated the parties’ motions and held a hearing. The court determined that, although the daughter had reached adulthood, she remained incapacitated and was entitled to continued support. The court calculated the father’s income based on unemployment benefits and later self-employment, and the mother’s income as including both her instructional aide wages and her IHSS payments. The court found that, due to insufficient evidence of the father’s assets’ value or liquidity, it would not include them as part of his income. The court adjusted the father’s support obligations downward but did not terminate them. The mother appealed these orders.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court’s orders. The appellate court held that IHSS payments received by a parent for providing care to their child are not excluded from gross income under Family Code section 4058(c), as the child, not the parent, is the statutory recipient of the needs-based public assistance. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the father’s income and deciding not to impute additional income from his assets. View "Marriage of R.M. and P.N." on Justia Law

A child, A.M.S., was born in 2014 to A.M.N.L. (the mother) and T.J.S. (the father). A.M.S. has always lived with her mother, who has been her primary caregiver. Since 2020, the mother has been in a committed relationship with Q.O., with whom she had another child in 2022. T.J.S. has a significant criminal history, including domestic violence, and is currently subject to a 20-year order of protection obtained by A.M.N.L. against him. T.J.S. had limited visitation with A.M.S. under a parenting plan, but his visitation was suspended after a 2022 arrest for domestic violence. He made only a single small child support payment between 2022 and 2025, accumulating over $15,000 in arrears. In September 2024, the mother and Q.O. petitioned to terminate T.J.S.’s parental rights and for Q.O. to adopt A.M.S., asserting T.J.S. was unfit and had not maintained a substantial relationship with the child.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, appointed counsel for T.J.S., granted him a 90-day continuance to prepare, but denied a subsequent request for a further continuance. At the termination/adoption hearing, the parties stipulated that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply, and the court proceeded to hear evidence. The court found T.J.S. unfit, concluded he had failed to maintain a substantial relationship and had waived his parental rights, and granted the adoption.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in accepting the parties’ ICWA stipulation, in denying a second continuance, and whether T.J.S. received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court held that although it was error for the District Court to accept a stipulation that ICWA did not apply, this was harmless because the facts did not trigger ICWA. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in denying the second continuance and concluded that T.J.S. did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. The decision was affirmed. View "In re Parenting and Adoption of A.M.S." on Justia Law