Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A man and a woman were in a committed romantic relationship for nearly eight years, during which they had a child and operated joint businesses. After they separated, the man initiated a lawsuit seeking division of assets he claimed were acquired during their domestic partnership. The parties agreed that they had a domestic partnership, which under Alaska law means a relationship in which they intended to share assets as though married. However, they disagreed on whether certain assets—a building the man owned before the relationship and a boat acquired during the partnership but titled and paid for solely by the man—were partnership property subject to division.The Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Dillingham found that all disputed assets, including the building and the boat, were partnership property. The court reasoned that the building, though purchased and built by the man before the relationship, was essential to the operation of one of their joint businesses, and that the boat, although acquired with the man’s separate funds and titled solely in his name, was intended for partnership use. The court ordered a 50/50 division of these assets and required the man to pay an equalization amount to the woman. The man moved for reconsideration, challenging the classification and valuation of the building and the boat, but the Superior Court denied reconsideration.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that property acquired before a domestic partnership begins is not subject to the special rules for partnership property and remains the owner’s separate property. It further held that, for property acquired during a domestic partnership, the tracing doctrine applies: if an item is acquired solely with one party’s separate funds and titled in that person’s name, it remains separate property. The court reversed the Superior Court’s rulings on both the building and the boat and remanded for further proceedings. View "King v. Carty" on Justia Law

A woman, Emily, had been under a conservatorship granted to her mother in 2012 due to mental incapacity and remained under that conservatorship, which was never formally terminated. Emily became a mother of four children. In early 2023, after concerns about the care and living situation of her youngest child, Zane, the Prentiss County Department of Child Protection Services (CPS) intervened. Zane was removed from Emily's custody and placed in foster care following an emergency order. Emily was given a reunification service plan, but failed to comply with its requirements, including obtaining stable housing and addressing drug use. Over the next two years, Emily struggled with housing, employment, and substance abuse, while Zane remained in foster care and developed a bond with his foster family.The Prentiss County Youth Court adjudicated Zane as a neglected child in April 2023, though Emily’s conservator, Lisa, was not served with process or present at the adjudication. Both Emily and Lisa participated in later proceedings. No appeal was taken from the adjudication or disposition orders. In August 2024, a permanency review led to a plan for Zane's adoption. Subsequently, the Prentiss County Chancery Court heard a petition to terminate parental rights. Carter, the father, voluntarily surrendered his rights. At the termination hearing, Emily argued that the underlying adjudication was void due to lack of service on her conservator, but the chancellor found this objection had been waived due to ongoing participation in the proceedings without timely objection or appeal.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed whether the youth court had personal jurisdiction over Emily and whether the chancellor erred in terminating her parental rights. The court held that any deficiency in service was waived by the parties’ participation and failure to timely object. The court also found that substantial evidence supported termination of Emily’s parental rights under statutory grounds, including desertion and substantial erosion of the parent-child relationship. The judgment of the chancery court was affirmed. View "E.K.W. v. Prentiss County Department of Child Protection Services" on Justia Law

The case involves a dissolution of marriage between two parties after a 16-year marriage. The wife filed for temporary spousal support, and the Superior Court of Los Angeles County ordered the husband to pay $45,000 per month. Later, the husband requested a modification of the temporary spousal support, arguing that he sold his business, retired, and his income had significantly decreased. His forensic accountant documented a substantial windfall from the sale of the business. The wife responded by seeking an increase in support, referencing the proceeds from the sale. At the hearing, the trial court found no sufficient change in circumstances to justify modification and denied both parties’ requests to alter the temporary support amount. Importantly, the court expressly reserved jurisdiction to retroactively modify the support award from the date the modification request was served until the trial commenced.After the court’s denial, the husband appealed the order. The wife moved to dismiss the appeal, contending that the order was not final or appealable due to the trial court’s express reservation of jurisdiction. The husband argued that the order should be considered appealable because, after his appeal was filed, the trial judge declined to modify the temporary support and entered judgment.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, determined that the order denying the modification of temporary spousal support was not final and therefore not appealable because the trial court had expressly reserved jurisdiction to retroactively modify the award. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that an order which leaves the parties’ rights subject to revision at trial is not final for appellate purposes. The court clarified that the husband could challenge the order in his pending appeal from the judgment, which rendered the order final. View "Sterndahl v. Sterndahl" on Justia Law

Two children, Dy. H. and Da. H., lived with their mother after her separation from their father, who had ceased contact and support. In February 2024, the mother was involved in a series of erratic and dangerous incidents, including crashing a vehicle into a security gate, brandishing a firearm, and making statements suggesting delusional beliefs about her children. She was arrested after a police pursuit, and her children were placed with her niece. Following her arrest, the mother testified that she had experienced a “manic episode” diagnosed by a hospital psychologist and described suffering from brain fog and blackouts for two years.After an emergency removal order, the Juvenile Court of Gwinnett County found by clear and convincing evidence that the children were dependent due to the mother’s “untreated mental health condition,” relying on OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1) regarding “medically verified” parental health deficiencies. The children remained in the custody of the Department of Family and Children Services, with their aunt as caretaker. The mother appealed, arguing that the order was unsupported by medical evidence about her condition’s duration or likelihood of recurrence.The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed, holding that “medically verified” under the statute did not require testimony from a medical professional and that the evidence was sufficient given the mother’s admission of diagnosis and the facts of the incident.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to clarify what evidence is needed for a finding of a “medically verified” health deficiency under OCGA § 15-11-311(a)(1). The court held that any competent evidence may suffice to establish such a deficiency but that the “duration or nature” of the deficiency must also be “medically verified” by a medical professional. Because the lower courts did not have medically verified evidence as to the duration or nature of the mother’s condition, the Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded for further consideration. View "IN THE INTEREST OF D. H." on Justia Law

After reports and investigations of sexual abuse allegations against a father, the State’s Department of Human Services (DHS) petitioned for foster custody of his children. The family court consolidated the cases, and in September 2024, it issued orders granting DHS foster custody and incorporating a Service Plan that required the father to participate in sex abuse treatment. Importantly, the plan mandated that he “acknowledge and take responsibility for the sexual abuse to his victims” as a condition of successful completion.The father appealed these orders to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai‘i (ICA), which affirmed the family court's decision. Due to complications with his legal representation, the father’s application for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i was filed late, but the Supreme Court agreed to consider the merits, recognizing his constitutional right to counsel in parental rights termination proceedings.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i reviewed whether the State can require a parent, as part of mandated rehabilitation therapy in child custody proceedings, to make incriminating disclosures. The court held that under Article I, Section 10 of the Hawai‘i Constitution, the State may not require a parent to admit to criminal misconduct as a condition of completing court-ordered therapy, as this violates the privilege against self-incrimination. However, the court clarified that if a parent’s silence or refusal to admit abuse hinders effective therapy, the court may consider that as a factor in custody determinations without violating the constitutional privilege. The court vacated the lower courts’ orders to the extent they required the father to admit to sexual abuse, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The lower courts’ orders were otherwise affirmed. View "In re: T.J." on Justia Law

The appellant, a father of six Indian children, challenged the termination of his parental rights under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took emergency custody of the children after receiving reports of neglect, including unsanitary living conditions and food insecurity. The father tested positive for multiple substances, and an initial out-of-home safety plan with a relative failed. OCS placed the children with their aunt, a preferred ICWA placement, and initiated proceedings for temporary custody, adjudication, disposition, and ultimately, termination of parental rights. Throughout the case, the father was represented by counsel at various stages, sometimes proceeding pro se, and repeatedly claimed he did not receive discovery materials.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, held hearings at each stage. Temporary custody was granted after expedited hearings, with findings that removal was necessary to prevent imminent harm. The father stipulated to probable cause for the children being in need of aid, reserving the right to contest at adjudication. Subsequent hearings resulted in approval of OCS’s permanency plan. The father failed to comply with his case plan, and OCS filed for termination. Multiple motions by the father, alleging ICWA and constitutional violations, were rejected by the superior court, which found OCS had complied with ICWA at all stages.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed three procedural arguments: denial of discovery, improper emergency removal, and alleged ICWA violations in earlier foster care proceedings. The court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion regarding discovery, that OCS’s emergency removal complied with ICWA and Alaska law, and that alleged errors in earlier foster care actions did not invalidate the later, separate termination action. The court affirmed the termination order, finding no reversible error. View "Dash D. v. State" on Justia Law

Three individuals alleged that New Jersey child welfare caseworkers violated their constitutional rights during a series of investigations and child removals in 2017. The principal facts involved caseworkers entering the plaintiffs’ residence without a warrant and subsequently removing children from parental custody without court authorization. One plaintiff was the mother whose children were removed; another was the father of her youngest child and a resident of the home; the third was the grandfather. The plaintiffs argued that the warrantless entry and removals were not justified by imminent danger, and that their consent to certain “family plan agreements” was coerced.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated that dismissal in part and remanded. Upon remand, the District Court dismissed the claims again, this time based on qualified immunity—holding that the defendants were shielded from liability because the plaintiffs had not shown violation of clearly established constitutional rights. The District Court found the defendants’ actions reasonable given alleged concerns about child safety and home conditions. Subsequent motions to dismiss by sheriff defendants were also granted, and the plaintiffs appealed.Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most aspects of the District Court’s dismissal. However, it held that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged a violation of clearly established Fourth Amendment law regarding the warrantless home entry, as no imminent danger was apparent from the complaint. The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of this Fourth Amendment claim against the caseworker who entered the home and remanded for further proceedings. All other claims, including those based on substantive and procedural due process, were affirmed as dismissed due to qualified immunity. View "O''Bryant v. Division of Child Protection and Permanency" on Justia Law

A child, A.S., was adjudicated dependent in 2017 after her mother, C.S., tested positive for drugs at the birth of another child. Temporary custody was granted to the child's paternal grandparents, while the mother entered treatment. After successfully completing her case plan, in 2019, the mother was granted shared legal custody of A.S. with the father, and the case was closed. In 2021, due to the father's illness, the mother was made the residential parent for school purposes. In 2023, following the father's death, the grandparents sought legal custody, citing concerns about the mother's drug history, her marriage to a sex offender, and truancy issues. The mother had limited interaction with A.S. at this time, and evidence was presented regarding her husband’s criminal history and A.S.'s discomfort around him.The Summit County Juvenile Court granted legal custody of A.S. to the grandparents without first finding the mother unsuitable. The mother objected, arguing her parental rights required a finding of unsuitability before custody could be transferred to nonparents. The juvenile court overruled her objections, reasoning that the prior dependency adjudication established unsuitability, and that R.C. 2151.42(B) controlled, requiring only a determination of changed circumstances and best interest. The mother appealed.The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the juvenile court did not need to find the mother unsuitable before awarding custody to nonparents, since the child had previously been adjudicated dependent. This decision conflicted with precedent from the Eighth District Court of Appeals (In re B.K., 2013-Ohio-1190).The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that when a natural parent has regained legal custody after a dependency finding and the dependency case is closed, a juvenile court may not terminate that custody order under R.C. 2151.42(B) without first finding that the parent has become unsuitable. The judgment of the Ninth District was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re A.S." on Justia Law

The parties in this case are former spouses who have been engaged in litigation over their divorce for several years. After the Sarpy County District Court entered a divorce decree in 2023, including a parenting plan, the party awarded sole physical custody sought enforcement of several provisions, alleging that the other party had failed to pay a court-ordered equalization payment, attorney fees, and his share of medical expenses for their children. She also alleged violations of the parenting plan, such as improper transportation arrangements, preventing communication with children, failure to administer medication, unauthorized travel, and exceeding allotted parenting time. The other party claimed inability to pay, disputed some allegations, and asserted misunderstandings regarding the parenting plan.The Sarpy County District Court held an evidentiary hearing, found the party in violation of its orders, and determined his testimony was not credible, particularly regarding his financial situation and explanations for his conduct. As a result, the court found him in willful contempt, ordered a 90-day incarceration which could be avoided by compliance ("purge" conditions), temporarily reduced his summer parenting time, and awarded attorney fees to the opposing party. The party appealed, but his brief contained numerous fictitious case citations and misstatements of law, leading the Nebraska Supreme Court to strike the brief and review only for plain error.The Nebraska Supreme Court found no plain error in the district court’s findings or sanctions. It clarified that self-represented litigants must adhere to the same standards as attorneys and that submission of briefs with fabricated citations is sanctionable. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s contempt order, the imposition of attorney fees, denial of in forma pauperis status, and the other sanctions. The district court’s order was affirmed. View "Shannon v. Shannon" on Justia Law

A woman gave birth to a child in the back of an ambulance and immediately informed hospital staff that she did not want or have the means to care for the baby, expressing her intent to relinquish the child for adoption. The Morgan County Department of Human Services (MCDHS) initiated a dependency or neglect proceeding, treating the matter as a typical abandonment case. MCDHS investigated the mother’s identity, contacted her family members to explore placement options, and took steps to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act, after learning the mother might be a member of a Canadian tribe.The Morgan County District Court, upon learning of MCDHS’s actions, intervened by issuing an order that recognized the birth mother’s right to anonymity and confidentiality under Colorado’s Safe Haven Law. The court directed MCDHS to halt its investigation into the mother’s identity and to cease contacting her family members, reasoning that the Safe Haven Law protected the mother’s privacy. The court also sealed records containing the mother’s name and refused to consider information derived from confidential sources. MCDHS challenged these orders through a C.A.R. 21 petition.Reviewing the matter, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that, although Colorado’s Safe Haven Law does not expressly guarantee anonymity and confidentiality, its structure, related statutory provisions, and underlying purpose imply such protections for parents who properly relinquish newborns under its terms. The Court concluded that county departments cannot pursue the identity of relinquishing parents or investigate their families for placement options. Once a newborn is surrendered pursuant to the Safe Haven Law, the county department must promptly seek adoptive placement and move to terminate parental rights while maintaining the parent’s anonymity and confidentiality. The Supreme Court of Colorado discharged its order to show cause and remanded for proceedings consistent with this holding. View "People ex rel. G.D.M." on Justia Law