Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Bobby Feehan sought extraordinary writ relief from the trial court’s order denying them temporary visitation during the pendency of their petition to establish a parental relationship with minor L.S. Feehan and Lauren Seto were in a romantic relationship while Seto was pregnant with L.S., who was later adopted by Seto’s partner, Jude Guide. Feehan claimed to have acted as a parent to L.S. from birth until the relationship with Seto ended, after which Seto cut off almost all contact between Feehan and L.S. Feehan filed a petition to determine their parental relationship and requested temporary visitation, which Seto and Guide opposed.The Superior Court of Alameda County denied Feehan’s request for temporary visitation, citing a lack of authority under Family Code sections 7604 and 6436 to order pendente lite custody and visitation. The court rejected Feehan’s argument that it had equitable authority to issue such orders when a prima facie case for parentage is made. Feehan then filed a petition for writ of mandate, which led to the current appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and found that the trial court had broad equitable authority to grant pendente lite visitation in parentage cases under Family Code sections 3022 and 3100, subdivision (a). The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in determining it lacked authority to grant Feehan’s request. The court held that trial courts have discretion to enter temporary visitation orders if the requesting party makes a preliminary showing of being a presumed parent and if the order is in the best interests of the child. The appellate court issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the trial court to vacate its order and reconsider Feehan’s request for pendente lite visitation. View "Feehan v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Elizabeth T. was taking her three children to see their father when she fell on a bus after consuming alcohol. An anonymous caller reported her to the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), alleging she was intoxicated and her children were neglected. Elizabeth denied being heavily intoxicated and claimed her children were well cared for. DCFS filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), alleging Elizabeth's substance abuse posed a risk to her children.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the petition, citing a prior sustained allegation of substance abuse from 2018. The court ordered informal supervision under section 360, subdivision (b). Elizabeth appealed, arguing that one incident of alcohol abuse did not support the finding that she posed a risk to her children at the time of the jurisdiction hearing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence of the bus incident, along with the four-year-old allegation, did not support the finding that Elizabeth's conduct created a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness to her children. The court noted that Elizabeth had cooperated with DCFS, submitted to drug and alcohol testing, and her children were healthy and well cared for. The court concluded that there was no substantial evidence of a current risk to the children and reversed the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings and disposition orders. View "In re Gilberto G." on Justia Law

In this case, a mother sought to set aside a family division order that terminated her parental rights to her daughter, G.L. The mother alleged that the Department for Children and Families (DCF) committed fraud on the court by withholding information about G.L.'s foster parents. The trial court denied her motion, and she appealed.The Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Family Division, initially terminated the mother's parental rights in December 2021, citing her volatile behavior and inconsistent contact with G.L. The court found that the mother had not made sufficient progress toward her case plan goals and that it was in G.L.'s best interests to terminate parental rights. The mother appealed this decision, but the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the termination order in June 2022.The mother then filed a motion to set aside the termination order, arguing that DCF had committed fraud on the court by not disclosing negative information about the foster parents. She claimed that this information was relevant to the termination proceedings and that DCF's failure to disclose it constituted fraud. The family division held an evidentiary hearing and found that DCF's practice of storing certain records separately was not intended to hide information. The court also found that the DCF worker and attorneys were not aware of the negative information during the termination proceedings.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the family division's decision. The court held that fraud on the court requires a showing of intentional deception or a deliberate scheme to defraud. The court found that the mother failed to prove that DCF engaged in such conduct. The court also noted that the information about the foster parents was not central to the termination decision, which was based primarily on the mother's inability to resume parenting within a reasonable time. Therefore, the court concluded that the family division did not abuse its discretion in denying the mother's motion to set aside the termination order. View "In re G.L." on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of a father's parental rights to his four minor children. The children were adjudicated as children in need of care (CINC) and placed in foster care due to the mother's suspected drug use, the family's unstable living situation, and noncompliance with a medical safety plan for one child's special needs. Over three years, the father relied on the mother as the primary contact with agencies and maintained that she would be the primary caretaker upon reintegration. However, the mother was repeatedly incarcerated, failed drug tests, and submitted falsified documents. The father, although appropriate during visits, was not engaged in the reintegration process and failed to meet the goals of his court-ordered reintegration plan.The Johnson District Court extended the parents' reintegration plans three times without sufficient progress and terminated parental rights after two failed attempts to place the children in Missouri, where the parents had bought a home. The Court of Appeals affirmed the termination decision for both parents. The father petitioned for review, questioning whether the district court properly considered his unfitness separate from the mother's and whether the termination was an abuse of discretion.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and found no error. The court held that the father was unfit by clear and convincing evidence due to his failure to engage in the reintegration process, reliance on the mother despite her issues, and failure to provide a sustainable childcare plan. The court also found that the father's unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, given the three-year period without significant progress. The court concluded that termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children, considering their need for permanency and the father's inability to provide a stable and safe environment. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of both the Court of Appeals and the district court. View "In re D.G." on Justia Law

The case involves Angelica A. (mother) and Luis C. (father), who have two children, Dezi C. and Joshua C. In 2019, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed petitions to assert dependency jurisdiction over the children due to the parents' substance abuse and domestic violence issues. Both parents denied having Indian heritage, and the juvenile court initially found that ICWA did not apply. The children were removed from their parents' custody, and parental rights were eventually terminated in January 2022, with the children deemed adoptable by their paternal grandparents.The mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the Department failed to comply with its duty under ICWA and related California provisions to inquire about the children's possible Indian ancestry from extended family members. The Court of Appeal acknowledged the Department's deficient inquiry but concluded that the error was harmless unless the record contained information suggesting a reason to believe the children might be Indian children.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and held that an inadequate initial ICWA inquiry requires conditional reversal of the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights. The court directed the Department to conduct an adequate inquiry and document it properly. If the juvenile court finds the inquiry proper and concludes that ICWA does not apply, the order terminating parental rights will be reinstated. If the inquiry reveals a reason to know the children are Indian children, the court must proceed in conformity with ICWA and California implementing provisions. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Dezi C." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Sharon Mitzel, Alan Mitzel, and Eric Mitzel, filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against Vogel Law Firm and Jerilynn Brantner Adams, alleging negligence in a divorce action involving the disposition of land known as Section 19. Fred and Sharon Mitzel, who were married and had two sons, formed a family limited partnership and conveyed their farm, including Section 19, to it. During their divorce, they agreed that Section 19 would go to Fred, subject to deeding it to their sons upon his death. However, a subsequent quiet title action determined that the family partnership owned Section 19, nullifying the divorce judgment's property distribution.The District Court of Cass County granted partial summary judgment dismissing Alan and Eric Mitzel’s claims, ruling they lacked standing as non-clients to sue for legal malpractice. The court also granted judgment as a matter of law dismissing Sharon Mitzel’s claims, concluding she presented no evidence that she gave up any marital property to secure the agreement for Section 19 to be deeded to her sons upon Fred’s death. Sharon Mitzel’s claim for attorney’s fees and costs incurred due to Vogel’s alleged malpractice was also dismissed.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss Alan and Eric Mitzel’s claims, agreeing they lacked standing. The court also upheld the measure of damages used by the lower court, which was based on what Sharon Mitzel gave up to secure Section 19 for her sons. However, the Supreme Court found that the lower court erred in determining Sharon Mitzel presented no evidence of incurring attorney’s fees and costs due to Vogel’s alleged malpractice. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Mitzel v. Vogel Law Firm" on Justia Law

Fawna and Terry Goff were married in 2015 and had one child, M.G. In late 2021, Terry left for work in Texas and did not return, pursuing a new relationship. Fawna allowed M.G. to visit Terry in Texas, but he refused to return the child. Fawna filed for divorce, and the circuit court granted her a divorce on grounds of adultery, awarded her primary custody of M.G., set child support, divided property, and awarded partial attorney fees to Fawna. Terry appealed.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Meade County, South Dakota, initially handled the case. Terry did not respond to the divorce complaint in time, leading Fawna to seek a default judgment. At the hearing, Terry requested to proceed with the divorce trial, which the court allowed. The court granted Fawna a divorce, primary custody of M.G., and ordered Terry to pay child support and arrearages. Terry was also ordered to pay half the mortgage on the marital home and awarded his camper. Terry filed for divorce in Texas, but the South Dakota court retained jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that Terry waived his claim against the trial on the merits by not objecting at the hearing. However, the court found that the circuit court abused its discretion in calculating arrearages without considering the months Terry cared for M.G. and other support provided. The court also found insufficient findings regarding the best interests of M.G. for visitation limitations and the award of attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for recalculating arrearages and further findings on visitation and attorney fees. View "Goff v. Goff" on Justia Law

A minor, V., was removed from her mother’s care at birth due to the mother’s drug abuse. V. and her half-brother, N., were initially placed together with a relative, but N. was later moved to his non-offending father’s custody. V. was placed with her aunt, who became her legal guardian in 2019. The aunt sought to adopt V. in 2022, but the mother opposed the termination of her parental rights, citing the parental relationship exception to adoption.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found that the mother did not meet the burden to demonstrate the parental relationship exception. However, the court, without input from the parties, applied the sibling relationship exception, concluding that adoption would not be in V.’s best interest due to her bond with N. The court selected legal guardianship as the permanent plan for V. Both the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and V. appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the juvenile court erred by sua sponte applying the sibling relationship exception without any party asserting it and by relieving the mother of her burden to prove an exception to adoption. The appellate court found that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding that the sibling relationship exception applied, as V. and N. had limited shared experiences and their relationship would likely continue even if V. were adopted. The appellate court reversed the juvenile court’s orders and directed it to enter a new order selecting adoption as the permanent plan for V. View "In re V.S." on Justia Law

Gregory Numann and Diane Gallant were married in 2002 and separated in October 2016. They verbally agreed to maintain separate residences, with Numann paying child support and both contributing to their child's college fund. Numann served in the military from 1989 to 2015, accruing a pension worth about $730,000 at separation. Gallant, who worked throughout the marriage, had two retirement accounts worth about $30,000. Gallant filed for divorce in 2021, seeking a portion of Numann’s military retirement benefit.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, held a two-day trial and issued a divorce decree in July 2022. The court awarded Gallant 50% of the marital portion of Numann’s military retirement benefit from the date of separation. It also credited Numann for child support payments made after their child reached the age of majority. The court found that Gallant was entitled to a portion of the retirement benefit starting from the date of separation and ordered Numann to pay Gallant $94,248.70, representing her share of the retirement payments received since separation. The court balanced this against other obligations to avoid prolonged financial entanglement.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the division of the military retirement benefit from the date of separation did not violate federal law under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA). The court clarified that the USFSPA allows state courts to treat military retirement pay as marital property subject to division under state law. The court also found no evidence of judicial bias against Numann. However, the court remanded the case to correct an inconsistency in the final written order regarding the division of the military retirement benefit. View "Numann v. Gallant" on Justia Law

Evan D., an Indian child, was born with significant health complications. Shortly after his birth, the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) filed an emergency petition to adjudicate him a child in need of aid due to his parents' history of neglect, substance abuse, and domestic violence. Evan was placed with foster parents Rosalind and Max M., who lived near a medical facility capable of addressing his health needs. The Native Village of Togiak, Evan’s tribe, was informed of the proceedings and later petitioned to transfer jurisdiction over Evan’s case to the tribal court.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, adjudicated Evan a child in need of aid and granted temporary custody to OCS. OCS petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Evan’s parents, and the Tribe petitioned to transfer jurisdiction. Rosalind and Max moved to intervene, arguing that the Tribe might place Evan with his grandmother, who they believed could not meet his health needs. The Superior Court denied their motion, stating that federal law prohibits considering potential placement changes when deciding whether to transfer jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that the foster parents' arguments against transferring jurisdiction were contrary to federal law, which prohibits considering whether transfer could affect the child's placement. The court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, stating that the foster parents did not present valid grounds to deny the transfer of jurisdiction and therefore did not share any issue of law or fact in common with the underlying proceedings that would justify their intervention. The court also addressed the procedure for staying transfer orders pending appeal, emphasizing the need to balance competing interests. View "Rosalind M. v. State" on Justia Law