Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

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In 2018, a juvenile court removed seven children from their biological parents' custody due to abuse and neglect. The children were returned in early 2019 but removed again a few months later after continued issues. The five oldest children were eventually placed with their grandparents in New Mexico, while the two youngest, Alice and Liam, were placed with a foster family in Utah. In October 2020, the juvenile court held a termination trial to determine the best permanent placement for Alice and Liam. The court decided it was in their best interest to terminate the biological parents' rights and allow the foster family to adopt them.The biological parents appealed the decision. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the termination order, concluding that the juvenile court's decision was against the clear weight of the evidence. The appellate court also held that termination must be "materially better" than any other option. Because it reversed on the merits, the court of appeals did not address other issues raised by the parents, such as ineffective counsel.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and found several errors in the court of appeals' reasoning. First, it rejected the "materially better" standard, stating that the correct standard is whether termination is "strictly necessary" to promote the child's best interest. Second, the court of appeals exceeded its scope by reweighing evidence and considering evidence outside the record. Third, the court of appeals erred in concluding that the juvenile court's decision was against the clear weight of the evidence. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case for consideration of the remaining issues in the biological parents' initial appeal. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

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Steven and Jennifer Condron were granted a divorce in September 2019. The divorce decree included a division of assets and ordered Steven to pay Jennifer a combination of permanent and rehabilitative alimony. Steven was also required to pay $3,218 per month in child support. Three years later, Steven petitioned to modify the child support, arguing that the alimony payments should be considered in the child support calculation. The child support referee declined to include the alimony payments in Jennifer’s income and refused to exclude them from Steven’s income, treating the payments as part of the property division rather than alimony. The circuit court adopted the referee’s findings and conclusions.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, initially handled the case. The court found that Steven’s gross annual income exceeded $1,000,000, while Jennifer had no income. The court ordered Steven to pay Jennifer $15,000 per month in alimony for four years, followed by $11,000 per month in permanent alimony. Steven later filed a petition to modify child support due to a significant reduction in his income after being terminated from his job. The child support referee found Steven’s new gross monthly income to be approximately $45,639.42 and Jennifer’s income to be $1,638. Despite these findings, the referee treated the alimony payments as part of the property division and did not adjust the parties’ incomes for child support purposes. The circuit court upheld this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the monthly payments were indeed alimony and not part of the property division. The court noted that the payments were consistently referred to as alimony and were terminable upon significant life events, such as death or remarriage, which is characteristic of alimony. The court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case for recalculating child support, including the alimony payments in Jennifer’s income and excluding them from Steven’s income. View "Condron v. Condron" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff and defendant were married in 1976 and divorced in 1999. Their marital settlement agreement (MSA) stipulated that their marital home would be sold, and the proceeds divided equally. The plaintiff was responsible for household expenses until the sale. The home was not sold until 2019, after the defendant filed a partition action. The defendant then sought specific performance, alleging the plaintiff breached the MSA by preventing repairs and refusing to divide property. The plaintiff counterclaimed, seeking reimbursement for expenses incurred due to the delayed sale and other breaches by the defendant.The Family Court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion for summary judgment. It found the MSA clear and unambiguous, except for the clause about splitting the pool bill. The court ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to reimbursement for expenses related to the marital home, as the MSA did not specify such obligations. The court awarded the defendant the 1982 Mercedes Benz and ordered the division of remaining funds and personal property. The plaintiff was awarded additional amounts for storage costs and attorney fees.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the Family Court's orders, agreeing that the MSA was clear and unambiguous regarding household expenses and that the plaintiff failed to pursue the proper remedy of specific performance for the defendant's alleged breaches. The court also upheld the award of the Mercedes Benz to the defendant and the distribution of funds and personal property. The plaintiff's additional claims for storage costs and contempt were not addressed due to procedural issues and lack of adequate argumentation. View "Jeremiah v. Estate of Jeremiah" on Justia Law

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A mother, K.G., gave birth to twins in September 2020. Due to concerns about her mental health and ability to care for the children, Muskingum County Adult and Child Protective Services (the agency) took emergency temporary custody of the children. The children were placed with their maternal aunt. The juvenile court adjudicated the children as dependent and continued the agency's temporary custody. K.G. was required to undergo a psychological evaluation, which revealed several mental health conditions that could impair her parenting abilities.The juvenile court later transferred temporary legal custody to the maternal aunt, with the agency maintaining protective supervision. The agency then moved for the maternal aunt to be granted legal custody and for the agency's supervision to be terminated. At the hearing, the agency presented a psychological report by Dr. Wolfgang, which K.G. objected to, arguing she should be able to cross-examine the psychologist. The juvenile court admitted the report and granted legal custody to the maternal aunt.The Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court's decision, holding that K.G.'s due process rights were violated because she was not able to cross-examine Dr. Wolfgang. The agency appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the appellate court's decision, holding that the juvenile court was permitted to consider the psychologist’s report under the statutory scheme governing legal-custody proceedings. The court found that K.G. was not denied an opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Wolfgang and that her due process rights were not violated. The case was remanded to the appellate court for consideration of K.G.'s remaining assignment of error. View "In re R.G.M." on Justia Law

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Harrison Sanders and Trinity Turner, divorced parents of two children, were involved in a legal dispute over compliance with a Family Court Order of Protection From Abuse (PFA Order) against Turner. The PFA Order required Turner to undergo evaluations by a certified treatment program and obtain a psychological evaluation. Turner failed to comply, leading to a contempt finding and a daily fine of $200 until compliance.The Family Court Commissioner found Turner in contempt twice. The first contempt order imposed a daily fine for noncompliance, and the second contempt order calculated the total fine at $51,200 for continued noncompliance. Initially, the Commissioner directed that the fine be paid to Sanders. Turner sought review by a Family Court Judge, who upheld the contempt finding and fine amount but ruled that the fine should be paid to the court, not Sanders. Sanders filed a motion for reargument, which the court denied, maintaining that the fine was to be paid to the court as it was intended to coerce compliance with the court's order.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's decision. The court held that coercive contempt fines, unless compensatory in nature, should be paid to the court. The court reasoned that it is the court's authority being vindicated through such fines, not the rights of a private litigant. The court also addressed procedural arguments, concluding that the Family Court Judge had the authority to review and modify the Commissioner’s orders and that Sanders suffered no prejudice from the court’s decision to consider the payment recipient issue. The Supreme Court denied Sanders' request for attorneys' fees, affirming the Family Court's judgment. View "Sanders v. Turner" on Justia Law

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The case involves divorcing parents who had entered into a custody settlement agreement for their child, which included a provision for the child to move to New Jersey in 2022. The father later sought to modify this agreement, arguing that the child's emotional and behavioral health had deteriorated and that moving out of state would negatively impact the child's progress in therapy and school. The superior court found a substantial change in circumstances and awarded primary physical custody to the father, deciding that the child's best interests favored staying in Alaska.The superior court initially approved the custody settlement agreement but withheld judgment on the relocation provision. After further briefing, the court ruled that the relocation provision was enforceable but noted that the father could challenge it by demonstrating a substantial change in circumstances. The father filed a motion to modify custody, and after a trial, the superior court found that the child's emotional and behavioral issues had significantly worsened since the original agreement, constituting a substantial change in circumstances. The court concluded that the child's best interests required staying in Alaska with the father.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court's decision. The court found no clear error or abuse of discretion in the superior court's best interests analysis, which favored the father on several factors, including his capability and desire to meet the child's needs, the stability and continuity of the child's environment, and the willingness to facilitate a relationship with the other parent. The court also found that any error in admitting the parenting coordinator's reports was harmless, as the reports were largely cumulative of other evidence. The Supreme Court upheld the superior court's custody modification order, allowing the child to remain in Alaska with the father. View "J. M. v. S. C." on Justia Law

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Lisa Schoenberg and Joshua Schoenberg, parents of two minor children, divorced in 2017 and agreed to share joint and equal residential responsibility. In November 2023, Lisa moved to modify this arrangement, seeking primary residential responsibility. She supported her motion with declarations and exhibits, including a declaration from an attorney who interviewed the children. Joshua opposed the motion, arguing Lisa failed to establish a prima facie case and objected to the attorney’s declaration and letter as hearsay.The District Court of Cass County struck the attorney’s declaration and letter, concluding they contained hearsay and did not meet the residual exception to the hearsay rule. The court also denied Lisa’s motion to modify residential responsibility, finding she failed to establish a prima facie case. Lisa’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decisions. The court held that the attorney’s declaration and letter were correctly excluded as they were not more probative than affidavits or declarations from the children themselves. The court also found that Lisa failed to establish a prima facie case for modification. Although she demonstrated material changes in circumstances, such as the children’s counseling and Joshua’s significant other moving in, she did not show these changes adversely affected the children or led to a general decline in their condition. Consequently, the court concluded that Lisa did not meet the necessary legal standard to warrant an evidentiary hearing for modifying residential responsibility. View "Schoenberg v. Schoenberg" on Justia Law

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Keith and Latasha Warner were married in 2018 and have one child. In May 2022, Keith filed for divorce and requested primary residential responsibility. The parties initially agreed to an interim order granting equal residential responsibility. After mediation in August 2022, a summary agreement was prepared but not signed by either party. Keith served multiple documents to Latasha at an incorrect address, causing her to miss a scheduling conference and not receive a notice of trial. Despite this, the court mailed a scheduling order to her correct address, setting a trial date for June 5, 2023.At trial, Latasha requested a continuance to retain counsel, which the court denied. The court awarded primary residential responsibility to Keith. Latasha did not appeal the judgment but later moved for relief from judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60, arguing that Keith's misrepresentation about the mediation agreement prevented her from fairly preparing her case. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied her motion.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s denial of Latasha’s motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion. The court found that the mediation agreement was not binding as it was not signed or approved by the court. The court also found that Keith’s counsel’s statement during trial was inaccurate but did not prevent Latasha from fairly preparing her case. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Latasha’s motion under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3) and affirmed the decision. View "Warner v. Warner" on Justia Law

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Philip Ritter appealed a divorce judgment, challenging the district court's decisions on the valuation and distribution of the marital estate, spousal support, and child support obligations. Philip and Megan Ritter were married in 2008 and have three minor children. Megan was the primary income earner until 2014, after which Philip's income fluctuated significantly. Megan filed for divorce in July 2022, and the trial was held in June 2023. The district court awarded Megan primary residential responsibility for the children, spousal support of $2,000 per month, and child support of $4,023 per month.The district court of Richland County, Southeast Judicial District, valued the marital home at $328,540, incorporating both parties' valuation methods and the cost of a kitchen remodel. The court allocated the Bank of America Platinum Plus Credit Card debt to Philip, finding he failed to account for part of the debt. The court also included an indemnity clause for joint debts, deciding not to require refinancing of the marital home mortgage due to Megan's inability to refinance.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found no clear error in the district court's valuation and distribution of the marital estate. The court affirmed the spousal support award, noting the significant disparity in the parties' incomes and Megan's career sacrifices. The court also upheld the child support calculation, which averaged Philip's fluctuating income over three years, resulting in a monthly obligation of $4,023 for three children.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the findings on property valuation, spousal support, and child support were not clearly erroneous and were supported by the evidence. View "Ritter v. Ritter" on Justia Law

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Jesse Rehbein and Danielle Buck are the natural parents of two children, L.M.A.R. and N.R.R. In January 2018, the Department of Child and Family Services removed the children from their care due to concerns including neglect of medical and educational needs, substance abuse, and domestic violence. The children were placed with their grandparents, Doug and Annette Rehbein, who have cared for them since March 2018. Jesse and Danielle made some efforts to improve their situation, including therapy and drug testing, but the grandparents were appointed as guardians in February 2019.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, issued an Amended Final Parenting Plan on September 6, 2023, granting the grandparents a third-party parental interest. Jesse and Danielle objected, arguing that the court should have applied the grandparent visitation statute (§ 40-9-102, MCA) rather than the third-party parental interest statute (§ 40-4-228, MCA). The District Court found that the grandparents met the requirements under § 40-4-228, MCA, and granted them a parental interest, allowing Jesse and Danielle unsupervised visitation every other weekend.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court held that the District Court correctly applied § 40-4-228, MCA, as the Montana Legislature allows grandparents to seek third-party parental status under this statute. The Court found clear and convincing evidence that Jesse and Danielle engaged in conduct contrary to the child-parent relationship and that the grandparents had established a child-parent relationship with the children. The Court also noted that the fitness of the natural parents is not a consideration under § 40-4-228, MCA, when granting a third-party parental interest. The decision to grant the grandparents a third-party parental interest was affirmed. View "In re the Parenting Plan of L.M.A.R and N.R.R." on Justia Law