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The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court's disposition orders and held that the juvenile court erred in establishing jurisdiction based on a factual and legal theory not raised in the original petition. In this case, the Department filed a dependency petition on G.B.'s behalf, alleging the child had been sexually abused by her mother's boyfriend, and that her mother had failed to protect her from the boyfriend's abuse. The juvenile court found the allegations untrue but, on its own motion, added three allegations against father based on facts and a legal theory not at issue in the original petition. View "In re G.B." on Justia Law

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The superior court awarded one of the husband’s investment accounts to his wife in a divorce. Before transferring the account, the husband transferred shares of three mutual funds from that account to a separate investment account. The wife asked the court to order him to account for the missing shares. The court ordered the husband to pay the wife the value of the shares on the date of the transfer and he did so. The parties contested the value of the income earned by the improperly transferred shares. Following lengthy litigation of this issue, the superior court awarded the wife enhanced attorney’s fees. The wife appealed the valuation of the earned income of the shares; the husband cross-appealed the valuation of the earned income on the shares and the award of attorney’s fees. The Alaska Supreme Court found the superior court appropriately awarded the wife prejudgment interest instead of damages as well as enhanced attorney’s fees. View "Erwin v. Mendenhall" on Justia Law

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Patricia Campbell appeals from an order of the Mobile Circuit Court adjudicating J.R.C., J.L.C., R.L.C., and J.H.S., minor children, as the heirs of the estate of her son, Remano Campbell. Remano died intestate in October 2011, the victim of a homicide perpetrated by his wife, Eugenia Campbell. At the time of his death, Remano was the insured under a $200,000 life-insurance policy issued by United of Omaha Life Insurance Company ("Omaha"). Because Eugenia was not considered to be Remano's surviving spouse, the proceeds of the insurance policy would pass to Remano's issue; if there was no surviving issue, then to his parent or parents equally. Remano and Eugenia were legally married in June 2002. During their marriage, Remano and Eugenia had three children, J.R.C., J.L.C., and R.L.C. Eugenia also had another child, J.H.S., who was born approximately 18 months before her marriage to Remano and who lived with Remano and Eugenia throughout their marriage. In January 2017, the administrator ad litem of Remano's estate filed a complaint in the interpleader action, seeking a judgment declaring that the Campbell children and J.H.S. were Remano's heirs and thus were entitled to the life insurance proceeds. After a hearing, the circuit court entered an order adjudicating the Campbell children and J.H.S. to be Remano's heirs and further finding that Patricia lacked standing to challenge the paternity of the children. Accordingly, the circuit court ordered disbursement of the insurance proceeds in the interpleader action and directed that the estate administration be remanded to the probate court. Patricia filed a postjudgment motion, which was denied. This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court’s judgment, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed adjudication of the children as Remano’s heirs. View "Campbell v. J.R.C." on Justia Law

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A certified class of minor children in the Permanent Managing Conservatorship (PMC) of DFPS filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking injunctive relief and alleging that Texas' maintenance of its foster care system exposes them to a serious risk of abuse, neglect, and harm to their physical and psychological well-being. The district court granted plaintiffs a permanent injunction requiring sweeping changes to the state's foster care system. The Fifth Circuit held that facts in the record adequately supported the finding that a policy or practice of maintaining overburdened caseworkers directly causes all PMC children to be exposed to a serious risk of physical and psychological harm; the district court correctly found that the State was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to the Licensed Foster Care (LFC) subclass as a result of its insufficient monitoring and oversight, and that these deficiencies were a direct cause of the constitutional harm; the district court erred in concluding that inadequate placement array causes constitutionally cognizable harm to the LFC subclass and that the State was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm; and to the extent that the lack of awake-night supervision may have sustained a constitutional claim under the circumstances, the remaining policies and their effects did not cause foster group homes (FGH) children an amplified risk of harm sufficient to overcome the threshold hurdle. The court also held that Rule 23-specific arguments were waived. While the district court entered an expansive injunction mandating dozens of specific remedial measures and it was entitled to grant plaintiffs injunctive relief, the court held that the injunction was significantly overbroad. Accordingly, the court vacated the injunction and remanded with instructions to remove the remedial provisions related to placement array and FGHs, and to strike provisions that were not necessary to achieve constitutional compliance. View "M.D. v. Abbott" on Justia Law

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The presumption of parentage is rebuttable and a non-biological parent can be a presumed parent. After Brian Pickett died, his partner, two biological children, and his partner's child, A.G., filed a wrongful death action against defendants. The trial court held that A.G. lacked standing to sue, and entered judgment against him. The Court of Appeal reversed the grant of summary judgment to defendants, holding that the record did not rebut the presumption that Brian Pickett was A.G.'s natural parent. In this case, from the time A.G. was one, Pickett was the only father he knew and unrebutted testimony established that Pickett held A.G. out as his child. View "A.G. v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

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In this matter where the adoptive family of a young child sought to have Nev. Rev. Stat. 432B.550(5)(a)’s rebuttable presumption that a dependent child’s placement with a sibling is in the child’s best interes- applied in determining the out-of-home placement of her biological baby sister, the Supreme Court granted in part Petitioners’ petition for extraordinary relief, holding that adoption does not preclude application of the legislative presumption that placing siblings together is in a child’s best interest. Amy Mulkern, the adoptive mother of Baby’s biological half-sister, Vivian Mulkern, was a willing and approved placement option for Baby. The Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS), however, determined that Baby had bonded with and should remain with her foster parents, who were also willing to adopt. Amy sought relief in the district court dependency proceeding. The district court determined that Vivian’s adoption severed the sibling relationship such that section 432B.550(5)(a)’s sibling presumption did not apply. The Supreme Court granted Amy and Vivian’s petition for extraordinary relief, holding that because Amy was the mother of Baby’s biological sister, the rebuttable sibling presumption applied. View "Mulkern v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

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Dr. Christopher Cummins, married man who was separated but not divorced from his wife, began a romantic relationship with one of his employees, Leah Jordan Goolsby (Jordan). The two began living together, had a child, and became engaged to one another. Cummins never divorced his wife. and he and Jordan never married. Jordan eventually ended their relationship and kept the engagement ring and wedding ring he gave her. When Jordan filed a paternity suit for child-support payments for their child, Cummins counterclaimed for the rings, which together were worth $11,435. Alternatively, he argued that if Jordan was awarded the rings, their value should be deducted from any child-support obligation. The chancellor awarded the rings to Jordan, finding the rings were not a conditional gift, because the condition of marriage was not met, since Cummins had remained married to his wife. The chancellor certified the ruling on the ring issue as final, and Cummins appealed. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed the fatal fact to Cummins’s claim was his marriage to another woman: because Dr. Cummins could not legally marry at the time he gave the engagement rings, he could not argue to a court of equity that he was entitled to get the rings back, since the condition of marriage never took place. Because Cummins has no right to recover the rings due to his unclean hands, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cummins v. Goolsby" on Justia Law

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At issue was whether Family Court can find that the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) made “reasonable efforts” toward family reunifications, as required by N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1089, if ACS failed to provide the “reasonable accommodations” required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Mother, an intellectually disabled individual, moved Family Court for a determination that ACS had not made reasonable efforts to reunite her with her child because ACS had not complied with the ADA by ensuring that she had access to certain services. Family Court responded by requiring ACS to provide the services Mother claimed as “reasonable accommodations” under the ADA. ACS generally provided those services. The Appellate Division determined that ACS had made reasonable efforts to provide Mother with services to facilitate the permanency goal of “return to parent.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the record supported the Family Court’s conclusion that ACS’s efforts met a minimum threshold of reasonableness. View "In re Lacee L." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to her two children, holding that the district court erred when it proceeded with termination of Mother’s parental rights before it had a conclusive determination of the children’s status in the Chippewa Cree Tribe and when it did not address whether the Department of Public Health and Human Services made “active efforts” to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that those efforts were unsuccessful. Specifically, the Court held (1) where the district court had reason to believe that the children may be eligible for enrollment in the Chippewa Cree Tribe, the court failed to satisfy the threshold requirement of the Indian Child Welfare Act to verify the children’s eligibility; (2) the district court did not err when it did not address whether the Department provided “active efforts” pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 1912(d); and (3) Mother’s due process were not violated when the Department raised the issue of abandonment during closing arguments at the termination hearing and Mother’s counsel did not object. View "In re L.A.G." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the Court denying Petitioner’s petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief. In his petition, Petitioner sought relief from an original divorce judgment as well as a modification to that judgment. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) to the extent that Petitioner continued to seek a stay to prevent his former wife’s trip to India with the parties’ children, the issue was now moot; and (2) to the extent Petitioner sought to preclude any and all future travel by seeking relief from the divorce judgment and the ensuing modification, Petitioner’s remedy did not lie with this Court. View "Panda v. Panda" on Justia Law