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This case involved a divorced, elderly couple who each requested a restraining order against the other. The trial court granted both requests and ex-husband appealed. The court affirmed and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against ex-husband, because there was substantial evidence of his past acts toward ex-wife, which constituted threatening and harassing behavior; "dwelling" in Welfare and Institutions Code 15657.03, subdivision (b)(4)(B), encompasses the residence, i.e., apartment unit of the protected person, and not the entire apartment building; the trial court's issuance of the DVRO and elder abuse restraining order (EARO) did not amount to mutual restraining orders that required specific findings of fact; and, although ex-wife's attachment of a confidential custody evaluation report to her appellate belief was sanctionable conduct, the court refrained from imposing sanctions as it would create an unreasonable financial burden on her. View "Herriott v. Herriott" on Justia Law

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Although the trial court acknowledged Respondent Irene Sweeney would receive substantial income from her share of an investment account, it granted her alimony. The court of appeals affirmed, noting the family court extensively analyzed the statutory factors governing alimony. The issue for the South Carolina Supreme Court’s resolution centered on whether the family court adequately considered the projected growth of a party's liquid assets apportioned through equitable division in awarding alimony. The Supreme Court affirmed the family court’s judgment, taking the opportunity to clarify that in determining alimony, family courts should consider the effect of investment income on both parties. View "Sweeney v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing the complaint of Appellant for a writ of prohibition or mandamus seeking a writ requiring dismissal of an adoption proceeding concerning his biological child, holding that the complaint was properly dismissed. The adoption case was probate in the probate division of the court of common pleas. Appellee in this action was the judge of that court. In his complaint, Appellant argued that because an adoption cannot be granted under Ohio Rev. Code 3107.06 without the biological father’s consent, he deprived the probate court of jurisdiction by withholding his consent to the adoption. The court of appeals dismissed the prohibition claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the probate court clearly possessed jurisdiction to determine whether Appellant’s consent was required and because Appellant could appeal any adverse judgment, the court of appeals correctly dismissed the prohibition claim; and (2) mandamus was not proper because Appellant had no legal right to such a dismissal, nor did the common pleas court judge have any legal duty to grant it. View "State ex rel. Roush v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

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Appellant C.T. (Mother) appealed an order changing primary physical custody of her minor son, A.B. to A.B.’s father, respondent R.B. (Father), in Arkansas. A.B. lived with Mother since his birth in 2006; Mother and Father separated in 2007. The trial court entered a final child custody order in 2010, with Mother’s home ordered A.B.’s primary residence. In 2011, Father moved from California to Arkansas and lived with his parents. In 2017, Mother and Father both requested sole physical custody of A.B. Mother contended Father failed to meet his burden of establishing that moving A.B. to Arkansas would not cause detriment to A.B., and that the change in physical custody was in A.B.’s best interests. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the child custody order awarding Father primary physical custody. View "In re the Marriage of C.T. and R.B." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order terminating Mother’s custodial rights but leaving intact her parental rights, holding that the circuit court’s account of the evidence was plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety. Father was granted sole custody of the minor child in this case. Thereafter, the circuit court terminated the custodial rights of Mother but left intact Mother’s parental rights to the child. On appeal, Father argued that Mother’s parental rights should have been terminated based on the circuit court’s factual findings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no reason to disturb the circuit court’s dispositional ruling. View "In re B.S." on Justia Law

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Mother Jane Doe appealed a magistrate court’s termination of her parental rights to her child T.G.E. At the time she gave birth, Mother had pending felony drug charges and an active warrant for her arrest; the child’s umbilical cord tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. Following a termination hearing, the magistrate court found termination proper based on neglect and entered an order to that effect on December 8, 2017 (the Order). However, in a subsequent decree (the Decree) issued on December 15, 2017, the magistrate court stated Mother’s parental rights were being terminated based on abandonment. The court also terminated Father’s parental rights however, Father had voluntarily relinquished his parental rights and was not a party to this appeal. On appeal, both Mother and the Department raised procedural issues relating to the conflicting Order and Decree. Subsequently, the Idaho Supreme Court remanded the case for entry of a new judgment terminating Mother and Father’s rights to Child, and stated the Order would constitute the findings of fact and conclusions of law. Mother appealed, contenting the magistrate court erred when it terminated Mother’s parental rights. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the ultimate termination. View "DHW v. Jane Doe" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s order terminating Petitioner’s parental rights to his three minor children despite concluding three months earlier that Petitioner had not abused or neglected them, holding that the circuit court erred by terminating Petitioner’s parental rights without first adjudicating him as an abusive or neglectful parent. Petitioner was serving a prison sentence for first-degree and was not eligible for parole until 2029. In 2018, the circuit court concluded that, although it explicitly found that Petitioner had not abandoned his children at the earlier adjudicatory hearing, the children’s best interests required termination of Petitioner’s parental rights. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment, holding that where the circuit court impermissibly terminated Petitioner’s parental rights without first adjudicating him an abusive or neglectful parent, the circuit court lacked the jurisdiction to enter those portions of its order purporting to terminate Petitioner’s parental rights. View "In re A.P.-1" on Justia Law

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Mother Jane Doe appealed a magistrate court’s judgment terminating her parental rights to her minor children. The judgment also terminated the parental rights of the children’s father, who appealed in a separate action. The children were placed in the custody of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the “Department”) following a March 2016 petition under the Child Protection Act (“CPA”). After the filing of the petition, the parents stipulated to an unstable home environment. In June 2016, the magistrate court ordered the parents to follow case plans provided by the Department. Roughly eight months later, the State filed a motion to terminate both parents’ parental rights based on failure to comply with their case plans and prior neglect. After holding a trial, the magistrate court terminated both parents’ parental rights. Mother argued on appeal that the Department did not make adequate efforts to reunify the family and that the magistrate court erred by finding that the Department’s efforts were reasonable. Unpersuaded by Mother’s arguments, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed termination. View "DHW v. Jane Doe" on Justia Law

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Father John Doe appealed a magistrate court’s judgment terminating his parental rights to his minor children. The judgment also terminated the parental rights of the children’s mother (she appealed in a separate action). Prior to the termination, the children and parents were the subject of a Child Protection Act (“CPA”) proceeding for over two years. When the prosecutors first filed a petition under the CPA, the parents were listed with separate addresses, but were living together. However, the parents ended and rekindled their relationship at various times prior to and during the CPA proceeding. By the time of trial, Father and Mother were permanently separated. The Department became involved in early March 2016 after receiving reports of drug use and neglect involving the children. Prior to this, the Department had received referrals for the family on two occasions in 2013 and 2014. The Department’s investigation revealed that both children had been born premature, exposed to drugs in-utero, and tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. Based on these concerns, the Lincoln County Prosecutor’s Office filed a petition under the CPA in March 2016. In June 2016, the court ordered the parents to follow case plans provided by the Department. Eight months later, the State filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of both parents based on failure to comply with the case plan and on prior neglect. After holding a trial, the court terminated both parents’ parental rights. Father argued on appeal the magistrate court’s finding of neglect was not supported by substantial, competent evidence and that the court erred by not considering how Father’s periods of incarceration affected his ability to comply with the case plan. The Idaho Supreme Court was not persuaded by Father’s arguments and affirmed termination. View "DHW v. John Doe" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in this grandparent visitation case affirming the judgment of the trial court awarding limited grandparent visitation to Bruce Tipton, the paternal grandfather of the children, holding that the trial court properly considered and applied the best interest factors and applied the proper standard of proof. David and Darlene Morton, the maternal grandfather and step-grandmother of the two children in this case, were granted permanent custody of the children. The family court included a provision for Tipton to have supervised visitation at the Mortons’ discretion. Tipton later filed this petition to modify the grandparent visitation by asking for an established visitation schedule. Ultimately, the trial court granted visitation three times per year with restrictions. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court properly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard and appropriately considered the relevant factors set forth in Walker v. Blair, 382 S.W.3d 862, 871 (Ky. 2012). The Supreme court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly used the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof when assessing whether Tipton’s grandparent visitation was in the best interest of the children and did not abuse its discretion when granting the limited visitation. View "Morton v. Tipton" on Justia Law