Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A petition was filed against a mother after she failed to follow a safety plan, which was implemented following her recording of a video threatening self-harm while with her child, A.C. The mother admitted that her mental health and substance abuse issues impaired her parenting, and she was adjudicated as an abusing parent. She was granted a post-adjudicatory improvement period. Subsequently, she entered into an agreement acknowledging her inability to provide adequately for A.C. at that time, which led to a dispositional order awarding full custody of A.C. to her non-abusing father, while her parental rights remained intact. The circuit court ordered the parties to return one year later for a modification hearing.After a year, the Department of Human Services filed a motion to modify the disposition and requested termination of the mother’s parental rights. At the modification hearing, witnesses, including the father and a child protective services worker, testified. The father reported an incident involving suspected drug paraphernalia but also stated he had never suspected the mother was under the influence during visits. The CPS worker testified that nothing had changed with the mother since the initial disposition. The circuit court nevertheless found a material change of circumstances and terminated the mother’s parental rights.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, the mother argued the Department failed to prove a material change in circumstances, as required by statute, and challenged the circuit court’s informal policy mandating a one-year limit on the dispositional order. The Department conceded that no material change had been alleged or proven and confessed error. The Supreme Court of Appeals held that the circuit court erred by terminating parental rights absent proof of a material change in circumstances and found the circuit court’s policy lacked statutory support and improperly shifted the burden. The order terminating parental rights was reversed and the case remanded for entry of an amended dispositional order. View "In re A.C." on Justia Law

A divorced couple with two minor children disputed the terms of parenting time after the mother was awarded primary residential responsibility and the father was granted reasonable visitation. Following the father’s return to Fargo, visitation resumed on an every-other-weekend daytime schedule. In 2024, the father moved for contempt, alleging violations of the parenting plan. The mother responded, seeking to modify parenting time and require the father to undergo psychological evaluation. After hearings, the District Court denied the contempt motion, ordered the evaluation, and imposed a stepped parenting plan beginning with supervised visits.The father appealed, and the Supreme Court of North Dakota previously affirmed the contempt denial, the evaluation requirement, and the decision to modify parenting time, but reversed the stepped plan due to improper delegation of authority to therapists without defined standards. The case was remanded for creation of a court-supervised plan. On remand, the District Court denied the father’s motions for reassignment and parent-child communication, maintained existing findings, and revised the parenting plan to ensure the court retained decision-making authority over parenting time transitions, with therapists limited to recommending rather than approving progression.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the appeal from the amended judgment, holding that the District Court complied with the mandate by removing improper delegation to therapists and reserving approval for the court. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing, determined the revised parenting plan included sufficient standards and endpoints, and rejected renewed challenges to findings previously affirmed. The amended judgment was affirmed, and the mother was awarded double costs and $1,000 in attorney’s fees for the father’s frivolous challenge to previously resolved findings. View "Boyda v. Boyda" on Justia Law

A couple who were not married but had been in a long-term relationship petitioned to jointly adopt a young child. One petitioner was the child’s maternal grandmother, and the child’s biological parents had both consented to the adoption, relinquishing their parental rights. The couple had cared for the child since infancy, and the only obstacle identified by the district court to granting the adoption was the couple’s unmarried status.The District Court of McKenzie County, Northwest Judicial District, faced uncertainty regarding whether North Dakota law permitted two unmarried adults to jointly adopt a child. The court found no reason to deny the adoption except for the unresolved legal question of eligibility under the applicable statute. The district court noted inconsistent rulings among other district courts on this issue and certified the legal question to the North Dakota Supreme Court, staying the underlying adoption proceeding pending resolution.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the certified question. It interpreted section 14-15-03 of the North Dakota Century Code, concluding that the statute authorizes joint adoptions only by a “husband and wife together” and not by two unmarried adults. The court reasoned that the selective use of the term “together” for married couples, and its absence elsewhere in the statute, indicated legislative intent to exclude unmarried couples from joint adoption. The court declined to expand the statute’s meaning, emphasizing that such policy decisions rest with the legislature. The Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that North Dakota law does not permit two unmarried adults to jointly adopt a child. View "Adoption of T.J.W.-H." on Justia Law

After an incident of domestic violence, the petitioner sought a domestic violence protective order against her husband, alleging that he had forced her to resign from her job, leaving her financially dependent, and had subjected her to escalating verbal, physical, and psychological abuse. Following a particularly violent episode that resulted in her hospitalization and the respondent’s arrest, she requested not only protection from contact but also temporary possession of the marital residence, reimbursement for expenses related to the violence, exclusive possession of the parties’ dog, temporary spousal support, temporary use of respondent’s vehicle, funds to hire a divorce attorney, and the return of her personal property.The Family Court of Wood County held a hearing, during which the respondent consented to a protective order and some relief such as temporary possession of the marital home and reimbursement for care of the dog. However, the family court refused to consider the petitioner’s other requests, stating that relief like temporary spousal support, vehicle possession, and return of personal property should be addressed in a divorce proceeding, not in a domestic violence case. The court’s order reflected these limitations. The petitioner appealed to the Circuit Court of Wood County, arguing that West Virginia Code § 48-27-503 authorized such relief within a protective order. The circuit court affirmed the family court’s decision, declining to address property and financial issues in the domestic violence proceeding.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and held that West Virginia Code § 48-27-503 permits family courts to grant broad, immediate relief—including financial and property-related relief—within domestic violence protective orders, when requested and appropriate. The family court is required to hear evidence, exercise its discretion, and make findings of fact and law regarding the requested relief. The circuit court’s decision was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Riley v. Riley" on Justia Law

A married couple with two minor children separated, and the wife initiated dissolution proceedings. They reached agreements on parenting and property, specifying that child support would be calculated under Montana Child Support Guidelines via the Child Support Services Division (CSSD). The husband was to maintain health insurance for the children if available at a reasonable cost, and the parties would split tax exemptions. CSSD issued a temporary support order, but the wife later challenged the calculation, arguing it contained errors regarding parenting days, incomes, and health-insurance credits, and she requested recalculation and back support.After the Office of Administrative Hearings denied her request for review as untimely, the wife sought recalculation in the Montana Fourth Judicial District Court. The parties eventually agreed on key financial inputs, and several support calculations were considered. The District Court initially ordered support based on a worksheet not admitted into evidence, modified the tax and insurance provisions from the parties’ agreement, and declined to award retroactive support. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court remanded for more detailed findings.Following remand, the District Court clarified income, parenting days, and tax allocations, and maintained that the wife should enroll the children in Healthy Montana Kids rather than private insurance. However, the adopted support calculation continued to credit the husband for private insurance premiums, contradicting the findings. The court again declined to award retroactive support, finding both parents had met the children’s needs and had received family assistance.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the District Court’s child-support calculation did not implement its findings regarding health insurance and reversed that portion of the order, remanding for a corrected calculation consistent with the findings. The denial of earlier retroactive support was affirmed. The husband’s request for sanctions was denied. View "In re Marriage of Christofferson" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a maternal grandparent and a mother regarding court-ordered visitation with the mother’s two children. The children were previously removed from the mother’s custody and placed with the grandparent during juvenile dependency proceedings, but the mother later regained custody. After the dependency court terminated jurisdiction and issued final custody and visitation orders, the grandparent petitioned under Family Code section 3104 for visitation with the grandchildren, alleging a close relationship with one child. The mother opposed this petition, arguing the grandparent lacked a substantial relationship with the children, and subsequently requested attorney’s fees and costs incurred in opposing the petition.The Superior Court of Riverside County issued an interim order allowing limited telephone contact between the grandparent and the children and set a date for a long-term visitation hearing. The court denied the mother’s request for attorney’s fees and costs, determining it lacked statutory authority to grant such fees in a grandparent visitation proceeding. Specifically, the court concluded that statutory fee-shifting provisions in the Family Code, including section 7605, did not apply to petitions brought under section 3104.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the denial of attorney’s fees. The appellate court held that a petition for grandparent visitation under section 3104 is not a proceeding under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) and therefore does not trigger the fee-shifting provision of Family Code section 7605. The court also found that previous juvenile court parentage and custody orders were not UPA judgments, and that dependency proceedings are fundamentally distinct from UPA actions. The order denying the request for attorney’s fees and costs was affirmed, with each party ordered to bear their own appellate costs. View "Timothy S. v. Sarah H." on Justia Law

A married couple each sought domestic violence restraining orders against the other during their divorce proceedings. Ultimately, they reached a settlement in which the wife admitted to certain acts of domestic abuse, agreed to a one-year restraining order protecting the husband, and dismissed her own restraining order request with prejudice. The parties also resolved financial issues, including temporary spousal support and advances on community property, but did not mention attorney fees in their agreement or the resulting court orders. The findings and restraining orders filed by the trial court specified that attorney fees were not applicable, and the section for such fees was left blank.After more than a year had passed, the husband moved for attorney fees under Family Code section 6344, arguing he prevailed on his restraining order request and successfully defended against his wife's request. The Superior Court of San Mateo County granted his motion, awarding him $39,000 in attorney fees. The wife appealed, contending the motion for attorney fees was untimely under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702, which requires such motions to be filed within the time limit for filing a notice of appeal—generally within 180 days of judgment.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that rule 3.1702 applies to requests for attorney fees under section 6344. Because the husband filed his motion for attorney fees fourteen months after the final order on the restraining orders, his request was untimely. The appellate court rejected arguments that the issue of fees had been reserved or that section 6344 created its own deadline. The court reversed the award of attorney fees and ordered that each party bear their own costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of A.O. & Vologodskaya" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were involved in a family court proceeding in Mohave County Superior Court that resulted in a Decree of Dissolution entered on January 21, 2025. The Decree dissolved the marriage and addressed the division of property and debts, denied spousal maintenance, and denied requests for attorney fees and costs. Husband subsequently filed a timely motion to alter or amend the Decree under Rule 83, specifically contesting aspects of the property division, including the value and allocation of a business and a retirement account. The court granted a stay regarding the disputed property but ultimately denied Husband’s Rule 83 motion on May 5, 2025, and lifted the stay on June 16, 2025.After the denial of his Rule 83 motion and the lifting of the stay, Husband filed a notice of appeal on June 17, challenging the Decree, the Rule 83 denial, and related orders. Wife moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely, arguing that it was filed more than 30 days after the May 5 order denying the Rule 83 motion. The Arizona Court of Appeals agreed, explaining that the time to appeal was triggered by the entry of the order disposing of the Rule 83 motion, not by subsequent orders or the inclusion of finality language, and dismissed Husband’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the matter to clarify when the time to appeal begins following a Rule 83 motion in family court. The Court held that, under ARCAP 9(e)(1)(C), the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal started when the superior court clerk entered the signed order denying the Rule 83 motion, regardless of whether that order contained Rule 78(b) or (c) finality language. Because Husband’s notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after this order, it was untimely. The Court affirmed the order dismissing Husband’s appeal. View "MACDONALD v MACDONALD" on Justia Law

Former spouses entered into a marital settlement agreement during their divorce proceedings in Montana, which included provisions for the ownership and future sale of a residential property located in Eagle, Idaho. The agreement specified that the Eagle property would be held as tenants in common and sold upon the mutual agreement of both parties. The settlement agreement was incorporated into the Montana divorce decree, which reserved exclusive jurisdiction to the Montana court over the enforcement, modification, or interpretation of the agreement. After the divorce, one spouse relocated to Idaho and, believing she was entitled to force a sale, filed a partition action in Ada County, Idaho, seeking to compel the sale of the Eagle property and to receive credit for fair market rent.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho considered the partition action. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action, reasoning that the Montana court’s decree, which incorporated the settlement agreement and reserved exclusive jurisdiction to the Montana court, deprived the Idaho court of subject matter jurisdiction over the partition claim. The court also denied a motion for reconsideration.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the Idaho district court did possess subject matter jurisdiction over partition actions generally, but that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution required Idaho courts to honor the Montana divorce decree’s reservation of exclusive jurisdiction. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that resolving the partition action would necessarily require interpreting or enforcing the Montana agreement, which only the Montana court could do. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the partition action, but on the alternative ground that full faith and credit precluded the relief sought, rather than a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court also declined to award attorney fees on appeal. View "Bear v. Bear" on Justia Law

A married couple executed a Marital and Property Settlement Agreement (MPSA) in 2012, which allocated their marital debts, including a Parent PLUS student loan, to the husband. He agreed to be solely responsible for the debt and indemnify his former wife. While he resolved other debts, he did not pay the Parent PLUS loan until the wife sought contempt in 2022. The parties then stipulated that the husband would make monthly loan payments and apply proceeds from a business sale toward the loan. The wife remained the borrower, but the husband assumed responsibility for payments. After further nonpayment, the wife again sought contempt in 2024.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, held the husband in contempt for failing to pay monthly amounts due in August and September 2024, denied his request for expanded account access, entered an immediately collectible judgment for the entire unpaid loan balance in favor of the wife, and awarded her attorney fees. The court determined that the husband had willfully failed to comply with his payment obligation and found that his unauthorized changes to the account justified restricted access.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the denial of unrestricted account access and the contempt determination based on August and September 2024 nonpayments. It also affirmed the award of $3,237.50 in attorney fees to the wife. However, the Supreme Court vacated the full-balance judgment for the loan, holding that the parties’ agreements did not authorize immediate acceleration of the entire debt based on missed monthly payments. The Court remanded for determination of an enforcement remedy consistent with the agreements and applicable law, and for reasonable appellate attorney fees, while denying appellate sanctions. The underlying allocation of debt and adjudicated obligations from June 2024 remain undisturbed. View "In re Marriage of Kearns" on Justia Law