Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A divorced couple’s agreed decree required them to sell community property, including their marital home, and divide the proceeds equally. The decree further required each party to deliver certain personal property to a receiver and specified that if either failed to deliver or damaged property, the fair market value of the missing or damaged items would be assessed against that party and “accounted for” out of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home. After the divorce, the wife alleged that the husband had damaged and failed to deliver certain property. The trial court found numerous violations, but rather than determining the specific value of the loss, it awarded the wife all proceeds from the sale of the marital home.The trial court, a district court in Texas, conducted hearings and ultimately ordered the entirety of the marital home’s sale proceeds be given to the wife, along with attorney’s fees and costs, without making findings about the fair market value of the alleged losses. The husband appealed, contending that the trial court had exceeded its jurisdiction by impermissibly modifying the substantive property division in the decree. The Twelfth Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the trial court’s order effectively redivided property in violation of Texas Family Code Section 9.007, and vacated the order, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Texas held that the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce the decree and award damages for breach, but it erred by reallocating all proceeds from the marital home without evidence of actual damages. The high court reversed the appellate court’s decision, clarified that the trial court’s error did not deprive it of enforcement jurisdiction, and remanded the matter for further proceedings to determine actual damages as required by the decree and statute. View "MORRISON v. MORRISON" on Justia Law

Ashley Cull and Andrew Cull were married in 2013 and have two children, born in 2016 and 2019. After initiating a divorce in 2021, a stipulated judgment was entered in January 2022, with Andrew awarded primary residential responsibility for the children. An amended judgment in March 2022 reaffirmed this arrangement. In February 2025, Ashley filed a motion to modify primary residential responsibility, arguing that material changes had occurred since the prior order which warranted a shift in custody to her. She submitted declarations from herself and her parents, alleging that Andrew delegated parenting to his mother, lacked routine in his home, and made unsafe decisions affecting the children.The Northeast Judicial District Court, Pembina County, reviewed Ashley’s motion and supporting documents, along with Andrew’s fourteen counter-declarations. The district court denied Ashley’s motion, concluding that she failed to establish a prima facie case under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6, as there was no material change in circumstances nor evidence that modification was necessary to serve the children’s best interests. The court found much of Ashley’s evidence was not based on firsthand knowledge or was not competent, and that extended family involvement and Andrew’s occupation as a farmer were known factors at the time of the original custody determination.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s order de novo. It held that Ashley Cull did not provide competent evidence of a material change in circumstances or show that modification was necessary for the children's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to modify primary residential responsibility, concluding that the statutory requirements for a prima facie case were not met. View "Cull v. Cull" on Justia Law

The parties in this case, who were never married but cohabitated and share two minor children, separated in early 2023 after their relationship deteriorated. The plaintiff filed a complaint in the Kent County Family Court seeking joint custody, primary placement of the children, and child support. Shortly after, the defendant filed a separate complaint alleging abuse, resulting in an ex parte temporary protection order and temporary custody for her. Over the following year, the Family Court issued various orders, including appointing a guardian ad litem, scheduling mediation, amending visitation, and addressing discovery issues related to the plaintiff’s income.After several hearings, the Family Court entered four orders on June 25, 2024. These included a visitation order (not challenged on appeal), an order granting primary placement of the children to the defendant, a child-support guideline worksheet setting the plaintiff’s monthly obligation at $1,254, and a handwritten order memorializing child-support details and other arrangements. The plaintiff objected, contending that there was no agreement or sufficient opportunity to present evidence, and that the best interests of the children were not properly considered.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case. It found that the Family Court did not make adequate factual findings regarding the children’s best interests to support the order granting primary placement to the defendant, as required by established precedent. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the disputed portion of the placement order. However, the Court affirmed the child-support guideline worksheet, determining that the plaintiff was bound by his attorney’s actions in signing the worksheet and that no special circumstances warranted overturning it. As the same support amount was memorialized in the handwritten order, the plaintiff’s appeal of that order was deemed moot. The case was remanded to the Family Court for further proceedings. View "Conway v. Orenberg" on Justia Law

A man and woman who had been in a relationship for five years were married in a ceremony on a dock, officiated by a minister, with only the groom’s minor son physically present at the ceremony. Two adults had previously signed the marriage license as witnesses, but only one of them was arguably present nearby in a vehicle; the other was definitely absent. After the ceremony, the marriage license was properly filed and accepted by the state. The couple lived as husband and wife until the groom’s unexpected death five months later. Following the death, a dispute arose between the widow and the decedent’s father, who acts as personal representative of the estate, regarding the decedent’s property and home.The decedent’s father sought a declaratory judgment in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, arguing that the widow was not the decedent’s legal spouse because the marriage was not solemnized in the presence of two reputable adult witnesses as required by statute. He contended this failure rendered the marriage void, and sought to prevent the widow from inheriting. The Court of Chancery treated this as a petition for annulment under the Delaware Divorce and Annulment Act, but denied relief, finding that the petitioner lacked standing to seek annulment after the decedent’s death and that minor defects in solemnization do not necessarily void a marriage.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the statutory requirements for marriage and found that, despite the absence of one adult witness, the parties had intended a lawful marriage and acted in good faith. The court held that the witness requirement is directory, not mandatory, and the marriage was not void for lack of a witness. The court affirmed the judgment below, holding that the marriage was valid and the petitioner could not seek its annulment. View "Lafon v. Felmlee" on Justia Law

Tara Starr petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to Thomas Starr, with the principal dispute centering on the date of separation—Tara claimed 2012 and Thomas asserted 2020. Tara’s original petition alleged a separation date of March 20, 2009, but after retaining counsel, she amended her petition to allege June 2, 2020, as the separation date. Throughout subsequent proceedings, including case management statements, trial briefs, and settlement conference statements, Tara consistently maintained that the actual separation occurred in 2012, and Thomas continued to dispute her position, claiming September 2020.The Contra Costa County Superior Court presided over pretrial and trial proceedings. The matter was bifurcated to first determine the separation date. At the trial, the court, sua sponte, raised the issue that Tara was bound by her amended petition’s allegation of June 2, 2020, as the separation date and suggested there was no controversy. Despite both parties previously treating the date as contested and preparing for trial on that issue, the court held Tara to the June 2020 date, after Thomas ultimately accepted it, and entered an order accordingly. Tara’s subsequent motion to set aside the order was denied, with the court finding her pleading to be a deliberate litigation strategy and not a mistake.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that Tara’s amended petition did not constitute a binding judicial admission regarding the date of separation, as Thomas had consistently contested the allegation throughout the litigation, and both parties prepared for trial on the disputed issue. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for further proceedings to determine the separation date, denying Tara’s request for reassignment to a different judge. Tara was awarded costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Starr" on Justia Law

Lucas Alzu and Amy Nichole Huff met in Colombia in 2018 and began a romantic relationship that led to Huff becoming pregnant. Both led highly nomadic lives, moving frequently and attending international gatherings. In July 2019, due to expiring Colombian visas, they decided to relocate to Argentina, where Alzu’s family lived, for the birth of their child. Huff moved to Argentina when six months pregnant, but soon left Alzu’s family home because of physical assault and lived independently before Alzu joined her again. Their child was born in March 2020, and the COVID-19 pandemic shortly thereafter restricted travel. Following a breakdown in their relationship in 2021, Huff was granted an order of protection and, after travel restrictions were lifted, obtained permission from an Argentinian court to travel with the child. Instead of returning, Huff remained in the United States and began working full-time.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri bifurcated proceedings to first determine the child’s habitual residence under the Hague Convention and International Child Abduction Remedies Act. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Alzu had not established Argentina as the child’s habitual residence and dismissed his petition for return of the child.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s determination for clear error, applying the totality-of-the-circumstances standard as required by Supreme Court precedent. The appellate court found that the district court properly weighed factors such as parental intentions, immigration status, the child’s age, residency, family relationships, and pandemic-related restrictions. The Eighth Circuit held that Alzu had not met his burden to show Argentina was the child’s habitual residence and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Alzu v. Huff" on Justia Law

A mother with a history of involvement with the Department of Family Services had her youngest child, BAR, removed from her care after police found her intoxicated, in possession of methamphetamine, and responsible for leaving children unattended in a running vehicle. She was subsequently arrested and convicted of child endangerment. The Department developed a reunification case plan focused on sobriety, mental health, stable housing, and parenting skills. Despite receiving significant support and services from the Department, the mother repeatedly failed to comply with her case plan. She did not maintain sobriety, attend counseling consistently, or secure stable housing, and her visitation with BAR was sporadic. Her progress was further hampered by recurring involvement in unstable and sometimes violent relationships and continued substance abuse.The District Court of Natrona County first placed BAR in the Department’s custody following an abuse and neglect petition. The juvenile court initially pursued a reunification plan but later shifted to a plan of adoption due to the mother’s lack of progress. After a five-day bench trial, the district court found clear and convincing evidence that BAR had been in foster care for at least fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and that the mother was unfit to have custody and control of BAR, citing ongoing instability, untreated mental health issues, substance abuse, and lack of consistent visitation. The court terminated the mother's parental rights under Wyoming Statute § 14-2-309(a)(v).On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming reviewed whether sufficient evidence supported termination under the statute. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that clear and convincing evidence established the statutory grounds for termination based on the mother’s unfitness and the duration of BAR’s time in foster care. View "B.A.R. v. State Ex Rel. Department of Family Services" on Justia Law

A married couple initiated divorce proceedings, with the primary dispute centering on the date of their separation. The wife, Tara, initially claimed in her petition that the separation occurred in 2009, while the husband, Thomas, claimed it was in September 2020. Tara later amended her petition, with the assistance of counsel, to allege a separation date of June 2, 2020. Despite this, in subsequent filings and during trial preparation, Tara consistently asserted that the actual separation occurred in 2012 and provided evidence and argument to support this claim. Both parties, through multiple attorneys and case management statements, continued to treat the date of separation as a contested issue, preparing for trial on whether the separation occurred in 2012 or 2020.The Contra Costa County Superior Court addressed the issue during a bifurcated trial. On the day of trial, the court, on its own initiative, declared that Tara was bound by the June 2, 2020 separation date alleged in her amended petition, characterizing it as a binding judicial admission. The court reasoned that Tara’s failure to formally amend her petition again prevented her from arguing a different date. When Thomas ultimately accepted the June 2, 2020 date to avoid trial, the court adopted this date as the legal separation and denied Tara’s subsequent motion to set aside the order or to permit another amendment to her petition.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that under the circumstances, the trial court erred in treating the separation date in the amended petition as a judicial admission binding Tara. The appellate court explained that a judicial admission requires the adverse party not to contest the allegation, which did not occur here, as Thomas continued to dispute the separation date throughout the proceedings until the trial began. The order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings to determine the actual date of separation. The appellate court declined to order reassignment to a different trial judge. View "Marriage of Starr" on Justia Law

A father and mother, previously married and sharing a child, were involved in an ongoing custody arrangement. After initial divorce proceedings, the mother was permitted unmonitored visitation with the child. In late 2023 and early 2024, the father alleged that the mother’s behavior had become increasingly erratic, including stalking, repeated unwanted visits to his home, entering his residence and car without permission, incessant calls and texts, following him and the child in her car, and making threats related to his employment and family. The father stated these actions caused fear for both himself and their child, prompting him to seek a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) and restored monitored visitation for the mother. The mother denied the allegations, attributing her actions to concern for the child’s safety and referencing her mental health history.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County heard testimony from both parties and considered evidence including text messages, videos, and the mother’s admissions. The court acknowledged that the mother’s conduct was obsessive and alarming but found that the behavior stemmed from her mental health condition rather than malicious intent. The court concluded that the father had not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the mother’s actions constituted abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), specifically focusing on whether her conduct was intentionally threatening or intimidating. The court denied the DVRO but ordered professionally monitored visitation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, found that the trial court misapplied the standard for abuse under the DVPA by requiring proof of intent to threaten or intimidate, rather than considering the totality of the circumstances and the effect of the conduct. The appellate court held that the uncontradicted evidence established abuse as defined by the DVPA and reversed the trial court’s order, remanding with directions to enter the requested DVRO. View "R.R. v. C.R." on Justia Law

Kathleen L. Jellison filed for divorce from Ralph E. Jellison, and the District Court incorporated the parties’ agreement regarding the division of marital assets. Kathleen was awarded the marital home, valued at $250,000 and subject to a $45,823.58 home equity loan, while Ralph received the Verso 401(k) account with a similar value. Both parties and the court agreed this was an equitable division, though Kathleen later contended she had not entered the agreement knowingly and voluntarily, and sought to hold Ralph responsible for half of the home equity debt.After the original judgment, Kathleen filed post-judgment motions, and the District Court amended its judgment to order Ralph to pay $30,000 from his 401(k) to Kathleen, which she was to apply to the home equity loan. Kathleen appealed, arguing the asset division remained inequitable. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the amended judgment in Jellison v. Jellison, Mem-24-115. Ralph did not cross-appeal.Subsequently, Ralph filed motions for relief from judgment under Rule 60(a) and then Rule 60(b), arguing that the provision requiring him to pay $30,000 was a mistake. The District Court granted relief under Rule 60(b), striking the payment provision and amending the judgment. Kathleen appealed this order.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the District Court erred in granting Ralph’s Rule 60(b) motion because it conflicted with the appellate mandate affirming the amended judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court clarified that a lower court may not modify matters expressly or impliedly disposed of on appeal, and Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for appellate review or a means to challenge issues not raised on direct appeal. The order granting Ralph’s motion for relief from judgment was vacated, and the case was remanded with instructions to deny the motion. View "Jellison v. Jellison" on Justia Law