Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A married couple separated after more than twenty years together. The wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, initially leaving the sections regarding property division unspecified. The husband was personally served with the petition but did not respond or participate in the proceedings for an extended period. The wife later retained counsel, took the husband’s default, and submitted additional disclosure forms. A default judgment was entered awarding the marital residence and other assets to the wife, subject to certain equalizing payments to the husband. Notice issues arose because the husband was not properly informed of hearing dates or the specific property division sought, and some communications between the wife's counsel and the court were conducted informally and off-the-record.After the default judgment was entered, the wife sought to enforce it, prompting the husband to appear at a subsequent hearing. He later retained counsel and moved to set aside the default judgment, arguing that he did not receive proper notice, the judgment exceeded the relief requested in the original petition, and the disclosures were inadequate or not properly served. The Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, considered extensive briefing and hearings. The court found that the husband was not provided proper notice of the proceedings and that the default judgment exceeded the relief requested in the petition, as the property for division had been left “to be determined” in the petition and not specified before judgment.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the lower court’s order setting aside the default judgment except as to marital status. The court held that a default judgment in a dissolution action cannot grant relief exceeding what was specified in the petition, per Code of Civil Procedure section 580, and that lack of notice to the defaulting party also warranted vacatur under the Family Code. The court directed that the wife amend her petition to list assets for division, allowed the husband to answer, and permitted the case to proceed accordingly. View "In re Marriage of Jenkins" on Justia Law

A married couple separated, and their marital settlement agreement (MSA) awarded the family home to the wife, specifying that the net proceeds of any future sale would be split equally. An amendment later required the wife to sign a quitclaim deed, removing her from the title, while retaining her right to half the proceeds upon sale. Disputes arose over whether the wife still had an interest in the home, leading to litigation. A trial court determined that she retained a one-half interest and ultimately ordered the husband to buy out her share. The only remaining issue was the wife’s request for attorney’s fees and costs under the MSA's prevailing party clause.The Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County found the wife was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees but limited the amount to $12,500, rather than the nearly $49,000 she claimed. The trial court considered the financial circumstances of both parties, noting that neither had significant income and that the case had been over-litigated. The court reasoned that the fees sought were not “reasonably necessary” under the circumstances and allowed the husband to pay in installments. The court also denied the wife’s request to recalculate the fee award solely under Civil Code section 1717, instead of the Family Code.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that, in marital dissolution cases, even when an MSA includes a prevailing party attorney’s fees clause, the trial court has discretion to consider the losing party’s ability to pay and other equitable factors under Family Code sections 2030 and 2032 when determining the amount of fees. The court found no abuse of discretion or legal error in the trial court’s decision. Each party was ordered to bear their own costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Bowman" on Justia Law

Johnathon and Lanora Sprague, divorced parents of three children, entered into a stipulation at the time of their divorce that provided for joint legal and physical custody. In 2022, Lanora sought to modify the custody provisions due to ongoing communication difficulties. On the day set for trial of the modification, the parties believed they had reached a verbal settlement agreement, though it was not reduced to writing or made part of the record. Subsequent drafts of the settlement were exchanged, but disagreements arose over the terms, leading Lanora to file a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, attaching her version of the proposed settlement and related correspondence.The Iowa District Court for Scott County held an unreported hearing and granted Lanora’s motion, finding her draft accurately reflected the parties’ agreement and ordering both parties to sign it. The court also found that Johnathon’s objections referenced provisions that were not part of the original agreement. Johnathon appealed, arguing that factual disputes remained and that the district court had not properly considered evidence. The Iowa Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed and remanded for a trial to determine whether a binding settlement existed and its terms, reasoning that material factual disputes precluded summary enforcement.The Iowa Supreme Court granted further review, vacated the appellate court’s decision, and affirmed the district court’s enforcement of the settlement. The Supreme Court held that because Johnathon, as appellant, failed to provide a record of the hearing, there was no basis to overturn the district court’s factual findings. The court reiterated that when an appellant does not ensure the record is adequate, affirmance is required unless the ruling is facially erroneous. Additionally, the Supreme Court awarded Lanora appellate attorney fees, finding she was required to defend a judgment that could not be meaningfully reviewed due to the incomplete record. View "In re the marriage of Sprague" on Justia Law

A divorced couple with one child became embroiled in post-divorce litigation over visitation and the enforcement of prior court orders. After the divorce, the mother had primary physical custody, but the father was granted substantial visitation. In 2015, a chancellor found the mother had interfered with visitation and ordered her to pay the father for medical debt related to her other child. Years later, the father again sought to enforce visitation and recover the debt, leading to a series of contentious proceedings. The mother failed to comply with orders regarding visitation and payment. The court ultimately found her in contempt, incarcerated her, and awarded custody to the father. During these proceedings, allegations arose that the mother’s attorney had advised her not to follow the court’s orders.The case was heard in the Hinds County Chancery Court, where the new chancellor enforced the previous order for payment, found the mother in contempt, and sanctioned her attorney, Matthew Thompson, for his actions related to the case and his failure to appear at a show-cause hearing. The mother and her attorney appealed several orders, including the contempt finding against the attorney and the enforcement of the 2015 order.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the appeals. It held that the chancellor improperly sanctioned Thompson for constructive criminal contempt without affording him due process, specifically notice and a hearing before a different judge. The court vacated the sanction against Thompson, remanded for further proceedings before another chancellor, and ordered the return of the $1,500 fine. The court affirmed the enforcement of the 2015 order against the mother and denied her requests for permanent recusal of the chancellor and referral to the judicial commission. All other issues related to visitation and custody were deemed moot after the father relinquished his parental rights. View "Jones v. Jones" on Justia Law

A Canadian citizen married an American citizen in 2017. The couple lived in Canada until 2020, then moved to Hawaii, where the American spouse began working as a physician. The Canadian spouse entered the United States on a tourist visa and soon applied for lawful permanent residency. To support this application, the American spouse signed a federal Affidavit of Support, committing to maintain the non-citizen’s income above 125% of the federal poverty line. The Canadian spouse obtained permanent residency in 2021. Around that time, the marriage ended, and the American spouse moved to Michigan and filed for divorce. In 2022, the parties entered into a settlement agreement and consented divorce judgment in Michigan, in which they resolved all issues—including spousal support—and released any claims against each other.The Canadian spouse later filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging that his former spouse had failed to provide the financial support required by the Affidavit of Support. The former spouse moved to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that the divorce judgment precluded the claim. The district court rejected the jurisdictional argument but agreed that claim preclusion under Michigan law barred the lawsuit, and dismissed the action.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that federal courts must give state court judgments the same preclusive effect they would have under state law, pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Act. The court ruled that Michigan claim preclusion law applied, and that the prior divorce judgment barred the new lawsuit because the claim could have been raised in the divorce proceedings. The court also rejected arguments that federal law or preemption required a different result. View "Ramgoolam v. Gupta" on Justia Law

A married couple living in New Hampshire began divorce proceedings after a long-term marriage. The husband had previously suffered a spinal cord injury in Ontario, Canada, before meeting his wife. As a result of lawsuits related to the injury, he acquired two annuities through structured settlements: the first before the marriage and the second during the marriage. After moving to New Hampshire, the couple used the second annuity to support their household. Upon divorce, the wife sought an equitable share of the annuities, and the husband requested to exclude the annuities from division or, alternatively, sought alimony if division occurred.The Circuit Court (Nashua Family Division) found the first annuity, which was acquired before marriage, should remain with the husband, but divided the second annuity equally between the parties, as it was obtained during the marriage. The court denied both parties’ requests for alimony. The husband moved for reconsideration, arguing that Ontario law precluded division of the second annuity and challenging the denial of alimony. The trial court denied the motion, as did the wife’s motion.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that New Hampshire law, not Ontario law, governs the classification of the second annuity as marital property because New Hampshire had the most significant relationship to the marriage at the time of divorce. Under New Hampshire law, the second annuity is divisible marital property. However, the court concluded the trial court erred by not considering the impact of dividing the annuity on the husband’s income and his health-related earning capacity when ruling on alimony. The Supreme Court affirmed the division of property, vacated the denial of alimony, and remanded for further proceedings on alimony. View "In the Matter of Whitehead & Whitehead" on Justia Law

A medically fragile child, A.E., was the subject of an abuse and neglect proceeding in Hancock County, West Virginia. After an evidentiary hearing, the Circuit Court awarded permanent custody of A.E. to his non-abusive mother, who resides in Florida. The court found that A.E.’s paternal grandparents, who live in West Virginia, were “psychological parents” entitled to visitation. As part of its permanency order, the court required the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) to pay the costs of transporting A.E. from Florida to West Virginia for summer visitation with the grandparents each year until A.E. turned twenty-three.The DHS complied with the court’s order to pay for transporting A.E. to Florida for the custody transition but appealed the part of the order requiring it to pay transportation costs for visitation with the grandparents after permanency was achieved. The DHS argued that the court lacked legal authority for this requirement. No party appealed the custody decision, the visitation grant, or the determination of psychological parent status.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the circuit court could require the DHS to pay visitation-related expenses after permanency. The high court held that, absent explicit statutory authority, circuit courts may not order the DHS to pay for such expenses after permanency has been achieved in an abuse and neglect proceeding. The court found no statutory or equitable basis for the order and further noted that the court’s jurisdiction and the DHS’s responsibilities end when the child turns eighteen or permanency is reached. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the portion of the order requiring the DHS to pay post-permanency transportation costs and remanded for entry of an amended order. View "In re A.E." on Justia Law

A dispute arose over the parentage of a young child, Stella, after her birth in October 2021. One day after Stella was born, her mother, Priscilla, and Steven signed a Voluntary Declaration of Parentage (VDOP) listing Steven as her other parent. However, Priscilla had married another man, Gianni, in October 2020, about a year before Stella’s birth. Priscilla later sought to set aside the VDOP, arguing that because she was married to Gianni at the time, Gianni was Stella’s presumed parent under California Family Code section 7611. Priscilla provided a confidential marriage certificate as evidence of her marriage to Gianni.In response, Steven contended that Priscilla’s marriage to Gianni was invalid because the couple had not been “living together as spouses” before their marriage, a requirement under California law for confidential marriages. After an evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court of San Diego County found that Priscilla and Gianni had not cohabitated as spouses before their marriage, declared the marriage invalid, and denied Priscilla’s application to set aside the VDOP. Priscilla appealed from that order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, determined that the order denying Priscilla’s application was not appealable, but exercised its discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court held that, under Family Code section 7611(b), a person may be a presumed parent if they attempted to marry the birth parent by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with the law, even if the marriage could be declared invalid. Here, the undisputed evidence showed that Gianni and Priscilla had attempted such a marriage, and Stella was born during it. Therefore, Gianni was Stella’s presumed parent when the VDOP was signed, rendering the VDOP void by law. The appellate court granted Priscilla’s petition and directed the trial court to set aside the VDOP. View "Steven N. v. Priscilla C." on Justia Law

B.S. filed a petition for a domestic violence protection order against Carlos Lopez-Rangel on behalf of herself and the parties’ two minor children, alleging that Lopez-Rangel sexually assaulted her in her home. B.S. provided testimony and physical evidence of the alleged assaults, including medical findings and photographs of injuries. She also noted that the children were present in the home during the incidents but did not know if they were awake or aware of what had occurred. At the time, Lopez-Rangel faced related criminal charges, and no-contact orders were in place to protect B.S. and the children.The District Court of Dunn County, Southwest Judicial District, first issued a temporary protection order, then, after a hearing, entered a domestic violence protection order in favor of B.S. and the two minor children, with the order designated to last for an unlimited duration. The district court found that domestic violence had been committed against B.S. but made no specific findings of harm or imminent harm to the children. Lopez-Rangel appealed, contesting the inclusion of his children as protected parties and challenging the unlimited duration of the order.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that there was sufficient evidence to support B.S.'s inclusion as a protected party, affirming that portion of the order. However, the court found no evidence of domestic violence directed at or witnessed by the children and therefore reversed their inclusion as protected parties. The court also found the district court abused its discretion by imposing an unlimited duration without sufficient findings, reversed that portion, and remanded for the district court to set a reasonable duration supported by specific findings. View "B.S. v. Lopez-Rangel" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two parents, Khilyn Craig and Dwayne Vormestrand, over the primary residential responsibility for their minor child. Initially, both parties agreed to share equal residential responsibility, with a provision that Craig would gain primary responsibility and could relocate once the child reached school age. Over time, both parties failed to adhere to the parenting schedule, leading to court admonishments. In 2024, Craig relocated to Texas with the child before the court ruled on her motion to enforce the automatic modification provision. Both parties subsequently filed motions seeking primary residential responsibility.The District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, held a hearing in December 2024, where Craig represented herself. After hearing testimony from both parties and other witnesses, the court awarded Vormestrand primary residential responsibility in an amended judgment. Craig then moved for a new trial or reconsideration, arguing that there were procedural irregularities, insufficient evidence, and that the decision was against the law. The District Court denied her motion, concluding it had properly considered all relevant factors, especially Craig’s conduct in withholding the child and relocating without court approval.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying a new trial or reconsideration. Applying an abuse of discretion standard, the Supreme Court held that, despite a minor misinterpretation of the statutory domestic violence factor, the error was harmless because the District Court did not find credible evidence of domestic violence. The Supreme Court concluded the District Court’s findings were supported by the record, it gave proper weight to the parties’ conduct, and no procedural irregularities warranted a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed both the amended judgment awarding Vormestrand primary residential responsibility and the order denying a new trial or reconsideration. View "Vormestrand v. Craig" on Justia Law