Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

After divorcing in 2022, Eric and Tiare experienced escalating harassment and abuse beginning in late 2023. Tiare repeatedly sent manipulative and threatening messages, made suicide threats, and harassed Eric’s new girlfriend. The harassment intensified, culminating in Tiare entering Eric’s property, physically attacking him, and being arrested for battery and unauthorized entry. Various protective orders were issued, including a temporary restraining order (TRO), an emergency protective order, and a criminal protective order. Despite these, Tiare violated the orders and continued contacting Eric.The Marin County Superior Court initially granted Tiare three continuances for the hearing on Eric’s petition for a domestic violence restraining order, citing reasons such as giving Tiare time to respond, her attorney’s absence, and her participation in residential treatment. At the fourth hearing, Tiare requested another continuance, arguing her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent due to pending criminal charges. The trial court denied this request, found that Eric had proven acts of abuse, and issued a three-year restraining order protecting both Eric and his girlfriend.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the trial court’s denial of the fourth continuance. The appellate court held that respondents in Domestic Violence Prevention Act proceedings who intend to assert their Fifth Amendment right are not automatically entitled to a continuance. The trial court must balance the respondent’s Fifth Amendment interests against other interests, including those of the petitioner, judicial efficiency, nonparties, and the legislative purpose of prompt resolution. The appellate court found the trial court had properly weighed these competing interests and did not abuse its discretion in denying the request. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Irvine v. Irvine" on Justia Law

A four-year-old child was repeatedly found outside alone and unsupervised, sometimes in dangerous situations. On multiple occasions, law enforcement and Child Protective Services (CPS) intervened due to reports of neglect by both parents. CPS substantiated several neglect allegations, including incidents where the child was left outside without proper clothing and where the father locked the mother and child in their apartment. The child exhibited developmental delays and behavioral issues, and there were additional reports of domestic abuse and possible sexual abuse. Following these events, the child was ultimately placed in CPS custody and later in a treatment facility.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, became involved after the State filed an abuse and neglect petition. Both parents stipulated that the child was abused or neglected, and the court entered an adjudication accordingly. When the State moved to terminate parental rights, the proceedings were delayed because the father’s first court-appointed attorney withdrew due to threatening messages from the father. A substitute attorney was appointed, but the father’s aggressive and threatening behavior toward this attorney led to a second withdrawal. The court then appointed the substitute attorney as standby counsel and warned the father that further misconduct would require him to represent himself. The dispositional hearing proceeded with the father representing himself with the support of standby counsel. The court ultimately terminated both parents’ parental rights after finding ongoing neglect, substance abuse, and failure to address mental health concerns.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the circuit court erred by failing to appoint a third attorney for the father at the dispositional hearing. The Supreme Court held that a parent’s right to counsel in parental rights termination proceedings, both statutory and under due process, can be waived by the parent’s misconduct after clear warning. The court affirmed the circuit court’s decision. View "Interest Of P.R.M." on Justia Law

Three individuals alleged that New Jersey child protection caseworkers violated their constitutional rights during investigations into suspected child abuse. The caseworkers entered the plaintiffs’ home without a warrant, pressured them to sign family agreements under threat of child removal, and ultimately removed the children from parental custody without prior court authorization. The removal was based on concerns about one parent’s alleged past violence, home conditions, and another parent’s mental health history. The plaintiffs claimed these actions violated their Fourth Amendment rights and their substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the complaint, finding the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The court relied on facts outside the complaint, including allegations from a child abuse report and statements from caseworkers, to support its ruling. The District Court also dismissed claims for money damages against the Division and its employees in their official capacities and found one plaintiff lacked standing. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo, considering only the facts alleged in the complaint and not external materials.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of most claims, including the substantive and procedural due process claims, holding that the law was not clearly established to put the defendants on notice that their conduct violated constitutional rights. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim against the caseworker who entered the home without a warrant. The court held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged a violation of clearly established Fourth Amendment law, and that qualified immunity did not shield the caseworker from liability on this claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the Fourth Amendment claim. View "O'Bryant v. DCP&P" on Justia Law

Stephanie M. Cordeiro sought a temporary order of protection against Steven R. Cordeiro in September 2023, which was granted by the Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County. The parties appeared before Judge Kutzman, stipulated to an extension of the temporary order, and agreed that the dissolution court could issue superseding orders. Separately, Stephanie filed for dissolution of marriage, and over time, both cases came under Judge Deschamps’s purview, though they were not formally consolidated. Throughout subsequent hearings, both parties engaged the dissolution court on matters relating to the protective order, including agreeing to further extensions and discussing the drafting of a master restraining order in connection with their parenting plan.As proceedings continued, the parties failed to agree on a final restraining order, prompting Stephanie to move for a permanent protective order. Steven objected to the court’s jurisdiction and to the admission of evidence from before the original stipulation but acknowledged the matters had effectively been joined. Judge Deschamps denied Steven’s motion to exclude evidence, held an evidentiary hearing, and ultimately issued a permanent protective order for Stephanie and the minor children.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana addressed whether the district court presiding over the dissolution had jurisdiction to enter a permanent protection order, whether it erred in extending the order without a hearing, and whether it abused its discretion by considering evidence from prior to the parties’ stipulation. The Supreme Court held that the district court had statutory authority and proper jurisdiction, that the parties had waived any right to an evidentiary hearing for the earlier extensions by their stipulation, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence or issuing the permanent order. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "In re Marriage of Cordeiro" on Justia Law

The case involves a father who was the primary caregiver of his minor child in Colorado. After expressing difficulty parenting alone and requesting assistance from the county department, the father set a deadline for the department to locate the child's mother. Following a concerning home visit, where the department observed possible neglect and suspected substance use, the department sought and received a verbal removal order. The child was placed in the temporary custody of the department and later moved to Kansas to live with her mother, after a magistrate granted the department's request. The father objected and sought review of the temporary custody order.While the father’s request for review was pending, the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services moved to dismiss the dependency and neglect petition, asserting the child was now with a safe caregiver and no longer at risk. The District Court for Arapahoe County granted the dismissal, terminated its jurisdiction over the child, and found the father’s request for review moot. The father appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the dismissal was not a final, appealable order since it did not determine the merits of the petition and the department was the sole authority to prosecute such cases.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that, under these circumstances, the dismissal order was a final, appealable order. The dismissal and the termination of jurisdiction effectively made the temporary custody order permanent, depriving the father of parental rights and preventing further proceedings regarding the child’s placement. Because the dismissal adversely affected the father's fundamental rights and locked in the change of custody, the court concluded it was appealable. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "T.L.P. v. People" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute over the legal paternity of a child born in September 2021, following sexual relations between the mother and two men, Tyler Strang and Christian Hernandez. After the child’s birth, the mother and Hernandez executed an acknowledgment of paternity (AOP), believing Hernandez was the biological father. Hernandez assumed caregiving responsibilities during the mother’s incarceration. Later, genetic testing revealed Hernandez was not the biological father, and subsequent testing in November 2023 and June 2024 established Strang’s biological paternity. Legal proceedings were initiated by the mother and Hernandez regarding decision-making and parenting time, but Strang was not originally included as a party.In Maricopa County Superior Court, Strang sought to intervene and filed his own petition to establish paternity, legal decision-making, and parenting time, arguing the AOP was executed under a mistaken belief. Hernandez moved to dismiss Strang’s petition, citing statutory and rule-based time bars for challenging an AOP. The superior court denied Strang’s requests, concluding the AOP had the force and effect of a judgment and that any challenge was untimely under Arizona Revised Statutes § 25-812(E) and Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 85(c).The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed whether the superior court properly applied the statutory bar. The Court held that § 25-812(E) does not prevent a biological father who was not party to the AOP from bringing an independent statutory action to establish paternity under § 25-803. If such a father establishes a competing presumption of paternity under § 25-814(A), the superior court must resolve those presumptions according to § 25-814(C). The Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "STRANG v MALAY" on Justia Law

After the death of his wife, the plaintiff raised his two daughters with help from family. He later began a romantic relationship with the defendant, who had been involved in his wife’s medical care and developed a bond with the children. The couple married when the girls were seven and nine, and the defendant became deeply involved in their lives, assisting with daily care and parenting. The plaintiff encouraged their relationship but did not consent to the defendant adopting the children as her own legal children. Following about five and a half years of marriage, the plaintiff initiated divorce proceedings, and the defendant petitioned to be recognized as the de facto parent of the children.The case was tried in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Middlesex. The court found the defendant had met the first six statutory criteria for de facto parentage under Connecticut law but failed to prove the seventh—continuing the relationship was in the children’s best interest. The trial court relied primarily on the plaintiff’s opposition to the defendant’s parentage claim, assigning it dispositive weight, and interpreted the relevant statute by importing custody and visitation best interest factors from another section. The court also expressed doubt about granting de facto parentage in the context of a traditional heterosexual stepparent relationship and awarded the defendant third-party visitation, denying her parentage petition.On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court determined the appeal was not moot regarding the older child, even though she had reached adulthood, as legal parentage carries ongoing consequences. The Supreme Court held the trial court misapplied the statutory best interest standard by overemphasizing the legal parent’s wishes and improperly focusing on marital structure. The holding requires the trial court to reconsider the de facto parentage petition using a holistic, fact-specific inquiry, guided by relevant statutory factors, and not limited by parental opposition or family structure. The judgment denying de facto parentage was reversed and remanded for further proceedings; other aspects of the judgment were affirmed. View "Perez v. Carusillo" on Justia Law

A mother and father, previously married and now divorced, have engaged in a lengthy, high-conflict custody battle over their only child, born in 2016. After their separation, the mother was awarded sole legal and primary physical custody, with the father receiving unsupervised visitation. The father’s subsequent conviction for domestic violence against his second wife resulted in suspended and later supervised visitation. Over time, the father completed court-ordered programs and sought increased custody, leading to ongoing modifications and disputes, including allegations that the mother frustrated visitation and moved with the child to Florida without an agreed-upon visitation plan.The Superior Court of San Diego County considered several motions and requests for orders over the years. Notably, in December 2024, the court awarded joint legal custody and primary physical custody to the father, with specified conditions for the mother’s visitation. The court also sanctioned the mother for her actions interfering with visitation and therapy. The mother appealed multiple orders, but some appeals were dismissed as moot or unaddressed due to forfeiture, and her contempt appeal was dismissed as nonappealable.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the remaining issues. It held that the trial court committed prejudicial error by refusing to apply the Family Code section 3044 presumption—regarding the detrimental impact of awarding custody to a parent who perpetrated domestic violence—based on a prior court’s stipulation that the father had rebutted the presumption in a different case involving another child and mother. The appellate court found that the issues in the two proceedings were not identical, and the mother was not bound by the prior determination. The court reversed the custody and visitation portions of the order and remanded for further proceedings to apply the section 3044 presumption and make the required findings, while affirming the sanctions and declining to require a different judge on remand. View "In re Marriage of Jessica L." on Justia Law

After a sixteen-year marriage, the husband filed for dissolution and later obtained a domestic violence restraining order against his wife when it was discovered she had placed a tracking device on his car. The parties ultimately reached a marital settlement agreement dividing substantial assets, including real estate and investments. The husband, an investment banker, agreed to significant spousal and equalization payments, and they established a child support structure based on both actual and imputed incomes. Subsequent disputes arose concerning custody, child support amounts, and payment of add-on expenses, particularly after the husband’s income decreased significantly from prior projections.The Superior Court of San Francisco City & County incorporated the settlement into judgment. As new disagreements developed, including over modifications to child support add-on allocations, both parties filed competing motions to adjust support and for attorney fees. The wife, who had stopped working during the marriage, requested attorney fees under Family Code sections 2030 and 3557, citing a disparity in access to funds. The family court denied her request, finding she had substantial liquid assets and did not demonstrate need, and concluded the litigation was overextended, with both parties incurring high legal fees.Reviewing the case, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, found that the family court erred by failing to make the explicit, statutorily required findings on whether there was a disparity in access to funds and whether one party could pay for both parties’ legal representation under section 2030. The appellate court concluded there was a reasonable probability that such findings, if properly made, could have resulted in a fee award. The court reversed and remanded for the family court to make the necessary findings and to reconsider the attorney fee request under section 2030. The appellate court also held that section 3557 did not apply, as the wife’s actions were not to enforce an existing support order. View "In re Marriage of Trousset" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a paternal grandmother, who has permanent sole legal and physical custody of her two grandchildren, and the children’s biological mother, who retains visitation rights but no custodial rights. The grandmother alleged that the mother had engaged in repeated verbal abuse and threats, including an incident where the mother threatened to kill her. Based on these allegations, the grandmother filed a petition for a civil protection order (CPO) against the mother.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed the grandmother’s petition before the mother was served, finding it lacked jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the grandmother was not a "family member" of the mother under the D.C. Intrafamily Offenses Act, and therefore the alleged conduct did not constitute an “intrafamily offense” for which a CPO could be sought. The trial court rejected the argument that the parties were family members by virtue of the legal custody arrangement, concluding they were not related by blood, adoption, custody, marriage, or domestic partnership as required by statute.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether the Act’s definition of “family member” includes the relationship between a grandmother with legal custody and the children’s biological mother. The Court of Appeals held that, considering both the blood relationships each party has to the children and the legal custody arrangement, the two are “family members” within the meaning of the statute. The court thus determined that the Superior Court had jurisdiction over the petition and reversed its dismissal, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Allen v. Whitehead" on Justia Law