Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court had to consider an appeal against a lower court's decision to terminate the parental rights of a mother, Samantha M., to her daughter, Jessalina M. The child had been removed from Samantha's care shortly after her birth due to concerns about Samantha's behavior and mental health issues. The child was placed in foster care and later with her father, Jose M.The court firstly clarified the meaning of "out-of-home placement" for the purposes of the relevant statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(7). It held that this term refers to any placement outside the home of the parent whose rights are at issue, including placement with another parent. Therefore, it held that Jessalina’s placement with her father was an “out-of-home placement” as far as Samantha was concerned.The court then considered the point at which the existence of the statutory basis for termination should be determined. It held that this should be determined as of the date the petition or motion to terminate parental rights is filed, not the date of trial or the date of the termination order. This is because the facts supporting the grounds for termination must be set forth in the petition or motion and must be based on facts existing at that time.Based on these interpretations, the court determined that the statutory basis for termination existed in this case, as Jessalina had been in out-of-home placement for more than 15 of the most recent 22 months before the termination petition was filed. It also held that the lower court did not err in finding that Samantha was unfit and that termination of her parental rights was in Jessalina's best interests. Therefore, it affirmed the decision of the lower court to terminate Samantha's parental rights. View "In re Interest of Jessalina M." on Justia Law

In 2021, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued Luis Jimenez Carrillo for securities violations he allegedly committed well after his divorce from Yolanda Sanchez-Diaz. Sanchez-Diaz was named as a relief defendant in the suit and the SEC sought to recover from her the value of a car she received four years earlier, claiming Carrillo paid for it with illicit funds. The SEC did not accuse Sanchez-Diaz of any wrongdoing but argued she had no legitimate claim to the car because she had not provided any consideration for it. The district court agreed and ordered her to pay almost $170,000, including interest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a relief defendant in an SEC enforcement action has a legitimate claim to funds if they have provided something of value in exchange and the value they provided is more than nominal in relation to the money received. In this case, the court concluded that through a 2016 child support agreement, Sanchez-Diaz provided more than nominal value in exchange for Carrillo's promise to purchase the car. The court found that the district court erred in its finding that Sanchez-Diaz provided no value at all. Accordingly, the Appeals Court reversed the district court's disgorgement order. View "SEC v. Sanchez Diaz Monge" on Justia Law

In this case heard by the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, Ivan and Donita Weber, who were married for less than four years, sought a divorce. Prior to their marriage, Donita owned significant assets, including a valuable farmland. During their marriage, the couple co-mingled and jointly titled most of their assets, including the farmland. They worked on and made improvements to the farm before selling it and most of the accompanying assets for approximately $2.5 million. Upon divorce, the circuit court treated most of the parties’ property as marital but awarded Donita a much larger share. Ivan appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion in dividing the marital assets and in failing to award him spousal support.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the circuit court appropriately considered the relevant factors, including the duration of the marriage, the value of the property owned by the parties, their ages, health, ability to earn a living, the contribution of each party to the accumulation of the property, and the income-producing capacity of the parties’ assets. The court found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital property, given the short length of their marriage and the fact that Donita brought in significantly more assets into the marriage than Ivan.Regarding Ivan's argument for spousal support, the court found that Ivan had waived his right to appeal this issue because he failed to present any issue concerning spousal support to the circuit court. Therefore, the court declined to award Ivan any attorney fees and awarded $5,000 in appellate attorney fees to Donita. View "Weber V. Weber" on Justia Law

In this case heard by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Jacoby Goehler was convicted by a jury for the first-degree murder of Davidlee Stansbury and sentenced to life in prison plus fifteen years. Goehler appealed his conviction on several grounds including the admission of incriminating statements made in police custody without his attorney present, denial of his motion to change venue, admission of testimony from his wife, and admission of a photograph of the victim. He also disputed the court's refusal to provide jury instructions on lesser-included offenses of manslaughter and second-degree murder.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision on each point. The Court stated that Goehler failed to preserve his argument about his incriminating statements for appeal. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a change of venue because the court was able to select an impartial jury. It also found that the spousal privilege did not apply to the testimony of Goehler's wife because the facts she testified about were not privileged. The Court ruled that the admission of the photograph of the victim was not an abuse of discretion because it aided the jury in understanding the consequence of Goehler's actions. Lastly, the Court found no error in the trial court's refusal to provide jury instructions on manslaughter and second-degree murder because there was no rational basis for acquitting Goehler of first-degree murder and instead convicting him of the lesser offenses. View "GOEHLER v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

This case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana involves Anthony Reed, the petitioner and appellant, and Catherine Martin, the respondent and appellee. The two parties share a child, L.R., born in 2013. After their separation in 2015, the child has primarily resided with Martin, with Anthony having limited, supervised visitation rights. Anthony has sought to modify the parenting plan on multiple occasions, asserting that his circumstances and those of L.R. have changed significantly over the years, but the District Court has denied his motions.Anthony's assertions of changed circumstances include his graduation from law school, passing of the bar exam, gainful employment as an attorney, entering a committed relationship, and undergoing therapy. He also asserts that L.R.'s growth and development from a toddler to a 10-year-old, his desire to interact with Anthony at his home and in the community, and Martin's alleged parental alienation constitute changes in L.R's circumstances.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that Anthony has met his burden under § 40-4-219(1), MCA, that a change of circumstances of the child has occurred, and that the District Court's failure to hold a hearing and finding otherwise was clearly erroneous. The Court reversed the District Court's denial of Anthony's motion to modify the parenting plan and remanded the case for a hearing to consider amendment of the parenting plan in L.R.'s best interests. The Court also stated that it appears appropriate for the District Court to order a parenting evaluation and, if deemed necessary, appoint a Guardian Ad Litem. View "In re Parenting of L.R." on Justia Law

In the child protection case before the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the appellant, Dominique Desiree Sciacca (Mother), contested the termination of her parental rights to her minor child, JDD. The Department of Family Services had filed a petition for termination based on Mother's neglect of the child and her failure to comply with a reunification plan. The District Court of Goshen County granted the Department's petition. On appeal, Mother did not dispute the grounds for termination but argued that her due process rights were violated because she was not physically present in court for the termination hearing, although she was allowed to participate by phone. She also contended that the court violated procedural rules by allowing her to testify by phone from the same location as the child's father, without adequate safeguards to protect her from his influence. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no violation of due process or procedural rules. The court ruled that Mother was given a meaningful opportunity to be heard and that the lower court had implemented sufficient safeguards during her phone testimony. View "In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights To: JJD v. State of Wyoming, Ex Rel. Department of Family Services" on Justia Law

In this case involving the State of Alaska, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children’s Services (OCS), the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska ruled on an appeal regarding the termination of parental rights of parents Allie P. and Jimmy E. The crux of the case revolved around the application of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), which provides specific protections for Indian children and their tribes in child custody proceedings.Allie P. and Jimmy E. had two children together and Allie had two older children from a previous relationship. All four children were removed from Allie’s custody due to her history of substance abuse. Jimmy E. claimed Alaska Native heritage and argued that his children should be considered Indian children under ICWA.The Supreme Court held that Jimmy did provide a sufficient reason to know that the two youngest children are Indian children and that OCS did not conduct a sufficient inquiry. Thus, the court vacated the termination of Jimmy’s and Allie’s parental rights as to the two youngest children and remanded for further proceedings.However, the court rejected Allie's additional challenges and affirmed the termination of her parental rights with respect to her two older children. The court found that Allie had not remedied the behavior causing her children to be in need of aid, OCS made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, and termination was in the children's best interests. View "Jimmy E. v. State of Alaska, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

In a case involving the State of Alaska's Office of Children’s Services (OCS), an adult relative, Taryn M., appealed the denial of her request to have custody of an Indian child, Marcy P., who was in the custody of OCS. Marcy P. had a severe congenital disease and required a bone marrow transplant. The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the decision of the lower court, finding that OCS had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Taryn M. was an unsuitable caretaker for Marcy P. The court established that the burden of proof was on OCS to show that a preferred placement under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was unsuitable. The evidence presented showed that Taryn M. was unwilling to abide by Marcy’s treatment plans, with instances including not following medical advice for treating fevers and not returning Marcy after a visit as planned. The court concluded that Taryn M.'s actions demonstrated clear and convincing evidence that she was an unsuitable caretaker. View "Taryn M. v. State of Alaska, Department of Family & Community Services" on Justia Law

In this case, two individuals, Tong Vang and Pa Kou Xiong, were in a relationship recognized by Hmong cultural customs but were not legally married. They had two children together. Upon their separation, Xiong sought repayment of $38,000, which she claimed were loans to Vang and his family. Vang disputed this and counterclaimed for damages. The Superior Court of the State of Alaska found in favor of Xiong, and Vang appealed.On appeal, Vang argued that the court should have applied a presumption that transfers of funds between close relatives are considered gifts rather than loans. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska rejected this argument because the parties were not legally married or in a domestic partnership, and they were not close relatives. Additionally, the court found that the record supported the lower court’s finding that Xiong intended the transfers of money to be loans.The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that the Superior Court did not err in treating the transfers as loans rather than gifts. The court found that Vang did not establish that he and Xiong were married, in a domestic partnership, or close relatives, which would have triggered the presumption that the transfers were gifts. Furthermore, the court found that the record supported the Superior Court's finding that Xiong intended the transfers of money to be loans. View "Vang v. Xiong" on Justia Law

In this case, Veronica Louise Hudson and Daniel Lee Hudson, a married couple in Alaska, divorced. The major points of contention revolved around the division of marital property and the classification of a severance and bonus package received by Daniel from his former employer, BP. Veronica argued that the severance and bonus pay were marital property, while Daniel contended that they were his separate property. The trial court ruled that the severance and bonus pay were separate property, and divided the remaining marital property equally between the parties. Veronica also challenged the court's order allowing Daniel to make an equalization payment over five years rather than in a lump sum and the court's denial of her request for attorney fees.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska concluded that the lower court erred in classifying the severance and bonus pay without sufficient information, and in its findings related to economic misconduct and the financial condition of the parties. The court also held that the lower court abused its discretion in ordering a schedule of equalization payments over multiple years. The court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the purpose of the severance and bonus pay, and whether a different division of property is warranted. The court also required the lower court to reconsider the terms of any equalization payment. The court affirmed the lower court's denial of attorney's fees. View "Hudson v. Hudson" on Justia Law