Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

After the death of his wife, the plaintiff raised his two daughters with help from family. He later began a romantic relationship with the defendant, who had been involved in his wife’s medical care and developed a bond with the children. The couple married when the girls were seven and nine, and the defendant became deeply involved in their lives, assisting with daily care and parenting. The plaintiff encouraged their relationship but did not consent to the defendant adopting the children as her own legal children. Following about five and a half years of marriage, the plaintiff initiated divorce proceedings, and the defendant petitioned to be recognized as the de facto parent of the children.The case was tried in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Middlesex. The court found the defendant had met the first six statutory criteria for de facto parentage under Connecticut law but failed to prove the seventh—continuing the relationship was in the children’s best interest. The trial court relied primarily on the plaintiff’s opposition to the defendant’s parentage claim, assigning it dispositive weight, and interpreted the relevant statute by importing custody and visitation best interest factors from another section. The court also expressed doubt about granting de facto parentage in the context of a traditional heterosexual stepparent relationship and awarded the defendant third-party visitation, denying her parentage petition.On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court determined the appeal was not moot regarding the older child, even though she had reached adulthood, as legal parentage carries ongoing consequences. The Supreme Court held the trial court misapplied the statutory best interest standard by overemphasizing the legal parent’s wishes and improperly focusing on marital structure. The holding requires the trial court to reconsider the de facto parentage petition using a holistic, fact-specific inquiry, guided by relevant statutory factors, and not limited by parental opposition or family structure. The judgment denying de facto parentage was reversed and remanded for further proceedings; other aspects of the judgment were affirmed. View "Perez v. Carusillo" on Justia Law

A mother and father, previously married and now divorced, have engaged in a lengthy, high-conflict custody battle over their only child, born in 2016. After their separation, the mother was awarded sole legal and primary physical custody, with the father receiving unsupervised visitation. The father’s subsequent conviction for domestic violence against his second wife resulted in suspended and later supervised visitation. Over time, the father completed court-ordered programs and sought increased custody, leading to ongoing modifications and disputes, including allegations that the mother frustrated visitation and moved with the child to Florida without an agreed-upon visitation plan.The Superior Court of San Diego County considered several motions and requests for orders over the years. Notably, in December 2024, the court awarded joint legal custody and primary physical custody to the father, with specified conditions for the mother’s visitation. The court also sanctioned the mother for her actions interfering with visitation and therapy. The mother appealed multiple orders, but some appeals were dismissed as moot or unaddressed due to forfeiture, and her contempt appeal was dismissed as nonappealable.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the remaining issues. It held that the trial court committed prejudicial error by refusing to apply the Family Code section 3044 presumption—regarding the detrimental impact of awarding custody to a parent who perpetrated domestic violence—based on a prior court’s stipulation that the father had rebutted the presumption in a different case involving another child and mother. The appellate court found that the issues in the two proceedings were not identical, and the mother was not bound by the prior determination. The court reversed the custody and visitation portions of the order and remanded for further proceedings to apply the section 3044 presumption and make the required findings, while affirming the sanctions and declining to require a different judge on remand. View "In re Marriage of Jessica L." on Justia Law

After a sixteen-year marriage, the husband filed for dissolution and later obtained a domestic violence restraining order against his wife when it was discovered she had placed a tracking device on his car. The parties ultimately reached a marital settlement agreement dividing substantial assets, including real estate and investments. The husband, an investment banker, agreed to significant spousal and equalization payments, and they established a child support structure based on both actual and imputed incomes. Subsequent disputes arose concerning custody, child support amounts, and payment of add-on expenses, particularly after the husband’s income decreased significantly from prior projections.The Superior Court of San Francisco City & County incorporated the settlement into judgment. As new disagreements developed, including over modifications to child support add-on allocations, both parties filed competing motions to adjust support and for attorney fees. The wife, who had stopped working during the marriage, requested attorney fees under Family Code sections 2030 and 3557, citing a disparity in access to funds. The family court denied her request, finding she had substantial liquid assets and did not demonstrate need, and concluded the litigation was overextended, with both parties incurring high legal fees.Reviewing the case, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, found that the family court erred by failing to make the explicit, statutorily required findings on whether there was a disparity in access to funds and whether one party could pay for both parties’ legal representation under section 2030. The appellate court concluded there was a reasonable probability that such findings, if properly made, could have resulted in a fee award. The court reversed and remanded for the family court to make the necessary findings and to reconsider the attorney fee request under section 2030. The appellate court also held that section 3557 did not apply, as the wife’s actions were not to enforce an existing support order. View "In re Marriage of Trousset" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a paternal grandmother, who has permanent sole legal and physical custody of her two grandchildren, and the children’s biological mother, who retains visitation rights but no custodial rights. The grandmother alleged that the mother had engaged in repeated verbal abuse and threats, including an incident where the mother threatened to kill her. Based on these allegations, the grandmother filed a petition for a civil protection order (CPO) against the mother.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed the grandmother’s petition before the mother was served, finding it lacked jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the grandmother was not a "family member" of the mother under the D.C. Intrafamily Offenses Act, and therefore the alleged conduct did not constitute an “intrafamily offense” for which a CPO could be sought. The trial court rejected the argument that the parties were family members by virtue of the legal custody arrangement, concluding they were not related by blood, adoption, custody, marriage, or domestic partnership as required by statute.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether the Act’s definition of “family member” includes the relationship between a grandmother with legal custody and the children’s biological mother. The Court of Appeals held that, considering both the blood relationships each party has to the children and the legal custody arrangement, the two are “family members” within the meaning of the statute. The court thus determined that the Superior Court had jurisdiction over the petition and reversed its dismissal, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Allen v. Whitehead" on Justia Law

A mother gave birth to a child, M.P., in February 2023. In September of that year, the mother sought emergency care for M.P., who was found to be severely malnourished and developmentally delayed. Medical professionals determined the child’s condition was the result of neglect, not an underlying medical disorder. The Department of Child Safety (DCS) took custody of M.P., ultimately placing her in a medically fragile foster home. The mother was arrested, pleaded guilty to attempted child abuse, and received probation. DCS filed a dependency petition alleging that M.P. was neglected due to the mother’s failure to provide adequate nourishment and to protect the child from domestic violence. The mother participated in reunification services, but DCS remained concerned about her ability to safely care for M.P.The Superior Court in Pima County adjudicated M.P. dependent and later held a hearing on DCS’s petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), which authorizes termination for neglect. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother’s neglect placed M.P. at substantial risk of harm and concluded that termination was in M.P.’s best interests, noting the mother’s lack of behavioral change despite engaging in services. The Arizona Court of Appeals vacated the termination, holding that the juvenile court was required to consider the mother’s participation in, and benefit from, services at the unfitness stage, and that consideration of rehabilitative efforts was not required in the best-interests analysis.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona vacated the court of appeals’ decision and affirmed the termination. The Court held that, under § 8-533(B)(2), the juvenile court is not required to consider subsequent participation in services when determining parental unfitness, but must consider rehabilitation efforts in the best-interests analysis. The Court found that the juvenile court properly applied the law and that due process was satisfied. View "IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P." on Justia Law

A married couple residing in Colorado initiated divorce proceedings after the wife began a relationship with another man living in New Mexico. During the divorce process, the husband filed suit in New Mexico against the wife’s new partner, alleging alienation of affections and prima facie tort. The husband claimed the new partner maliciously pursued a relationship with his wife while she was still married, resulting in the loss of her affections and leading to their divorce.The defendant moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that alienation of affections was no longer recognized in New Mexico. The District Court denied these motions and allowed the case to proceed, including permitting extensive discovery into communications between the wife and her new partner. The wife, intervening due to the burdensome discovery, sought judgment on the pleadings, contending that Colorado law—which does not recognize and indeed criminalizes the tort—should apply. The District Court denied her motion, but certified the choice-of-law question for interlocutory appeal. The New Mexico Court of Appeals reframed the issue and certified to the New Mexico Supreme Court the broader question of whether the tort of alienation of affections should continue to exist in New Mexico.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico reviewed the history and policy implications of the tort. The Court concluded that the tort’s origins were rooted in outdated and patriarchal concepts, and that it conflicted with modern legal and public policy developments, including the recognition of no-fault divorce and privacy in marital matters. The Court expressly abolished the tort of alienation of affections in New Mexico, overruled prior precedent, and held that the plaintiff could not proceed on a prima facie tort theory. The Court ordered dismissal of the husband’s claims. View "Butterworth v. Jackson" on Justia Law

A mother surrendered her four-day-old twin sons at a hospital under Maryland’s Safe Haven Act, which allows parents to leave unharmed newborns at designated facilities within sixty days of birth, granting immunity from criminal prosecution and civil liability for the act of surrender. The mother left the twins with identifying information but did not disclose her identity, provide information about alternative caregivers, or express intent to return. Hospital staff found the twins healthy and notified the local department of social services, which took custody and placed them in foster care. The department later identified both parents through family contact and DNA testing. Mother participated in proceedings and argued that her actions did not constitute neglect under the Child in Need of Assistance (CINA) statute, and that Safe Haven Act immunity precluded such a finding.The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, sitting as the juvenile court, held a de novo hearing and found that the mother’s actions amounted to neglect, as the twins were left without a legal custodian or provision for long-term care, placing them at substantial risk of harm. The court denied mother’s request to award custody to the father and committed the twins to the department’s care. Both parents appealed. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the neglect finding, concluding that abandonment under the Safe Haven Act can constitute neglect if court intervention is required to prevent harm, and that Safe Haven immunity from “civil liability” does not shield against a CINA neglect determination.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. The court held that a parent who surrenders a newborn under the Safe Haven Act may be found to have neglected the child within the meaning of the CINA statute if the child is left without a legal custodian or provision for care, placing the child at substantial risk of harm. The court further held that Safe Haven Act immunity from “civil liability” does not preclude a CINA neglect finding. View "In re: B.Cd. & B.Cb." on Justia Law

The case involves two parents, Emily A. Bickford and Matthew A. Bradeen, who share parental rights and responsibilities for their child. They initially agreed to a shared parenting arrangement in 2013, requiring joint decisions on matters such as the child’s religious upbringing and medical care. In 2021, disputes arose when Bradeen alleged that Bickford involved the child in religious activities without his knowledge, while Bickford claimed Bradeen tried to prevent the child’s religious training. Both parents sought sole authority over the child’s religious upbringing. After mediation resolved most issues except religion and healthcare, the District Court held hearings and found that Bickford's unilateral decisions regarding religion and medical care caused the child anxiety and endangered her relationship with Bradeen. The court also found that Bradeen was more capable of making decisions in the child’s best interest.The District Court (Portland) modified the prior order, allocating to Bradeen final decision-making authority regarding the child’s religious upbringing (especially relating to Calvary Chapel Greater Portland) and medical care. The court used a best-interest standard for medical decisions and, believing strict scrutiny was required for religious matters, found a compelling interest in protecting the child from psychological harm. Bickford’s motions for post-judgment relief were denied, and she appealed, arguing constitutional violations.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and clarified that strict scrutiny does not apply to allocations of parental rights between parents, even in religious matters. The Court held that the best-interest standard governs such decisions, provided there is no religious bias. It found no evidence of religious hostility or abuse of discretion by the District Court and affirmed the judgment, upholding Bradeen’s final authority in the disputed areas. View "Bickford v. Bradeen" on Justia Law

A married couple separated after 18 years, and the wife petitioned for dissolution. The husband sought and obtained a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against the wife, based on her actions in 2020. The wife admitted to being convicted and sentenced for domestic violence against the husband, and a criminal protective order was referenced, though not provided. Despite the DVRO, both parties continued to interact, exchanging flirtatious messages and spending time together. The wife had not worked during the marriage, devoted her time to caring for the home and children, and lacked current marketable skills. Evidence at trial showed financial dysfunction and mutual misconduct, including the husband withholding funds and both parties admitting to drug use.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County conducted a trial on issues including spousal support. The court acknowledged the wife's domestic violence conviction and the DVRO, but weighed various statutory factors under California Family Code section 4320, noting the wife's lack of employment, her role as primary caregiver, and the long duration of the marriage. The court found the husband's withholding of funds constituted coercive control, recognized mutual dysfunction and reconciliatory conduct post-conviction, and determined that the section 4325 presumption against awarding spousal support to a convicted spouse was rebutted. The court awarded the wife spousal support for five years, denied retroactive support, and limited the support term due to the history of domestic violence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The Court held that the trial court properly interpreted and applied Family Code section 4325, allowing consideration of all relevant equitable factors, including those in section 4320, to rebut the presumption. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the judgment awarding limited spousal support. View "Marriage of Traweek" on Justia Law

A mother left her three-year-old son in the care of his father, despite knowing the father routinely drank to unconsciousness and exposed the child to unsafe living conditions. The mother was absent from the home for two months and made no effort to contact her child during that period. When relatives discovered the situation, they took the child to live with his grandparents. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) initiated a child in need of aid (CINA) case, and over several years developed case plans for both parents, focusing on sobriety, stable housing, and maintaining a relationship with the child. The mother resisted drug testing, did not complete mental health or substance abuse assessments, and inconsistently attended visitations.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Valdez, heard testimony from family members, OCS workers, and the mother during the parental rights termination trial. The court initially terminated the mother’s rights on the basis of abandonment, finding the child was left without care and the mother failed to maintain contact or remedy her behavior. After the mother appealed, OCS moved for reconsideration, arguing the facts also supported a finding of neglect. The superior court granted reconsideration and issued an amended order finding the child in need of aid due to neglect as well, emphasizing the mother’s failure to provide adequate care and her lack of progress on her case plan.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the termination of parental rights. The court held that the procedural error in granting reconsideration after the notice of appeal did not prejudice the mother and could be considered. Substantively, the court found no clear error in the findings of neglect and failure to remedy the conduct or conditions placing the child at risk, thus affirming the order terminating parental rights. View "Victoria W. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law