Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A woman married a man who was, unbeknownst to her, still legally married to his first wife. After learning of the bigamy, she obtained an annulment of the marriage. Meanwhile, the man's first wife obtained a court judgment against him for unpaid spousal support and an equalization payment, totaling over $1.4 million. To enforce this judgment, the first wife secured a writ of execution and served notices of levy on the man's bank accounts. Relying on a statutory provision allowing a judgment creditor to levy accounts in the name of a judgment debtor’s spouse without a court order if accompanied by an affidavit of spousal status, the first wife provided an affidavit stating that the second woman was the man's spouse. As a result, more than $380,000 was levied from accounts held in the second woman's name, either individually or with her son.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied the second woman’s motion to quash the levies, concluding that the annulment of her marriage did not undermine the validity of the levies. The court found the levies valid, except for a small exemption, and awarded nearly all the seized funds to the first wife. The second woman appealed, arguing that her marriage to the judgment debtor was void from the outset and thus could not form the basis for levying her separate accounts without a court order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that the trial court erred. The appellate court determined that, under California law, a void marriage is invalid from its inception and its invalidity can be shown in collateral proceedings. Therefore, the affidavit of spousal status was ineffective, and the levies on the second woman's accounts were invalid. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order, directed that the levies be quashed, and ordered the return of the funds improperly seized. View "Greely v. Greely" on Justia Law

The parties in this case are former spouses who share a minor daughter. Their marriage was dissolved in 2019, and they were awarded joint legal and physical custody. Following the dissolution, both filed numerous motions related to custody, resulting in increased litigation. In 2022 and 2023, each sought sole custody through postjudgment modification motions. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing over several dates to resolve these motions and others. Ultimately, the court awarded the defendant sole legal and primary physical custody, issuing its decision 133 days after the close of evidence.After the decision, the plaintiff moved to void and set aside the custody order, arguing that the decision was untimely under General Statutes § 51-183b, which sets a 120-day deadline for rendering judgment. The Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford, denied this motion, ruling that postjudgment modification motions are “short calendar matters” governed by Practice Book § 11-19, not § 51-183b. Under § 11-19, the party must file a motion for reassignment within 14 days after the 120-day deadline to preserve a timeliness objection, which the plaintiff did not do. The trial court also did not expressly rule on two contempt motions, and, without prior notice to the parties, it took judicial notice of the plaintiff’s conduct in a prior, unrelated custody proceeding involving a different child.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had waived her timeliness objection by failing to follow the procedure set forth in Practice Book § 11-19. The court declined to review the claim regarding the unresolved contempt motions, as the plaintiff had not requested a ruling or sought articulation. However, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion by sua sponte taking judicial notice of facts from the unrelated custody proceeding without giving the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to respond. This error was harmful because it significantly influenced the custody decision. The Supreme Court reversed the custody award and remanded for further proceedings, affirming the decision in all other respects. View "Hamilton v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

After twelve years of marriage, one party filed a petition for dissolution in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Montana, seeking the dissolution of the marriage and equitable distribution of marital property and debts. The other party was personally served with the petition and summons, which warned that failure to respond could result in a default judgment. Despite receiving formal service, the respondent did not answer or appear in court. Subsequently, the petitioner requested entry of default, which was granted, and a hearing was scheduled. The respondent did not attend the hearing, during which the petitioner testified regarding her proposed distribution of the marital estate. The District Court then issued a final decree, awarding the marital home to the respondent but requiring him to pay the petitioner $100,000 from the home's equity or, failing that, to sell the house and pay her $100,000 from the proceeds.Following the decree, the respondent filed two motions to set aside the default judgment under Montana Rules of Civil Procedure 55(c) and 60(b), arguing lack of notice of the hearing, improper email service, inequitable property distribution, and asserting that the distribution unlawfully included veterans’ disability benefits used to pay the mortgage. The District Court denied both motions, finding the respondent had actual notice of the proceedings, failed to appear or respond, and that the equity award was supported by the petitioner’s testimony and not inequitable. The respondent appealed, and the petitioner requested sanctions for a frivolous appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decisions. The Court held that the respondent was properly served and was not entitled to written notice of the default-judgment hearing because he had not appeared in the action. The Court also found that the decree awarded marital home equity, not protected veterans’ disability benefits, and thus did not violate federal law. The request for sanctions was denied. View "Cline v. Pritchard" on Justia Law

A father, K.W., lost custody of his newborn son, K.A., when New York City’s Administration for Children’s Services removed the infant from his care without a court order, citing concerns about the mother’s history of neglect toward her other children. At the time, K.W. had not been accused of any abuse or neglect, and K.A. had been living with him since birth. The following day, the agency obtained a family court order for continued removal, but the petition did not cite any wrongdoing by K.W. and omitted key facts about his involvement as K.A.’s caretaker. As a result, K.W. was denied custody and granted only limited visitation for nearly three years, despite no allegations of unfitness. Both K.W. and K.A. suffered emotional harm from the prolonged separation.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a motion to dismiss all of the plaintiffs’ claims, ruling that they had not successfully stated a claim and that the defendant caseworker was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court also dismissed the claims against the Children’s Aid Society and its caseworker.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs stated viable claims on behalf of K.A. for unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment and for violation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court concluded that qualified immunity did not protect the individual caseworker, Moody, for these claims. However, the court affirmed dismissal of K.W.’s individual procedural due process claim as time-barred, and upheld dismissal of all claims against the Children’s Aid Society and its caseworker. The Second Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the surviving claims for further proceedings. View "K.W. v. The City of New York" on Justia Law

A woman in a long-term, unmarried same-gender relationship helped plan and raise a child with her partner, including choosing the child’s name, sharing caregiving responsibilities, and being recognized as a parent by others. The child was conceived via sperm donation from the woman’s cousin, who understood that he was not to be a parent. The woman was not listed on the birth certificate and had not adopted the child. After the couple separated, the biological mother restricted the woman’s access to the child and eventually moved out of state with the child.After the separation, the woman filed a petition in the Family Court of the First Circuit to establish legal parentage based on Hawai‘i’s “holding out” presumption under HRS § 584-4(a)(4), which presumes parentage for a person who receives a child into their home and holds them out as their own. The family court found that she had held the child out as her own but concluded she could not establish legal parentage as a matter of law because the statute’s language was gender-specific and she was neither married to the biological mother nor the child’s biological parent. The court granted her temporary visitation as a de facto parent but denied her request for legal parentage and for the child’s return to Hawai‘i.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case de novo. It held that under the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act and Hawai‘i Revised Statutes, parentage presumptions must be applied in a gender-neutral manner insofar as practicable, including the “holding out” presumption. The Court vacated the family court’s findings and conclusions denying legal parentage, directed that legal parentage be established for the woman, and remanded for proceedings regarding custody and visitation. View "JK v. HK." on Justia Law

A state child services agency filed a petition alleging that a father had a history of illegal substance abuse and criminal activity, and that the child’s mother abused substances while pregnant. When the petition was filed, the father was incarcerated on pending charges, but upon release, he entered inpatient rehabilitation for drug abuse. He later stipulated to the petition’s allegations and moved for a post-adjudicatory improvement period, which the circuit court granted retroactively, effectively shortening the period. The terms required him to maintain sobriety, complete classes, and participate in supervised visitation, among other conditions. However, during the entire period, the state agency made no referrals for services, and only one attempt at visitation was made, which failed because the father was reincarcerated for a probation violation. The father completed rehabilitation and classes on his own initiative, but was incarcerated again near the end of the improvement period.The Circuit Court of Wetzel County terminated the father’s parental rights, stating generally that the conditions of abuse and neglect had not been remedied and that termination was in the child’s best interests. The court also found that the state agency had made reasonable efforts to achieve permanency, although the record showed the agency failed to provide required referrals or facilitate services and visitation. The father appealed, contending the court failed to make adequate findings and erred in concluding the agency met its statutory obligations.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the circuit court’s orders lacked the necessary findings to support termination of parental rights, particularly regarding whether the father could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect, and failed to analyze factors related to his incarceration as required by precedent. The higher court also found that the state agency’s failure to make reasonable reunification efforts tainted the proceedings. The order terminating parental rights was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with statutory requirements. View "In re K.S." on Justia Law

The case centers on a protracted child custody dispute between two parents, one residing in Canada and the other in Texas. After their separation, the mother relocated to Canada with the children, initially under a Texas court order allowing her to determine their residence without geographic restriction. Over several years, both parents engaged in parallel legal proceedings in Texas and Canada, with each court issuing conflicting orders regarding custody and the children’s primary residence. The father later retained the children in Texas, prompting the mother to file a federal petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, alleging wrongful retention in violation of her Canadian custody rights.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas conducted a bench trial. It found the children’s habitual residence was Canada, based on their long-term integration there, and concluded the father's retention in Texas was wrongful under the Hague Convention. The district court ordered the children’s return to Canada and rejected three defenses: consent, age and maturity, and judicial estoppel. Subsequently, as the father continued custody litigation in Texas, the district court issued a preliminary injunction barring him and two Texas judges from further proceedings and directed that the Canadian courts should resolve custody.Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision ordering the children’s return to Canada, holding that the children were habitually resident in Canada and the retention in Texas violated the mother’s rights of custody under Canadian law. The appellate court also ruled that the defenses raised by the father did not bar the return remedy. However, it vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction, finding it improper to enjoin state and foreign courts from adjudicating custody. Thus, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the return order but vacated the injunctions restricting proceedings in Texas and Canada. View "Moreau v. White" on Justia Law

A mother and father, who were never married, shared a child and originally litigated custody and care arrangements in 2019. At that time, the Iowa District Court for Boone County granted joint legal custody but awarded the father primary physical care, despite his history of domestic abuse, finding both parents credible but favoring the father's attentiveness to the child's needs. Over the years, the father was repeatedly involved in incidents of domestic violence, both with the mother and with other partners, resulting in multiple convictions. The mother sought to modify the custody decree, citing the father's new convictions and ongoing instability in his household, including frequent moves and changes in the child’s schools. She argued that her own home was stable and free from domestic violence.The Iowa District Court for Boone County initially denied the mother’s modification petitions. It acknowledged the father’s domestic abuse history but found no direct evidence that this negatively affected the child. The court also concluded that the mother had not demonstrated she was the superior parent, given the absence of substantial evidence regarding her parenting strengths or a direct negative impact on the child from the father's actions. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, with a dissenting judge arguing that the father’s domestic violence history warranted modification in favor of the mother.The Supreme Court of Iowa, upon further review, vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision and reversed the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court clarified that under Iowa law, the rebuttable presumption against awarding joint legal custody to a parent with a history of domestic abuse does not extend to physical care determinations. However, a parent’s ongoing pattern of domestic abuse remains a significant factor. The Supreme Court held that the mother established herself as the superior parent due to her stability and the absence of domestic violence in her home. The case was remanded for further proceedings on visitation and child support. View "Miller v. Teter" on Justia Law

A married couple, both active-duty military members, separated after nearly two decades of marriage and executed a notarized separation agreement in 2020 while stationed in Okinawa. The agreement provided that the wife would receive $1,500 per month in maintenance until divorce, 20% of the husband’s military retirement pay upon his retirement, and be named as beneficiary of his Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP). The wife later initiated a divorce in South Dakota, and the parties submitted a stipulation and settlement agreement incorporating key provisions from their separation. The divorce decree was filed in February 2021. Over time, the husband failed to make some required maintenance payments and, after retiring, did not pay the wife her portion of his retirement nor complete the SBP paperwork. The wife sought contempt and modifications, while the husband argued compliance was impossible due to deficiencies in the decree.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Charles Mix County, declined to hold the husband in contempt, finding the divorce decree’s orders too vague for enforcement. The court denied modification of the property division, found no fraud or coercion, and refused to vacate the decree. It reduced the wife’s retirement share from 20% to 16.1% using a coverture formula, ordered payment of $5,000 in arrears plus 8% interest, and instructed the husband to effectuate the SBP. Both parties appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that reducing the wife’s retirement share below the agreed 20% was error, as was applying an 8% rather than the statutory 10% interest rate to arrears. The court remanded for correction of those issues, but affirmed the denial of contempt, refusal to vacate the decree, and the exclusion of additional payments for stimulus or tax refunds. The court also found no due process violations or abuse of discretion in declining to take sworn testimony. View "Shevling v. Major" on Justia Law

A mother lived with her five minor children and her boyfriend. The Department of Human Services filed for immediate custody of the children after three of them witnessed the fatal stabbing of their father by the mother’s boyfriend. The children were removed and placed with their maternal grandmother. The petition cited prior substantiated allegations of abuse and neglect, concerns about drug use, inadequate supervision, poor hygiene, and injuries to the children. The mother was later charged with felony child neglect related to the stabbing incident.The Circuit Court of Lincoln County held several hearings, including an initial hearing ordering drug screening and visitation for the mother, while keeping the children in temporary legal custody with DHS. After multidisciplinary team meetings and status hearings, the mother indicated her intention to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights. At a July 31, 2024 hearing, the court confirmed with the mother and her counsel that she understood the consequences and was not acting under duress or coercion. The mother signed separate written relinquishments for each child, explicitly acknowledging the permanent nature of the act. The circuit court accepted the relinquishments, adjudicated her as an abusing parent, and terminated her parental rights, finding the relinquishments free from fraud or duress and in the children’s best interests.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the circuit court’s order. Applying a clearly erroneous standard to factual findings, the Court held that the mother’s written admissions in the relinquishment forms demonstrated she understood the permanent nature of her decision. Because she did not argue fraud, duress, or procedural noncompliance, and her statements contradicted her claim of misunderstanding, the Court affirmed the order accepting her voluntary relinquishments and terminating her parental rights. View "In re: A.A." on Justia Law