Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Three individuals alleged that New Jersey child welfare caseworkers violated their constitutional rights during a series of investigations and child removals in 2017. The principal facts involved caseworkers entering the plaintiffs’ residence without a warrant and subsequently removing children from parental custody without court authorization. One plaintiff was the mother whose children were removed; another was the father of her youngest child and a resident of the home; the third was the grandfather. The plaintiffs argued that the warrantless entry and removals were not justified by imminent danger, and that their consent to certain “family plan agreements” was coerced.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated that dismissal in part and remanded. Upon remand, the District Court dismissed the claims again, this time based on qualified immunity—holding that the defendants were shielded from liability because the plaintiffs had not shown violation of clearly established constitutional rights. The District Court found the defendants’ actions reasonable given alleged concerns about child safety and home conditions. Subsequent motions to dismiss by sheriff defendants were also granted, and the plaintiffs appealed.Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most aspects of the District Court’s dismissal. However, it held that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged a violation of clearly established Fourth Amendment law regarding the warrantless home entry, as no imminent danger was apparent from the complaint. The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of this Fourth Amendment claim against the caseworker who entered the home and remanded for further proceedings. All other claims, including those based on substantive and procedural due process, were affirmed as dismissed due to qualified immunity. View "O''Bryant v. Division of Child Protection and Permanency" on Justia Law

A child, A.S., was adjudicated dependent in 2017 after her mother, C.S., tested positive for drugs at the birth of another child. Temporary custody was granted to the child's paternal grandparents, while the mother entered treatment. After successfully completing her case plan, in 2019, the mother was granted shared legal custody of A.S. with the father, and the case was closed. In 2021, due to the father's illness, the mother was made the residential parent for school purposes. In 2023, following the father's death, the grandparents sought legal custody, citing concerns about the mother's drug history, her marriage to a sex offender, and truancy issues. The mother had limited interaction with A.S. at this time, and evidence was presented regarding her husband’s criminal history and A.S.'s discomfort around him.The Summit County Juvenile Court granted legal custody of A.S. to the grandparents without first finding the mother unsuitable. The mother objected, arguing her parental rights required a finding of unsuitability before custody could be transferred to nonparents. The juvenile court overruled her objections, reasoning that the prior dependency adjudication established unsuitability, and that R.C. 2151.42(B) controlled, requiring only a determination of changed circumstances and best interest. The mother appealed.The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the juvenile court did not need to find the mother unsuitable before awarding custody to nonparents, since the child had previously been adjudicated dependent. This decision conflicted with precedent from the Eighth District Court of Appeals (In re B.K., 2013-Ohio-1190).The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that when a natural parent has regained legal custody after a dependency finding and the dependency case is closed, a juvenile court may not terminate that custody order under R.C. 2151.42(B) without first finding that the parent has become unsuitable. The judgment of the Ninth District was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re A.S." on Justia Law

The parties in this case are former spouses who have been engaged in litigation over their divorce for several years. After the Sarpy County District Court entered a divorce decree in 2023, including a parenting plan, the party awarded sole physical custody sought enforcement of several provisions, alleging that the other party had failed to pay a court-ordered equalization payment, attorney fees, and his share of medical expenses for their children. She also alleged violations of the parenting plan, such as improper transportation arrangements, preventing communication with children, failure to administer medication, unauthorized travel, and exceeding allotted parenting time. The other party claimed inability to pay, disputed some allegations, and asserted misunderstandings regarding the parenting plan.The Sarpy County District Court held an evidentiary hearing, found the party in violation of its orders, and determined his testimony was not credible, particularly regarding his financial situation and explanations for his conduct. As a result, the court found him in willful contempt, ordered a 90-day incarceration which could be avoided by compliance ("purge" conditions), temporarily reduced his summer parenting time, and awarded attorney fees to the opposing party. The party appealed, but his brief contained numerous fictitious case citations and misstatements of law, leading the Nebraska Supreme Court to strike the brief and review only for plain error.The Nebraska Supreme Court found no plain error in the district court’s findings or sanctions. It clarified that self-represented litigants must adhere to the same standards as attorneys and that submission of briefs with fabricated citations is sanctionable. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s contempt order, the imposition of attorney fees, denial of in forma pauperis status, and the other sanctions. The district court’s order was affirmed. View "Shannon v. Shannon" on Justia Law

A woman gave birth to a child in the back of an ambulance and immediately informed hospital staff that she did not want or have the means to care for the baby, expressing her intent to relinquish the child for adoption. The Morgan County Department of Human Services (MCDHS) initiated a dependency or neglect proceeding, treating the matter as a typical abandonment case. MCDHS investigated the mother’s identity, contacted her family members to explore placement options, and took steps to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act, after learning the mother might be a member of a Canadian tribe.The Morgan County District Court, upon learning of MCDHS’s actions, intervened by issuing an order that recognized the birth mother’s right to anonymity and confidentiality under Colorado’s Safe Haven Law. The court directed MCDHS to halt its investigation into the mother’s identity and to cease contacting her family members, reasoning that the Safe Haven Law protected the mother’s privacy. The court also sealed records containing the mother’s name and refused to consider information derived from confidential sources. MCDHS challenged these orders through a C.A.R. 21 petition.Reviewing the matter, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that, although Colorado’s Safe Haven Law does not expressly guarantee anonymity and confidentiality, its structure, related statutory provisions, and underlying purpose imply such protections for parents who properly relinquish newborns under its terms. The Court concluded that county departments cannot pursue the identity of relinquishing parents or investigate their families for placement options. Once a newborn is surrendered pursuant to the Safe Haven Law, the county department must promptly seek adoptive placement and move to terminate parental rights while maintaining the parent’s anonymity and confidentiality. The Supreme Court of Colorado discharged its order to show cause and remanded for proceedings consistent with this holding. View "People ex rel. G.D.M." on Justia Law

The parties in this case were married from 1998 until their divorce in 2025. During the marriage, the wife acquired thirty shares in her employer’s business, Plan One Architects, after the couple jointly decided to invest. The shares were purchased using loans from the husband’s mother, refinancing their home, and selling a car. Plan One’s bylaws require only employees to hold shares, so the wife solely owns them and must sell them back to the company when her employment ends. The value of the shares primarily comes from annual shareholder distributions, which comprise most of the wife’s income.The District Court of Park County held a bench trial to resolve disputes over the division of the Plan One shares and associated debts. It found the shares to be marital property acquired during the marriage, largely due to the wife’s loyalty to her employer and financial support from the husband’s mother. The court ordered the wife to pay the husband one-half of the annual distributions from the shares, minus associated taxes, until her employment ends. Additionally, the court required both parties to equally repay the outstanding loans to the husband’s mother. Upon the wife's eventual sale of the shares, she must pay the husband one-half of the sale proceeds, minus capital gains taxes.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed whether the district court erred in awarding the husband half of the distributions, assigning tax liability to the wife, and directing repayment of the debt to the husband’s mother. The Supreme Court held that the shares were a vested marital asset and affirmed the district court’s discretion in awarding the husband periodic property distribution payments, assigning tax responsibility to the wife, and dividing the marital debt. The district court’s decree was affirmed. View "Atkinson v. Atkinson" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the division of a government pension earned by an employee during a lengthy period of cohabitation before marriage. The employee worked at the East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD), contributing to his pension from 1987 to 2018. He and his partner began living together in 1993, executed a domestic partnership affidavit for benefits, purchased a home jointly, and eventually married in 2003. After their relationship ended, the partner sought legal separation and also filed a civil action alleging breach of an oral agreement made during their cohabitation period, in which they agreed to pool their earnings and share equally any property acquired as a result.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco consolidated the civil and divorce proceedings. It bifurcated the case, first trying the claims regarding the oral agreement. After trial, the court found that an implied-in-fact (Marvin) agreement existed during the cohabitation period, entitling each party to an equal share of property acquired, including pension contributions and accumulations. The employee moved to clarify that statutory protections made his pension “unassignable” and “exempt from execution,” but the court held that the partner was entitled to half of the pension benefits accrued during the Marvin period, and could receive payment upon distribution or via other assets after actuarial valuation.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed whether Public Utilities Code section 12337 barred the partner from sharing in pension benefits accrued during cohabitation. The court held that section 12337 does not prohibit the partner from receiving a share of pension contributions and accumulations, because her claim was based on ownership arising from the Marvin agreement, not as a creditor or assignee. The trial court’s order was affirmed. View "Seiwald v. Irias" on Justia Law

A married couple with three minor children separated after more than a decade together, leading to divorce proceedings focused on property and custody issues. The central dispute concerned the proceeds from the sale of the marital home, which had been purchased in part with funds that one spouse received as an inheritance. During the marriage, the home increased in value, and the parties disagreed about whether the inheritance funds and their appreciated value should be considered separate or marital property. Additional disputes included whether proceeds from the sale of a neighboring property to a family member should be part of the marital estate and whether credits or adjustments were owed for post-separation expenses and exclusive use of the marital home.The Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Homer, conducted a property division trial. The court credited the wife’s testimony that her inheritance funds used for the down payment remained her separate property, but classified the increase in the home’s value as marital. It ordered an equal division of marital property, enforced a payment promised by the wife to the husband to facilitate the home sale, denied claims for credits and imputed rental value, and required each party to pay their own attorney’s fees. The court issued a child support order based on information provided by the wife after the husband failed to submit requested documentation.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the Superior Court’s ruling that the inheritance funds remained separate property, holding that when separate property is commingled with marital property, a presumption arises that it becomes marital unless rebutted by sufficient evidence. Uncorroborated testimony about intent is insufficient to overcome this presumption. The court affirmed the remainder of the Superior Court’s rulings, including the equal division of marital property, denial of credits and imputed rental value, enforcement of the agreed payment, child support award, and attorney’s fees. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Dickerson v. Dickerson" on Justia Law

Law enforcement responded to a welfare check at a hotel where a mother and her two young children were staying. Upon investigation, officers discovered evidence of methamphetamine use and poor living conditions, including malnutrition and neglect of the children. The children were taken into protective custody, and the mother was arrested and charged with endangering children. During the dependency proceedings, the mother gave birth to a third child, who was also removed after testing positive for methamphetamine at birth. Over the next two years, the mother struggled with housing instability, inconsistent visitation with her children, repeated incarceration, and ongoing substance abuse.The State of Wyoming, through the Department of Family Services (DFS), filed neglect and later termination petitions in the District Court of Fremont County. The mother participated in case planning and received services but failed to meet critical goals, such as obtaining safe housing, maintaining sobriety, and engaging consistently with her children. The district court conducted a bench trial and, after considering evidence of the mother’s continued substance abuse, incarceration, and inability to care for the children, terminated her parental rights under Wyoming Statute §§ 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (a)(v). The court found that DFS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family and that termination was in the children’s best interests.The Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming reviewed the case, applying a strict scrutiny standard and examining whether the evidence supported termination under either statutory ground. The court held that DFS’s procedural shortcomings did not prevent the mother from understanding or completing her case plan and distinguished this situation from MB v. Laramie County Department of Family Services, 933 P.2d 1126 (Wyo. 1997). Because the mother failed to challenge termination under § 14-2-309(a)(v), the court affirmed the district court’s decision to terminate her parental rights on that independent ground. View "In re Termination of Parental Rights To: BAC II" on Justia Law

A husband and wife, both originally from Pakistan, married there in 2008 before moving to Houston, Texas, where they accumulated substantial community assets during their marriage. The wife alleges she suffered ongoing abuse from the husband. In 2012, the husband sent the wife back to Pakistan under the pretext of renewing her visa, and in early 2013, he divorced her without her knowledge via a unilateral Islamic talaq proceeding in Pakistan. The wife was not informed of the proceedings, was not served with process, and only learned of the divorce two years later. Upon returning to Houston, she filed for divorce and sought a division of marital property in Texas.The 295th District Court of Harris County dismissed the wife’s divorce petition for lack of jurisdiction, granting comity to the Pakistani divorce judgment. The trial court found that under Pakistani law, the wife was precluded from further property claims, and since Pakistan does not recognize community property, the court rendered a take-nothing judgment against her. The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas affirmed this judgment, agreeing that the Pakistani proceedings were conclusive.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts’ decisions. It held that the notice provided to the wife—five days of publication in a small Pakistani newspaper—was constitutionally inadequate when the husband could have easily provided direct notice. The court determined that such notice failed to satisfy fundamental principles of due process and natural justice, and that Texas courts may not afford comity to a foreign judgment obtained through procedures that violate constitutional guarantees. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "AZHAR v. CHOUDHRI" on Justia Law

A child, BEP, was born in November 2022 and soon after was hospitalized due to breathing difficulties and low weight, leading to concerns about his mother’s ability to care for him. The mother had inappropriately watered down formula and given BEP medicine unsuitable for his age. As a result, BEP was placed in protective custody and later foster care under the Wyoming Department of Family Services (Department), while paternity was being established. The Department identified Skylar Colten Remer as BEP’s legal father in May 2023 and developed a case plan to help him establish a safe relationship with BEP, which included counseling, supervised visitation, and parenting coaching. Despite these efforts, the Department found Father did not engage in the services provided, failed to demonstrate meaningful change, and was unable to provide basic or higher-level care for BEP, who had significant behavioral and emotional needs.The Department petitioned the District Court of Natrona County to terminate Father’s parental rights under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (v), citing Father’s neglect, instability, and lack of engagement. Father failed to timely respond to the petition, resulting in a default being entered against him. At the subsequent termination hearing, Father could cross-examine witnesses but could not present his own evidence. The district court found clear and convincing evidence supporting termination on both statutory grounds and concluded termination was in BEP’s best interest.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed whether sufficient evidence supported the district court’s decision. The Court held that clear and convincing evidence established that BEP had been in foster care for the required period and that Father was unfit to have custody and control of BEP, as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v). The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s termination of Father’s parental rights. View "In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights To: BEP" on Justia Law