Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The parties in this case are former spouses who have been engaged in litigation over their divorce for several years. After the Sarpy County District Court entered a divorce decree in 2023, including a parenting plan, the party awarded sole physical custody sought enforcement of several provisions, alleging that the other party had failed to pay a court-ordered equalization payment, attorney fees, and his share of medical expenses for their children. She also alleged violations of the parenting plan, such as improper transportation arrangements, preventing communication with children, failure to administer medication, unauthorized travel, and exceeding allotted parenting time. The other party claimed inability to pay, disputed some allegations, and asserted misunderstandings regarding the parenting plan.The Sarpy County District Court held an evidentiary hearing, found the party in violation of its orders, and determined his testimony was not credible, particularly regarding his financial situation and explanations for his conduct. As a result, the court found him in willful contempt, ordered a 90-day incarceration which could be avoided by compliance ("purge" conditions), temporarily reduced his summer parenting time, and awarded attorney fees to the opposing party. The party appealed, but his brief contained numerous fictitious case citations and misstatements of law, leading the Nebraska Supreme Court to strike the brief and review only for plain error.The Nebraska Supreme Court found no plain error in the district court’s findings or sanctions. It clarified that self-represented litigants must adhere to the same standards as attorneys and that submission of briefs with fabricated citations is sanctionable. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s contempt order, the imposition of attorney fees, denial of in forma pauperis status, and the other sanctions. The district court’s order was affirmed. View "Shannon v. Shannon" on Justia Law

A woman gave birth to a child in the back of an ambulance and immediately informed hospital staff that she did not want or have the means to care for the baby, expressing her intent to relinquish the child for adoption. The Morgan County Department of Human Services (MCDHS) initiated a dependency or neglect proceeding, treating the matter as a typical abandonment case. MCDHS investigated the mother’s identity, contacted her family members to explore placement options, and took steps to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act, after learning the mother might be a member of a Canadian tribe.The Morgan County District Court, upon learning of MCDHS’s actions, intervened by issuing an order that recognized the birth mother’s right to anonymity and confidentiality under Colorado’s Safe Haven Law. The court directed MCDHS to halt its investigation into the mother’s identity and to cease contacting her family members, reasoning that the Safe Haven Law protected the mother’s privacy. The court also sealed records containing the mother’s name and refused to consider information derived from confidential sources. MCDHS challenged these orders through a C.A.R. 21 petition.Reviewing the matter, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that, although Colorado’s Safe Haven Law does not expressly guarantee anonymity and confidentiality, its structure, related statutory provisions, and underlying purpose imply such protections for parents who properly relinquish newborns under its terms. The Court concluded that county departments cannot pursue the identity of relinquishing parents or investigate their families for placement options. Once a newborn is surrendered pursuant to the Safe Haven Law, the county department must promptly seek adoptive placement and move to terminate parental rights while maintaining the parent’s anonymity and confidentiality. The Supreme Court of Colorado discharged its order to show cause and remanded for proceedings consistent with this holding. View "People ex rel. G.D.M." on Justia Law

The parties in this case were married from 1998 until their divorce in 2025. During the marriage, the wife acquired thirty shares in her employer’s business, Plan One Architects, after the couple jointly decided to invest. The shares were purchased using loans from the husband’s mother, refinancing their home, and selling a car. Plan One’s bylaws require only employees to hold shares, so the wife solely owns them and must sell them back to the company when her employment ends. The value of the shares primarily comes from annual shareholder distributions, which comprise most of the wife’s income.The District Court of Park County held a bench trial to resolve disputes over the division of the Plan One shares and associated debts. It found the shares to be marital property acquired during the marriage, largely due to the wife’s loyalty to her employer and financial support from the husband’s mother. The court ordered the wife to pay the husband one-half of the annual distributions from the shares, minus associated taxes, until her employment ends. Additionally, the court required both parties to equally repay the outstanding loans to the husband’s mother. Upon the wife's eventual sale of the shares, she must pay the husband one-half of the sale proceeds, minus capital gains taxes.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed whether the district court erred in awarding the husband half of the distributions, assigning tax liability to the wife, and directing repayment of the debt to the husband’s mother. The Supreme Court held that the shares were a vested marital asset and affirmed the district court’s discretion in awarding the husband periodic property distribution payments, assigning tax responsibility to the wife, and dividing the marital debt. The district court’s decree was affirmed. View "Atkinson v. Atkinson" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the division of a government pension earned by an employee during a lengthy period of cohabitation before marriage. The employee worked at the East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD), contributing to his pension from 1987 to 2018. He and his partner began living together in 1993, executed a domestic partnership affidavit for benefits, purchased a home jointly, and eventually married in 2003. After their relationship ended, the partner sought legal separation and also filed a civil action alleging breach of an oral agreement made during their cohabitation period, in which they agreed to pool their earnings and share equally any property acquired as a result.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco consolidated the civil and divorce proceedings. It bifurcated the case, first trying the claims regarding the oral agreement. After trial, the court found that an implied-in-fact (Marvin) agreement existed during the cohabitation period, entitling each party to an equal share of property acquired, including pension contributions and accumulations. The employee moved to clarify that statutory protections made his pension “unassignable” and “exempt from execution,” but the court held that the partner was entitled to half of the pension benefits accrued during the Marvin period, and could receive payment upon distribution or via other assets after actuarial valuation.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed whether Public Utilities Code section 12337 barred the partner from sharing in pension benefits accrued during cohabitation. The court held that section 12337 does not prohibit the partner from receiving a share of pension contributions and accumulations, because her claim was based on ownership arising from the Marvin agreement, not as a creditor or assignee. The trial court’s order was affirmed. View "Seiwald v. Irias" on Justia Law

A married couple with three minor children separated after more than a decade together, leading to divorce proceedings focused on property and custody issues. The central dispute concerned the proceeds from the sale of the marital home, which had been purchased in part with funds that one spouse received as an inheritance. During the marriage, the home increased in value, and the parties disagreed about whether the inheritance funds and their appreciated value should be considered separate or marital property. Additional disputes included whether proceeds from the sale of a neighboring property to a family member should be part of the marital estate and whether credits or adjustments were owed for post-separation expenses and exclusive use of the marital home.The Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Homer, conducted a property division trial. The court credited the wife’s testimony that her inheritance funds used for the down payment remained her separate property, but classified the increase in the home’s value as marital. It ordered an equal division of marital property, enforced a payment promised by the wife to the husband to facilitate the home sale, denied claims for credits and imputed rental value, and required each party to pay their own attorney’s fees. The court issued a child support order based on information provided by the wife after the husband failed to submit requested documentation.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the Superior Court’s ruling that the inheritance funds remained separate property, holding that when separate property is commingled with marital property, a presumption arises that it becomes marital unless rebutted by sufficient evidence. Uncorroborated testimony about intent is insufficient to overcome this presumption. The court affirmed the remainder of the Superior Court’s rulings, including the equal division of marital property, denial of credits and imputed rental value, enforcement of the agreed payment, child support award, and attorney’s fees. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Dickerson v. Dickerson" on Justia Law

Law enforcement responded to a welfare check at a hotel where a mother and her two young children were staying. Upon investigation, officers discovered evidence of methamphetamine use and poor living conditions, including malnutrition and neglect of the children. The children were taken into protective custody, and the mother was arrested and charged with endangering children. During the dependency proceedings, the mother gave birth to a third child, who was also removed after testing positive for methamphetamine at birth. Over the next two years, the mother struggled with housing instability, inconsistent visitation with her children, repeated incarceration, and ongoing substance abuse.The State of Wyoming, through the Department of Family Services (DFS), filed neglect and later termination petitions in the District Court of Fremont County. The mother participated in case planning and received services but failed to meet critical goals, such as obtaining safe housing, maintaining sobriety, and engaging consistently with her children. The district court conducted a bench trial and, after considering evidence of the mother’s continued substance abuse, incarceration, and inability to care for the children, terminated her parental rights under Wyoming Statute §§ 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (a)(v). The court found that DFS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family and that termination was in the children’s best interests.The Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming reviewed the case, applying a strict scrutiny standard and examining whether the evidence supported termination under either statutory ground. The court held that DFS’s procedural shortcomings did not prevent the mother from understanding or completing her case plan and distinguished this situation from MB v. Laramie County Department of Family Services, 933 P.2d 1126 (Wyo. 1997). Because the mother failed to challenge termination under § 14-2-309(a)(v), the court affirmed the district court’s decision to terminate her parental rights on that independent ground. View "In re Termination of Parental Rights To: BAC II" on Justia Law

A husband and wife, both originally from Pakistan, married there in 2008 before moving to Houston, Texas, where they accumulated substantial community assets during their marriage. The wife alleges she suffered ongoing abuse from the husband. In 2012, the husband sent the wife back to Pakistan under the pretext of renewing her visa, and in early 2013, he divorced her without her knowledge via a unilateral Islamic talaq proceeding in Pakistan. The wife was not informed of the proceedings, was not served with process, and only learned of the divorce two years later. Upon returning to Houston, she filed for divorce and sought a division of marital property in Texas.The 295th District Court of Harris County dismissed the wife’s divorce petition for lack of jurisdiction, granting comity to the Pakistani divorce judgment. The trial court found that under Pakistani law, the wife was precluded from further property claims, and since Pakistan does not recognize community property, the court rendered a take-nothing judgment against her. The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas affirmed this judgment, agreeing that the Pakistani proceedings were conclusive.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts’ decisions. It held that the notice provided to the wife—five days of publication in a small Pakistani newspaper—was constitutionally inadequate when the husband could have easily provided direct notice. The court determined that such notice failed to satisfy fundamental principles of due process and natural justice, and that Texas courts may not afford comity to a foreign judgment obtained through procedures that violate constitutional guarantees. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "AZHAR v. CHOUDHRI" on Justia Law

A child, BEP, was born in November 2022 and soon after was hospitalized due to breathing difficulties and low weight, leading to concerns about his mother’s ability to care for him. The mother had inappropriately watered down formula and given BEP medicine unsuitable for his age. As a result, BEP was placed in protective custody and later foster care under the Wyoming Department of Family Services (Department), while paternity was being established. The Department identified Skylar Colten Remer as BEP’s legal father in May 2023 and developed a case plan to help him establish a safe relationship with BEP, which included counseling, supervised visitation, and parenting coaching. Despite these efforts, the Department found Father did not engage in the services provided, failed to demonstrate meaningful change, and was unable to provide basic or higher-level care for BEP, who had significant behavioral and emotional needs.The Department petitioned the District Court of Natrona County to terminate Father’s parental rights under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (v), citing Father’s neglect, instability, and lack of engagement. Father failed to timely respond to the petition, resulting in a default being entered against him. At the subsequent termination hearing, Father could cross-examine witnesses but could not present his own evidence. The district court found clear and convincing evidence supporting termination on both statutory grounds and concluded termination was in BEP’s best interest.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed whether sufficient evidence supported the district court’s decision. The Court held that clear and convincing evidence established that BEP had been in foster care for the required period and that Father was unfit to have custody and control of BEP, as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v). The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s termination of Father’s parental rights. View "In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights To: BEP" on Justia Law

The case involves two parents who were never married and share two daughters. In 2016, they agreed to an allocation judgment regarding parental responsibilities and parenting time, which was entered by the Circuit Court of McHenry County. The mother was awarded primary parenting time and major decision-making authority, while the father received weekly and alternating weekend visits. Over the years, circumstances changed: the father moved to a larger home, began remote work, and the children grew older, with one diagnosed with autism. In 2021, the father sought to modify the allocation judgment to increase his parenting time, arguing these changes warranted adjustment.After unsuccessful mediation, the father filed a motion in the Circuit Court to modify parental responsibilities and later amended it to seek only increased parenting time. The court held a hearing, heard testimony from experts and parties, and ultimately granted the mother’s motion for a directed finding. The court concluded that the father had not demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances as required under section 610.5(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, thus modification was not justified.On appeal, the Appellate Court, Second District, vacated the circuit court’s decision, finding that the circuit court applied the incorrect legal standard. The appellate court held that a motion to modify parenting time under section 610.5(a) requires only a showing of changed circumstances, not a substantial change, and remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. The Court held that section 610.5(a) governs motions to modify parenting time and requires the moving party to show changed circumstances that necessitate modification to serve the child’s best interests. The circuit court’s judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Reynolds v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

After divorcing in 2022, Eric and Tiare experienced escalating harassment and abuse beginning in late 2023. Tiare repeatedly sent manipulative and threatening messages, made suicide threats, and harassed Eric’s new girlfriend. The harassment intensified, culminating in Tiare entering Eric’s property, physically attacking him, and being arrested for battery and unauthorized entry. Various protective orders were issued, including a temporary restraining order (TRO), an emergency protective order, and a criminal protective order. Despite these, Tiare violated the orders and continued contacting Eric.The Marin County Superior Court initially granted Tiare three continuances for the hearing on Eric’s petition for a domestic violence restraining order, citing reasons such as giving Tiare time to respond, her attorney’s absence, and her participation in residential treatment. At the fourth hearing, Tiare requested another continuance, arguing her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent due to pending criminal charges. The trial court denied this request, found that Eric had proven acts of abuse, and issued a three-year restraining order protecting both Eric and his girlfriend.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the trial court’s denial of the fourth continuance. The appellate court held that respondents in Domestic Violence Prevention Act proceedings who intend to assert their Fifth Amendment right are not automatically entitled to a continuance. The trial court must balance the respondent’s Fifth Amendment interests against other interests, including those of the petitioner, judicial efficiency, nonparties, and the legislative purpose of prompt resolution. The appellate court found the trial court had properly weighed these competing interests and did not abuse its discretion in denying the request. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Irvine v. Irvine" on Justia Law