Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court modified the decision of the court of appeals affirming the denial of a petition to terminate Father's parental rights and clarified the correct standard of review at the adjudication and dispositional stage, holding that there were no grounds to terminate Father's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1), (4), or (7).Mother filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights, alleging that grounds for termination existed under section 7B-1111(a0(1), (4), and (7). In denying the petition, the trial court found that Father made an effort to have a relationship with his child but was blocked from doing so, that the child was not neglected, and that Father had not willfully abandoned the child. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the trial court did not err in concluding that the grounds necessary to terminate Defendant's parental rights did not exist; and (2) the court of appeals' decision is modified to the extent it could be read to be applying an abuse of discretion, rather than a clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, standard of review at the adjudicatory stage of the proceeding. View "In re S.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating the orders of the trial court dismissing Mother's terminating MOther's parental rights, holding that the trial court did not err.After a hearing, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights. The court of appeals remanded the case for a new hearing, citing its concerns about the fundamental fairness offered to Mother before the trial court dismissed her provisional counsel. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) the trial court complied with the legislature's enactments concerning provisional counsel under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1108.1(a)(1) and properly considered at the pretrial hearings the issues listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1101.1(a)(1); and (2) therefore, the court of appeals erred by reversing the judgment of the trial court. View "In re R.A.F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court in this termination of parental rights case, holding that any error was harmless.The trial court in this case referenced a timeline introduced into evidence and expressly relied on that timeline, which the court found to be "credible and reliable," in determining that grounds existed to terminate Respondent's parental rights for willful failure to make reasonable progress under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(2). The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the trial court's findings of fact were proper because the trial court did not merely accept and rely upon the timeline but expressly evaluated whether the timeline was credible and reliable; (2) there was no error in the trial court's disposition order; and (3) if the trial court erred by permitting an amendment that added an additional ground for termination, the error was harmless. View "In re H.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court changing the permanency plan for a minor child (Child) from reunification to adoption, holding that there was no error.In 2021, the State filed a petition against Mother alleging neglect of Child. The juvenile court removed Child from the home follow a hearing and placed Child into non-relative foster care. In 2022, the Department of Family Services (DFS) recommended that the juvenile court change the permanency plan from reunification to adoption. The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing and then issued an order changing the permanency plan from reunification to adoption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the juvenile court did not err in excluding Child's maternal grandmother as a placement option; (2) the juvenile court did not err in changing the permanency plan from reunification to adoption and allowing DFS to cease further reunification efforts; and (3) Father was not materially prejudiced by his absence from a shelter care hearing. View "AG v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court issued pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 15-7-7(a)(3) terminating Father's parental rights to his son, J.B. holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.The Department of Children, Youth, and Families filed a petition in the family court to terminate the parental rights of Father based on two grounds of unfitness. After a trial, the trial justice found clear and convincing evidence that Father was not a fit parent who could care for J.B. immediately and that it was in J.B.'s best interests to terminate Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent evidence supported the findings of the trial justice that Father was an unfit parent pursuant to section 15-7-7(a)(3) and that termination of Father's parental rights was in J.B.'s best interests. View "In re J.B." on Justia Law

Victoria Fietzek and Henry Fietzek cross-appealed a divorce judgment. Victoria argued the district court erred in: (1) its Ruff-Fischer analysis; (2) the distribution of the marital estate; (3) the valuation of the assets; (4) finding Henry did not commit economic waste; (5) limiting the duration of spousal support; and (6) in not awarding attorney’s fees to her. Henry argued only that the district court erred in the duration and amount of spousal support awarded to Victoria. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s Ruff-Fischer analysis, the court’s findings of fact in regard to the equitable distribution of the martial estate, the court’s finding that Henry did not commit economic waste, and the court’s denial of attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court reversed the order for spousal support and remanded for the district court to make additional findings regarding spousal support and, if necessary, reconsider the allocation of property. View "Fietzek v. Fietzek" on Justia Law

After the Carter County, Oklahoma District Court adjudicated S.J.W. (child) as deprived, Parents-appellants appealed. S.J.W., through child's attorney, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. S.J.W. claimed the Chickasaw Nation had exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) based on the plain language in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because S.J.W. resided within the Chickasaw reservation, notwithstanding the fact that S.J.W. was an Indian child and member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. Parents raised two issues to the Oklahoma Supreme Court: (1) whether Oklahoma courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian child's deprived case arising in Carter County, which was completely within the external, territorial boundaries of the Chickasaw reservation; and (2) if the court did have jurisdiction, whether a delay in the adjudication hearing deprived Parents of their due process rights. With respect to the first issue, the Supreme Court held the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate S.J.W. deprived. Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b), the State of Oklahoma shared concurrent territorial jurisdiction with an Indian child's tribe when the Indian child is not domiciled or residing on the Indian child's tribe's reservation. "In our dual federalism system, an Oklahoma district court's subject matter jurisdiction may be limited by the Oklahoma or U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. X; Okla. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 7(a)." In addition, the Supreme Court found no violation of the Parents' right to due process of law as any delay was not "arbitrary, oppressive or shocking to the conscience of the court," and Parents had a meaningful opportunity to defend throughout the proceeding. View "In the Matter of S.J.W." on Justia Law

Petitioners Grant and Kalan Lloyd sought to adopt minor child L.B.L. without Mother Sara Pollard's consent. The District Court found that Child was eligible for adoption without Mother's consent. Mother appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court. "Ideally, the child's best interests run together with the parent's. In practice these principles seldom conflict, because a trial court may usually give equal effect to both. Sometimes, this can only be done by ensuring the parent's due process rights are protected, then considering which outcome is in the child's best interests." Here, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the Court of Civil Appeals specifically acknowledged the best interests of the child standard, but allowed it to be outweighed by other considerations in reaching its conclusion. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals opinion, affirmed the trial court, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Adoption of L.B.L." on Justia Law

Appellants (father and mother) challenged multiple circuit court orders finding both parents neglected their children and ordering the children's removal from their home. Appellants were the parents of B.R., S.R., and J.R. Both parents had a significant history with the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), including reports alleging one or both parents were manufacturing or selling methamphetamines in the home with the children present. In March 2021, based on criminal allegations against mother (relating to her purchase and use of methamphetamine), DCYF filed a motion for ex parte removal of the children from the home. The trial court granted the motion and found that mother’s continued involvement in drug trafficking beginning in 2015, and her risk-taking behavior related thereto, “demonstrate that the children’s health or life are in imminent danger if they are allowed to remain in the parents’ home.” The court awarded DCYF protective supervision of the children. In May 2022, following a dispositional hearing, the court found that return of the children to their home would be contrary to their welfare because neither parent had corrected the behavior that led to the children’s initial removal. Father and mother each appealed separately. The New Hampshire Supreme Court accepted the two appeals and consolidated them. Parents argued both findings were unsupported by the evidence. Father also argued that the court’s orders failed to provide specific written findings as required by RSA 169-C:6-b, III (2022). After review of the circuit court orders, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "In re J.R.; In re S.R.; In re B.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the family court concluding that a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) entered in 2001, rather than a final order of divorce, must control the division of Husband's retirement benefit, holding that Husband's motion to vacate the QDRO was untimely under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 60(b).The parties in this case were divorced by a final order entered by the circuit court in 2000, and the circuit court entered a QDRO in 2001. In 2020, Husband filed a motion to vacate the QDRO, arguing that Wife was only entitled to the amount contained in the divorce order. The family court denied the motion after determining that the QDRO and final divorce order contained conflicting terms regarding the division of Husband's retirement benefit, and therefore, the QDRO must be enforced. The Supreme Court affirmed after considering Husband's argument pursuant to Rule 60(b), holding that Husband's requested relief was not timely sought. View "Carl A. v. Deborah A." on Justia Law