Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

S.B. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights over his daughter H.B. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. Father contends only that the juvenile court erred in finding the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) inapplicable based on the record of inquiry made by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) with H.B.’s extended family members.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the Department inquired about Indian ancestry with representatives from both sides of two generational levels of H.B.’s family. It contacted every person its interviewees identified as a likely source of information about ancestry. The juvenile court had an adequate basis on which to conclude the Department fulfilled its inquiry obligations under section 224.2, subdivision (b), and that neither the Department nor the court had reason to know or believe that H.B. is an Indian child. Under the court’s deferential standard of review, the juvenile court did not need the Department to contact every unnamed extended family member that had attended a court hearing, regardless of difficulty in doing so, to reach its conclusion. View "In re H.B." on Justia Law

Nicole Fitzpatrick obtained a dissolution of her marriage to Jeremy Fitzpatrick. The couple had minor children and significant marital assets, including real property, bank accounts, investments, and personal possessions. Among these were investments in oil and gas assets. The issue this case presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s review centered on the Court of Civil Appeals decision regarding the division of the oil and gas assets. During the course of the marriage, Husband pursued a mutual goal of investments in oil and gas assets through two different ventures. He inextricably tied the Bakken and Energy deals and encumbered marital assets. The trial court found that all the A and B units of both the Bakken and Energy properties were acquired during the marriage through joint efforts of both parties, and were marital property subject to division. Because part of the properties' value lay in their future growth, the trial court considered the most equitable form of property division. The court ordered that future distributions and proceeds flowing from both sets of A and B units were to be held in constructive trust for both parties' benefit, and for Husband to distribute her equal marital share to Wife. COCA reversed the trial court's decisions regarding the Energy A and B units, finding that the trial court should have determined the units' value and set a valuation date. COCA also found that the trial court's use of a constructive trust for the Energy units was not proper. However, COCA did not disturb the trial court's use of a constructive trust with regard to the Bakken units. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s authority to distribute the assets although they could not be valued at the time of the divorce decree; the Court concurred with the trial court’s imposition of a constructive trust to ensure protection of the assets’ future value. View "Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick" on Justia Law

J.N. was born in August 2013. On the eve of J.N.’s eighth birthday in August 2021, the State filed a petition alleging that J.N. was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS) due to lack of proper parental care (CHINS- B) after an incident during which mother had dragged J.N. by her arms, causing bruises. The court transferred temporary custody to the Department for Children and Families (DCF). After a series of subsequent incidents at school and home, a trial court issued a disposition order that continued custody of J.N. with DCF, with a goal of reunification with her mother by June 2023. Mother appealed the CHINS disposition, Mother argued the State essentially used a CHINS petition to advance a claim of abuse, and that by accepting that framing, the trial court deprived her of notice and interpreted the statute in a manner that was unconstitutionally over broad. The Vermont Supreme Court determine the trial court’s findings did not fit the theory charged by the State. To the extent the State asked the Supreme Court to affirm the CHINS determination based on a theory of abuse, the Court agreed with Mother that this would create a problem of notice. Accordingly, the disposition was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "In re J.N." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of the juvenile court denying Father's request for an evidentiary hearing on his petition filed under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 388 to reinstate reunification services with Minor, holding that, under the circumstances, it was error to deny Father's request for an evidentiary hearing on his section 388 petition.A few days after Minor's birth, the Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a petition on his behalf under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 300. The juvenile court terminated the reunification services of Father, who had been incarcerated since before Minor was born, and set a Cal. Well. & Inst. Code 366.26 hearing. The day before the hearing, Father filed his section 388 petition, stating that he had not been provided with services despite the court's orders. The court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the juvenile court erred in denying Father's request for an evidentiary hearing on his section 388 petition. View "In re Damari Y." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court entering an order removing reunification with Parents from the permanent plan as to their two children, holding that competent evidence supported the trial court's findings of fact, and those findings sustained the trial court's conclusions of law.The Catawba County Department of Social Services filed a juvenile petition alleging that Parents' infant daughter had been abused and that both she and Parents' son were neglected. The court adjudicated the daughter as both abused and neglected and the son as neglected. An ensuing permanency planning order made reunification the primary plan. Given the severity of the daughter's injuries and that neither parent had acknowledged responsibility for the injuries, however, the court modified the permanent plan, eliminating reunification from the plan and specifying a primary plan of adoption. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the evidence on the record supported the trial court's findings of fact, which supported the conclusions of law in the permanency planning order; and (2) the court of appeals addressed a constitutional issue that was not preserved for appellate review. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a parent whose parental rights have been terminated cannot complain for the first time on appeal that the trial court failed to make the "extraordinary circumstances" and "best interest" findings under Tex. Fam. Code 263.401(b).The statute at issue provides that a court may retain a parental rights termination suit if it finds that extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services and that continuing that conservatorship is in the child's best interest. The court in this case made only one of the required findings when it extended the dismissal deadline. Mother appealed a subsequent judgment terminating her parental rights. The court of appeals vacated that judgment and dismissed the termination suit, concluding that the trial court lost jurisdiction by failing to make the additional required finding by the dismissal deadline. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the findings requirement is not jurisdictional, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in dismissing the action. View "In re Interest of J.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court dismissing the underlying abuse and neglect petition against Father and remanded for the circuit court to adjudicate him as a neglectful parent, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing the abuse and neglect petition.As to the merits of the underlying abuse and neglect allegations, the circuit court denied adjudication, concluding that a prior decision by the Court dictated its decision. The court then "reluctantly" ordered that the State return the child to Father despite his methamphetamine use. The child's guardian ad litem appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for the circuit court to adjudicate Father as a neglectful parent, holding that the case that the circuit court relied on was materially distinguishable from this case and that a parent threatens his child's well-being when he chronically abuses methamphetamine while entrusted as the child's custodian. View "In re S.C." on Justia Law

The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) governs state court adoption and foster care proceedings involving Indian children, requiring placement of an Indian child according to the Act’s hierarchical preferences absent a finding of “good cause” to depart from them, 25 U.S.C. 1915(a), (b). Indian families or institutions from any tribe (not just the tribe to which the child has a tie) outrank unrelated non-Indians or non-Indian institutions. The child’s tribe may alter the prioritization order. The preferences of the Indian child or her parent generally cannot trump those set by statute or tribal resolution. In involuntary proceedings, the Indian child’s parent or custodian and tribe must be given notice of any custody proceedings, and the right to intervene. ICWA requires a party seeking to terminate parental rights or to remove an Indian child from an unsafe environment to satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services; a court cannot order relief unless the party demonstrates, by a heightened burden of proof and expert testimony, that the child is likely to suffer serious harm. A biological parent who voluntarily gives up an Indian child cannot necessarily choose the child’s placement. The tribe has a right to intervene and can enforce ICWA’s placement preferences. States must keep certain records and transmit specified information to the Secretary of the Interior.The Supreme Court concluded that ICWA is consistent with Congress’s Article I authority and that conflicting state family law is preempted. Requirements concerning “active efforts” to keep Indian families together do not command the states to deploy their executive or legislative power to implement federal policy. The provisions apply to “any party” who initiates an involuntary proceeding–private individuals, agencies, and government entities. Legislation that applies “evenhandedly” to state and private actors does not typically implicate the Tenth Amendment. ICWA’s requirement that state agencies perform a “diligent search” for placements that satisfy ICWA’s hierarchy also applies to both private and public parties. Congress can require state courts to enforce federal law and may impose ancillary record-keeping requirements related to state-court proceedings without violating the Tenth Amendment.The Court did not address an equal protection challenge to ICWA’s placement preferences and a non-delegation challenge to the provision allowing tribes to alter the placement preferences, citing lack of standing to raise the challenges. View "Haaland v. Brackeen" on Justia Law

Jay Wright appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to his ex-wife, Kristie Parish. Wright and Parish were married in 2002 and divorced in 2019. Before they were married, Wright and Parish, as single persons, purchased two adjacent parcels of real property in Island Park, and their ownership of the property did not change following their marriage. A magistrate court presided over their divorce proceedings and the distribution of their community property. The magistrate court classified as community property certain loan payments and improvements that had been made for the benefit of the Island Park Properties but specifically declined to divide the properties because the court concluded the properties were separate property and that it “lack[ed] authority to divide the property.” The magistrate court concluded that Wright and Parish “apparently” owned the properties as tenants-in-common, each with a fifty percent interest, though it never made a definitive ruling on each party’s interest, concluding only that they were “joint owners[.]” Roughly one year after the magistrate court entered its final judgment for the divorce, Wright filed suit seeking a partition of the Island Park Properties and for Parish to deed them to him, arguing in part that his ownership interest in the properties exceeded the fifty percent determination that the magistrate court had ostensibly made. In response, Parish moved for summary judgment, arguing that Wright’s claim that he was entitled to a greater ownership interest was precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The district court granted Parish’s motion for summary judgment after determining that the issues in Wright’s complaint had already been litigated in the prior divorce proceedings. As a result, the district court concluded that the proceeds from the sale of the properties should be equally divided between Wright and Parish. Wright appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Parish, and remanded the case for the trial court to consider whether Wright could produce evidence to overcome the rebuttable presumption of equal ownership in the properties. View "Wright v. Parish" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Mother's motion for default and making final a temporary child support order from 2018, holding that the district court erred.In this appeal, Father challenged a district court order granting Mother's motion for default and making final a 2018 temporary child support order, arguing, among other things, that the district court violated his right to due process by granting Motion's motion for default before the closing of his twenty-day response window under Wyo. R. Civ. P. 6(c)(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Father timely filed his notice of appeal, and therefore, this Court had jurisdiction; (2) the district court violated Father's right to due process by granting Mother's motion before Father's opportunity to respond expired; and (3) the district court abused its discretion by making the 2018 temporary child support order the final order without obtaining sufficient financial information under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 20-2-308. View "Tucker v. Tucker" on Justia Law