Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the probate and family court judge denying M.H.'s motion to intervene in an action brought by J.M. against C.G. seeking custody and expanded parenting time and affirmed the judgments dismissing two other actions brought by M.H., holding that there was no clear error.In 2016, J.M. had executed a voluntary acknowledgment of parentage as to Amelia. In 2020, J.M. brought an action seeking legal custody and expanded parenting time. M.H., Amelia's putative biological father, moved to intervene in the action as Amelia's putative biological father. M.H. filed complaints in both equity and under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209C to establish his paternity of Amelia. The lower judge dismissed both complaints and denied the motion to intervene. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) to the extent M.H. challenged the VAP on the basis of fraud, his claim was time barred; and (2) there was no reason to address the constitutionality of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209B. View "J.M. v. C.G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the sanctions order entered by the trial court against Joseph Monroe for pursuing a shareholder-derivative suit against his wife, Lisa Monroe, the majority shareholder of a closely held corporation, holding that the sections order violated Rule 1:1.Lisa and Joseph were the married co-owners of MEPCO Materials, Inc. One week after Joseph, as the then-sole director, filed for divorce he caused MEPCO to filed a civil action against Lisa for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. After Joseph resigned his position at MEPCO he sought to convert the action to a shareholder-derivative action. The granted the motions, converted the suit to a derivative action, and then dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Thereafter, the trial court granted Lisa's motion for sanctions and ordered Joseph to pay $70,097 to MEPCO and Lisa. The Supreme Court vacated the order granting sanctions, holding (1) Joseph had standing to appeal the sanctions award; but (2) the sanctions order violated Rule 1:1 because it was not timely entered. View "Monroe v. Monroe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the district court's award of attorney fees based on conduct that occurred outside the context of litigation, holding that the district court exceeded the scope of its inherent authority when it awarded attorney fees.In this case arising from a post-dissolution, mediated settlement agreement between Appellant and Respondent regarding the treatment of a college savings account. The agreement required that the account be awarded to the parties' daughter when she turned twenty-one years old, but when their daughter reached that age Appellant took no action to transfer the account. Ultimately, after intervention on the part of the district court, the transfer became effective. Respondent moved for conduct-based attorney fees under Minn. Stat. 518.14. The district court granted the motion.. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court exceeded the scope of its inherent authority in awarding attorney fees because the award was not necessary to the performance of a judicial function. View "Buckner v. Robichaud" on Justia Law

In an appeal by allowance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether a proposed adoption by a mother’s long-term partner, in conjunction with the termination of the biological father’s parental rights, constituted “cause” to excuse the relinquishment requirement of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2903 with respect to the mother under Section 2901. The Court found that, in order to seek termination of Father’s parental rights and the proposed adoption by Partner under Section 2901, Mother had to demonstrate cause as to why she could not satisfy the statutory requirement, i.e., why she and Partner cannot marry, and then establish why the relinquishment requirement under Section 2711(d) was satisfied under the facts of her case. As the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights without first evaluating whether Mother established cause under Section 2901, and given that Mother did not provide evidence pertaining to this “cause” analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order remanding to the orphans’ court for consideration of whether Mother could establish cause, as defined in this opinion, to excuse the relinquishment requirement under the facts of this case. View "In Re Adopt. of: M.E.L." on Justia Law

Nicholas Otten appealed a district court judgment entered after a bench trial on divorce proceedings. On appeal, he argued the court erred by denying his motion to continue trial. He also argued the court erroneously admitted, reviewed, and relied on Jessica Otten’s evidence, and thereby erred in its division of marital property, consideration of the best interest factors, and award of his parenting time. After review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the judgment. View "Otten v. Otten, et. al." on Justia Law

Derrick Dogbe appealed district court’s order denying his motion to modify primary residential responsibility, an order denying his motion to vacate the modification order, and an order awarding attorney’s fees to Rebekah Dogbe (now known as Rebekah Grafsgaard). After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed that part of the order denying Dogbe’s motion to modify primary residential responsibility, but reversed those parts of the orders awarding attorney’s fees. View "Dogbe v. Dogbe, et al." on Justia Law

Ryan Fleck appealed the denial of his motion to amend a parenting plan. He argued the district court erred in allowing Dana Fleck to testify, and he made various challenges to the court’s findings. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court held the court did not err in allowing Dana to testify. Furthermore, the Court held the trial court applied an erroneous standard for determining whether a material change in circumstances had occurred for purposes of modifying parenting time. Thus, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fleck v. Fleck, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights as to his minor child (Child), holding that the trial court did not violate Father's right to adequate notice when it terminated Father's parental rights after the close of the evidence pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 17-112(j)(3)(B)(ii).At the close of the evidence in this case the Commissioner of Children and Families moved to amend the petition to allege a different ground for the termination of Father's rights. The trial court granted the motion pursuant to Practice Book section 34a-1(d). Thereafter, the Commissioner of Children and Families filed an amended summary of the facts in support of its petition claiming that grounds existed for termination of Father's parental rights pursuant to section 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(ii). At the conclusion of trial, the trial court granted the petition to terminate Father's parental rights on ground (B)(ii). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not violate Father's constitutional due process right to adequate notice by allowing the Commissioner to amend the petition after the close of the evidence and terminating Father's parental rights pursuant to ground (B)(ii). View "In re Gabriel S." on Justia Law

Malinowski filed for dissolution of her marriage to Martin. While that case was pending, Malinowski filed an ex parte request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; Fam. Code, 6200), seeking to protect herself and the parties’ children. Pending a hearing on the merits, the trial court issued a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO) against Martin with “no-contact” and “stay-away” provisions. Subsequently, the court modified the DVTRO to allow Martin brief contact with the children consistent with a visitation order. Malinowski contends the trial court erred by modifying the DVTRO without adhering to Code of Civil Procedure section 533, which requires notice and a showing of changed circumstances for modification or dissolution of an injunction or a temporary restraining order.The court of appeal concluded that section 533 does not provide the exclusive means by which a trial court in a DVPA action may modify a DVTRO; a trial court is not necessarily obligated to proceed under section 533 before modifying a DVTRO to allow for exceptions consistent with child visitation ordered in a parallel dissolution case. In an appropriate case, the requirements of due process may require the court to consider evidence presented at a noticed hearing consistent with section 533 in order to resolve disputed factual matters. View "Malinowski v. Martin" on Justia Law

Appellant Shauna Willis appealed an order granting her request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her ex-husband, Respondent Ricky Willis. She contended the family court erred under Family Code section 3044(a) because the court maintained joint physical custody by keeping in place a visitation order which had granted each approximately equal custody time with their child, T.W. The issue presented by this appeal was whether the rebuttable presumption of section 3044(a) arose in a proceeding for issuance of a DVRO when neither party was seeking custody or a modification of a custody or visitation order. To this, the Court of Appeal concluded the presumption of section 3044(a) did not arise in that situation. "Our conclusion is based on the plain language of section 3044(a), which by its terms applies only when a party is seeking custody of the child and is reinforced by other statutory provisions." Because the presumption of section 3044(a) did not arise, the family court erred by awarding Appellant sole legal and physical custody of T.W. Although Respondent did not appeal, the Court reversed that part of the order in the interest of justice. View "Marriage of Willis v. Costa-Willis" on Justia Law