Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

S.L.S., biological mother of D.M.H., appeals from an order reappointing J.H.T. and L.H.T. as D.M.H’s guardians and adopting a prior visitation schedule as the current visitation schedule. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed: S.L.S. did not cite any statute or case requiring that a visitation schedule be updated or changed at a specific time. "Nor has she cited us to any law prohibiting a juvenile court from adopting a prior visitation schedule. Absent such a law and absent any argument a different visitation schedule would be beneficial to D.M.H., the court did not err by adopting the prior visitation schedule." View "Interest of D.M.H." on Justia Law

Tyler Vetter appealed a fifth amended judgment entered after the district court denied his motion to hold Amy Salter in contempt and, on its own motion, invoked N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a) to modify a fourth amended judgment. The district court entered a judgment requiring Vetter to pay Salter child support. The judgment was amended various times (for reasons not relevant to this appeal). In a separate action, the court ordered primary residential responsibility changed from Salter to Vetter. The court subsequently entered a fourth amended judgment requiring Salter to reimburse Vetter child support amounts he paid. Two days after the court entered its order to amend the judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hamburger v. Hamburger, 978 N.W.2d 709, which explained a vested child support obligation could not be retroactively modified. Neither party appealed the fourth amended judgment. Vetter moved for an order to hold Salter in contempt for not paying him the $2,930. In consideration of Hamburger, the court, citing N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a), ordered the fourth amended judgment “be modified to reinstate the child support obligation of Tyler Vetter” for the earlier period and to “strik[e] the obligation of Amy Salter to make reimbursement.” A fifth amended judgment was entered accordingly. The Supreme Court reversed in part: even if the trial court was correct that its original decision was based upon a mistaken view of the law, Rule 60(a) did not authorize the court’s modification. Therefore, the Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying the law when it invoked Rule 60(a) to relieve Salter of her obligations under the fourth amended judgment. View "North Dakota, et al. v. Vetter" on Justia Law

Savanna Perales appealed a district court order requiring her to return her children to North Dakota. Perales and Erik Gonzalez were divorced by a Texas divorce decree. After the divorce, both parties lived in North Dakota. Perales then relocated with the children to Georgia. The district court, in an ex parte emergency order, ordered Perales to return the children to North Dakota. Later, the court held a hearing and issued the order from which Perales appealed. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded this order was not appealable and dismissed the appeal. View "Gonzalez v. Perales" on Justia Law

Jerome Lowe, Jr. appealed a domestic violence protection order restraining him from contact with Lori Legacie-Lowe for 12 months. The North Dakota Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and remanded with instructions for the district court to make sufficient findings to enable the Supreme Court to review the order. Upon reviewing the district court’s findings on remand, the Court affirmed the domestic violence protection order. View "Legacie-Lowe v. Lowe" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Edison appealed a divorce judgment and an amended judgment awarding primary residential responsibility for two children to Signe Edison, arguing error in the form of gender bias and in the court’s finding that Jeffrey Edison was underemployed for purposes of child support. Signe argued Jeffrey waived his gender bias argument and, in the alternative, that the trial court’s judgment was not based on gender bias. Jeffrey also requested the North Dakota Supreme Court award the parties equal residential responsibility and impose a “50/50 parenting plan” or reassign the case on remand to a different trial judge. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to reconsider: (1) the decision to award Signe with primary residential responsibility; and (2) the best interests of the children under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1) and to recalculate any child support obligations. View "Edison v. Edison" on Justia Law

Vilches, the father and guardian of Doe (age 7), took her to Leao for treatment. Vilches later sued Leao to compel the release of Doe’s therapy records. Under Health and Safety Code 123110, the personal representative of a minor is entitled to access the minor’s patient records unless “[t]he health care provider determines that access to the patient records ... would have a detrimental effect on the provider’s professional relationship with the minor patient or the minor's physical safety or psychological well-being. The decision of the health care provider ... shall not attach any liability to the provider unless the decision is found to be in bad faith. Leao indicated she had determined that it would have a detrimental impact on Doe’s ability to trust in general, and would negatively impact the patient-counselor relationship. She was also concerned that Vilches would use the records to coach his daughter's responses in a court evaluation in an upcoming custody proceeding.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of Leao, rejecting an argument that the absence of bad faith does not immunize a therapist’s determination from judicial review and that section 123110 creates a presumption of entitlement to disclosure. The statute does not require separate determinations for each type of patient record. When the provider makes the detriment determination, a plaintiff must show bad faith to compel disclosure. View "Vilches v. Leao" on Justia Law

Mother has seven children by several different fathers: the child at issue in this case—Jayden M. (born 2021). On November 19, 2021, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition asking the juvenile court to exert jurisdiction over Jayden on two grounds. On May 2, 2022, the juvenile court held the dispositional hearing. The court removed Jayden from Mother’s custody and also bypassed reunification services under subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) of section 361.5. More specifically, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that bypass was proper under these provisions because (1) Mother’s reunification services or parental rights for Jayden’s older half-siblings had been terminated, and (2) Mother’s most recent four months of effort to address her drug addiction—did not eliminate the court’s “concerns” in light of her 20-year history of drug abuse problems and prior dependency cases. On appeal, Mother’s chief argument on appeal is that the juvenile court’s order bypassing reunification services was not supported by the record.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the juvenile court’s order. The court held that the juvenile court’s finding is further supported by evidence that Mother has repeatedly relapsed after treatment and/or periods of sobriety in the past. This finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom and practical reality that short and recent periods of sobriety are often not enough to counter a longstanding pattern of use and relapse. Thus, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the effort underlying Mother’s brief period of sobriety after decades of drug abuse is not “reasonable.” View "In re Jayden M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's modification of physical custody in this custodial action but reversed the court's parenting time allocation and vacated its award of attorney fees and costs, holding that the district court abused its discretion in part.In this opinion, the Supreme Court (1) provided a definition of sole physical custody to ensure custodial orders are properly characterized; (2) directed district courts to retain their substantive decision-making authority over custodial modifications and parenting time allocations; and (3) clarified when reassignment of a case to a different judge on remand is appropriate due to the requisite fairness demanded in ongoing child custody proceedings. As to the case before it, the Court held (1) substantial evidence supported the district court's decision to modify physical custody; (2) the district court abused its discretion by improperly characterizing its custodial award as primary physical custody when it was in fact sole physical custody. View "Roe v. Roe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of prohibition preventing Judge Peter J. Corrigan from proceeding in a declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction action, holding that Judge Corrigan did not lack jurisdiction to proceed in the case.United Twenty-Fifth Building, LLC sued Jessica Maron, a party to a pending divorce case, alleging that Jessica was interfering with an easement involving a multistory building in Cleveland. Specifically, United argued that Jessica was preventing access to the building's elevator, lobby, and stairwell and delaying the construction of a restaurant in the building. Jessica filed a prohibition petition seeking to prevent Judge Corrigan from exercising jurisdiction in United's case because, under the jurisdictional-priority rule, Judge Corrigan patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed because the case involved property that may be subject to equitable division in her divorce case. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Jessica failed to show that the jurisdictional-priority rule applied under the circumstances of this case. View "State ex rel. Maron v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

In April 2022, Vinson sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former boyfriend, Kinsey, to protect herself, two children she shares with Kinsey (six and 10 years old), and her 19-year-old child from another relationship. Vinson sought orders for legal and physical custody of the younger children, with no visitation for Kinsey. Vinson’s request listed March 2022 as the date of the most recent abuse when Kinsey “began threatening to beat my face in” and “stated that he would kill me.” Vinson also described a June 2020 incident, when Kinsey took her phone out of her hand and “punched me in my face and pushed me on the floor,” leaving her with bruises. Vinson stated that Kinsey had abused her “verbally, mentally, and physically for many years,” “has threatened to kill me on numerous occasions”; and “shows up at my house unannounced any time he chooses”; and that she was “in fear of my life.”The trial court denied Vinson a DVRO and granted Kinsey unsupervised visitation. The court of appeal remanded for reconsideration. The trial court focused narrowly on the March incident, indicated that it did not believe Vinson took that threat seriously, and apparently did not consider evidence of additional threats and repeated verbal and physical abuse. View "Vinson v. Kinsey" on Justia Law