Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Hub Alan Freeman and Rod Alan Freeman were domestic partners and then spouses for over 15 years before separating. After their marital dissolution trial, the family court ordered Hub to pay Rod $2,100 a month in permanent spousal support. The court also determined that the community had a 60.2 percent interest in a rental property that Hub had purchased prior to their domestic partnership. The court found Rod’s expert opinion on the rental property’s value more persuasive and used it to determine the property’s value.The Superior Court of Riverside County entered a status-only judgment dissolving the marriage and domestic partnership but reserved jurisdiction over other issues. The trial addressed the amount of spousal support and the value of the community’s interest in the rental property. The family court applied the relevant support factors under Family Code section 4320 and found that Rod had the need for spousal support. The court also found that the community had a 60.2 percent interest in the rental property based on the amount of principal paid and improvements made during the relationship.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the family court’s order, finding no abuse of discretion in the spousal support award. The appellate court held that the family court properly considered the section 4320 factors and did not solely rely on the Xspouse software or the temporary spousal support order. The court also found that the family court correctly valued the rental property closer to the time of trial, as required by section 2552 of the Family Code. The appellate court rejected Hub’s due process claim, noting that he did not object to the time allocation during the trial. View "In re Marriage of Freeman" on Justia Law

A husband appealed a final divorce order that set aside a prenuptial agreement and instead allocated an equitable division of property. The family division found the agreement unconscionable because it would prevent the wife from receiving any significant property settlement or spousal maintenance. The husband argued that the court applied an incorrect standard of unconscionability and made errors in the property settlement proceedings.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Family Division, initially found that both parties had made full financial disclosures and entered the agreement voluntarily. However, the court later concluded that the agreement was unconscionable because it left the wife in the same financial situation as if they had not married, which the court believed undermined the status of marriage. The court also quashed subpoenas for the wife's father and sister and incorrectly calculated the length of the marriage.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the family division applied the wrong standard for assessing unconscionability. The Supreme Court held that prenuptial agreements are enforceable if they are entered into voluntarily, with full financial disclosure, and are not unconscionable at the time of execution. The court found that the agreement's terms, which left the parties in the same financial situation as before marriage, were not inherently unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed the family division's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider the wife's alternative arguments regarding the enforceability of the agreement, including whether the husband's behavior constructively forced her to file for divorce. View "Lacroix v. Rysz" on Justia Law

Nancy and Carlos Sistrunk were married in 1984 and separated in 2021. Nancy filed for divorce citing irreconcilable differences or, alternatively, adultery. They have four adult children, including Emily, who has Down syndrome and other health issues, making her incapable of self-support. Both parties agreed to proceed with the divorce based on irreconcilable differences. In 2023, Nancy filed a motion regarding the marital residence and child support for Emily, which Carlos opposed.The trial, primarily focused on financial issues and property division, was held in September 2023. The chancery court granted the divorce, divided the real and personal property approximately equally, and declined to award alimony, child support for Emily, or attorneys’ fees. The court failed to make specific findings of fact regarding the factors required for equitable distribution of assets, and many of its findings were unsupported by the record.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The court found that the chancery court did not make sufficient findings of fact regarding each applicable Ferguson factor, which is necessary for equitable distribution of marital property. The court noted that the chancery court's findings were not supported by substantial evidence, particularly regarding the parties' incomes and the dissipation of marital assets. The Supreme Court also highlighted the lack of consideration for the emotional value of the marital home and the financial needs of the parties, especially Nancy's role as Emily's primary caregiver.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the chancery court's judgment on the equitable distribution of assets and related matters and remanded the case for further consideration. The chancery court was instructed to make specific findings of fact regarding each applicable Ferguson factor and to rectify unsupported findings. The court may also reconsider issues related to alimony, child support for Emily, and attorneys’ fees on remand. View "Sistrunk v. Sistrunk" on Justia Law

Katrina Danforth appealed the termination of her parental rights to her child, SLD. The case began when Ryan Hansen, the child's father, filed a petition to terminate Danforth's parental rights, citing her felony conviction for a murder-for-hire plot against him. Danforth counterclaimed, seeking to terminate Hansen's parental rights, and requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL) for SLD. The Department of Family Services conducted a social study, which Danforth argued was inadequate because it did not include her input.The District Court of Sheridan County held a bench trial and terminated Danforth's parental rights. The court found that Hansen adequately represented SLD's interests and that a GAL was unnecessary. Danforth's counterclaim was dismissed without a separate evidentiary hearing, as she did not present evidence to support it during the trial. Danforth appealed, arguing that the social study was prejudicial, the denial of a GAL was erroneous, her counterclaim should not have been dismissed without a hearing, and that the termination of her parental rights unjustly extended her punishment for her past crime.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court found that the social study complied with statutory requirements and did not prejudice Danforth, as she had the opportunity to testify about her situation. The court also held that the district court did not err in finding a GAL unnecessary, as Hansen adequately represented SLD's interests. The dismissal of Danforth's counterclaim without a separate hearing was upheld because she failed to prosecute it during the trial. Finally, the court concluded that the termination of Danforth's parental rights was based on statutory grounds and SLD's best interests, not as an extension of her criminal punishment. View "In re Termination of Parental Rights To SLD v. Hansen" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought damages from the Department of Children and Families (DCF), alleging religious discrimination during child protection proceedings that led to the termination of his parental rights. The trial court dismissed most of the plaintiff’s claims as time-barred but allowed some timely allegations related to the termination trial to proceed. DCF’s motion to reargue, asserting that the litigation privilege barred the remaining claims, was denied by the trial court.DCF appealed to the Appellate Court, which concluded that the litigation privilege did indeed bar the plaintiff’s remaining timely allegations and directed the trial court to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. The trial court complied, dismissing the entire complaint before the plaintiff could seek further appellate review.The plaintiff and the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities argued that the Appellate Court erred in applying the litigation privilege to bar the discrimination claims. They contended that the privilege should not apply to DCF, a governmental entity, and that the legislature intended to abrogate the privilege in discrimination cases.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the litigation privilege barred the plaintiff’s timely allegations related to DCF’s conduct during the termination trial. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s claims were akin to defamation, to which the privilege applies, and not to vexatious litigation, which challenges the purpose of the underlying action. The court also found that other remedies were available to address DCF’s conduct and declined to adopt a rule precluding nonpersons from invoking the privilege.However, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment to the extent that it directed the trial court to dismiss the entire complaint, as this hindered the plaintiff’s ability to appeal the dismissal of his untimely claims. The case was remanded to the Appellate Court to vacate the trial court’s judgment and to remand the case for a new judgment of dismissal, allowing the plaintiff to appeal the timeliness ruling. View "Ammar I. v. Dept. of Children & Families" on Justia Law

The case involves the foster parents of a minor child, J, who were initially granted intervenor status in neglect proceedings concerning J. The trial court later removed them as intervenors based on the Appellate Court's decision in In re Ryan C., which concluded that nonrelative foster parents are precluded by statute from intervening in neglect proceedings. The foster parents appealed this decision, arguing that In re Ryan C. was wrongly decided. While their appeal was pending, the trial court held a hearing on a motion to revoke J's commitment to the Commissioner's custody and transferred guardianship to J's biological father. The foster parents also filed a writ of error challenging this decision.The trial court initially granted the foster parents' motion to intervene in the neglect proceedings. However, after the Appellate Court's decision in In re Ryan C., the trial court removed them as intervenors. The foster parents appealed this removal, claiming that the decision in In re Ryan C. was incorrect. Subsequently, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to revoke J's commitment and transferred guardianship to J's biological father. The foster parents were not allowed to attend the entire hearing or give a sworn statement after hearing the evidence, which they claimed violated their right to be heard under the statute.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that In re Ryan C. was wrongly decided and must be overruled. The court held that the statute does not bar a trial court from granting a foster parent's request for permissive intervention in the dispositional phase of a neglect proceeding. The court reversed the trial court's order removing the foster parents as intervenors and granted the writ of error, remanding the case for a new revocation hearing. The court also concluded that the foster parents' right to be heard includes the right to be present throughout the proceeding and to argue at the appropriate time as to the child's best interest in light of the evidence presented. View "In re Jewelyette M." on Justia Law

A woman, Sarah Ann Miles, entered into an oral traditional surrogacy agreement with Jeffrey Gerstein, a single gay man, to conceive and bear a child using her ova and his sperm. The agreement stipulated that Gerstein would be the sole parent, and Miles would not assume any parental role. The child, E., was born in December 2013, and both parties adhered to the terms of the agreement for seven years, with Gerstein acting as the sole parent and Miles having limited, non-parental interaction with E.The Superior Court of Sacramento County reviewed the case when Miles filed a petition in May 2021 to establish her parental relationship with E., seeking joint custody and visitation. Gerstein opposed, asserting the surrogacy agreement. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found clear and convincing evidence of a valid oral surrogacy agreement, determining that Miles was not E.'s parent under the agreement and that it was not in E.'s best interest for Miles to assume a parental role.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the oral traditional surrogacy agreement was enforceable under California law, which does not require all surrogacy agreements to be in writing. The court found that the agreement did not lack a lawful object and that Miles's parentage was not established under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) due to the clear intention and conduct of the parties. The court also concluded that enforcing the agreement did not violate public policy or Miles's constitutional rights, as she never assumed a parental role in E.'s life. The judgment was affirmed, and Miles was ordered to pay Gerstein's costs on appeal. View "Miles v. Gernstein" on Justia Law

Benjamin Jones and Melanie Jones were married in 2003 and have two minor children. They resided in Glenburn, North Dakota, and purchased a modular home and surrounding acreage from Melanie's parents under a contract for deed. During the COVID-19 pandemic, payments on the contract were suspended, and no payments have been made since, leaving an outstanding debt. In March 2023, Benjamin filed for divorce. In February 2024, Melanie's father notified the parties of his intention to declare default and cancel the contract for deed. The trial was held later that month.The District Court of Renville County granted the divorce, awarded primary residential responsibility of the children to Benjamin, and divided the property and debts. The court found zero equity in the marital home due to nonpayment and the intention to foreclose. It reserved ruling on the final value of the marital home and debt consolidation loan for six months. The court awarded Melanie spousal support of $900 per month for 10 years and ordered her to pay $590 per month in child support.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the award of primary residential responsibility to Benjamin, finding no clear error in the lower court's decision. However, it reversed the lower court's reservation of ruling on the marital home and debt consolidation loan valuations, as well as the valuation of the marital home and corresponding debt without specific findings on the valuation date. The Supreme Court also found error in the child support calculation for omitting spousal support and in-kind income.The Supreme Court remanded the case for the lower court to clarify the valuation date for the marital property and debt, make specific findings if another valuation date is fair and equitable, redistribute the marital estate if valuations change, reconsider spousal support in light of any redistribution, and recalculate child support to include spousal support. View "Jones v. Jones" on Justia Law

Crystal Lorene Limary and Shaun Patrick McLean were married in 2015 and had one child together. They moved into a house purchased by Shaun's parents in 2016, making monthly payments to them until 2019 when Shaun took out a mortgage to buy the house, using a $70,000 gift of equity from his parents as a down payment. Crystal filed for divorce, and the couple disagreed on the classification of the house, the $70,000 gift, a camper trailer, and the parenting schedule for their daughter.The magistrate court held a four-day trial, during which it extensively questioned the parties and witnesses. The court determined that the house and camper trailer were community property and that the $70,000 was a gift to both Crystal and Shaun. Shaun appealed, arguing that the magistrate court's conduct at trial was inappropriate and biased. The district court agreed, finding that the magistrate court's active participation obscured the reliability of its decision. The district court vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to reassign it to a different judge.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the district court's decision and affirmed it. The court held that the magistrate court abused its discretion by extensively questioning the parties and witnesses, which affected Shaun's right to a fair trial. The court concluded that the district court did not err in vacating the judgment and remanding the case for a new trial with a different magistrate judge. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal, but costs were awarded to Shaun as the prevailing party. View "Limary v. McLean" on Justia Law

Charlene Monfore petitioned for guardianship and conservatorship over her mother, Gerda Flyte, who suffers from dementia. Gerda’s son, Roger Flyte, objected and requested to be appointed instead. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found it was not in Gerda’s best interests to appoint either Charlene or Roger and instead appointed Black Hills Advocate, LLC (BHA), a for-profit corporation. Charlene appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by not appointing her and lacked statutory authority to appoint a for-profit organization.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Fall River County, South Dakota, initially appointed Charlene as temporary guardian and conservator. Roger objected, raising concerns about Gerda’s care under Charlene, including medical neglect and financial mismanagement. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the court found both Charlene and Roger unsuitable due to various concerns, including Charlene’s failure to provide necessary medical care and financial mismanagement, and Roger’s financial irresponsibility and anger issues. The court appointed BHA as guardian and conservator.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint Charlene, given the evidence of her inadequate care and financial mismanagement. However, the Supreme Court found that SDCL 29A-5-110 does not authorize the appointment of for-profit entities as guardians or conservators, except for qualified banks or trust companies as conservators. Therefore, the appointment of BHA was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also awarded Roger one-half of his requested appellate attorney fees. View "Guardianship And Conservatorship Of Flyte" on Justia Law