Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute that arose after a divorce between Greg Grengs and Lisa Genareo (formerly Lisa Grengs). As part of the divorce settlement, the Supreme Court of North Dakota ordered that property owned by GLG Farms, LLC, a company established by Grengs to hold ownership of his farm property and equipment, be mortgaged to provide Genareo with security for a property settlement payment valued at $1,300,000. Following the court order, two new members were added to GLG Farms, LLC, and the company filed for bankruptcy protection. Grengs and GLG Farms, LLC, then entered into a stipulation agreement in bankruptcy court, agreeing to mortgage terms and payment terms. However, GLG Farms, LLC, later argued that the two new members of the company were not required to execute the mortgage and that the agreement in bankruptcy court had little impact on the court's decision.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's order, holding that Grengs acted as an ostensible agent of GLG Farms, LLC, with apparent authority. The court found that Genareo was right to believe that GLG Farms, LLC, consented to Grengs acting as its agent, thus binding the company to the stipulation agreement. The court concluded that GLG Farms, LLC, ratified Grengs' actions by embracing their advantages and using them in judicial proceedings and did not timely disavow Grengs' actions.The court also rejected GLG Farms, LLC's argument that the district court failed to adequately describe the terms of the required mortgage, pointing out that a statutory mortgage form exists and that the amounts due by Grengs were plainly provided in the stipulation. The court further found GLG Farms, LLC's argument that North Dakota law does not provide a standard mortgage to be frivolous, awarding Genareo $1,000 as a sanction. View "Grengs v. Grengs" on Justia Law

In a divorce and child support dispute in the State of North Dakota, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower court's judgment, which involved the calculation of the defendant's child support obligation, decisions on evidentiary matters and the awarding of attorney’s fees.Aron Williams and Jennifer Williams, who have two children together, divorced in February 2018. Jennifer Williams was awarded primary residential responsibility of the children, and Aron Williams was ordered to pay child support based on his classification as an experienced farmer with an imputed gross annual income. The case has gone through several rounds of modification and amendment of judgments.In the latest appeal, Aron Williams contested the district court's categorization of him as a "farmer" and its subsequent calculation of his income for child support purposes, arguing that he should be considered a "farm laborer" with a lower income. The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court did not err in classifying Aron Williams as a farmer and imputing the statewide average income of a farmer to him for the purposes of child support.Additionally, Aron Williams argued that the district court erred in its decisions regarding evidentiary matters and the awarding of attorney’s fees to Jennifer Williams. The Supreme Court of North Dakota concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Aron Williams’s motion to reopen the record or in awarding attorney’s fees, and therefore affirmed these decisions. View "Williams v. Williams" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Texas examined the requirements for terminating parental rights based on a parent's noncompliance with a service plan ordered by the court. The mother had been ordered to follow a service plan after her children were removed from her care due to allegations of neglectful supervision. The plan required her to attend counseling sessions, parenting classes, and substance abuse classes. The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services later sought to terminate the mother's parental rights based on her alleged failure to comply fully with the service plan.The lower courts held that the mother's failure to strictly comply with the plan's requirements necessitated termination of her parental rights. However, the Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with this interpretation. The court stated that the requirement for termination of parental rights based on noncompliance with a service plan is not strict compliance with every detail of the plan. The court emphasized that the noncompliance must involve a requirement that is specifically established in the plan and is material to the plan's overall purpose. In light of this, the court found that there was insufficient evidence to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on her noncompliance with the service plan.The court therefore reversed the judgment of the lower courts in part and rendered judgment vacating those portions of the trial court’s order terminating the mother's parental rights. The remainder of the trial court’s termination order was affirmed. View "IN THE INTEREST OF R.J.G., R.J.G., D.G.M." on Justia Law

In a divorce case, the appellant, Brian M. Noland, sought to establish that he stood in loco parentis to his stepdaughter, A.B., in order to litigate issues of custody and parenting time. The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the district court had erred in its interpretation of the law when it ruled that the biological mother, Erin N. Yost, had the absolute right to unilaterally terminate the in loco parentis relationship. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that parental preference principles did not give natural parents an absolute right to terminate an established in loco parentis relationship at will. The court reasoned that while the presumption that fit parents act in their child's best interest must be considered, it must give way where the child has established strong psychological bonds with a person who, although not a biological parent, has lived with the child and provided care, nurture, and affection. The court reversed the order of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Noland v. Yost" on Justia Law

A person identified as O.R. appealed the decision of the Los Angeles County Superior Court to place his child, N.R., under the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) based on allegations of substance abuse. The Supreme Court of California reviewed two issues concerning the interpretation of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(D), which allows for jurisdiction over a child in cases where the parent’s substance abuse results in an inability to provide regular care for the child and causes or could cause the child serious physical harm or illness.First, the court clarified the term “substance abuse” as used in the statute. It rejected O.R.’s argument that “substance abuse” must be shown through a medical diagnosis or by meeting the criteria for a substance use disorder as outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). The court held that “substance abuse” in this context should be given its ordinary meaning, which refers to the excessive use of drugs or alcohol. The court cautioned that to establish dependency jurisdiction, the abuse must render the parent unable to provide regular care for the child and either cause the child serious physical harm or illness, or place the child at substantial risk of such harm or illness.Second, the court rejected the so-called “tender years presumption,” which holds that substance abuse by a parent is prima facie evidence of an inability to provide regular care and a substantial risk of serious physical harm when the child is very young. The court held that this presumption is not supported by the language of the statute or the legislative intent, and improperly simplifies the analysis required under section 300(b)(1)(D). Instead, the court held that the government must establish each element of the statute separately, without shifting the burden to the parent to rebut a presumption created by a finding of substance abuse.The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re N.R." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed the procedural issue of whether a notice of appeal could be filed electronically in a termination of parental rights (TPR) case that had been sealed. The court had to interpret the relevant statutes and rules, which stated that TPR cases should be sealed upon the entry of the final order and that sealed cases were not eligible for electronic filing. The Court of Appeals had ruled that the appellant had complied with the rules for timely filing a notice of appeal, as the rules were ambiguous about whether a TPR case could be electronically filed after it had been sealed.However, the Supreme Court of Kentucky disagreed with the lower court. It held that the statutory law and administrative rule, read together, effectively prohibited a notice of appeal from being electronically filed in a TPR case. The Court found no ambiguity in this interpretation. It pointed out that the rules clearly stated that TPR cases were always confidential but would only be sealed upon the entry of the trial court’s final order. Once sealed, these cases were no longer subject to mandatory electronic filing.Therefore, the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that the appellant had not complied with the rules for timely filing a notice of appeal, as the notice should have been filed conventionally. As a result, the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s termination of the appellant's parental rights. View "CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES V. D.W." on Justia Law

Three sisters, Danielle, Angela, and Alyssa, were placed in the custody of their aunt, Kathy Riggle, and her husband, William Kenneth Riggle Sr. (Senior) in 2009 due to their parents' struggles with drug abuse. For the eight years they lived with the Riggles, the sisters alleged that they were sexually abused by Senior and his son, William Kenneth Riggle Jr. (Junior). The abuse was reported in 2017 after the girls were returned to the custody of their mother. Senior was charged with and convicted of multiple counts of sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and intimidating a participant in the legal process. The trial court imposed a 70-year sentence in line with Kentucky law. Senior appealed, raising four allegations of error.The Supreme Court of Kentucky found no reversible error and affirmed the convictions. It held that the trial court correctly admitted testimony from two other minor girls who had experienced inappropriate sexual conduct from Senior, as this evidence demonstrated a pattern of conduct and was not merely proof of propensity. The Court also ruled that the testimony from Angela's school counselor was admissible for rehabilitative purposes, as it was offered to explain an inconsistency in Angela's testimony, not to verify the truth of her allegations. The Court further held that any issues with jury instructions regarding unanimity did not rise to palpable error, given the overwhelming weight of evidence against Senior. Finally, the Court found that the trial court did not err in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal on certain counts, as the Commonwealth had produced more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support the charges. View "RIGGLE V. COMMONWEALTH" on Justia Law

In this case, Ángel Menéndez-Montalvo, while serving a term of supervised release arising from his conviction for a federal firearm offense, violated the conditions of his release by breaching Article 3.1 of Puerto Rico's Domestic Violence Law. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had to determine whether a violation of Article 3.1 is a "crime of violence" as used in section 7B1.1(a)(1) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The court found that it is not because Puerto Rico courts have applied the law to encompass less-than-violent force. As such, the court vacated Menéndez's sentence because the district court had held to the contrary in calculating a sentencing range that was higher than it should have been. The court further clarified that its decision does not prevent the district court from considering Menéndez's conduct while on supervised release as it bears on the factors specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "US v. Menendez-Montalvo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was presented with a case involving the mental health of the respondent, D.E. In the case, the Circuit Court had denied D.E.'s motion to dismiss and granted New Hampshire Hospital’s (NHH) petition for guardianship. It also granted NHH’s petition for involuntary admission. D.E. appealed these decisions, arguing that his due process rights were violated by the simultaneous hearing of both the guardianship and involuntary admission petitions, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitions as he was not a resident of New Hampshire nor was he lawfully detained there.The Supreme Court held that D.E.'s due process argument regarding simultaneous hearings was not preserved as it was not raised in the trial court and was therefore not eligible for review. However, the court found that at the time the non-emergency involuntary admission petition was filed, D.E. was not lawfully detained and thus the trial court did not have jurisdiction on this basis. The question of whether D.E. resided in New Hampshire, giving the court jurisdiction, was remanded to the trial court for determination.In relation to the guardianship order, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's findings that D.E. was incapacitated and that a guardianship was the least restrictive form of intervention were supported by the evidence. The court also found no error in the trial court's appointment of D.E.'s brother as guardian, despite D.E.'s preference for an independent, professional guardian. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision on guardianship, vacated the decision on involuntary admission, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of D.E." on Justia Law

In a divorce case, the appellant, Mr. James Baker, contested the decree entered by a successor district judge after the original district judge who presided over the trial retired. Mr. Baker argued that the successor judge violated his right to due process by making findings of fact and conclusions of law without a formal certification under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure (W.R.C.P.) 63.The Supreme Court of Wyoming concluded that Mr. Baker had waived his right to object to the successor judge's procedure. During a status conference, in which the successor judge proposed to proceed with determining the case based on the trial transcripts, Mr. Baker's counsel affirmed this approach and requested the court to make a ruling based on the existing record. Therefore, the court ruled that Mr. Baker intentionally relinquished his right to object to the successor judge's procedure, constituting a waiver.The court also clarified that the language in W.R.C.P. 63 does not necessitate the successor judge to advise the parties of their rights under the rule. The court found no authority supporting an affirmative duty for the successor judge to do so. Hence, the court affirmed the decree of divorce entered by the successor district court judge. View "Baker v. Baker" on Justia Law