Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In the case at hand, the Supreme Court of Mississippi dealt with an appeal by George Hawkins who was convicted for sexual battery of a minor under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-95(2). This law requires the State to prove that the defendant was in a position of trust or authority over the minor when the crime was committed. Hawkins' appeal was based on the argument that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of him being in such a position over the victim, as he had no legal authority over her.In 2014, Hawkins began dating Tonya Ingram and gradually became a part of her and her children’s lives, to the point where they even considered themselves to be common-law married. In the spring of 2015, Tonya and her children moved into Hawkins's home "as a family". Hawkins and Tonya filed their taxes jointly, claimed Tonya’s children as dependents, and contributed equally to the family’s finances. The victim, Jane, one of Tonya's children, trusted Hawkins, which ended when he sexually assaulted her one night.The court found that while Hawkins did not possess any legal authority over Jane, a reasonable jury could have concluded that he was in a position of trust or authority over her based on the totality of the circumstances and their relationship. The court held that the list of individuals who are typically in positions of authority provided in Section 97-3-95(2) serves only as examples, and does not limit this to persons in positions of legal authority over the child. Therefore, the court affirmed Hawkins' conviction. View "Hawkins v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Wyoming, Todd Andrew Domenico and Josie Daniel, formerly married, were in a dispute over custody of their two children. The couple divorced in 2018, with the court awarding joint legal custody to both parents and primary physical custody to the father. In 2020, the mother filed for a modification of the decree, requesting primary physical custody of the children. The district court maintained primary physical custody with the father and increased the mother's visitation rights. Both parents appealed this decision.The Supreme Court found that the district court abused its discretion in several aspects. First, it erred in denying a psychological evaluation of the mother and prohibiting inquiry into her mental health. The mother's mental health was directly relevant to determining the best interest of the children. Second, the court's factual conclusions were insufficient to support its visitation determinations. The findings did not provide enough specifics or detail to clarify the reasoning behind the decisions, particularly regarding the extension of the mother's summer visitation and the removal of the requirement for the mother to provide qualified caregivers for the severely autistic child. Third, the court erred in failing to designate one parent as the final decision-maker on issues of the children's welfare, particularly medical decisions. The court's refusal to resolve the parents' impasse over medical decision-making was harmful to the children. Lastly, the district court abused its discretion in refusing to consider allegations of the mother's psychological abuse of one child after the evidence had closed.The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to not modify physical custody of the children, and it did not exceed its jurisdiction when it prohibited the mother from obtaining a psychological evaluation of the children. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Daniel v. Domenico" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, Wilmot Yalartai, the plaintiff and appellant, appealed against an order dismissing his case against Jamesetta Miller, the respondent. The two are married with minor children and Yalartai had filed two cases against Miller - one for parenting responsibility and the other for divorce. After a hearing, a judicial referee dismissed the parenting responsibility case, stating that issues concerning parenting responsibility could be resolved in the divorce case. The referee's dismissal order was given without notice to the parties, and Yalartai appealed against this order.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota, in its decision, stated that the dismissal order is not appealable under N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02 because it was issued without notice. Thus, the court dismissed Yalartai's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that under N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02(7), orders issued without notice to the parties are not appealable and litigants must first seek relief in the district court from an order made without notice. The court further explained that an adversarial record, which does not exist in this case, is required for their review. Hence, Yalartai's failure to seek relief from the dismissal order as required by law led to the dismissal of his appeal. View "Yalartai v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County terminating a father's parental rights to his child. The father had been convicted of two felony violations, each involving a child victim. The father appealed the decision, arguing that his felony violations were not statutory grounds justifying the termination of his parental rights, that these grounds should be declared unconstitutional, and that there was insufficient evidence to declare him an unfit parent. However, the Supreme Court found that the father's first two arguments were not preserved for appeal and therefore declined to address them. The court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to terminate the father's parental rights, upholding the lower court's decision. The court found the termination was in the best interest of the child. View "In the Interest of: E.G. v. Juvenile Officer" on Justia Law

In an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County, five minors, aged between one and fourteen years, challenged the juvenile court's decision to order reunification services for their parents, identified as A.B. (mother) and A.S. (father). The minors were adjudged dependent children due to ongoing domestic violence and substance abuse in their home. The court had to interpret and apply the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), which allows a court to bypass reunification services for parents with a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or alcohol who have resisted prior court-ordered treatment in the three years prior to the filing of the petition.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District concluded that the juvenile court had misapplied the law when it decided it could not deny reunification services to the parents while they were participating in treatment. The court emphasized that the statute requires proof of the parent’s resistance during the three years preceding the petition, regardless of their engagement in treatment at the time of the disposition hearing.The court reversed the juvenile court's dispositional order providing reunification services to the parents for all five children and remanded the case for a new disposition hearing based on the family's present circumstances. This decision was made despite subsequent events that rendered the case potentially moot, as the court deemed the issue of statutory interpretation important. View "In re L.B." on Justia Law

The case involves Billie S., who appealed from a judgment by the District Court (Bangor, Roberts, J.) which terminated her parental rights to her children pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (2023). The mother argued that the judgment did not provide sufficient independent findings of fact to support the termination of her parental rights. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the mother's contention.The trial court based its decision on evidence from various sources including the Department of Health and Human Services caseworker's testimony, guardian ad litem reports, and the petitions for termination. However, the judgment simply incorporated the entirety of these sources as its "specific findings" instead of providing an independent articulation of the specific facts that formed the basis of the court’s ultimate findings regarding the mother’s parental unfitness and the best interests of the children.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that these were not the “specific findings of fact” required by Rule 52(a) or prior decisions. The court could not infer factual findings in a termination case when the adequacy of the findings was the issue at hand. As a result, the court vacated the judgment due to its lack of adequate findings that would sufficiently inform the mother and the court of the reasoning behind the decision. The case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Children of Billie S." on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Jessica Banks sued the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) for removing her four-year-old son R.B. from her custody without parental consent or a court order, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied DFPS's motion for summary judgment, finding that its employees were not entitled to qualified immunity as they had violated clearly established law.DFPS appealed the decision, but the appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court found that the removal of R.B. violated the constitutional rights of both the child and Banks, as there were no exigent circumstances that justified a warrantless removal from his mother. The court emphasized that the mere possibility of danger in the future was not enough to constitute exigent circumstances. The court also held that the law was clearly established that removing a child from their home without consent, a court order, or exigent circumstances was a constitutional violation.However, the court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity for Linda Juarez, an Investigation Supervisor at DFPS. The court ruled that Juarez was not the ultimate decision-maker and was not actively involved in the decision to remove R.B., thereby entitling her to qualified immunity. View "Banks v. Herbrich" on Justia Law

In the case of a contested divorce between Quin Whitman and Douglas F. Whitman, the founder of a once successful hedge fund, the Court of Appeal of the State of California ruled on several issues. The court affirmed that Doug failed to prove he retained any separate property interest in the hedge fund at the time of dissolution, despite an initial $300,000 investment of his own separate funds. The court also ruled that the community was not financially responsible for any of the legal fees Doug incurred to defend against criminal charges brought against him for insider trading or the $250,000 fine imposed on him in that case. However, the court erred in holding the community responsible for the $935,000 penalty imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission for illegal insider trading. Quin did not demonstrate that the court erred in holding the community responsible for legal fees expended by the hedge fund when it intervened as a third party into these proceedings. The court also concluded that Quin failed to prove her claim that Doug breached his fiduciary duty in connection with the sale of the couple’s luxury home. The court concluded that the couple’s entire interest in the hedge fund is community property, subject to equal division. The court also found that Doug's legal expenses incurred in defending against insider trading charges and the $250,000 fine imposed on him were his separate debts. View "In re Whitman" on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District, a dispute arose from the marital dissolution proceedings of Daniel Gilbert-Valencia (husband) and Kate McEachen (wife). The husband argued that the family court erred in awarding 100 percent of the net proceeds from the sale of the parties’ quasi-marital property to the wife, excluding evidence of domestic violence perpetrated by the wife, and retroactively modifying the tax deductibility of spousal support payments made by the husband.The facts of the case reveal that the husband sold the house over the wife’s objections during the dissolution proceedings, believing it was his personal property. He used the net proceeds from the sale exclusively for personal purposes. The family court decided that the wife was a putative spouse, the house was quasi-marital property, and the husband had breached his fiduciary duty to the wife by selling the house and using the proceeds for personal purposes. Consequently, the court awarded 100 percent of the net proceeds from the sale of the house to the wife.The appellate court agreed with the husband's first two contentions. It held that the family court committed an error by awarding 100 percent of the net proceeds from the sale of the quasi-marital property to the wife without finding oppression, fraud, or malice by the husband. This decision was an abuse of discretion because it contradicted the requirement under Family Code section 1101 for such findings to justify an unequal division of community property.The appellate court also held that the family court erred in excluding a videotape that was documented evidence of the wife’s domestic violence. In addition, it found that the family court failed to consider the husband's request for a domestic violence restraining order, admitted into evidence with the wife's consent, when deciding on spousal support. This failure was deemed a reversible error.The appellate court reversed the family court's orders and remanded the case for reconsideration of the division of quasi-marital property and spousal support, and a decision on the tax deductibility of the husband's spousal support payments. View "Marriage of Gilbert-Valencia & McEachen" on Justia Law

In a case heard by the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, the appellant, a mother (La.B.), challenged the juvenile court's decision to terminate her parental rights. The mother claimed the court failed to adequately inquire into her child's (L.B.'s) potential Native American ancestry as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Despite the mother's indication on a form that she might be a member of a federally recognized tribe of unknown name and location, no extended family members were asked about the child's potential Native American ancestry.The appellate court agreed with the mother's contention, finding the inquiry into the child's ancestry inadequate and thus, an abuse of discretion. The court noted that the inquiry was legally required to include extended family members, regardless of how the child was initially removed from their home. The trial court had failed to adhere to this requirement despite the availability of several family members who could have provided relevant information.The appellate court conditionally reversed the judgement and instructed the juvenile court to order the Social Services Agency to complete the initial ICWA inquiry, including inquiries required under section 224.2, subdivision (b). Depending on the results of the inquiry, the court should proceed in accordance with ICWA and related California law. If no evidence of the child's Native American heritage is found, the juvenile court should immediately reinstate the judgement. View "In re L.B." on Justia Law