Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A child was born in 2012 to Kendra and Christopher, but due to concerns about Kendra’s fitness as a parent, the child was placed with her paternal grandmother, Denise, and Denise’s long-term partner, David Lemaster, under a Cabinet safety plan. Denise was later granted permanent custody of the child, and the child lived with Denise and Lemaster for her entire life. Kendra, the child’s mother, was initially denied visitation but later received supervised and then unsupervised visitation. Denise and Lemaster jointly raised and financially supported the child, functioning as a family unit. In 2022, Denise died, and Lemaster sought to intervene in the ongoing custody case, claiming de facto custodian status and seeking custody or visitation.The Greenup Family Court granted emergency custody to Kendra and, without holding an evidentiary hearing, later awarded her full custody, denying Lemaster’s motion to intervene as untimely and finding he could not qualify as a de facto custodian. Lemaster’s motion to alter or amend was denied. On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Lemaster’s intervention was untimely and that he could not be a de facto custodian since he co-parented with Denise, the legal custodian.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed and remanded. It held that Lemaster had standing to intervene as a “person acting as a parent” under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and had sufficiently alleged a basis for de facto custodian status, even though he was not married to Denise. The Court found that Lemaster’s motion to intervene, filed two days after Denise’s death, was timely, as his interest was previously protected by Denise. The Court ordered the family court to allow Lemaster to intervene and to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine his status as a de facto custodian. View "LEMASTER V. STILTNER" on Justia Law

After a 17-year marriage, a couple divorced in 2018. The court awarded the wife, who was a homemaker, five years of maintenance and set child support based on her imputed income and the husband’s substantial earnings as an orthodontist. The wife later suffered a traumatic brain injury in a car accident, which left her unable to work for two years. She remarried, ending her maintenance payments, and subsequently experienced ongoing health issues, including complications from Covid-19. By 2024, her maintenance had expired, her income was significantly reduced, and she alleged that the children’s needs had changed, including concerns about health insurance for a special needs child. She also claimed the husband’s income had increased.The Montana Fifth Judicial District Court denied her motion to modify child support without permitting discovery or holding an evidentiary hearing. The court reasoned that the expiration of maintenance was anticipated in the original decree and did not constitute a changed circumstance. It also found the wife’s claims about the husband’s increased income and the children’s needs to be speculative and unsupported by concrete evidence, and thus concluded that no changed circumstances warranted review or modification of the child support order.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the wife’s substantial decrease in income, her ongoing health impairments, the children’s aging and insurance needs, and the husband’s alleged increased income constituted sufficient changed circumstances to warrant further inquiry. The Court found that the District Court abused its discretion by denying discovery and an evidentiary hearing, as these were necessary to determine whether the existing child support order had become unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s order and remanded for further proceedings, including discovery and a hearing. View "In re Marriage of Jackson" on Justia Law

Twin infants were removed from their parents’ care after authorities found them living in unsanitary and unsafe conditions, including exposure to drugs, lack of medical care, and the presence of a registered sex offender in the home. The parents had a history of involvement with child protective services, including three prior removals of their older children due to domestic violence, substance abuse, and neglect, culminating in the involuntary termination of their parental rights to those children. After the twins’ birth in Washington, the family returned to Montana, where similar concerns quickly arose, leading to the Department of Public Health and Human Services seeking emergency protective services and termination of parental rights.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, held hearings on the Department’s petition. The parents did not contest probable cause for removal at the emergency hearing. The court appointed a guardian ad litem, who recommended that no reunification efforts were required due to the parents’ history. At the adjudication and termination hearing, the court found clear and convincing evidence of aggravated circumstances, including chronic, severe neglect and prior involuntary terminations, and concluded that the parents’ unfitness was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. The court terminated both parents’ rights to the twins and granted permanent legal custody to the Department, finding that a treatment plan and further reunification efforts were not statutorily required.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in terminating the father’s parental rights. The Supreme Court held that substantial evidence supported the District Court’s findings of chronic, severe neglect and the relevance of prior terminations. The Court also held that the Department was not required to provide reunification services after seeking a determination that such efforts were unnecessary, and that the father’s due process rights were not violated. The decision of the District Court was affirmed. View "In re S.W. & D.W." on Justia Law

After the dissolution of their marriage in 2019, two parents agreed to a parenting plan for their child, D.C.S., which was adopted by the court and provided that the child would primarily reside with the mother, Rebeccah, while the father, Joshua, would have parenting time during visits to Montana. This arrangement remained unchanged for nearly four years. In 2022, the child’s maternal grandfather and step-grandmother, the Scotts, began caring for D.C.S. due to concerns about Rebeccah’s behavior, including substance abuse and neglect. The Scotts alleged that the child’s living conditions with Rebeccah were unsafe and that Joshua had not been involved in the child’s life for several years. After Rebeccah removed D.C.S. from school and moved him to North Dakota, the Scotts sought third-party parenting rights and obtained an ex parte emergency order granting them temporary custody.The Scotts filed their petition and emergency motion in the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County. Rebeccah objected, challenging the Scotts’ standing and the allegations against her, and moved to amend or set aside the emergency order. The District Court denied her motion, finding the Scotts’ affidavits sufficient for temporary relief. After a full evidentiary hearing, where both sides presented evidence, the District Court issued findings and amended the parenting plan, granting primary custody to the Scotts and parenting time to Rebeccah.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court’s final custody order should be vacated due to alleged procedural errors in granting the initial emergency order, and whether plain error review was warranted for the denial of Rebeccah’s post-judgment motions. The Supreme Court held that any procedural defects in the temporary order were cured by the subsequent evidentiary hearing and final order, rendering those issues moot. The Court also declined to exercise plain error review, finding no manifest miscarriage of justice. The District Court’s order was affirmed. View "In re Parenting of D.C.S." on Justia Law

A child was born in Connecticut in July 2024 to parents who both resided in Connecticut at the time of the birth. The mother, who had previously lived in Massachusetts and had a long history with the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (DCF), moved to Connecticut several months before the birth, enrolling in a Connecticut healthcare program and living in a domestic violence shelter there. The father had also been living in Connecticut. The Massachusetts DCF, concerned about the child’s welfare due to the mother’s history and a recent domestic violence incident involving the father, arranged to take emergency custody of the child at the Connecticut hospital immediately after birth.Two days after the child’s birth, the Massachusetts DCF filed a care and protection petition in the Hampden County Division of the Juvenile Court Department, seeking temporary custody. The Juvenile Court granted temporary custody to the department without determining the basis for jurisdiction. Later, after hearings, a Juvenile Court judge found that Massachusetts had default jurisdiction under the Massachusetts Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (MCCJA), and subsequently, after joint conferences with a Connecticut judge, concluded that Massachusetts was the appropriate forum because Connecticut had declined jurisdiction. The parents and the child sought interlocutory appeal, and the Appeals Court allowed it. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts then transferred the case on its own initiative.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction under the MCCJA because Connecticut was the child’s “home state,” as the child lived there from birth with the parents. The Court found that Massachusetts did not have default, emergency, or appropriate forum jurisdiction, as Connecticut had not declined jurisdiction before the Massachusetts court issued custody orders. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction. View "Care and Protection of Faraj" on Justia Law

A married couple separated after more than twenty years together and reached a settlement agreement to divide the marital portion of the husband’s Alaska Railroad Corporation pension plan equally, including a 50% survivor benefit for the wife. However, the pension plan’s terms did not allow for the precise division the parties intended. The plan only permitted three options for survivor benefits: no survivor, treating the wife as the surviving spouse (which would give her more than her marital share), or a conditional benefit that could end if the husband remarried and predeceased the wife. The husband proposed selecting the third option and, if he remarried, purchasing life insurance to protect the wife’s interest. The wife objected, expressing concern about relying on the husband to maintain life insurance and arguing for the option that would make her the sole survivor beneficiary.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, selected the third option, allowing the husband to name a future spouse as a joint survivor beneficiary, but did not require him to purchase life insurance. The court reasoned that this option most fairly allocated the risks and reflected the parties’ agreement to divide only the marital portion of the plan. The court did not address or incorporate the husband’s offer to purchase life insurance in its order.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether the superior court abused its discretion by not requiring life insurance or otherwise protecting the wife’s survivor benefit interest. The Supreme Court held that the superior court erred by failing to explain why it did not require the husband to purchase life insurance or otherwise ensure the wife’s interest was protected. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to reconsider the life insurance offer and explain its decision. View "Sandvik v. Frazier" on Justia Law

Two minor children were removed from their parents’ care after their father was incarcerated for felony convictions and their mother was unable to care for them due to drug addiction and homelessness. The children were placed in foster care after the Kansas Department for Children and Families determined that neither parent could provide adequate care. The father, while incarcerated, had limited contact with the children and did not complete most tasks in the reintegration plan, citing the constraints of his imprisonment. The children exhibited significant behavioral and emotional issues while in foster care, and potential placement with a maternal grandmother was being considered.The Leavenworth County District Court adjudicated the children as in need of care and, after 16 months without progress toward reintegration, found both parents unfit. The court based its finding regarding the father on his felony conviction and imprisonment, failure of reasonable efforts by agencies to rehabilitate the family, and failure to carry out a reasonable reintegration plan. The court concluded that the father’s unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future and that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interests, given their need for permanency and the availability of a stable placement with a relative.The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, focusing primarily on the father’s imprisonment as a statutory ground for unfitness and agreeing that the unfitness was unlikely to change soon. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case and held that clear and convincing evidence supported the findings of unfitness and that the conduct or condition rendering the father unable to care for his children was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination was in the children’s best interests. The judgments of both lower courts were affirmed. View "In re K.W.D." on Justia Law

A woman and her former husband divorced in 2011, entering into a detailed stipulation that was incorporated into a final divorce order by the Vermont family division. The order awarded her sole legal parental rights for their three minor children and required the husband to pay spousal maintenance for a set period. It also required him to maintain a $400,000 life insurance policy naming her as the sole beneficiary for at least fifteen years or until his maintenance obligation was paid in full, whichever was later. After remarrying, the husband obtained new life insurance policies naming his new wife as beneficiary and assigned part of one policy to a lender as collateral. Upon his death, the ex-wife discovered she was not a beneficiary on these policies and sued, seeking the insurance proceeds based on the divorce order.The Vermont Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Civil Division, denied the ex-wife’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings to the defendants. The court found that Vermont law prohibited courts from ordering postmortem spousal maintenance or requiring life insurance to secure such maintenance, and concluded the life-insurance provision in the divorce order was invalid and unenforceable. The court ordered the insurance proceeds to be distributed to the new wife and the lender, and granted interpleader relief to one insurer.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Vermont law recognizes an equitable cause of action to recover life insurance proceeds based on a divorce order, and that parties may agree to secure maintenance with life insurance, even if the court could not impose such a requirement unilaterally. The Court affirmed the interpleader relief but reversed the remainder of the judgment, remanding for further proceedings to determine the ex-wife’s equitable entitlement to the insurance proceeds and the priority of competing claims. View "diMonda v. Lincoln National Corp." on Justia Law

A married couple with three minor children separated after more than a decade together, with the wife returning to Maine with the children and the husband remaining in the marital home in Atlanta. The wife, who had been the primary homemaker, filed for divorce, seeking division of property, spousal support, child support, and attorney fees. The husband, who had a significantly higher income, continued to pay the mortgage on the marital home, which had substantial equity.The Maine District Court in Calais held a contested hearing and entered a divorce judgment. The court awarded shared parental rights, primary physical residence of the children to the wife, and divided the marital property by awarding the home to the husband but granting the wife half the equity. The husband was ordered to pay spousal and child support, as well as the wife’s attorney fees. The husband filed post-judgment motions seeking clarification and amendment, particularly regarding the calculation of spousal support and attorney fees. The court reaffirmed its findings, including imputing minimum-wage income to the wife and finding the attorney fee award reasonable. The husband then appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found a clerical error in the District Court’s property distribution table, which double-counted the equity in the marital home. This error potentially affected the determinations of spousal support and attorney fees. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment as to the property distribution calculations and remanded for correction and reconsideration of spousal support and attorney fees in light of the corrected figures. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. The Court denied the wife’s request for appellate attorney fees as sanctions but allowed her to seek such fees in the trial court. View "Newman v. Riser" on Justia Law

A woman sought a protection order against her former partner, with whom she shares two minor children, alleging that his actions caused her and the children to fear imminent physical harm. The petition described several incidents, including one where the former partner allegedly pointed a laser through a window at her and one of the children, and another where he handled a firearm after consuming alcohol. The woman also testified to past physical and emotional abuse directed at both her and the children. The former partner denied threatening them with a firearm or laser, asserting that any lasers involved were harmless pointers for the children.The Seventh Judicial Circuit Court in Pennington County, South Dakota, held a hearing and found the woman’s testimony credible. The court determined that the former partner’s conduct, particularly the laser incident, constituted domestic abuse by inflicting fear of imminent physical harm. The court issued a five-year protection order prohibiting all contact between the former partner and the woman and their children. When the former partner later moved to modify the order to allow contact with the children, the court denied the request, despite both parties expressing willingness for supervised visitation and acknowledging that the facility typically used for such visits would not participate due to the nature of the allegations.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding domestic abuse and did not abuse its discretion in issuing a five-year protection order covering the woman and the children. However, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court abused its discretion by prohibiting all contact between the father and his children for five years without considering the children’s best interests or the parties’ wishes for supervised visitation. The Supreme Court affirmed the protection order in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings to provide for appropriate contact and visitation. View "Wagner v. Tovar" on Justia Law