Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This case concerns the dissolution of a marriage between Diana and Andreas Lietz. The primary point of contention was the valuation of the family home. Diana presented an appraisal report valuing the home at $1.1 million, while Andreas's appraisal report valued it at $1,020,000. Both appraisal reports stated the home was on a 9,000 square feet lot. However, Diana attempted to argue that the lot size was more than 9,000 square feet. The trial court found Andreas's appraiser more credible and accepted his valuation. On appeal, Diana argued that the court erred by preventing her from presenting evidence and testimony suggesting that the lot size was larger than 9,000 square feet. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the trial court followed the correct procedure when it sustained objections to Diana's attempts to present evidence about the larger lot size due to the lack of competent evidence supporting her claim. The court emphasized that an expert witness could not assert case-specific facts in hearsay statements unless they were independently proven by competent evidence or covered by a hearsay exception. View "In re Marriage of Lietz" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota dealt with a dispute between divorced parents, Nickolette Keller and Michael Keller, over tax exemptions for their children. The divorce judgement had allocated the right to claim the oldest child to Michael Keller and the younger child to Nickolette Keller. In 2023, Michael Keller attempted to claim his eldest child on his taxes, but received a letter from the child, facilitated by Nickolette Keller, stating the child would be filing his own taxes. Consequently, Michael Keller filed a motion for contempt against Nickolette Keller.The district court found Nickolette Keller in contempt for willful and inexcusable intent to violate the court order and awarded Michael Keller attorney’s fees up to when Nickolette Keller provided the necessary tax form. The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Nickolette Keller's refusal to comply with the divorce judgement and her facilitation of the child's letter constituted contempt.Michael Keller cross-appealed, arguing the district court erred in not awarding him the full amount of attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court denied his claim, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not awarding Michael Keller attorney’s fees incurred after Nickolette Keller provided him the IRS form. Michael Keller also unsuccessfully requested attorney’s fees on appeal, which the Supreme Court denied due to inadequate briefing and argument. View "Keller v. Keller" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Derrick Sherwood appealed a district court order denying his motion to vacate a domestic violence protection order (DVPO) under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60. The court held a hearing and entered a DVPO restraining Derrick Sherwood from having contact with Valerie Sherwood, his ex-wife, and their two minor children. The order also required Derrick Sherwood to surrender his firearms to law enforcement. Later, the court amended the DVPO to remove the restriction on Derrick Sherwood’s possession of firearms. Derrick Sherwood later moved to vacate the DVPO altogether.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Derrick Sherwood’s request to treat Valerie Sherwood as a hostile witness or in denying Derrick Sherwood’s motion to vacate the DVPO. The court also held that the district court did not err in awarding Valerie Sherwood attorney’s fees.Furthermore, the court held that Derrick Sherwood did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02(4)(g), which allows a DVPO to require, under certain circumstances, that the respondent surrender any firearm or other specified dangerous weapon. As the DVPO was amended to allow Derrick Sherwood to possess firearms, he did not have a justiciable controversy regarding the constitutionality of this statute.The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Sherwood v. Sherwood" on Justia Law

In this divorce case between Stacey Jean Dimmler and Dustin Scott Dimmler, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed several issues. The couple had two children and disputed matters of property division, child support, and primary residential responsibility. Both parties appealed the decision of the District Court. Dustin argued that the court erred in valuing and distributing the marital estate, in determining primary residential responsibility, in calculating child support, and by refusing to remove a parenting investigator. Stacey cross-appealed, arguing that the court erred by not making child support retroactive to the date of the interim order, not awarding her attorney’s fees, and not ordering Dustin to repay her the cost of her parental capacity evaluation.The supreme court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. It affirmed the district court's valuation of the Florida property and the parties’ personal property, its decision on primary residential responsibility, its calculation of Dustin's child support payments, its refusal to retroactively award child support to Stacey, and its denial of attorney’s fees or reimbursement of Stacey's fees for a parental capacity evaluation. However, the court found error in the district court's calculation of the farmland's value. The supreme court held that the district court should have included the debt from the life estate in calculating the value of Dustin's remainder interest in the farmland. It remanded the case for further proceedings to properly evaluate the farmland’s value and to equitably divide the marital estate. View "Dimmler v. Dimmler" on Justia Law

In this case, appellant Austin Levi Payne appealed his convictions for felony murder and other crimes related to the death of one-year-old Journey Cowart. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Payne's convictions. The court reasoned that since Payne and the victim's mother, Brandy Boyd, were the only caretakers of the child during the time the fatal injuries were inflicted, the jury could reasonably conclude that either Payne, Boyd, or both were responsible for the injuries. The court also refuted Payne's arguments regarding the exclusion of evidence about Boyd's drug use and the failure to give a requested jury charge on grave suspicion. Finally, the court dismissed Payne's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding that Payne failed to show that his trial counsel performed deficiently. View "PAYNE v. STATE" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Shomari Tahir Holmes, appealed his convictions for felony murder and other crimes related to the death of his 20-month-old son and for cruelty to children in the first degree against his son's three-year-old half-sister. The appellant was found guilty but mentally ill by a jury. On appeal, the appellant claimed that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting an audio recording of an interview conducted by a psychiatrist and expert witness for the State, and that the court erred by failing to instruct the jury on a verdict of “guilty but with intellectual disability.”The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected both of appellant’s claims and affirmed the convictions. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the audio recording of the interview. The court reasoned that the appellant put his mental condition at issue, and the recording only addressed the purpose of the interview and did not constitute an opinion or inference about appellant’s mental state at the time of the crime.Furthermore, the court held that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on a verdict of “guilty but with intellectual disability.” The court explained that the appellant's counsel initially requested the instruction but later withdrew the request at the charge conference. Under Georgia law, when a defendant requests a specific jury instruction at the outset of trial but later withdraws the request during the charge conference, the defendant has affirmatively waived any right to the charge. Therefore, the appellant's claim concerning the charge failed. View "HOLMES v. STATE" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed a lower court's judgment that the relationship between the plaintiff, M.A., and the defendant, B.F., did not constitute a dating relationship under Family Code section 6210, thus not supporting a tort claim for domestic violence. The plaintiff and defendant had characterized their relationship as “friends with benefits,” and while they had several sexual encounters, they did not go on dates or have social outings together. The court noted that the determination of whether a dating relationship exists is a fact-intensive inquiry and cannot be resolved based on shorthand labels or descriptors. The court held that the frequency and intimacy of the interactions did not amount to a dating relationship as defined by Family Code section 6210, which requires "frequent, intimate associations primarily characterized by the expectation of affection or sexual involvement independent of financial considerations." View "M.A. v. B.F." on Justia Law

The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded a decision from the bankruptcy court in a case involving unpaid child support. The debtor, Justin Gary LaMonda, petitioned for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7. He was married to Natalia LaMonda, and after they divorced, he was ordered to pay child support. The case has been converted multiple times, from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13, and then back to Chapter 7 again. Natalia LaMonda filed an unsecured priority claim for unpaid child support, which the Chapter 7 Trustee objected to. The bankruptcy court sustained the Trustee's objection, leading to this appeal.The Appellate Panel found that Natalia LaMonda's claim for unpaid child support arose after the order for relief and before the case was converted under section 1307 of the Bankruptcy Code. According to the Panel, her claim should therefore be treated as if it arose before the petition date, making it eligible for treatment as a priority unsecured claim. Thus, the Panel held that the bankruptcy court erred by disallowing Natalia LaMonda's claim based on the Trustee's objection. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "LaMonda v. Harder" on Justia Law

In a case involving the Department of Child and Family Services of the County of Los Angeles and individual social workers, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a mixed ruling. The case arose from the removal of two minor children from their parents' custody following an anonymous report that the parents were using medical marijuana to treat one child's severe autism. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment.The Circuit Court reversed the district court's summary judgment for the defendants on the parents' claim of judicial deception. The court concluded that the application submitted by the defendants in support of the warrant for removal contained misrepresentations and omissions and a reasonable trier of fact could find these misrepresentations material.The Circuit Court also reversed the district court's summary judgment for defendants on the parents' intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and their Monell claim, which argued that the county had an unofficial policy of encouraging social workers to omit exculpatory information from warrant applications.However, the Circuit Court affirmed the district court’s judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim concerning the social worker's interview of one child at her school, finding that the social worker was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also found no error in the district court's handling of a jury question during trial.The court remanded the case for further proceedings on the claims of judicial deception, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the Monell claim.The case was remanded for further proceedings on these issues. View "SCANLON V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Barni A., appealed against an order from the District Court in Lewiston, Maine, terminating her parental rights to her older child. The child was born prematurely with a genetic abnormality that led to several medical issues, including tumors on his brain, leading to seizures and affecting his executive functioning, vision, and visual processing. The child qualified for 24/7 private nursing care under Maine's Medicaid program, MaineCare, but never received it. Barni A. argued that the State of Maine's failure to provide the child with the required care resulted in the trial court erroneously finding her unfit because she could not address her child's complicated medical needs.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Barni A., stating that the trial court's findings did not address important issues that needed to be answered before determining whether the record supports a finding by clear and convincing evidence that she is unfit. The court noted that the child's right to full-time private nursing care under federal and state law had not been provided by the Department of Health and Human Services, and this failure affected the mother's ability to care for the child. The court further explained that while the mother had made significant progress in dealing with her personal challenges, her visitation time with the child was substantially limited, and she was never afforded the assistance necessary to care for her child.The court therefore vacated the judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court, instructing it to consider whether the mother has an intellectual disability, whether the mother is or would be unfit regardless of the Department's failure to meet its MaineCare obligation regarding skilled nursing care, and whether there is an alternative to termination of the mother's parental rights that meets the best interest of the child. View "In re Child of Barni A." on Justia Law