Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves an appeal against a judgment from the Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, which committed the appellant, G.M., into the custody and care of the Montana State Hospital (MSH) for involuntary mental health treatment. The key issue at hand is whether the District Court erroneously found that G.M. was unable to adequately care for her own basic needs and safety based on hearsay statements made by her husband through the testimony of a court-appointed professional.G.M., aged 66 at the time of the petition for involuntary mental health commitment in 2021, was alleged to be suffering from a diagnosed psychotic mental disorder. G.M.'s husband's statements, along with her own behavior and assessments from mental health professionals, were the basis for the court's decision. G.M.'s counsel repeatedly objected to the court-appointed professional's testimony regarding her husband's out-of-court statements, but these objections were overruled.G.M. testified on her own behalf, denying having a mental disorder or requiring treatment. Despite this, the District Court found that due to her diagnosed schizophrenic and delusional mental disorder, G.M. was “substantially unable to provide for her own basic needs of food, clothing, shelter, health, or safety."On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the judgment of the lower court. The court found that the lower court's decision was not clearly erroneous and was supported by substantial admissible evidence. The court stated that the hearsay statements of G.M.'s husband were admissible under the rules of evidence to explain the underlying rationale for the court-appointed professional person's expert opinion. The court also noted that the judgment was independently supported by the professional person's personal observations and opinions on G.M.'s condition and ability to care for her own needs and safety. View "In re Matter of G.M." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed a case involving the question of whether the federal Title X program preempts a Texas law that gives parents the right to consent to their teenagers’ obtaining contraceptives. Alexander Deanda, a father raising his children according to Christian beliefs, challenged the Secretary of Health and Human Services' administration of Title X, which funds clinics providing contraceptives to minors without parental notification or consent. Deanda contested this on the grounds that it nullifies his right to consent to his children's medical care, infringing on his state-created right. The court held that Title X does not preempt Texas's law. The statute does not preempt Deanda's parental right to consent to his children's obtaining contraceptives because Title X's goal (encouraging family participation in teens’ receiving family planning services) is not undermined by Texas's goal (empowering parents to consent to their teen’s receiving contraceptives). Instead, the two laws reinforce each other. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment to the extent it declared that Title X does not preempt Texas's parental consent law. However, the court reversed the partial vacatur of a regulation which forbids Title X grantees from notifying parents or obtaining their consent, as the regulation was not challenged by Deanda under the Administrative Procedure Act or otherwise. View "Deanda v. Becerra" on Justia Law

In a dispute between Nancy Robayo and Luis Robayo, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Family Court. The case focuses on a marital settlement agreement between the plaintiff, Nancy Robayo, and the defendant, Luis Robayo, who are former spouses. The plaintiff argued that she is entitled to survivor benefits in the defendant's federal civilian pension according to their marital settlement agreement. The agreement was silent on the issue of survivor benefits, leading the court to find it ambiguous in this regard.The Supreme Court concluded that the most equitable construction of the agreement does not entitle the plaintiff to survivor benefits. The court's decision was based on the circumstances of the parties' marriage, their separation, and the context of their agreement. The parties had lived separately in different states for sixteen years during their twenty-eight-year marriage and had acknowledged in their marital settlement agreement that they had not had a "marital relationship" since 2010. The court found that all of the plaintiff's rights to the defendant's pensions ended on June 30, 2018, as stated in the agreement.The Supreme Court also addressed the plaintiff's argument that the trial justice erred in taking judicial notice of defense counsel's experience litigating in the Family Court. The court found that this did not constitute judicial error. View "Robayo v. Robayo" on Justia Law

The court examined a case involving a divorcing couple, Amy Sue Openshaw and Glen Romney Openshaw, who had a custom of regularly saving a portion of their income throughout their marriage. The husband contested the judge’s alimony decision, arguing that the judge should not have considered the couple's practice of saving as part of the marital lifestyle in setting the amount of alimony.The court held that where a couple has a customary practice of saving during the marriage, such saving can be considered as a component of the couple's marital lifestyle in determining alimony. Therefore, the judge did not err in considering the parties' regular savings practice in setting the alimony amount.The husband also disputed the division of liabilities, as the judge assigned the wife only $5,032 in liabilities, while the husband was assigned $343,280, primarily for the family's unpaid tax debt. The court found the division of liabilities to be erroneous as the judge did not explain why the tax debt, a significant marital liability, was assigned solely to the husband. The court ordered a remand to reevaluate the division of liabilities in the judgment. View "Openshaw v. Openshaw" on Justia Law

This case arose from a contentious guardianship dispute over Kathleen June Jones. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division in Clark County, Nevada appointed an attorney to act as a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) for Jones to help determine her best interests. The GAL sought fees at her standard hourly rate for legal services, which the district court granted over Jones' objections. Jones argued against the fee award, asserting that the GAL had no right to fees when the appointment order did not specify the rate, that the court improperly appointed an attorney as the GAL, and that the GAL should be compensated at the rate of a fiduciary, not an attorney.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that Jones had waived her right to argue about the form of the GAL's appointment order by failing to raise the issue earlier. The Supreme Court found that the district court did err in interpreting the law as requiring the appointment of an attorney as a GAL where there is no court-approved volunteer program. However, this error was deemed harmless because the district court had expressly appointed an experienced attorney due to the complexity of the guardianship case.The court concluded that GALs in Nevada act as fiduciaries, not as attorneys for the protected person, but if they perform services also performed by attorneys and have commensurate experience as an attorney, GALs may be compensated at an attorney rate for their work. The court determined that the GAL's requested fees were appropriate for her work as a fiduciary in this case, given her legal experience and the complexity of the guardianship dispute. View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law

The case involves a father, J.L., who appealed against orders that declared his children, P.L and L.L, to be dependents of the juvenile court and placed them with their mother, H.T. J.L. also contested the condition of his visitation rights, arguing that the court improperly delegated its visitation authority to the children. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency maintained that J.L. forfeited the issue by not raising it at the lower court level.The parents had a child welfare history dating back to 2019, with multiple referrals regarding J.L. physically or emotionally abusing the children. The parents divorced in 2023, and shared custody until an incident occurred where J.L. allegedly punched P.L. The Agency then obtained protective custody warrants for the children. The court placed the children with their mother and ordered liberal supervised visitation for J.L., considering the children's wishes on whether visits would go forward. This order was not objected to by J.L's counsel.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California concurred with the Agency and affirmed the lower court's orders. It held that J.L. forfeited his right to contest the visitation orders by failing to raise the issue at the lower court level. Furthermore, even if the issue was not forfeited, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion by the lower court in allowing the children to decline visiting J.L. The court explained that it was J.L.’s responsibility to request a specific change to the visitation order if he was unhappy with the children's refusal to visit him. View "In re P.L." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed a decision from the Fifth District Court of Appeal related to the termination of a father's parental rights. The father, identified as C.C., had been convicted 18 times over a 15-year period, including for domestic violence, arson, and driving while intoxicated. He was repeatedly incarcerated, leading to his lack of involvement in the life of his son, L.A., who was taken into state custody shortly after his birth due to his mother's physical abuse of his older brother. Despite minimal involvement in L.A.'s life, C.C. challenged the termination of his parental rights, arguing that the termination was not the least restrictive means of protecting L.A.The trial court had concluded that C.C.'s repeated incarceration, token support, and failure to maintain a substantial and positive relationship with L.A. constituted abandonment, and that his repeated incarceration and unavailability presented a risk of harm to L.A., despite his receipt of services. On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded that C.C. should have been provided with a case plan and the opportunity to comply with it before his parental rights were terminated.The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed with the Fifth District's decision, finding that it had improperly reweighed the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's determination that termination was the least restrictive means of protecting L.A. was supported by competent, substantial evidence, and it remanded the case to the Sixth District to affirm the trial court's order terminating C.C.'s parental rights. The court emphasized that the paramount concern was the welfare of the child and that despite the services provided to C.C., he had not been able to overcome the issues that led to L.A.'s dependency. View "Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office v. C.C." on Justia Law

In this case, J.C.P., the father of A.P., appealed a juvenile court's decision to terminate his parental rights. The child had been placed in protective custody due to his negligence and was adjudicated in need of protection. Both parents were in default, and the court had extended protective custody for an additional nine months. The mother did not appear at any of the hearings, but J.C.P. did, except for the final status conference. At this conference, the State moved for default against J.C.P., and the court agreed, terminating both parents' rights.J.C.P. argued that the court had abused its discretion by taking judicial notice of the affidavit underlying the petition without receiving testimony or other evidence in support of termination. He claimed that the court's findings were erroneous as they were not supported by evidence in the record. The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed, finding that the juvenile court had abused its discretion by relying on an affidavit that the State never offered and the court never received into evidence.The court also pointed out that the juvenile court should not have accepted the qualified expert witness's affidavit instead of testimony, as the parties had not stipulated to this. The Court concluded that the juvenile court's findings on termination were clearly erroneous because they were not supported by evidence in the record. As a result, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the juvenile court order terminating parental rights and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Interest of A.P." on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal from a defendant, Christopher Michael Welch, who was convicted of attempted incest, incest, sexual abuse of children, and unlawful restraint. Welch began dating the mother of three daughters in 2018, and they eventually got married. The oldest daughter, J.P., testified about the inappropriate behavior and sexual advances made by Welch towards her. During the trial, Welch's defense suggested J.P. fabricated her claims.Welch's appeal raised two issues. First, he claimed prosecutorial misconduct, arguing that the prosecutor improperly vouched for J.P.'s credibility and made inappropriate emotional appeals to the jury. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana found no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct that would warrant plain error review, arguing that the prosecutor's comments were within the boundaries of discussing witness credibility and the lack of forensic evidence. The court also rejected Welch's argument that the cumulative effect of the state's comments prejudiced his right to a fair trial.Second, Welch objected to certain probation restrictions imposed by the District Court, arguing they had no reasonable nexus to the offense charged. These included prohibitions on using or possessing alcohol and illegal drugs, gambling, entering bars, and entering casinos. The court found these to be standard conditions authorized by statute and ruled that Welch failed to demonstrate that the lower court abused its discretion in imposing them. Therefore, the court affirmed the conviction and sentencing. View "State v. Welch" on Justia Law

In a suit involving the West Virginia Department of Human Services (the Department), the plaintiff, A.R., alleged that her injuries stemmed from the Department's negligence, specifically its failure to follow proper procedures, policies, and protocols mandated by the Child Welfare Act. The Department moved to dismiss the claims on the basis of qualified immunity, asserting that the claims were based on discretionary, governmental functions and thus it was immune from claims of negligence. However, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County denied the Department’s motion.In its decision, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the lower court's decision in part, ruling that the Department was indeed entitled to qualified immunity from A.R.'s negligence claims. The Court found that the hiring, training, and supervision of employees were discretionary governmental functions, and A.R.'s broad allegations that the Department violated the Child Welfare Act and the Child Protective Services Policy were insufficient to defeat the Department's claim of qualified immunity. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, consistent with its opinion. View "West Virginia Department of Human Resources v. A.R." on Justia Law