Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a Venezuelan couple, Carlos Cuenca Figueredo and Yauri Rojas, who had a son, C.R. After their separation and divorce, they shared custody of C.R. in Venezuela. However, Rojas took C.R. to the United States without Figueredo's knowledge or permission. Twenty months after Rojas left Venezuela with C.R., Figueredo filed a petition in the Middle District of Florida seeking his son’s return under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.The Middle District of Florida found that C.R. was settled in his new environment in the United States. The court considered factors such as C.R.'s stable residence, school attendance, community participation, and Rojas's employment and financial stability. The court also took into account C.R. and his mother's immigration status, noting that Rojas had been granted authorization to remain and work in the United States while her asylum application was pending. Consequently, the court denied Figueredo's petition for C.R.'s return.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that a child's immigration status is one relevant factor in determining whether a child is settled in a new environment. The court found that the district court did not err in finding that C.R. was settled in his new environment and did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order his return to Venezuela. View "Alberto Cuenca Figueredo v. Del Carmen Rojas" on Justia Law

A German citizen, Asli Baz, filed a suit under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) to compel Anthony Patterson, a U.S. citizen, to return their six-year-old son, A.P., from Illinois to Germany. The couple had previously lived together in Chicago, but after their relationship ended, they continued to cohabit and share custody of their son. Baz later moved to Germany with A.P., with Patterson's consent. However, Patterson later took A.P. from his school in Germany and brought him back to the U.S., refusing to return him to Germany.The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that A.P.’s habitual residence at the time he was retained was in Germany, where he had lived with Baz for over a year, and that the retention in Illinois violated Baz’s rights of custody under German law. It thus granted Baz’s petition and ordered the child’s return. Patterson appealed, challenging both the jurisdiction of the district court and its rulings on the merits of the petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court rejected Patterson's argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction due to a provision in the Illinois Allocation Judgment, which stated that the Circuit Court of the State of Illinois had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The court also found that the district court did not err in determining that A.P.'s habitual residence was Germany, and that Baz was exercising her rights of custody at the time of the retention. The court emphasized that its decision did not touch on any matters of custody, which should be resolved by the courts of the child's habitual residence. View "Baz v. Patterson" on Justia Law

A fatal motor vehicle accident involving a juvenile driver led to a delinquency petition filed against the driver, who later pleaded nolo contendere to two charges of driving so as to endanger, resulting in death. The parents of the deceased, who were present for the plea, subsequently filed a motion in the Family Court seeking access to the transcript of the proceeding where the juvenile driver was certified and sentenced. The Family Court denied the motion, leading to an appeal by the deceased's parents, who were not parties to the case.The Family Court's denial of the motion was based on the consideration of the "good cause" standard, as stipulated by the statute and precedent. The court found that the parents failed to show how they would not be able to seek restitution for their damages without the transcript. The court also noted that the parents and their attorneys were present during the proceedings for which they requested a transcript. Balancing the interests of the state in protecting the confidentiality of juvenile justice proceedings against the interests of the parents, the court concluded that the state's interests outweighed the parents' interests.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Family Court's order. The Supreme Court noted that the parents failed to meet the standard for production of confidential juvenile records of Family Court proceedings. The court also disagreed with the parents' argument that the transcript might prove helpful in the event of inconsistencies in the juvenile's testimony, describing this argument as speculative. The court concluded that the Family Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. View "In re C.R." on Justia Law

Antonio Ortiz, while on supervised release for a drug-trafficking conviction, was accused of repeatedly raping his teenage daughter. The district court found Ortiz guilty of three release violations related to the rapes and revoked his supervised release. Ortiz was sentenced to the statutory maximum of sixty months of imprisonment, to be served consecutively to any state court sentence he might receive.Ortiz appealed, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the evidentiary hearing and that the sentence imposed by the district court was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. He claimed his counsel failed to present medical evidence that would have corroborated his testimony that he was physically incapable of raping his daughter due to injuries from previous motorcycle accidents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with Ortiz's arguments. The court noted that Ortiz had not shown that the purportedly deficient performance of his counsel prejudiced his defense. The court also concluded that the rationale for the sentence was evident from the record and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing it. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

The case involves a non-marital couple, A.M.B. and T.G., who sought to adopt A.M.B.'s biological child, M.M.C. T.G. had been a father figure to M.M.C. for over a decade and had assumed various parental duties. The parental rights of M.M.C.'s biological father had been terminated. Despite a positive Home Study Report recommending the adoption, the Circuit Court for Ashland County denied the adoption petition. The court cited Wisconsin's adoption statutes, which only allow a non-marital partner to adopt their partner's child if they are married to the child's parent. A.M.B. and T.G. appealed, arguing that the statutes violated their equal protection rights.The Circuit Court for Ashland County denied the adoption petition, citing Wisconsin's adoption statutes. The statutes only allow a non-marital partner to adopt their partner's child if they are married to the child's parent. The court referenced a previous case, Georgina G. v. Terry M., which held that an adoption by a third party who is not the spouse of the parent is not permissible. A.M.B. and T.G. appealed the decision, arguing that the statutes violated their equal protection rights.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the adoption statutes did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the statutes did not restrict a fundamental right or regulate a protected class. The court concluded that the state had a legitimate interest in promoting stability for adoptive children through marital families, which provided a rational basis for the legislative limits on eligibility to adopt a child. View "A. M. B. v. Circuit Court for Ashland County" on Justia Law

The case involves Weldon K. McDavid, Jr., who was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and attempted premeditated murder. McDavid, a shooting instructor, had a romantic relationship with Diana Lovejoy, who was going through a contentious divorce. The two hatched a plan to kill Lovejoy's husband, Greg Mulvihill. McDavid shot Mulvihill, causing severe injuries but not killing him. The jury found true allegations that McDavid intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury, and personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim.McDavid appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial court was unaware of its full sentencing discretion under Senate Bill No. 620, which grants trial courts the discretion to strike formerly mandatory enhancements. The Court of Appeal agreed, vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing. However, the trial court declined to strike the enhancements. McDavid appealed again, and while the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeal held that a trial court has the authority to impose a lesser enhancement not only under section 12022.53 but also under other statutes if the facts supporting the lesser enhancement were alleged and found true by a jury. The Attorney General filed a petition for rehearing, which the Court of Appeal granted. On rehearing, the Court of Appeal reversed course and held that a trial court’s discretion to impose a lesser included, uncharged enhancement is confined to the enhancements in section 12022.53 and does not include enhancements specified in other statutes.The Supreme Court of California reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The court held that when a court has exercised its discretion under subdivision (h) to strike a section 12022.53 enhancement and finds that no other section 12022.53 enhancement is appropriate, the second sentence of subdivision (j) is inapplicable and does not bar the court from imposing a lesser included, uncharged enhancement under a law other than section 12022.53. The court thus has discretion to impose such an enhancement if it is supported by facts that have been alleged and found true. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "People v. McDavid" on Justia Law

The case involves Joel Dudley, who was appealing the 2023 revocation of his supervised release and his sentence of two terms of two years of incarceration, to be served consecutively, followed by supervised release for life. The revocation was the second one from his prior convictions in 2014 for possession of child pornography and making a false declaration before the court. The revocation was based on the district court's finding that he had violated five conditions of his supervised release, including by sharing images of himself sexually abusing his daughter when she was approximately four years old and engaging in sexual contact with, exchanging sexually explicit messages with, and receiving and possessing pornographic video of his daughter when she was seventeen years old.Previously, Dudley had been found guilty on both counts at two separate jury trials. His supervised release was first revoked in 2019 after he violated the conditions of his release by failing to update his sex offender registration and having other individuals access the internet on his behalf. His supervised release was again revoked in 2020 after he had unapproved contact with his daughter, exchanged sexually explicit messages with her, and used an unreported cell phone number and Facebook account under a false name.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court judge did not err or abuse his discretion in revoking Dudley's supervised release and that Dudley's sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. The court affirmed the decision of the lower court. View "United States v. Dudley" on Justia Law

The case involves Carl Michael Seibert who appealed a summary judgment by the Madison Circuit Court in favor of Lorri Stricklen and Zoe Aldige. Seibert had filed claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process against Stricklen and Aldige. The case originated from a divorce proceeding between Seibert and Stricklen. Seibert believed Stricklen was having an affair and began gathering evidence. Stricklen filed a criminal complaint against Seibert for stalking, leading to his arrest and indictment. The criminal case ended in a mistrial, and Seibert subsequently filed his complaint alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process.The Madison Circuit Court granted a summary judgment in favor of Stricklen and Aldige, noting that Seibert's case had effectively languished due to his failure to conduct meaningful discovery or prosecute the case. The court found that if Seibert could not defeat a motion for a summary judgment after 58 months, a trial on his claims would be useless. Stricklen and Aldige also filed a motion for an award of attorney fees and costs under the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act ("the ALAA"), which the court granted in part.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed in part and reversed in part. It affirmed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of Stricklen on the malicious-prosecution claim and in favor of Stricklen and Aldige on the abuse-of-process claim. However, it reversed the trial court's implicit determination that Seibert's lawsuit was filed without substantial justification, remanding the case to the trial court with instructions to set forth its reasoning as to why Stricklen and Aldige are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs under the ALAA. View "Seibert v. Stricklen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the termination of parental rights of Victoria Rodriguez and Everardo Rodriguez, Sr., parents of four children who were adjudicated deprived. The children were removed from their parents' custody following allegations of severe sexual abuse against the eldest daughter, M.R., by her father over a two-year period, and the mother's failure to protect the children from this abuse.The District Court of Oklahoma County terminated the parents' rights after a jury trial. Both parents appealed separately, and their appeals were considered together in this opinion. The mother argued that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was unconstitutional as it denied her equal protection under the law. However, the court found that she lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of ICWA. The court also held that the trial court did not violate her right to equal protection under the law by failing to apply a heightened burden of proof under ICWA.The father argued that the trial court erred by not making certain required findings under federal and state law and by granting the State's Motion in Limine. The court found that the trial court did not err in these respects. The court affirmed the trial court's orders terminating the parental rights of both parents. View "In the Matter of M.R." on Justia Law

The case involves a plaintiff, referred to as "Clara," who alleged that she was sexually assaulted by the defendant, referred to as "Martin," in June 2018. Following the incident, Clara applied for a temporary protective order (TPO) and then a final protective order (FPO) under the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act of 2015 (SASPA). The trial court found that Clara had been subjected to nonconsensual sexual contact due to her extreme intoxication and that there was a possibility of future risk to Clara’s safety or well-being. The court issued an FPO directing Martin to have no contact with Clara.The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's decision based on the test used to assess consent. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the affirmative consent standard is the correct standard to be applied in determining whether sexual activity was consensual under SASPA. The case was remanded for reconsideration.On remand, Clara testified about her ongoing trauma from the assault. The court found Clara’s testimony credible and Martin’s testimony not credible. The court held that consent to sexual contact was not affirmatively and freely given and found a significant risk to Clara’s psychological well-being should the order not remain in effect. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification limited to the interpretation of the statute regarding the possibility of future risk to the victim's safety or well-being.The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the plain language of the statute creates a standard that is permissive and easily satisfied. The court found that Clara's testimony about her ongoing trauma and fear for her safety was sufficient to demonstrate a "possibility of future risk" to her "safety or well-being." View "C.R. v. M. T." on Justia Law