Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Laura Cote and Adam Cote, who were divorced in November 2022. The divorce agreement prohibited exposing their children to felons and known sex offenders. However, Laura Cote began dating Steven Alexander, a convicted sex offender, in August 2022. In April 2023, Adam Cote filed a motion to modify residential responsibility and sought a contempt sanction against Laura Cote for violating the terms of the judgment by allowing Alexander to be around the children. He also filed a motion to compel discovery seeking communications between Laura Cote and Alexander and Laura Cote’s bank statements.The District Court of Ward County found Laura Cote in contempt of court for allowing and encouraging contact between the children and Alexander. However, the court denied Adam Cote’s motion for primary residential responsibility, deeming it an "extreme remedy." Instead, the court ordered that the children have no contact with Alexander and warned Laura Cote of significant consequences for non-compliance. The court also denied Adam Cote’s motion to compel discovery.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Adam Cote appealed the district court's orders denying his motion to modify residential responsibility and motion to compel discovery. Laura Cote cross-appealed the order finding her in contempt of court. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in part, agreeing that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Adam Cote’s motion to compel discovery or in finding Laura Cote in contempt of court. However, the Supreme Court found that the district court failed to make necessary findings regarding the best interest factors for the Supreme Court to provide a meaningful review of the district court’s denial of a modification of primary residential responsibility. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case with instructions to provide findings on the best interests of the children. View "Cote v. Cote" on Justia Law

The parties, Nancy M. Steward and Joseph H. Steward, were married in 2006 and divorced in 2020, with two minor children. The court adopted their Stipulated Parenting Plan (SPP), which included a child support arrangement. After the court adopted the SPP, Joseph requested a modification of child support from the Montana Child Support Services Division (CSSD). CSSD issued a modified order determining Joseph's child support obligation to be less than initially stipulated. Nancy contested the date of commencement of the modified child support, asserting it should not have commenced until the month after she received notification from CSSD of the modified amount.The issue on appeal was whether the District Court abused its discretion in commencing modified child support prior to Nancy receiving actual notification of the modified child support order and amount from CSSD. Nancy argued that under § 40-4-208, MCA, and Healy, child support may only be modified subsequent to her receipt of actual notice of the CSSD modification notice and order. Joseph argued that the statute supported modification of the court’s original child support order for any installments accruing subsequent to when he served Nancy notice of his request for hearing on child support modification with CSSD.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court ruled that the District Court correctly interpreted the law and appropriately determined the commencement of the modified child support after notice to Nancy of Joseph’s request to modify child support, as permitted by § 40-4-208(1), MCA. The Supreme Court also overruled any interpretation of Healy that limits a district court’s authority to modify child support installments accruing after a party’s receipt of actual notice of the CSSD modification notice and order when that party was appropriately put on notice of the other party’s pursuit of modification of child support well before CSSD’s notice and order. View "In re Marriage of Steward" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny absolute and qualified immunity to two social workers, Gloria Vazquez and Mirta Johnson, in a case brought against them by Sydney Rieman and her child, K.B. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by (1) failing to provide them with notice of a juvenile detention hearing where the County’s Child and Family Services sought custody of K.B., and (2) providing false information to the Juvenile Court about why Ms. Rieman was not noticed for the hearing.The court rejected the defendants' claim that they were entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in their quasi-prosecutorial role as social workers. The court determined that the failure to provide notice of the hearing and the provision of false information to the Juvenile Court were not similar to discretionary decisions about whether to prosecute. Therefore, absolute immunity did not apply.The court also held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from suit for failing to provide notice of the hearing and for providing false information to the Juvenile Court. The court affirmed that Ms. Rieman had a due process right to such notice and that this right was clearly established. It was also clear that providing false information to the court constituted judicial deception. The court concluded that a reasonable social worker in the defendants' position would have understood that their actions were violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. View "RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ" on Justia Law

The case in question concerns the termination of parental rights and involves Chelsey Marie Smith (the Mother) who appealed the decision of the district court granting the Wyoming Department of Family Services’ (the Department) petition to terminate her parental rights to her children, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (v) (2023). The children were initially removed from the Mother's care due to neglect, and despite the Department's efforts to rehabilitate the family, the Mother was unable to consistently abide by the objectives set out in the Department’s case plan.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that clear and convincing evidence supported that the Department made reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to rehabilitate the Mother and reunify her with the children under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii). The court noted that while the Mother had a fundamental right to raise her children, the children also had a right to stability and permanency in their family relationships. View "In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights To: Pml and Egl, Minor Children v. State of Wyoming, Ex Rel. Department of Family Services" on Justia Law

The case involves a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) issued in favor of a child's father (Jacob G.) against the child's mother (Savanah F.) following an incident of custodial interference that involved the mother taking the child from Alaska to Texas without the father's knowledge and in violation of a custody order. The father had sought attorney's fees, which were denied by the Superior Court without explanation.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that a person who successfully petitions for a DVPO is entitled to seek attorney’s fees from the respondent, and these can only be denied in exceptional circumstances. The Court held that neither of the arguments made by the mother in opposition to the fees - that her act of custodial interference was justified by the father’s substance abuse, and that she could not afford to pay the fees - constituted exceptional circumstances. The Court noted that the mother's argument fails to recognize the harm caused by custodial interference, and that her financial circumstances did not justify denial of the fees, given she had paid her own legal fees and had the ability to earn income. View "Jacob G. v. Savanah F." on Justia Law

The case revolves around the appellant, Joey Green-Remache, who was charged with interstate violation of a protective order, following a jury trial. Green-Remache was also charged with first-degree burglary and kidnapping, but the jury hung on these charges. He later pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary, and the Government dismissed the kidnapping charge. The charges were based on the Government's claim that Green-Remache broke into his on-again-off-again girlfriend's apartment and forcibly transported her from D.C. to Maryland, contrary to a civil protective order. At trial, the Government presented a Clinical Psychologist who testified about the characteristics of coercive control relationships between sexual partners. The appellant claimed that the jury was likely heavily influenced by this "opinion testimony," which he argues was not connected to the circumstances of this case. Therefore, he requested that the case be remanded to determine whether counsel's failure to object to the Psychologist's testimony constituted ineffective assistance that prejudiced him.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the appellant's request for a remand. The court held that the record conclusively demonstrated that the appellant was not prejudiced by his counsel's alleged errors. The court noted that the Government introduced considerable evidence to support its theory that the appellant caused his girlfriend to travel with him to Maryland by force, coercion, duress, or fraud, apart from the Psychologist's testimony. This evidence included the girlfriend's grand jury testimony, recorded interviews, a 911 call, testimony from a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner, and testimony from two eyewitnesses. The court concluded that this "overwhelming" evidence against the appellant undercut his claim that, but for his counsel's alleged errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different. The court affirmed the judgment of the District Court. View "USA v. Green-Remache" on Justia Law

A mother appealed from juvenile court orders denying her petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The mother argued that the proceedings violated her substantive due process rights because the juvenile court was not required to consider her potential for further brain development, or her capacity to change, given her status as a teenager.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three affirmed the juvenile court orders. The court rejected the mother's arguments, concluding that sections 366.26 and 388 did not violate her due process rights. The court found that the focus of the proceedings shifted to permanence and stability for the child once reunification efforts failed. This shift did not violate the mother’s rights, even though she was a teenage parent. The court reasoned that the mother’s youth did not change or lessen the child’s need for permanence and stability.The court also dismissed the mother's reliance on cases concerning juvenile offenders in the criminal context, stating that the objectives and interests of the criminal justice system are vastly different from those of the juvenile dependency system. The court noted that the legislative choices to shift focus from reunification to permanency, require a parent to demonstrate changed circumstances, and prefer adoption as a permanent plan, were not intended to punish the parent, but to focus on the child's rights in proceedings where expediency is critical to the protection of their interests. View "In re S.G." on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, the case involved a mother contesting the juvenile court's decision concerning the permanency plan for her child, A. In July 2019, A was made a ward of the court and placed in substitute care under the Department of Human Services (DHS). Despite DHS's efforts, the juvenile court determined that the mother had not made sufficient progress to allow A's safe return home.The mother argued that the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard, asserting that she had made significant progress. The court, however, determined that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the juvenile court's conclusion that the mother's progress was inadequate for A’s safe return home.The court held that the juvenile court's "sufficient progress" determination is a legal conclusion rather than a factual finding. It concluded that the record developed in this case was legally sufficient to support the juvenile court's legal conclusion that the mother's progress was insufficient to make possible A's safe return home. As a result, the court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the juvenile court. View "Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B." on Justia Law

In this case heard by the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the appellant, Benjamin David Wilson, was charged with second-degree sexual abuse of a minor and third-degree sexual abuse of a minor, following allegations involving his stepdaughter, K.P. The jury acquitted him of the second-degree charge but found him guilty of the third-degree charge. Wilson appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence presented was insufficient for a conviction on the third-degree charge.The facts presented to the court included K.P.'s testimony that Wilson had inappropriately touched her during a family event. Wilson denied the allegations, providing an alternative account of the incident. Despite this, the jury found him guilty of third-degree sexual abuse of a minor, leading to a sentence of 10 to 15 years in prison.In response to Wilson's appeal, the court affirmed the conviction. It stated that the jury's acquittal on one charge did not necessarily impact the verdict on the other charge. The court indicated that each charge was treated as a separate indictment, and verdicts on multiple charges did not need to be consistent. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court considered the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, affirming Wilson's conviction based on K.P.'s testimony. View "Wilson v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Wyoming heard an appeal by Rodger William Dillard, who contested the termination of his parental rights to his three minor children. Dillard had initially adopted his grandchildren after their biological parents' rights were terminated. After Dillard's wife, who had custody of the children, passed away, allegations of sexual abuse were made against Dillard by two of the children. Dillard was then charged with multiple counts of sexual abuse of a minor.The Department of Family Services initially aimed to reunify the children with Dillard. However, after more than a year in the Department's custody, the plan was changed to adoption due to Dillard's lack of progress in meeting the requirements of his Family Service Case Plan. Dillard was eventually sentenced to concurrent sentences of three to five years for two counts of sexual abuse of a minor. Following this, the Department filed a petition to terminate Dillard's parental rights.The district court found that termination was in the best interest of the children, as Dillard was unfit to meet their ongoing physical, mental, and emotional needs. Dillard appealed this decision, arguing that the Department had not made reasonable efforts to reunify him with the children.However, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court's decision to terminate Dillard's parental rights. The Court held that Dillard's incarceration due to his felony convictions for sexual abuse of a minor demonstrated his unfitness to have custody and control of the children. The Court therefore affirmed the termination of Dillard's parental rights under the provision of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iv), which allows for termination of parental rights if the parent is incarcerated due to a felony conviction and is shown to be unfit for custody and control of the child. View "In re Termination of Parental Rights To: Mmd, Jid and Drd v. State, Ex Rel. Department of Family Services" on Justia Law