Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A.K. appealed a disorderly conduct restraining order issued against her. Jennifer Gooss, on behalf of her minor daughter, filed the petition alleging A.K., also a minor, engaged in disorderly conduct. A temporary restraining order was issued, and a hearing was held. After a 30-minute hearing, the district court issued a disorderly conduct restraining order against A.K.The District Court of Mercer County, South Central Judicial District, conducted the hearing. A.K. argued on appeal that she was denied due process because the court's time limit on the hearing deprived her of a reasonable opportunity to rebut the evidence and testify on her own behalf. She also contended that the district court's findings were not supported by the evidence.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court noted that a district court's decision to grant a restraining order or conduct a hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court found that A.K. did not object to the 30-minute time limit at the outset of the hearing and did not request additional time. The court determined that the district court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by setting the time limitations and that A.K. had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the petitioner.The Supreme Court also reviewed the district court's findings and concluded that sufficient evidence supported the finding that A.K.'s conduct affected the minor petitioner's safety, security, or privacy. The court held that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous and that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the restraining order. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the disorderly conduct restraining order. View "Gooss v. A.K." on Justia Law

Samantha Davis filed a petition for a disorderly conduct restraining order against Richard Romanyshyn in April 2024. The district court granted a temporary restraining order and outlined the hearing procedure, which limited the hearing to 15 minutes unless a full evidentiary hearing was requested. The procedure required the requesting party to file a notice of witnesses and a summary of their anticipated testimony three days before the hearing. If no request was made, evidence had to be presented by affidavit, and affiants had to be available for cross-examination if notified 24 hours before the hearing.Davis did not request a full evidentiary hearing but filed a notice to cross-examine Romanyshyn. Romanyshyn argued he requested a full evidentiary hearing and filed a notice to cross-examine through his answer, but the district court found he did not follow the proper procedure. The hearing was limited to arguments from Davis’s counsel and Romanyshyn, along with Davis’s petition and Romanyshyn’s affidavit. The district court granted Davis a two-year restraining order, later amended to include the parties’ two minor children, conflicting with an existing parental responsibility order.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and concluded that the district court deprived Romanyshyn of a full evidentiary hearing as required by N.D.C.C. § 12.1–31.2–01(1). The court found that the district court relied solely on inadmissible hearsay in Davis’s petition and Romanyshyn’s affidavit, without allowing cross-examination or presenting admissible evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the restraining order and remanded the case for a full evidentiary hearing. The court also noted that any restraining order issued on remand must not conflict with the existing parental responsibility order. View "Davis v. Romanyshyn" on Justia Law

Ashley Navarro and Goretti Cervera were in a relationship for approximately eight years. During and after their relationship, Cervera struggled with mental health issues, including borderline personality disorder, general anxiety, and major depressive disorder. In July 2018, after their breakup, Cervera attempted to confront Navarro at her workplace, leading to a violent incident where Cervera was found with a large kitchen knife and admitted to intending to kill Navarro. Navarro obtained an emergency protective order and a five-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Cervera. Cervera violated the DVRO in 2019 by contacting Navarro via email and text, leading Navarro to obtain a three-year criminal protective order.The Alameda County Superior Court initially issued the DVRO based on the 2018 incident, finding Navarro had a reasonable apprehension of physical harm. In May 2023, Navarro sought a permanent renewal of the DVRO, citing ongoing fear of harm due to Cervera's mental health issues and past behavior. Cervera opposed the renewal, claiming her mental health had stabilized and she had not contacted Navarro in four years. The trial court denied the renewal request, finding Navarro's fear of future abuse unreasonable and noting Cervera's improved mental health and lack of recent contact.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and found that the trial court abused its discretion. The appellate court held that the facts of the 2018 incident, combined with Cervera's violations of the DVRO, established a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. The court reversed the trial court's decision and directed it to grant the renewal request, determining whether the DVRO should be renewed for five or more years, or permanently. View "Navarro v. Cervera" on Justia Law

Thomas Steiger and Hope VanDelden have two minor children, G.L.M.S. and T.L.S. Thomas filed a Petition for Establishment of a Permanent Parenting Plan in October 2016, which was granted in May 2017 after Hope did not respond or attend the hearing. The plan allowed the children to reside primarily with Thomas and have contact with Hope on alternating weekends, holidays, and up to 14 days of vacation each year. Hope filed a motion to amend the parenting plan in October 2017, claiming Thomas had reduced her parenting time. Thomas’s mother and stepfather also petitioned to intervene, asserting their grandparenting time had been decreased.In October 2023, Hope filed a motion to proceed with mediation to address the parenting plan. After unsuccessful mediation, she filed another motion to amend the plan in January 2024, claiming Thomas did not allow the children to spend additional time with her. Thomas opposed the motion, asserting there was no change in circumstances to warrant an amendment. The District Court set an in-chambers interview with the oldest child, G.L.M.S., but did not hold an evidentiary hearing before granting Hope’s motion to amend the parenting plan in July 2024.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the District Court erred by not holding a hearing on the motion to amend the parenting plan, as required by Montana law unless the motion is denied for lack of adequate cause. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s order and remanded the case for a hearing to determine if the statutory criteria for amending the parenting plan were met and to amend the plan in the best interests of the children. View "In Re G.L.M.S. and T.L.S." on Justia Law

A firefighter retired and chose to participate in the Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement Plan B program years after his divorce. His former spouse sought to enforce the divorce decree, which required the firefighter to pay her a portion of his Plan B benefits. The district court ruled in favor of the former spouse, ordering the firefighter to pay her a portion of the funds in the Plan B account.The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the district court's decision, construing the former spouse's request as an impermissible modification of the divorce decree. The appellate court held that final property judgments cannot be modified absent fraud. The former spouse then sought certiorari from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reviewed the case and held that when a vested firefighter selects the Plan B option post-divorce and the divorce decree does not specify the allocation of these funds, the Plan B account is divisible marital property to the extent that any funds in the account are attributable to the marital years. The court applied the precedent set by Baggs v. Baggs, which established that retirement benefits accrued during the marriage are divisible marital property. The court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion and affirmed the district court's judgment, allowing the former spouse to collect her share of the Plan B benefits, including interest. View "CUMMINGS v. SASNETT" on Justia Law

David Morway sought review of an unpublished order by the court of appeals that dismissed his appeal as untimely. The appeal was against a May 24, 2023, circuit court order denying his motion to modify or terminate spousal maintenance. The court of appeals concluded that the order was final for purposes of appeal under WIS. STAT. § 808.03(1) and dismissed the appeal because David filed his notice of appeal outside the 90-day timeframe.In the Ozaukee County Circuit Court, David and Karen Morway were divorced in 2019, with David ordered to pay spousal maintenance. David filed a motion to modify the maintenance in May 2022 due to a change in his employment circumstances. The family court commissioner reduced David’s maintenance obligation, but Karen appealed. The circuit court held a trial and denied David’s motion to modify or terminate maintenance in an oral decision on April 19, 2023, which was later memorialized in the May 24 order. Karen’s post-trial motion for attorney fees based on overtrial was also denied at that time.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the May 24 order was final because it disposed of the entire matter in litigation, specifically David’s motion to modify or terminate maintenance. The court held that the order was unambiguous in its finality, despite lacking an explicit finality statement. The court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, concluding that David’s notice of appeal was not timely filed within the 90-day period, and thus, the court of appeals properly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Morway v. Morway" on Justia Law

A Montana State Representative, William W. Mercer, requested access to certain child abuse and neglect case records from the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) under a statute that allows legislators to review such records. The DPHHS provided some records but withheld others, including emails, text messages, and attorney-client privileged materials. Mercer filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and for declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the DPHHS to release the additional records.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County granted a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring the DPHHS to provide the requested records, including those claimed to be attorney-client privileged, but imposed additional confidentiality protections. The DPHHS appealed, arguing that the District Court misinterpreted the statute and that the attorney-client privilege should exempt certain records from disclosure.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the plain language of the statute required the disclosure of the records to the legislator, subject to confidentiality protections. The court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, as Mercer demonstrated a clear likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities tipped in his favor, and that the injunction was in the public interest. The court emphasized that the preliminary injunction did not resolve the ultimate merits of the case, which would be determined in further proceedings. View "Mercer v. Department of Public Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

David Weingarten and Krystal Mamer, who were never married, agreed to conceive a child via in vitro fertilization (IVF) using Weingarten’s sperm and a third party’s egg. They agreed to share the IVF costs, which totaled $55,635. Approximately one month after the child was born, Mamer filed a petition to determine parental relationship under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA). Weingarten responded and later requested an order directing Mamer to reimburse him for half of the IVF costs. Mamer opposed, arguing that the statute did not authorize a court to order a mother to pay a father for any pregnancy expenses.The family court held a hearing and denied Weingarten’s reimbursement request, ruling it had no authority under Family Code section 7637 to order reimbursement of expenses incurred before the parentage action was filed. Weingarten appealed the order, and the family court subsequently entered a judgment declaring Mamer and Weingarten to be the parents of the child.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Family Code section 7637 does authorize a court to direct a parent to pay reasonable expenses of the mother’s pregnancy, including IVF costs, even if those expenses were incurred before the parentage action was filed. The court found that the family court erred in its interpretation of the statute and that the statute does not limit the court’s authority to order reimbursement to expenses incurred after the parentage action is filed.The appellate court reversed the order denying Weingarten’s reimbursement request and remanded the matter to the family court to exercise its discretion in determining whether to direct Mamer to pay a portion of the IVF costs. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects, and Weingarten was entitled to recover costs on appeal. View "Mamer v. Weingarten" on Justia Law

Jane's three young daughters were taken into custody by the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (CPS) due to unsafe living conditions and neglect. Jane had left her daughters with her disabled mother in a cramped, unsupervised apartment. CPS developed a service plan for Jane to regain custody, which included obtaining stable housing, employment, and transportation. Despite completing parenting classes and getting clean from drugs, Jane failed to comply with the other requirements. She did not secure stable housing or employment and did not regularly visit her daughters. Consequently, CPS petitioned to terminate her parental rights.The Monroe County Chancery Court held a termination hearing where CPS workers testified about Jane's noncompliance with the service plan and the unsafe conditions that led to the removal of her daughters. Jane testified about her efforts to get clean and find employment but admitted to various failures. The court-appointed Guardian Ad Litem recommended terminating Jane's parental rights, citing her unwillingness to provide for her daughters' basic needs. The chancellor found clear and convincing evidence supporting the termination based on statutory grounds, including abandonment, unwillingness to provide necessary care, failure to exercise reasonable visitation, and substantial erosion of the parent-child relationship.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the chancellor's decision. The court held that substantial evidence supported the termination of Jane's parental rights, emphasizing that her lack of effort to care for and visit her daughters, rather than her lack of money, was the reason for the termination. The court found that the termination was in the best interest of the children to ensure a permanent and stable future. View "J.J.B. v. Monroe County Department of Child Protection Services" on Justia Law

The case involves the father of two children, L.B. and R.B., who were removed from their parents' care in December 2021 due to homelessness, domestic violence, and the father's alcoholism. The children were placed in foster care with R.D., a caregiver selected by Child Protective Services (CPS). Despite multiple efforts by CPS to assist the family, including providing basic necessities and facilitating treatment programs for the father, he was unable to maintain sobriety or stable housing.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, granted emergency protective services and later adjudicated the children as youths in need of care (YINC). The court granted temporary legal custody to the Department of Public Health and Human Services. After nineteen months, the Department requested a permanency plan for state-sponsored guardianship. The District Court held a hearing and, based on testimony from various experts, ordered the children to be placed with R.D. as their legal guardian.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The father argued that the Department failed to provide sufficient active efforts to help him overcome barriers to sobriety and housing. However, the court found that the Department made extensive efforts, including providing housing assistance, treatment referrals, and facilitating family engagement meetings. The court noted that the father's lack of participation and refusal of treatment options contributed to the failure of reunification efforts.The Supreme Court held that the Department made sufficient active efforts to reunite the father with his children and that further efforts would be unproductive and not in the children's best interests. The court affirmed the District Court's decision to grant legal guardianship to R.D. View "In re Matter of R.B." on Justia Law