Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Mitchell Rataiczak and Gwendolyn Parker, who were never married, are the biological parents of two minor children. After their relationship ended, Parker moved to Wyoming with the children, while Rataiczak remained in Arizona. Rataiczak filed a petition to establish paternity, custody, visitation, and child support. The District Court of Park County awarded joint legal custody to both parents, primary physical custody to Parker, and visitation rights to Rataiczak. The court also ordered Rataiczak to pay child support.The district court's visitation schedule was graduated, requiring Rataiczak to visit the children in Wyoming for a certain number of days each year, with no overnights initially allowed. The court also ordered Rataiczak to be solely responsible for transportation costs, but made no adjustment to his child support obligation.Rataiczak appealed to the Supreme Court of Wyoming, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in setting the visitation schedule and in not adjusting his child support obligation in light of the transportation costs. The Supreme Court found that the visitation provisions were not clear enough to promote understanding and compliance, and that the graduated visitation schedule was unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence. The court also found that the district court should have considered whether an adjustment to Rataiczak's child support obligation or the allocation of transportation costs was appropriate in light of the visitation determination. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Rataiczak v. Parker" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Julie and Gary Liebel, who married in 2010 and divorced in 2022. Prior to their marriage, they had signed a premarital agreement stating that each party's assets would remain separate and under their sole control, even after the marriage. The agreement also stated that neither party would acquire any interest in the other's property due to the marriage. The couple divorced on the grounds of adultery, and the circuit court applied the premarital agreement in dividing their assets. Julie appealed, arguing that the court erred in applying the agreement to the property division in the divorce and abused its discretion in classifying and distributing the parties’ property.The circuit court had found the premarital agreement to be valid and enforceable in the context of divorce. It also found that the agreement unambiguously governed the division of property in the event of divorce. The court treated the marital home, which was held jointly, as marital property, but most of the remaining property was treated as nonmarital. Gary received the bulk of the nonmarital property valued at $713,705. Upon division of the net marital assets, Julie was awarded marital property valued at $35,482, while Gary received marital property valued at $134,535. The court ordered Gary to make a cash equalization payment to Julie in the amount of $49,526, less $2,062.80 in attorney fees awarded to Gary for defending a protection order that the court determined Julie filed maliciously.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. It found that the premarital agreement unambiguously provided that neither spouse may claim an interest in the separate property of the other, whether it was acquired before or during the marriage. This could only be understood to mean that the other spouse would not obtain any interest in separately owned property under any circumstances, including divorce, unless mutually agreed to by creating a joint tenancy in any property. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the lower court's division of property. View "Liebel v. Liebel" on Justia Law

This case involves the termination of parental rights of a father, B.W., to his son, Bob. The State of Wisconsin filed a petition to terminate B.W.'s parental rights on the grounds that Bob was a child in continuing need of protection or services and that B.W. failed to assume parental responsibility. B.W. entered a no-contest plea to the grounds for termination. At the dispositional hearing, the court terminated B.W.'s parental rights, finding it was in Bob's best interest.B.W. filed a post-disposition motion to withdraw his no-contest plea, arguing that the plea colloquy was defective because the court miscommunicated the burden of proof required at the dispositional phase. He also argued that the court improperly relied on the proposed adoptive parent's assurance that she would allow B.W. to continue to visit Bob. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that B.W. failed to make a prima facie showing that the plea colloquy was defective. The court also concluded that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by relying on the proposed adoptive parent's testimony. The court held that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion, considering the testimony and weighing the statutory dispositional factors. View "State v. B. W." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Michael Powell and Melanie Knoepfler-Powell over the modification of their child custody arrangement. The couple divorced in 2017 and agreed to joint legal custody of their child, with primary physical custody granted to Melanie. In 2021, Melanie intended to move to Alabama and sought to modify the custody arrangement. Michael objected and sought an injunction to prevent the relocation. He also sought primary physical custody if Melanie relocated or more time with the child if she stayed in Virginia. Both parties also requested "tie-breaking authority" regarding the child's legal custody.The Fairfax County Circuit Court denied Michael's motion to modify the custody arrangement. The court allowed their child, who was nine years old, to testify and used her notes as a guide for questioning. The court admitted the notes as a demonstrative exhibit, meaning they had no independent probative value and were meant to explain or clarify other substantive evidence. The court used uncorroborated portions of the notes in its decision not to modify the custody arrangement. Michael appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred by reviewing the child's notes while she testified, admitting the notes as a demonstrative exhibit, and relying on them in reaching its decision.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the trial court's decision. It ruled that Michael failed to sufficiently preserve for appeal any challenges to the trial court's review of the child's notes or the admission of the notes as a demonstrative exhibit. The Court of Appeals also determined that the trial court's ruling was not actually based on the child's notes, but on testimony contained in the record.The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the portion of the Court of Appeals decision that affirmed the judgment of the trial court. It held that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the uncorroborated portions of the child's notes in determining whether it was in the child's best interests to modify the custody arrangement. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration. View "Powell v. Knoepfler-Powell" on Justia Law

This case involves a marital dissolution proceeding between Monique Covington Moore and Charles Moore. During the discovery process, Covington served deposition subpoenas for the production of business records on non-parties Rocket Lawyer, Inc. and Acendi Interactive Company, LLC. Both companies objected and refused to comply with most of the subpoenas’ demands. Covington then filed a motion to compel their compliance. The trial court granted the motion in substantial part and ordered each company to pay Covington $25,000 in monetary sanctions.The companies appealed, raising several claims of error regarding the trial court’s rulings. They argued about the timeliness of Covington’s motion against Rocket Lawyer, the sufficiency of her attempts to meet and confer with Acendi, and the reasonableness of the monetary sanctions award, among other matters.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three agreed with only one of their contentions. It held that the fees and costs Covington incurred in mediation as meet and confer attempts after her discovery motions were already filed were not compensable as discovery sanctions because they were not incurred as part of the necessary costs of bringing the motions. Therefore, the court reversed the orders in part and remanded for redetermination of the sanctions awards. In all other respects, the court affirmed the trial court’s rulings. View "In re Marriage of Moore" on Justia Law

This case involves the termination of parental rights of R.A.M., the mother of P.M., a child born in 2015. In 2017, R.A.M. was convicted of child abuse after a police officer found P.M. with scratches, bruising, and bleeding from the nose. P.M. was placed in foster care and later with his paternal uncle. In 2021, the State filed a petition for the termination of R.A.M.'s parental rights, citing a continuing need for protection and services (CHIPS) and R.A.M.'s failure to assume parental responsibility. R.A.M. contested both grounds.The case was heard in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court. During the proceedings, R.A.M. failed to appear for a hearing on July 5, 2022, despite a standing order requiring her to attend all court appearances. The court found her absence to be egregious and without justification, and granted the State's motion for default judgment. The court then immediately moved to the dispositional phase and concluded the hearing on the same day, finding that termination of R.A.M.'s parental rights would be in P.M.'s best interest.R.A.M. appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals reversed the order, holding that the circuit court lost competency when it proceeded to the dispositional hearing on the same day that the grounds phase concluded. The Court of Appeals also held that R.A.M.'s due process rights were violated. The case was remanded to the circuit court with instructions to hold a new dispositional hearing.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that under Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3., the circuit court was required to wait at least two days after finding R.A.M.'s conduct in failing to appear as ordered was egregious and without clear and justifiable excuse before proceeding to the dispositional phase of proceedings. The court's failure to abide by this statutory mandate resulted in a loss of competency to proceed. Therefore, R.A.M. is entitled to a new dispositional hearing. View "State v. R.A.M." on Justia Law

In December 2019, Zackey Rahimi, the respondent, had a violent altercation with his girlfriend, C. M., who is also the mother of his child. Rahimi grabbed C. M., dragged her back to his car, and shoved her in, causing her to hit her head. When a bystander witnessed the incident, Rahimi retrieved a gun from his car. C. M. managed to escape, and Rahimi fired his gun, though it is unclear whether he was aiming at C. M. or the witness. Following this incident, C. M. sought a restraining order against Rahimi, which was granted by a state court in Texas. The order included a finding that Rahimi had committed “family violence” and posed “a credible threat” to the “physical safety” of C. M. or their child. The order also suspended Rahimi’s gun license for two years. Despite the order, Rahimi violated it by approaching C. M.’s home and contacting her through social media. He was later charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for threatening another woman with a gun.Rahimi was indicted for possessing a firearm while subject to a domestic violence restraining order, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(8). Rahimi moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that Section 922(g)(8) violated his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The District Court denied his motion, and Rahimi pleaded guilty. On appeal, he again raised his Second Amendment challenge, which was denied. Rahimi petitioned for rehearing en banc.The Supreme Court of the United States held that when a restraining order contains a finding that an individual poses a credible threat to the physical safety of an intimate partner, that individual may—consistent with the Second Amendment—be banned from possessing firearms while the order is in effect. The Court found that since the founding, the nation's firearm laws have included provisions preventing individuals who threaten physical harm to others from misusing firearms. As applied to the facts of this case, Section 922(g)(8) fits comfortably within this tradition. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Rahimi" on Justia Law

In this case, Asia R. Mann, now known as Asia R. Harrison, and Brian L. Mann were disputing modifications to their stipulated dissolution decree. The main issues in the case revolved around child custody, visitation, child support, and attorney fees.Prior to this case, the couple had been granted joint legal and physical custody of their two children. However, after Brian was convicted of stalking Asia, she sought sole legal and physical custody of the children. She argued that Brian's conviction constituted domestic intimate partner abuse under the Parenting Act, and as such, the court should take specific actions to protect her and the children.The Nebraska Supreme Court found that Brian's conviction for stalking did not constitute domestic intimate partner abuse under the Parenting Act, as the act requires that bodily injury be attempted, caused, or credibly threatened. The court found no evidence of this in Brian's conduct. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to deny Asia's request for sole custody of the children.The court also found no error in the lower court's decisions regarding child support, health insurance, and attorney fees. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to allow Brian to choose between two school districts for the children's enrollment.Finally, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to vacate the portion of the dissolution decree that found Brian stood in loco parentis to Asia's child from a previous relationship, Maleah. The court found that the lower court lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act to modify the California child custody judgment as to Maleah. View "Mann v. Mann" on Justia Law

The case involves Katherine Cassell (Kathy) and William Cassell (Bill), who were married in 1991 and separated in 2021. Prior to their marriage, Bill and his siblings inherited land in Mississippi from their mother and formed Waterloo Farms, Inc. (Waterloo), which held title to the inherited land. Waterloo also owned two tracts of land in Claiborne County. During their marriage, Bill began farming as Valley of the Moon Farms, LLC (VOM), which was owned 50% by Bill and 50% by Moon Planting Company, Inc. (MPC). MPC was formed by Bill’s father, who transferred 99% of MPC’s ownership to Kathy and 1% to Bill. Kathy and Bill maintained two bank accounts—one personal joint account and one account for VOM. Revenue from VOM was deposited into the VOM account and from there, money would be transferred into Kathy and Bill’s joint personal account for monthly expenses.The couple separated in 2021, and Kathy filed for divorce on the grounds of uncondoned adultery and, alternatively, habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and irreconcilable differences. Kathy sought an equitable division of the marital estate, permanent periodic alimony, lump sum alimony and for Bill to maintain her medical and dental insurance and his own life insurance for which she was the sole beneficiary. Kathy also requested reasonable attorneys’ fees. The chancery court entered a final judgment of divorce and his findings of fact and conclusions of law. The chancellor granted the divorce on the ground of uncondoned adultery. Among other assets, the chancellor classified Tract Two and the Turley Property as Bill’s separate property, and classified the Thompson Property and the VOM account as marital property. In total, Bill’s separate property was valued at $5,341,640.14. After classifying and equitably dividing the various marital assets applying the Ferguson factors, the chancellor considered Kathy’s alimony request weighing the Armstrong factors and awarded her permanent periodic alimony in the amount of $7,500 per month. In total, Kathy was awarded permanent periodic alimony and 40 percent of the marital estate, and the court ordered Bill to maintain life insurance for which Kathy was the sole beneficiary in the amount of $500,000 and to maintain Kathy’s health insurance until she turned sixty-five or was able to obtain Medicare. Kathy’s portion of the marital estate amounted to a lump sum payment of $667,557, whereas Bill’s portion of the marital estate was valued by the chancellor at $1,861,629.53. From this final judgment and findings of fact and conclusions of law, Kathy appeals.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the chancery court's decision. The court held that the burden of proof to rebut the presumption of marital property is by a preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, the party claiming property excluded from marital property has been commingled and transformed into marital property bears the burden of proof, likewise by a preponderance of the evidence. Finally, the court overruled Cheatham insofar as it has any bearing on a chancellor’s decision to award alimony and reaffirmed the factors enumerated in Ferguson—awarding alimony during the division of the estate—and Armstrong—awarding alimony subsequent to the division of the estate—as the appropriate factors to be considered. View "Cassell v. Cassell" on Justia Law

The case involves Tristan Tanner, an employee of Stryker Corporation of Michigan, who appealed against the district court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of Stryker. Tanner had filed claims for interference with his rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and for retaliation for his exercise of those rights. Tanner had requested paternity leave for the birth of his child and had taken time off work before the birth of his child, during which he accrued "occurrence points" under Stryker's attendance policy. He was terminated after accruing more than the allowed number of points.The district court had granted summary judgment in favor of Stryker, finding that Tanner was not entitled to FMLA leave for his absences before his child's birth. The court also found that Stryker had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Tanner, namely his accrual of eight occurrence points due to repeated unexcused absences.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the days Tanner spent in Connecticut waiting for his child to be born were not covered under FMLA. The court also found that Tanner had not provided evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Stryker's reason for his termination was pretextual. Therefore, the court concluded that summary judgment in Stryker's favor was appropriate for both Tanner's FMLA retaliation and interference claims. View "Tanner v. Stryker Corporation of Michigan" on Justia Law