Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Christopher Vargas Zayas, who was convicted for malice murder and a related crime in connection with the shooting death of his girlfriend, Carly Andrews. The shooting occurred in September 2018, and Zayas was indicted for multiple charges, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, family violence, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Zayas was found guilty on all five counts and sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. He filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.Zayas appealed his convictions, arguing that the circumstantial evidence at trial was insufficient to exclude the alternative hypothesis that the pistol discharged accidentally as Andrews grabbed it. He also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress statements he made to investigators at the police station before he received Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, affirmed the convictions, concluding that the circumstantial evidence authorized the jury to reject Zayas's alternative hypothesis as unreasonable, that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to seek to suppress Zayas's statements, and that Zayas suffered no prejudice from any instructional error. View "ZAYAS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a child, R.N., who was removed from his mother's care and placed in foster care with Ben and Charissa Wagner. The Wagners had previously adopted two of the mother's other children. The Department of Public Health and Human Services was granted temporary legal custody of R.N. and ordered the mother to complete a treatment plan. The Department later filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights due to her failure to complete the treatment plan and alleged abandonment of R.N. However, the mother began to engage with the Department and made positive changes, leading to the Department's shift from termination to reunification.The Wagners, unhappy with the Department's change of stance, filed a motion to intervene, asserting that it was appropriate under M. R. Civ. P. 24 and § 41-3-422(9)(b), MCA. The District Court granted the Wagners' intervention motion, despite objections from the mother, the Department, and the guardian ad litem. The Wagners then filed a motion seeking an order for R.N. to be immediately placed in their care and for the Department to pursue termination of the mother's parental rights. The District Court did not set a hearing or issue a determination on the Wagners' motion. The Department filed a motion to dismiss the case, which the District Court granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision to dismiss the case. The Supreme Court found that the District Court had misinterpreted the law when it allowed the Wagners to intervene. The court also ruled that the Wagners did not have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of R.N. because the mother's rights had not been terminated. Furthermore, the court held that neither the District Court nor the Supreme Court had the authority to order or compel the Department to refile and prosecute its petition for termination. View "In re R.N." on Justia Law

The case involves an appellant, G.G., who sought renewal of a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former partner, G.S. The original DVRO was issued based on stalking. The appellant and respondent were former romantic partners and parents of two young children. The appellant testified that the respondent had repeatedly attempted to control her during their relationship, including planting a listening device in their home, taking her phone, and following her to work. After the relationship ended, the respondent continued to stalk the appellant, appearing at her home uninvited at least 70 times. The appellant filed a request for a DVRO, which was granted for a two-year period.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially issued the DVRO. After the DVRO was issued, the appellant's unwanted contact with the respondent was reduced, but not entirely eliminated. The appellant filed a request to renew the DVRO two weeks before its expiration, asking that the order be made permanent. The trial court found no evidence that the respondent had intentionally violated the DVRO and concluded that the appellant's fear, while genuine, was not reasonable. The request to renew the DVRO was denied.The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four. The court found that the trial court did not apply the correct legal standard in denying the renewal of the DVRO. The court held that a DVRO can be renewed based on the original facts, regardless of whether they involved physical or non-physical abuse, and renewal is not conditioned on the presence or absence of "ongoing" events. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a new hearing, directing the trial court to reconsider the request for renewal consistent with the legal framework outlined in the decision. View "G.G. v. G.S." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Laleh Taghvaei Mohammadijoo and Ramin Dadashian, who were married in Iran and later settled in California. The couple separated after 12 years of marriage. The main contention revolves around two missing assets: approximately $150,000 in community funds that Mohammadijoo secured through a home equity line of credit (HELOC) and transferred to Iran for her brother to manage, and approximately $170,000 of separate property proceeds that Dadashian inherited from his father’s real estate investments in Iran. Dadashian argued that Mohammadijoo had exclusive management and control over these assets post-separation, and thus, the burden of proof should be shifted to her to account for these missing assets.The trial court declined to shift the burden of proof to Mohammadijoo. It found that there was no credible evidence as to what happened to the funds. The court also sanctioned Mohammadijoo for violating her statutory disclosure obligations but did not charge her with the value of the missing assets.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Two reversed the judgment. The court held that the burden-shifting framework applies when one spouse solely controls and manages a relationship with a third party who directly oversees the management and investment of community funds post-separation. In such a case, the managing spouse must account for the missing assets. The court also extended this burden-shifting framework to missing separate property. Therefore, the trial court erred in declining to shift the burden of proof to Mohammadijoo regarding the missing assets. The case was remanded for a retrial of the community property issues. View "Marriage of Dadashian" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over parental rights and responsibilities between a mother and father who filed for divorce. The couple, who married in Vermont in 2006 and had two children, moved to California in 2008. The mother was the primary caregiver, while the father was actively involved in the children's lives. In 2016, they moved back to Vermont. In 2021, due to financial strain and dissatisfaction with his job, the father wanted to move back to California. The mother agreed to look for work in California, but did not commit to staying there. By August 2021, neither party had found work and the mother returned to Vermont with the children. The father returned to Vermont in the fall but moved back to California in the spring of 2022 without informing the mother of his intention to move permanently.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Family Division, found that the father's attempt to move the family to California constituted abuse within the statutory meaning, as it risked and actually caused harm to the psychological growth, development, and welfare of the children. The court awarded the mother sole legal and primary physical rights and responsibilities, subject to a parent-child contact schedule that gave the father approximately equal time with the children. The father appealed this decision.The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the father that the finding of abuse was clearly erroneous and struck that finding. However, the court affirmed the rest of the order, stating that the remaining findings were sufficient to support the award of parental rights and responsibilities to the mother. The court found that both parents were able to provide the children with love and guidance and meet their material and developmental needs. However, the court also found that the father had a tendency to be controlling and belittling toward the mother and expressed concern that if the father were given the power to make legal decisions for the children, he might have difficulty putting their interests ahead of his own or supporting the mother's relationship with them. View "Centeno v. Centeno" on Justia Law

The case involves Rachel Goldstein and James Sabatino, who had a two-year relationship in Massachusetts that ended in 2017. In March 2020, Sabatino began contacting Goldstein, informing her that he had found sexually explicit photos and conversations on a cell phone she had loaned him during their relationship. Despite Goldstein's request for Sabatino to return the phone, he refused. Goldstein became concerned that Sabatino would use these texts and images to control her and ruin her career. In May 2020, a Massachusetts court granted Goldstein a protective order against Sabatino, which he violated, leading to his arrest. In June, the Massachusetts court extended the protective order for another six months. The same month, Goldstein moved to Harris County, Texas. While the Massachusetts protective order was still in effect, Sabatino began filing small-claims lawsuits in Massachusetts against Goldstein. In October 2020, Goldstein filed an application for a protective order against Sabatino in Harris County.The district court in Harris County issued a protective order against Sabatino, a Massachusetts resident, based on conduct that occurred entirely within Massachusetts. Sabatino appealed, challenging the district court's personal jurisdiction over him and its subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding. The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas vacated the order and dismissed the case, holding that the district court lacked territorial jurisdiction—a purportedly nonwaivable, third jurisdictional requirement. The court of appeals did not address personal jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals’ territorial jurisdiction analysis, but agreed with Sabatino that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The court held that territorial jurisdiction is not an independent jurisdictional requirement in Chapter 7B protective-order proceedings. The court also held that Sabatino did not enter a general appearance, and thus did not waive his challenge to the district court's personal jurisdiction. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment vacating the protective order and dismissing the case. View "GOLDSTEIN v. SABATINO" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Abel Gomez Medina, who was convicted of sexual abuse and indecent contact with a minor. The minor, identified as Dorothy, was his stepdaughter. She reported the abuse to her school counselor, stating that it had been ongoing since she was eleven years old. Dorothy's stepbrother, Frank, also testified that he had witnessed inappropriate behavior between Medina and Dorothy. The defense presented witnesses who claimed they had never seen anything inappropriate between Medina and Dorothy.Prior to the trial, the State moved to permit Dorothy and Frank to testify via closed-circuit television, citing the potential trauma caused by in-person testimony. The district court granted this for Dorothy but denied it for Frank. During the trial, Dorothy turned eighteen and Medina objected to her continuing to testify via closed-circuit television, arguing that the statute permitting such testimony only applied to minors. The district court overruled this objection, citing a different paragraph of the statute that allowed for closed-circuit testimony for victims or witnesses with mental illnesses, regardless of age.Medina appealed his conviction, arguing that allowing Dorothy to testify via closed-circuit television violated both the Iowa Code and the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. The court of appeals affirmed Medina's convictions, holding that permitting Dorothy’s closed-circuit testimony satisfied constitutional requirements while she was a minor, and that by meeting the requirements under Iowa Code after she turned eighteen, Medina’s claim of a Confrontation Clause violation similarly failed. Medina then filed an application for further review of the court of appeals ruling, which was granted by the Supreme Court of Iowa.The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. It concluded that Medina had failed to preserve error on his Confrontation Clause argument concerning Dorothy’s testimony after she turned eighteen. The court also found that the district court had properly applied the statute to permit Dorothy’s closed-circuit testimony, based on the evidence presented at the pretrial hearing. The court let the court of appeals decision stand on Medina's arguments that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to comment during closing argument and by excluding 911 call logs. View "State v. Medina" on Justia Law

In a marital dissolution case, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the division of assets, alimony, attorney fees, and other matters. The couple, Clint and Lisa Seemann, had a premarital agreement that classified certain assets as marital or nonmarital. The court found that the appreciation of certain assets, such as a membership interest in a limited liability company (LLC) and carpet and tile, should have been included in the marital estate. The court also found that Lisa's retirement accounts were overvalued and that the value of Clint D. Seemann, P.C. should have been included in the marital estate.The court affirmed the lower court's decision in part, but reversed the division of the marital estate and remanded the case for a new equitable division of the marital estate. The court also modified the decree to require Clint to pay a larger amount towards a line of credit debt. The court affirmed the lower court's decision on alimony, attorney fees, and other matters.The court's decision was based on a de novo review of the record, and it made independent factual determinations based on the record. The court also considered the parties' premarital agreement and the general rule that a spouse should be awarded one-third to one-half of the marital estate. The court did not find any abuse of discretion by the lower court in its determinations regarding alimony, attorney fees, and other matters. View "Seemann v. Seemann" on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, M.L., who has a history of substance abuse and involvement with the Department of Human Services (DHS). She has four children, all of whom have been affected by her substance abuse. The case at hand pertains to her fourth child, H.T., who was born drug-addicted. After H.T.'s birth, the court transferred his custody to DHS, which placed him with his father's relatives. M.L. was granted a disposition that allowed her to retain her parental rights while H.T. remained in the physical and legal custody of his father, D.T. However, D.T. died of a drug overdose, leaving H.T. without a legal guardian.The Circuit Court of Marion County had previously granted M.L. a disposition that allowed her to retain her parental rights while H.T. remained in the physical and legal custody of his father. After D.T.'s death, M.L., acting as a self-represented litigant, filed a motion to modify disposition to regain custody of H.T. However, the court found that M.L. had not shown a material change in circumstances warranting a less restrictive alternative than the previous disposition.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that M.L. had a long history of substance abuse and had exhausted all improvement periods and services available to her. Despite her claims of sobriety, she continued to test positive for drugs. The court concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be corrected in the near future and that it was in H.T.'s best interest to terminate M.L.'s parental rights. View "In re H.T." on Justia Law

The case revolves around the custody of three children, Kelly, Amy, and Matt, who were taken into nonsecure custody by the Vance County Department of Social Services (DSS) due to their parents' issues with homelessness, mental health, and domestic violence. The children were initially placed in foster care and later with their paternal great aunt (Great Aunt). The trial court ordered an investigation into the possibility of placing the children with their maternal grandmother (Grandmother) who lived in Georgia. However, DSS did not initiate the out-of-state home study on Grandmother until November 2021, despite the court's order in February 2019.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to grant guardianship to Great Aunt, concluding that there was no obligation under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) for a home study to be completed to rule out an out-of-state relative as a placement option. The Court of Appeals also vacated the order in part and remanded for reconsideration of the mother's visitation rights.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that trial courts are not necessarily required to wait on completion of a home study to rule out the placement with an out-of-state relative if the trial court concludes that an in-state relative is willing and able to provide proper care and supervision and the placement is in the best interest of the children. However, the court noted that in some scenarios, the best-interest determination may require the completion of an ICPC home study before the trial court can make a placement. The court also clarified that the ICPC does apply to an order granting guardianship to out-of-state grandparents. View "In re: K.B., A.M.H., M.S.H" on Justia Law