Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute between Sheena Hayes and Morgan Lawrence-Hayes, and Richard Penkoski. The dispute arose from Penkoski's social media posts, which the Hayes couple claimed were harassing and stalking. Penkoski, a public figure who identifies as a pastor, activist, and street preacher, posted content on Facebook criticizing the Hayes couple's church and their organization, Oklahomans for Equality. The Hayes couple, who are also public figures, claimed that they and their minor child were pictured in the posts, which they found offensive and threatening.The Hayes couple obtained a protective order against Penkoski from the District Court of Washington County. The court issued a permanent order of protection for five years, prohibiting Penkoski from posting any pictures, images, videos, or any likenesses of the Hayes couple or their minor child on any social media, making reference to them, or coming within 500 feet of them.Penkoski appealed the decision, arguing that his actions did not meet the requirements of stalking or harassment as defined by the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, and that his posts were protected by his constitutional right to free speech.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that Penkoski's actions were not directed toward an individual person, but rather were public Facebook posts that named two organizations, not individuals. The court concluded that Penkoski did not direct his posts or comments toward the Hayes couple, and therefore, the district court abused its discretion in issuing the order of protection. The court vacated the order of protection. View "Hayes v. Penkoski" on Justia Law

The case involves a minor, Andrew M., who tested positive for methadone at birth and was placed in foster care. His biological parents, S.M. and A.M., failed to reunify with him. Despite this, the juvenile court decided not to terminate the parents' parental rights, citing the parental-benefit exception, which applies if a parent shows that they maintained regular visitation with the child, the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parents, and terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even considering the benefit of a new, adoptive home.The Superior Court of Orange County had previously ordered Andrew to be removed from parental custody and provided the parents with reunification services. However, the parents failed to reunify with Andrew and their services were terminated. The court then scheduled a permanency planning hearing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three reviewed the case. Andrew's appointed appellate counsel argued that the juvenile court's decision not to terminate the parents' parental rights was an abuse of discretion. The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA), although a respondent in this appeal, supported Andrew's counsel's position. The court agreed with Andrew's counsel and the SSA, concluding that the circumstances did not support the application of the parental-benefit exception. The court reversed the lower court's order and remanded the matter with instructions. View "In re Andrew M." on Justia Law

The case involves Elsy and Isai Diaz-Hernandez, siblings from El Salvador who illegally entered the United States and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. They claimed that they had suffered harm or fear of harm in El Salvador from their maternal uncle, who abused them to avenge his earlier deportation from the United States, for which he blamed their mother. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found that revenge was not a central reason for the uncle’s abuse of Elsy and Isai but at most a “tangential reason.” The IJ concluded that Elsy and Isai failed to establish the required nexus between their harm and a protected ground and therefore the requirements for either asylum or withholding of removal.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision and dismissed the appeal. The BIA rejected the petitioners’ argument that the evidence showed that their relationship to their mother was “at least one central reason” for the uncle’s abusive behavior against them. The BIA noted that the IJ’s finding that the petitioners failed to demonstrate the necessary nexus between the harm and a protected ground was “a classic factual question,” and after reviewing the facts, concluded that the IJ did not clearly err.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the petitions for review, concluding that substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding that the petitioners failed to establish the requisite nexus between the harm they feared and their family tie. The court also rejected their argument that the BIA applied the wrong standard for assessing whether they met their burden to prove the required nexus with respect to their withholding of removal claims. View "Diaz-Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law

In July 2023, the San Francisco Human Services Agency filed a petition alleging that three children were at risk due to the actions of their mother, M.S., and their alleged father, P.F. The Agency claimed that the children were at risk of suffering serious physical or emotional harm due to P.F.'s domestic violence towards M.S. and his substance abuse issues. The Agency also alleged that M.S. had allowed P.F. to stay in her home despite a restraining order against him. The juvenile court sustained the allegations in part, released the children to M.S., and ordered the family to participate in therapy. M.S. appealed this decision.The lower courts had previously reviewed this case and made several findings. The juvenile court found that the children were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical and/or emotional harm due to the domestic violence perpetrated by P.F. towards M.S. The court also found that P.F. had substance abuse issues which impeded his ability to care for the children. The court denied M.S.'s request to dismiss the case, declared the children dependents of the court, and ordered M.S. and the children to participate in family therapy.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three affirmed the decision of the lower court. The court held that an alleged father constitutes a “parent” within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The court also found that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s declaration of dependency and that the court did not abuse its discretion by not granting M.S.'s request to dismiss the case and instead ordering family therapy. View "In re A.F." on Justia Law

The case revolves around an adoption dispute involving a minor child, G.P. The child's step-great-grandparents, Katherine and Michael, had agreed to temporary guardianship of G.P. after being contacted by the child's birth mother during her pregnancy. After G.P.'s birth, Katherine and Michael filed for temporary guardianship in the Second Judicial District Court in Washoe County. Concurrently, G.P.'s grandparents, Angela and Randall, filed a competing petition for guardianship. The birth parents of G.P. later consented to terminate their parental rights and agreed to G.P.'s adoption by Katherine and Michael. With these consents, Katherine and Michael filed a petition for adoption in the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County.The Second Judicial District Court had scheduled a hearing for the competing guardianship petitions. However, it was unaware of the pending adoption petition in the Eighth Judicial District Court. The court denied Angela and Randall's petition for temporary guardianship but set a trial date for the competing guardianship requests. A few days later, the Eighth Judicial District Court granted Katherine and Michael's adoption petition. Upon learning of the adoption, Angela and Randall moved to set aside the adoption in the Eighth Judicial District Court, alleging misrepresentation and misconduct. The court granted their motion, setting aside the adoption.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the lower court's decision. The court clarified that a motion to set aside a judgment under NRCP 60(b) could be brought by a party to the proceeding, an entity in privity with one of the parties, or a nonparty with interests directly affected by the judgment. However, Angela and Randall, as nonparties, lacked standing to move to set aside the adoption. They were not parties in the adoption proceedings, did not have rights directly affected by the proceedings, and lacked any other statutory or constitutional basis for standing. The court concluded that the district court had abused its discretion in setting aside G.P.'s adoption. View "In re Petition of Perry" on Justia Law

In June 2016, Peter Franklin Goullette was driving with his child in the backseat when he struck and killed Kathy Stelzer and severely injured Zualita Updike, who were walking on the road. Goullette admitted to officers that he was attempting to buckle his son back in when he struck the victims. He was charged with vehicular manslaughter and reckless driving. Goullette entered a guilty plea while maintaining his innocence, known as an Alford plea. He later appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court abused its discretion when it accepted his guilty plea because it failed to inquire into the factual basis of his guilty plea.The case was first heard in the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Bonner County, where Goullette was convicted. He then appealed to the Idaho Court of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction. Goullette subsequently filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed Goullette's conviction. The court held that the district court did not err in accepting Goullette’s Alford plea because the record as a whole demonstrated that Goullette entered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea. The court also held that the district court did not err by failing to revisit the validity of Goullette’s plea at sentencing because the district court was not presented with evidence raising an obvious doubt as to Goullette’s guilt. View "State v. Goullette" on Justia Law

The case involves a divorced couple, Bradley Carter (father) and Rachel Carter (mother), who have two children. Following their divorce, the mother, who had an alcohol use disorder, was granted supervised visits with her children twice a month. After two years of sobriety and the impending closure of their visitation center, the mother requested unsupervised visits and weekends with her children, which the father opposed.The Circuit Court initially sent the parties to mediation, which proved unsuccessful. At the final hearing, the mother requested two modifications of her parental rights and responsibilities: unsupervised parenting time and an expansion of her parenting time. The Circuit Court denied her request, maintaining the schedule of two, two-hour supervised visits with the mother per month with a mutually agreeable supervisor. The mother appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The mother argued that the trial court improperly narrowed its “present environment” inquiry to the children’s routine with the father and failed to consider other factors, including the infrequency of their contact with their mother. The Supreme Court agreed with the mother, stating that the children’s “present environment” is determined by assessing the surroundings or conditions in which the children now exist, which includes their daily activities, mental and emotional states, and their needs.The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order denying the mother’s request for a modification of parenting time and remanded for the trial court to reconsider her request. The Supreme Court also vacated the court’s denial of her request for unsupervised visitation, allowing the parties to clarify the statutory basis for the relief they are requesting on remand. View "In the Matter of Carter & Carter" on Justia Law

The case involves a woman who sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former intimate partner, alleging he sexually assaulted her after their relationship had ended. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) which barred the partner from possessing firearms and from attending the same church as the woman. At a later DVRO hearing, the trial court issued a DVRO, finding the man had sexually assaulted the petitioner and had committed subsequent acts of abuse by attending the same church as the petitioner and possessing a firearm, both in violation of the TRO.The man appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his procedural due process rights by conducting a direct examination of the petitioner, allowing her to testify about an incident of sexual assault not contained in the petition, admonishing his counsel about his method of questioning his client, and by depriving him of the opportunity to respond to a law enforcement firearms report that showed he owned a firearm.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court's procedures were adequate and did not violate the man's procedural due process rights. The court noted that the trial court had given the man several opportunities to respond to the report that he was the registered owner of a firearm, and he refused to respond fully. The court also found that the trial court acted appropriately in conducting questioning, restricting itself to eliciting material facts with general questions and clarifying confusing and incomplete testimony. The court affirmed the protective order. View "Bailey v. Murray" on Justia Law

This case involves a personal injury claim and the question of whether an adult child can claim loss of parental consortium when the parent has not died but has entered a persistent vegetative state and will not recover. The plaintiffs, including the adult child of the individual now in a persistent vegetative state, argued that a previous case, Masaki v. General Motors Co., allowed for a parent to recover damages for the loss of filial consortium of an injured adult child, and that this should extend to an adult child's claim for loss of parental consortium. The defendants, a group of healthcare providers, argued that a previous case, Halberg v. Young, held that no action exists in favor of a child for injuries sustained by the parent not resulting in the parent’s death.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the reasoning of Masaki would apply to the loss of parental consortium presented in this case. The court also found that the Halberg case was distinguishable factually from the current case, as it involved a parent who would recover from their injuries, unlike the parent in the current case who was in a persistent vegetative state.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i affirmed the lower court's decision, overruling Halberg to the extent that it held that a child cannot claim loss of parental consortium where a parent is severely injured but not killed. The court held that a child, whether a minor or an adult, may bring a loss of parental consortium claim for severe injury to a parent. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "HELG Administration Services, LLC v. Department of Health" on Justia Law

The case involves Ling Mueller and Paul Mueller, a married couple who separated in 2017. During their marriage, they cultivated cannabis and buried the proceeds on their property. They initially attempted to use a collaborative law process to dissolve their marriage. They signed an agreement that outlined the collaborative process, including a confidentiality clause. However, the agreement also explicitly stated that it did not create any legally enforceable rights or obligations. During the second collaborative session, Ling became angry and left the meeting abruptly when asked about investments she had made using the proceeds from the couple's marijuana operation. She subsequently initiated divorce proceedings in family court.In the family court, Paul subpoenaed both parties' collaborative attorneys to testify about statements Ling made during the second collaborative session. Ling argued that the confidentiality clause in the agreement shielded her statements from disclosure. However, the court found the agreement, including the confidentiality clause, to be unenforceable. It also found that Ling had waived the confidentiality provision. As a result, it allowed the parties' collaborative attorneys to testify about the second collaborative session. The court found Ling to be not credible and ordered her to make a $161,077 equalizing payment.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Five, the sole issue on appeal was the admissibility of testimony about the second collaborative session. This depended on whether the confidentiality clause was enforceable despite the agreement's multiple statements that it created no enforceable rights or obligations. The court found that the agreement unequivocally stated that it did not give either party enforceable legal rights. Therefore, the court affirmed the family court's decision that the confidentiality clause was unenforceable. View "Mueller v. Mueller" on Justia Law