Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A mother and father, who were never married, have one child together, A.H.S., born in February 2018 in San Diego, California. The mother is from Brazil, and both she and the child are dual citizens of Brazil and the United States. The family moved to Montana in April 2020. In September 2022, the mother took the child to California without the father's consent, cutting off contact. The father filed a Verified Petition for Parenting Plan and a Motion for Ex Parte Interim Parenting Plan in Montana, which was granted, requiring the mother to return the child to Montana and surrender the child's passports.The mother attempted to get California to exercise jurisdiction by filing for a domestic violence restraining order. A UCCJEA conference was held between the California and Montana courts, resulting in the California court declining to exercise jurisdiction. The mother avoided service for several months but eventually returned the child to Montana in June 2023. The Montana District Court held hearings and issued a Final Parenting Plan in May 2024, providing for a 50/50 alternating week parenting schedule and temporarily limiting the child's travel outside Montana.The mother appealed the District Court's decisions. The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's rulings. The court held that the District Court correctly determined it had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and Montana law, as no other state had jurisdiction. The court also found that the temporary travel restriction was reasonable to ensure the child's stability and continuity of care. Finally, the court concluded that the District Court properly considered the best interest factors under Montana law, including evidence of domestic violence, and did not err in its parenting plan decision. View "In re Parenting of A.H.S." on Justia Law

The case involves a child, C.E.-1, who was found in a dangerous situation due to his parents' substance abuse. The Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition against the parents, L.F. and C.E.-2, after L.F. was found unconscious with heroin nearby, and C.E.-1 was left in her care. Both parents admitted to drug use and were granted improvement periods to address their issues. However, they failed to comply with the terms, leading the guardian ad litem to move for termination of the improvement periods.The Circuit Court of Hancock County extended the improvement periods despite the parents' noncompliance, effectively prolonging the case. The guardian ad litem objected, but the court continued the improvement periods until July 2023. The court then scheduled a dispositional hearing but instead held an ex parte meeting with all parties except the guardian ad litem. Following this meeting, the court approved a Disposition Five agreement, placing C.E.-1 in the custody of the DHS and planning for a legal guardianship with the maternal grandmother.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court erred by not conducting a proper dispositional hearing and by excluding the guardian ad litem from the ex parte meeting. The court also noted that the dispositional order lacked necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's dispositional order and remanded the case for a proper dispositional hearing and entry of a new order consistent with its opinion. View "In re C.E.-1" on Justia Law

The case involves M.D., the mother of minor H.M., who appeals the termination of her parental rights by the Superior Court of Tuolumne County. The appeal centers on the alleged noncompliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) by the Tuolumne County Department of Social Services. M.D. contends that the department failed to fulfill its duty of inquiry and adequately document its efforts regarding H.M.'s potential Native American ancestry.Initially, the department responded to a referral in April 2023, when both M.D. and newborn H.M. tested positive for drugs. H.M. was placed into protective custody. During the inquiry, M.D. reported she was adopted and unaware of her Native American ancestry, while the father mentioned possible Blackfeet tribe ancestry. The department sent notification letters to relatives, and some expressed interest in H.M.'s placement but did not confirm Native American ancestry.The Superior Court of Tuolumne County held several hearings, during which M.D. and the father were present. The court made findings that H.M. might be an Indian child and directed further inquiry. The department contacted the three federally recognized Cherokee tribes and the Blackfeet tribe. Two Cherokee tribes responded that H.M. was not eligible for membership, while the Cherokee Nation required additional information, which the department provided but received no further response.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the department and the juvenile court conducted adequate inquiries and documented their efforts sufficiently. The court held that the department's inquiry into H.M.'s potential Native American heritage was proper and that the ICWA did not apply. Consequently, the court affirmed the termination of M.D.'s parental rights. View "In re H.M." on Justia Law

Petitioner C.S. and Respondent A.F.-1 are the non-offending parents of D.S., a child involved in an abuse and neglect proceeding. The Circuit Court of Grant County held several evidentiary hearings to determine custody of D.S. and awarded equal custodial responsibility to both parents. The father argued that he was the primary caregiver and that the mother had serious mental health issues affecting her ability to parent. The mother, the child’s guardian ad litem, and the Department of Human Services contended that the mother was receiving proper treatment and could share caretaking responsibilities.The Circuit Court of Grant County found that both parents had stable employment and homes, and although the mother had mental health issues, she was seeking proper treatment and could safely parent. The court noted that the mother had expansive visitation with D.S., which was appropriate and beneficial for the child. The court also emphasized the importance of D.S. maintaining contact with his half-sibling, A.F.-2. Despite concerns about the parents' strained relationship, the court concluded that both parents had the child’s best interests at heart and ordered a transition plan for equal custody.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and applied a two-prong deferential standard of review. The court found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding equal custodial allocation. The court noted that the circuit court had considered all relevant factors, including the mother’s mental health treatment and the father’s allegations. The court affirmed the circuit court’s decision, emphasizing the importance of meaningful contact between the child and both parents, as well as the child’s half-sibling. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law

The case involves a seventeen-year-old named M.Z., who was adjudicated as a child in need of assistance (CINA) by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County due to behavioral issues and her mother's inability to manage her. M.Z. was placed in a therapeutic youth group home and later returned to her mother's custody. The Baltimore County Department of Social Services sought to terminate the CINA case, but M.Z.'s mother objected, citing ongoing behavioral concerns and the need for additional services.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County terminated the CINA case over the mother's objection, finding that the mother could adequately care for M.Z. and that the Department had exhausted its services. The mother appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland, which dismissed the appeal, holding that the mother was not "aggrieved" by the termination since her custodial rights were restored.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case to determine whether a parent is entitled to appeal the termination of a CINA case over their objection. The court held that a parent is an "aggrieved party" entitled to appeal if they have not obtained the full relief sought in the juvenile court. The court emphasized that the CINA statute's purpose extends beyond parental rights to include the child's safety and well-being. The court found that the mother's interest in ensuring M.Z.'s safety and receiving necessary services was sufficient to make her an aggrieved party.The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve the merits of the mother's appeal. View "In re M.Z." on Justia Law

K.T. filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her ex-partner, E.S., with whom she shares three daughters. K.T. alleged that E.S. had subjected her to physical and sexual abuse over several years, including incidents where the children were present. She also claimed that E.S. had abducted the children from Texas to California without her consent. K.T. sought to include the children as protected parties in the DVRO, citing their exposure to E.S.'s abusive behavior.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted K.T. a temporary restraining order (TRO) against E.S. but did not include the children as protected parties, citing a lack of imminent risk of harm to them. During the hearing on K.T.'s DVRO request, the court reviewed her declaration and testimony, which detailed the abuse and the children's exposure to it. The court granted the DVRO protecting K.T. but did not include the children, stating there was no credible evidence of physical or sexual abuse of the children.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court had used the wrong legal standard by requiring evidence of direct abuse of the children. The appellate court held that the correct standard was "good cause" based on the totality of the circumstances, which includes the children's exposure to domestic violence. The appellate court found that K.T. had provided sufficient evidence of good cause to include the children as protected parties in the DVRO.The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision in part, directing it to modify the DVRO to include the children as protected parties. The court otherwise affirmed the trial court's order and awarded costs to K.T. View "K.T. v. E.S." on Justia Law

C.T. filed a petition in 2019 in San Francisco Superior Court seeking a domestic violence restraining order against K.W. and sole custody of their son, born in November 2018. The court issued a temporary restraining order granting C.T. sole custody and determined California as the child's home state. In 2022, the court granted C.T. a five-year restraining order and continued temporary custody orders. In 2024, C.T. requested to relocate to Denmark with the child, which the court granted, maintaining C.T.'s sole custody and setting a future hearing for final custody determinations.The San Francisco Superior Court found in August 2024 that neither the child, C.T., nor K.W. resided in California but retained jurisdiction over the ongoing custody case. C.T. challenged this decision, arguing that the court lost jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) because none of the parties resided in California.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court retained jurisdiction to resolve the original custody and visitation issues despite the parties' relocation. The court emphasized that jurisdiction attaches at the commencement of the proceeding and is not lost due to subsequent relocations. The appellate court denied C.T.'s petition for a writ, affirming that the trial court had jurisdiction to make final custody and visitation determinations. View "C.T. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case involves the dissolution of a marriage between Carol Sperry Smith and Dale Preston Smith. The key issue is the classification of a tract of land located at 4080 Racetrack Road in Grifton, North Carolina. Dale Preston Smith purchased this property before the marriage. The parties signed stipulations in January 2019, designating the property as marital property. However, Dale later filed a motion to set aside these stipulations, claiming the property was his separate property.In the District Court of Pitt County, the trial court approved a pretrial order that listed Racetrack Road as a disputed property, with Carol claiming it was a mixed asset and Dale asserting it was his separate property. The trial court classified the property as Dale's separate property and distributed it to him. Carol appealed, arguing that the stipulations were binding since the trial court never ruled on Dale's motion to set them aside.The Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, affirmed the trial court's order. The majority held that the pretrial order showed the parties did not agree that Racetrack Road was marital property. The dissenting judge argued that the trial court's failure to rule on the motion to set aside the stipulations meant the stipulations remained binding.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. The court held that Carol invited any error by agreeing to proceed with the equitable distribution hearing without a direct ruling on the motion to set aside the stipulations. Therefore, she could not use this as a basis for a new hearing. The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, though it did not adopt its reasoning. The invited error doctrine barred Carol from obtaining a new equitable distribution hearing. View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

Clint Seemann and Lisa Seemann, now known as Lisa Newell, married in 2005 and executed a premarital agreement listing their premarital assets, which included land and shares of stock, to be considered marital property. The agreement specified that these assets, along with any property resulting from their efforts during the marriage, should be divided equally in the event of death or divorce. In 2021, Clint filed for divorce.The District Court for Douglas County initially valued Lisa’s retirement accounts at $1,480,720 and included them in the marital estate. It determined that Clint’s membership interest in 75th and L Street, LLC, and its appreciation were nonmarital property. The court found the premarital agreement enforceable and divided the marital estate equally, ordering Lisa to make an equalization payment to Clint. Lisa appealed, and the Nebraska Supreme Court in Seemann v. Seemann (Seemann I) found errors in the district court’s valuation and inclusion of certain assets, remanding the case for redivision of the marital estate.On remand, the district court divided the marital property into two groups: assets listed in the agreement and the remainder of the marital estate. It equally divided the listed assets but awarded Clint all the assets added on remand without ordering an equalization payment, resulting in an unequal division of the total marital estate. Lisa received 45.25% of the total marital estate, while Clint received 54.75%.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and held that the premarital agreement required an equal division of the entire marital estate. The court reversed the district court’s division and remanded with directions to divide the entire marital estate equally. View "Seemann v. Seemann" on Justia Law

Chanel Glover and Nicole Junior, a same-sex married couple, decided to conceive a child using assistive reproductive technology (ART) and a sperm donor. They entered into various contracts with a fertility clinic and a sperm bank, and both signed affidavits expressing their intent for Junior to adopt the child. However, their relationship deteriorated before the child was born, and Glover filed for divorce. Junior sought a court order to establish her parentage of the child, which the family court granted.The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County confirmed Junior as the legal parent of the child, ordered Glover to inform Junior when she went into labor, and required Junior's name to appear on the child's birth certificate. Glover appealed, and the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that Junior established parentage through contract principles, equitable estoppel, and intent-based parentage.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and held that none of the existing pathways to establish legal parentage—biology, adoption, equity, or contract—applied to the facts of this case. The court adopted the doctrine of intent-based parentage into Pennsylvania common law, recognizing that the parties' mutual intent to conceive and raise the child together, as evidenced by their actions and agreements, established Junior's parentage. The court affirmed the Superior Court's decision on the ground of intent-based parentage, emphasizing that this doctrine aligns with public policy and the evolving concept of family. View "Glover v. Junior" on Justia Law