Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A father and mother, previously married and sharing a child, were involved in an ongoing custody arrangement. After initial divorce proceedings, the mother was permitted unmonitored visitation with the child. In late 2023 and early 2024, the father alleged that the mother’s behavior had become increasingly erratic, including stalking, repeated unwanted visits to his home, entering his residence and car without permission, incessant calls and texts, following him and the child in her car, and making threats related to his employment and family. The father stated these actions caused fear for both himself and their child, prompting him to seek a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) and restored monitored visitation for the mother. The mother denied the allegations, attributing her actions to concern for the child’s safety and referencing her mental health history.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County heard testimony from both parties and considered evidence including text messages, videos, and the mother’s admissions. The court acknowledged that the mother’s conduct was obsessive and alarming but found that the behavior stemmed from her mental health condition rather than malicious intent. The court concluded that the father had not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the mother’s actions constituted abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), specifically focusing on whether her conduct was intentionally threatening or intimidating. The court denied the DVRO but ordered professionally monitored visitation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, found that the trial court misapplied the standard for abuse under the DVPA by requiring proof of intent to threaten or intimidate, rather than considering the totality of the circumstances and the effect of the conduct. The appellate court held that the uncontradicted evidence established abuse as defined by the DVPA and reversed the trial court’s order, remanding with directions to enter the requested DVRO. View "R.R. v. C.R." on Justia Law

Kathleen L. Jellison filed for divorce from Ralph E. Jellison, and the District Court incorporated the parties’ agreement regarding the division of marital assets. Kathleen was awarded the marital home, valued at $250,000 and subject to a $45,823.58 home equity loan, while Ralph received the Verso 401(k) account with a similar value. Both parties and the court agreed this was an equitable division, though Kathleen later contended she had not entered the agreement knowingly and voluntarily, and sought to hold Ralph responsible for half of the home equity debt.After the original judgment, Kathleen filed post-judgment motions, and the District Court amended its judgment to order Ralph to pay $30,000 from his 401(k) to Kathleen, which she was to apply to the home equity loan. Kathleen appealed, arguing the asset division remained inequitable. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the amended judgment in Jellison v. Jellison, Mem-24-115. Ralph did not cross-appeal.Subsequently, Ralph filed motions for relief from judgment under Rule 60(a) and then Rule 60(b), arguing that the provision requiring him to pay $30,000 was a mistake. The District Court granted relief under Rule 60(b), striking the payment provision and amending the judgment. Kathleen appealed this order.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the District Court erred in granting Ralph’s Rule 60(b) motion because it conflicted with the appellate mandate affirming the amended judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court clarified that a lower court may not modify matters expressly or impliedly disposed of on appeal, and Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for appellate review or a means to challenge issues not raised on direct appeal. The order granting Ralph’s motion for relief from judgment was vacated, and the case was remanded with instructions to deny the motion. View "Jellison v. Jellison" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a domestic-abuse complaint in Rhode Island District Court, alleging that the defendant forced her to engage in sexual relations by force or duress. An ex parte temporary protective order was issued, prohibiting contact and requiring the defendant to surrender firearms. Following a hearing, the District Court granted a final order of protection for three years, continuing the firearm restrictions under relevant Rhode Island statutes.The defendant appealed to the Kent County Superior Court, which held a de novo bench trial. At trial, the judge stated he would apply a clear and convincing evidence standard, rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard typically used in civil cases, due to the temporary deprivation of the defendant’s firearm rights. The judge concluded that the plaintiff did not meet this higher burden of proof, found the defendant’s evidence more credible, and dismissed the complaint, dissolving the protective order. The plaintiff then appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo, focusing solely on the appropriate burden of proof for civil protective orders involving temporary restrictions of firearm rights. The Court held that the preponderance of the evidence is the correct standard in such proceedings, notwithstanding the Second Amendment implications or statutory provisions regarding firearm surrender. The Court found no legislative intent to require a higher standard, and emphasized that temporary restrictions do not amount to a significant deprivation of liberty requiring heightened proof. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded for a new hearing under the preponderance of the evidence standard. View "Andrew v. Adorno" on Justia Law

A businessman and rancher in South Dakota, after dating a Colorado horse breeder for nearly a year, proposed marriage. Shortly before the wedding, he presented her with a prenuptial agreement drafted by his attorney. The agreement waived her right to any share of his estate after his death. The parties signed the agreement at the attorney’s office minutes before their civil ceremony. They were later married in Italy and had two children. The businessman died approximately eight years later. The surviving spouse then petitioned for an elective share of the estate and a family allowance, claiming her signature on the agreement was involuntary and the agreement was unconscionable.The Fourth Judicial Circuit Court of Dewey County, South Dakota, held a trial on her petition. The court granted her request for a family allowance but denied her petition for an elective share. The court found she voluntarily signed the agreement and that it was not unconscionable, emphasizing her education, business experience, and opportunity to review the agreement or consult independent counsel. The court also found that the financial disclosures provided were fair and reasonable, and that the terms of the agreement, including a provision for her in the event of divorce, were not disproportionate or unjust. Stephanie appealed the denial of her elective share.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court held that the prenuptial agreement was voluntarily executed and was not unconscionable under South Dakota law. It found no clear error in the circuit court’s factual findings and determined that the financial disclosure and circumstances surrounding execution of the agreement satisfied statutory requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed the validity and enforceability of the prenuptial agreement and the waiver of the elective share. View "Estate Of Webb" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Corey Raber and Michael Robert Raber married in Texas and later moved to Idaho, where their only child was born. After marital difficulties, Mother filed for divorce in Idaho in 2022. Initially, Child lived with Mother in Coeur d’Alene, while Father had weekend visitation. Mother resumed part-time legal work and began traveling with Child to Texas. A temporary custody schedule was modified in June 2023 to a week-on/week-off rotation, resulting in Child regularly traveling between Idaho and Texas. Following an evaluation by a psychologist recommending Mother be allowed to relocate to Texas with primary custody, the magistrate court proposed two alternative custody schedules depending on Mother’s residence, ultimately finalizing custody without articulating a best-interests-of-the-child analysis.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho previously vacated the magistrate court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the magistrate court to exercise discretion regarding the scope of proceedings. On remand, Judge Anna Eckhart declined to consider new evidence or hold a new trial, instead relying on previous records and issuing findings that prioritized Child’s remaining in Idaho and continuing a week-on/week-off schedule if Mother returned to Idaho. If Mother remained in Texas, the court applied the psychologist’s recommended visitation schedule for Father, granting Mother one long weekend per month. Judge Katherine Murdock later entered judgment memorializing this custody and child support order after Judge Eckhart’s retirement. Mother appealed, challenging the custody determination and child support calculation.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Idaho found the magistrate court abused its discretion by relying on a clearly erroneous factual finding regarding Child’s residence and by conducting an incomplete best-interests-of-the-child analysis. The court also found error in the child support calculation and its lack of supporting analysis. Thus, the Supreme Court of Idaho vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial before a different magistrate judge, instructing the court to consider all relevant evidence and properly analyze the child’s best interests. View "Raber v. Raber" on Justia Law

The case concerns a child, DC, who was removed from his parents’ care shortly after birth due to substantiated concerns about neglect, failure to thrive, domestic violence, mental health issues, substance abuse, and instability within the family. The child was placed with maternal grandparents, and a permanency plan for family reunification was established. The father, AC, was given a case plan with specific requirements addressing sobriety, mental health, parenting skills, stable housing, and employment. Over the next eighteen months, the father was incarcerated for nearly a year of that period, including a new sentence of five to seven years for felony offenses. He failed to make consistent progress on his case plan goals, particularly concerning mental health and substance abuse treatment, employment, and securing stable housing.The District Court of Platte County—sitting as a juvenile court—initially ordered reunification, then shifted to a concurrent goal of reunification and adoption as the father’s progress stalled and his incarceration continued. The Department of Family Services documented extensive, tailored efforts to facilitate reunification, including arranging for services while the father was both in and out of custody. Despite these efforts, the father did not meaningfully participate in or complete the required treatment, counseling, or parenting programs. At an evidentiary review hearing, the court found the Department’s efforts reasonable and accessible, and that it was in the child’s best interests to change the permanency plan to adoption. The father appealed the change, arguing insufficient efforts were made to accommodate his incarceration.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the juvenile court’s decision for abuse of discretion. It held that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify father and child, even considering the constraints of incarceration, and that the child’s need for stability outweighed the father’s incomplete progress. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s order changing the permanency plan to adoption. View "In the Interest Of: DC" on Justia Law

A mother filed a petition for protection from child abuse on behalf of her two minor children against their father, following allegations of threats, mental injury, and physical abuse. An ex parte hearing in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County resulted in a temporary protective order and referral to the Department of Social Services (DSS) for investigation. The DSS report, completed before the final hearing, corroborated the children’s accounts of abusive behavior. At the final hearing, the mother was unrepresented and the father had counsel; after hearing testimony, the court granted a final protective order awarding custody to the mother and supervised visitation to the father.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s grant of the final protective order. It found that the circuit court had sufficient basis to extend the temporary protective order pending the DSS investigation, that the father’s right to procedural due process was not violated by not being served with the petition, and that the circuit court’s negative credibility determination of the father’s testimony was enough to support the finding of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed three issues. First, it held that the father did not preserve for appellate review the question of whether the circuit court erred by not stating on the record whether good cause existed to set the final hearing beyond seven days of service of the temporary order. Second, the Court held that service of a temporary protective order, which includes factual allegations and notice of the hearing, generally satisfies procedural due process requirements; thus, the father was not entitled to service of the petition in addition. Third, the Court held that the Appellate Court erred by affirming the final protective order solely on the basis of the circuit court’s negative credibility finding; lack of credibility alone does not satisfy the petitioner’s burden of proof. The judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Clarke v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Kyle Wardner and Tamara Porath were the parents of a minor child, E.M.M.W., who was born in 2017 while the parents resided in different countries—Wardner in North Dakota and Tamara Porath in Canada. After Tamara Porath’s death in November 2020, her sister, Rebecca Porath, sought legal guardianship of the child in Canada. Wardner opposed the application, and the Canadian court ultimately awarded him primary residential responsibility for E.M.M.W., who then moved to North Dakota. In May 2022, both parties stipulated to a final Canadian order that established Wardner’s custody and the Poraths’ visitation rights. Wardner registered this order in North Dakota in May 2024.Subsequently, Wardner filed a motion in the District Court of McLean County, South Central Judicial District, seeking to modify the Canadian visitation order. After a hearing in January 2025, during which both sides testified, the district court denied Wardner’s motion. The court found that Wardner had not demonstrated a material change in circumstances required for modification under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6, the statute it applied to the case. The Poraths also argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction but conceded North Dakota was the child’s home state.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), and that it erred by applying the wrong statutory standard. The Supreme Court determined that N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-14, governing modification of nonparent visitation, was the correct statute to apply to Wardner’s motion, rather than the statute for modifying primary residential responsibility. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with instructions for further proceedings under the proper law. View "Wardner v. Porath" on Justia Law

Evan Markestad and Joy Markestad, who divorced in early 2023, share two minor children. Joy was awarded primary residential responsibility, while Evan received parenting time. In summer 2024, Evan agreed that Joy and the children could temporarily reside in Bismarck. Joy later decided to remain in Bismarck permanently and enrolled the children in school there. In March 2025, Evan moved to modify parenting time due to the changed circumstances. Joy partially agreed, asking the district court to alter the school-year schedule but not the summer and holiday arrangements. The district court held a hearing and issued an order and amended judgment modifying parenting time.In the District Court of Ramsey County, Northeast Judicial District, the court examined both parties’ proposals for summer parenting time. Evan requested the entire summer, whereas Joy proposed alternating weekends and two additional weeks. The court considered their respective work schedules, finding Joy, as a teacher with summers off, more available and able to transport the children. The court also considered Evan’s farming obligations, noting his work frequently interrupted the prior parenting schedule. The court ultimately awarded Evan two consecutive weeks in July, Father’s Day, and an additional two-week vacation period, rather than adopting either party’s full proposal. The court also considered the conduct of both parties, including Joy’s lack of candor regarding her move and Evan’s demeaning language, but concluded the record supported its findings.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s decision under the clearly erroneous standard and affirmed both the order modifying parenting time and the amended judgment. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not misapply the law or prioritize Joy’s wishes over the children’s best interests, and its findings were supported by the record. Requests for attorney’s fees by both parties were denied, and the Supreme Court found the appeal was not frivolous. View "Markestad v. Markestad" on Justia Law

Ashley Brito and Jennifer Salas, a same-sex couple, sought to have a child using Angel Rivera’s sperm, which Brito used via an at-home artificial insemination kit. After Brito became pregnant, she and Salas married. The birth certificate listed both women as parents. They raised the child together for over a year before separating, with Brito taking the child. Rivera subsequently sought to be recognized as the child’s legal father.The Circuit Court denied Rivera’s petition for paternity, relying solely on section 742.14 of the Florida Statutes, which it interpreted to mean that a sperm donor—unless part of the commissioning couple or having executed a preplanned adoption agreement—automatically relinquishes all parental rights. The court determined that Rivera was a donor and did not fit either exception. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding Rivera was “obviously the donor” and that the statute’s relinquishment provision applied irrespective of whether assisted reproductive technology (ART) was involved.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case, addressing the certified conflict with Enriquez v. Velazquez, a Fifth District Court of Appeal decision holding section 742.14 only applies when a child is conceived using ART, not at-home artificial insemination. The Supreme Court held that section 742.14 applies exclusively in contexts involving ART, as defined by laboratory handling of human eggs or preembryos. Since the child in this case was not conceived through ART, Rivera’s parental rights were not automatically relinquished by operation of section 742.14. The Supreme Court quashed the Second District’s decision, disapproved A.A.B. v. B.O.C., and approved Enriquez v. Velazquez. View "Brito v. Salas" on Justia Law