Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A.M. and R.Y. were married in April 2019, separated in April 2023, and have a daughter born in August 2019. A.M. filed for divorce in April 2023, and the parties signed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) in December 2023, which was incorporated into an uncontested judgment of dissolution in February 2024. The MSA gave A.M. sole legal and primary physical custody of their daughter, with R.Y. having supervised weekend visitation. In May 2024, A.M. filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against R.Y., alleging psychological, verbal, and emotional abuse, as well as coercive control.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied A.M.'s request for a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO) on the same day it was filed, citing insufficient evidence of past abuse and lack of detail about recent incidents. The court scheduled a hearing for a permanent DVRO but did not grant a temporary order pending the hearing. A.M. appealed the denial of the DVTRO and requested a stay of further proceedings in the trial court, which was denied. The court set the permanent DVRO request for an evidentiary hearing in August 2024, later continued to August 2025.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and found that A.M. made a prima facie showing of abuse based on her declaration and accompanying evidence. The court concluded that the trial court erred in finding A.M.'s evidence insufficient and in denying the DVTRO without proper reasons. The appellate court held that the trial court has discretion to deny a DVTRO if it reasonably concludes that it is not necessary to protect the petitioner pending the noticed hearing. The appellate court reversed the order denying the DVTRO and remanded the matter for further consideration based on the totality of circumstances. View "Marriage of A.M. and R.Y." on Justia Law

A mother and father, who divorced in 2017, were involved in a contentious child custody dispute. Initially, the mother was granted primary physical custody of their two sons, with the father having visitation rights. The court ordered both parents to attend counseling and appointed a parenting coordinator to help manage their disputes. In 2021, the father sought to modify the custody arrangement, alleging that the mother had been dishonest and failed to comply with the court's orders, including attending counseling for her factitious disorder.The magistrate court held an eight-day trial and found that the mother had indeed been dishonest and had not complied with the court's orders, which negatively impacted the children. The court granted the father sole legal and physical custody of the children, with the mother having limited visitation rights. The mother was also ordered to attend counseling with a new therapist experienced in treating dishonesty.The mother appealed directly to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the magistrate court's findings were not supported by substantial evidence and that the court had abused its discretion in various ways, including denying her motion to interview the children and admitting her personnel file from a previous employer.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court's decision, finding that there was substantial and competent evidence to support the findings of the mother's dishonesty and its negative impact on the children. The court also held that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to interview the children, admitting the personnel file, or retaining the parenting coordinator. The Supreme Court awarded attorney fees and costs to the father, concluding that the mother's appeal was frivolous and without foundation. View "Stephens v. Buell" on Justia Law

In 2016, a divorce decree awarded Eric Van Genderen Sr. (Father) custody of his child, EVG, with visitation rights for Ekaterina Nicholaevna Pokrovskaya (Mother). In 2022, Mother sought to modify her visitation rights, alleging Father was alienating EVG from her and not adhering to the visitation terms. The district court found a material change in circumstances and modified the visitation schedule to include a graduated plan starting with supervised visits.The District Court of Teton County granted Mother’s request for modification, establishing a graduated visitation schedule due to Father’s refusal to allow meaningful contact between Mother and EVG. The court found it in EVG’s best interests to amend the visitation schedule, starting with supervised visits and potentially leading to unsupervised visits. Father was ordered to pay for Mother’s travel expenses during the transition period.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the district court had jurisdiction over the matter and that Mother’s appeal was timely. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s detailed and clear visitation schedule, which considered the best interests of EVG, including the quality of the parent-child relationship, the ability of each parent to provide care, and the geographic distance between the parents. The court also upheld the allocation of travel costs to Mother after the transition period, noting that the district court’s decision was reasonable and within its discretion. The Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that the district court’s findings were supported by the evidence and affirmed the modified visitation order. View "Pokrovskaya v. Van Genderen" on Justia Law

Vanessa Turner (formerly Vanessa Colley) and John S. Colley, III were divorced in 2012, with a marital dissolution agreement (MDA) and a permanent parenting plan incorporated into the final decree. Post-divorce, John filed a petition to terminate his transitional alimony obligation, alleging Vanessa was cohabiting with her fiancé. Vanessa defended the alimony award, and after extensive litigation, John nonsuited his petition before it was adjudicated on the merits.The Circuit Court for Davidson County awarded Vanessa $16,500 in attorney fees, finding it reasonably necessary for her to defend the alimony award. John appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that neither party was a "prevailing party" under the MDA or Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c) because the petition was nonsuited before a decision on the merits.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that Vanessa was the prevailing party under both the MDA and section 36-5-103(c). The Court reasoned that the MDA's language entitled Vanessa to attorney fees as the prevailing party because she successfully defended the alimony award, achieving her objective of maintaining the status quo. The Court also held that under section 36-5-103(c), a party defending against a petition to alter or modify an alimony award can be considered a prevailing party even if the petition is nonsuited before a decision on the merits.The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees to Vanessa, and awarded her attorney fees on appeal. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees for the appeals. View "Colley v. Colley" on Justia Law

Kateryna A. Bagrii sought to establish herself as a de facto parent of two children whose biological parents are John P. Campbell and Jie Chen. Bagrii claimed she had acted as a parent to the children since 2014, after Campbell brought them from China to Ukraine without Chen's consent. Bagrii and Campbell later married and moved to the United States with the children. Bagrii argued that she had taken on full parental responsibilities and that her relationship with the children was in their best interests.The District Court (Newport, Ociepka, J.) dismissed Bagrii’s complaint for lack of standing, finding that although she proved most elements required for de facto parentage, she failed to demonstrate that Chen had fostered or supported her relationship with the children or accepted her parental role. The court noted that Chen had not consented to the children's removal from China and had not known their whereabouts for several years.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's judgment. The court held that under the Maine Parentage Act, a person seeking de facto parent status must prove that all legal parents who appear and object to the petition have fostered or supported the relationship. The court found that Chen had not implicitly or explicitly consented to Bagrii’s parental role. The court also rejected Bagrii’s request to exercise parens patriae authority, stating that due process principles require proof of consent from all legal parents. Thus, the judgment dismissing Bagrii’s complaint for lack of standing was affirmed. View "Bagrii v. Campbell" on Justia Law

S.W., a minor, was placed with foster parents A.E. and Ann.E. by the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (CYF) shortly after her birth in September 2020. In August 2022, CYF filed a petition to remove S.W. from the foster parents' home. The foster parents attended the hearing but did not seek to intervene. The trial court granted CYF's petition, and S.W. was placed with another foster family. The foster parents later filed a motion to intervene, which the trial court denied, stating they did not have standing as they had not requested S.W.'s return and had not achieved the status of prospective adoptive parents.The foster parents appealed to the Superior Court, which vacated the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the foster parents had standing as prospective adoptive parents based on the precedent set in Mitch v. Bucks County Children and Youth Social Services Agency. However, the Superior Court panel was divided, with one judge expressing doubts about the standing of prospective adoptive parents under the current law and another judge suggesting legislative changes to grant standing to all foster parents.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and determined that the issue of standing for prospective adoptive parents was moot, as the foster parents had withdrawn their motion to intervene and for S.W.'s return. Despite this, the court addressed the substantive issue due to its public importance. The court concluded that the legislative enactment of 42 Pa.C.S. § 6336.1, which states that foster parents and preadoptive parents do not have legal standing in dependency proceedings unless they have been awarded legal custody, abrogated the judicially created standing for prospective adoptive parents established in Mitch. The court reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that preadoptive parents without legal custody do not have standing in dependency proceedings. View "In the Interest of: S.W." on Justia Law

A woman, acting as guardian for her elderly father, moved him out of the house he shared with his fourth wife and later filed for divorce on his behalf, citing that the couple had lived apart for more than three years. The trial court granted the divorce, and the wife appealed. The man died while the appeal was pending, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot but affirmed the divorce decree.The wife raised three issues before the Supreme Court of Texas: (1) the man's death did not moot her appeal, (2) Texas law does not permit a guardian to sue for divorce on her ward’s behalf, and (3) living apart is not a ground for divorce when neither spouse voluntarily lived apart from the other. The Supreme Court agreed that the man's death did not moot the appeal because whether the marriage ended by divorce or by death substantially affects the wife’s asserted property interests.The Supreme Court of Texas did not definitively decide whether Texas law permits a guardian to sue for divorce on behalf of a ward. However, it held that, to whatever extent the Texas Estates Code may allow a guardian to seek a divorce on her ward’s behalf, it requires the guardianship and divorce courts to find that permitting the divorce would promote the ward’s well-being and protect his best interests. Because neither court made that finding in this case and, due to the ward’s death, neither can do so now, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment, vacated the divorce decree, and dismissed the suit. View "IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF BENAVIDES" on Justia Law

A child was born on May 30, 2017, to unmarried parents. The mother, A.D., believed Q.T. was the father, and he signed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Parentage (VAP) on June 1, 2017. However, a DNA test on July 6, 2017, revealed Q.T. was not the biological father. Despite this, the VAP was not rescinded within the statutory period, and Q.T. ceased contact with the child. Years later, the mother identified K.S. as the potential biological father through a DNA testing platform and filed multiple complaints to establish K.S. as the legal father.The Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court initially dismissed the mother’s complaints due to procedural issues and the existing VAP. However, after consolidating the sixth and seventh complaints, the court ordered genetic marker testing, which confirmed K.S. as the biological father. The court then rescinded the VAP, declared K.S. the legal father, and ordered changes to the child’s birth certificate.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the Probate and Family Court judge lacked the authority to override the statutory deadlines for rescinding a VAP. The statute of repose under G. L. c. 209C, § 11(a), establishes strict time limits for challenging a VAP, which had long expired in this case. The court emphasized the legislative intent to provide finality in parentage determinations for the stability and security of the child. Consequently, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the lower court’s judgments and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "A.D. v. K.S." on Justia Law

Christina DeBenedetti and Morgan Ensburg were involved in a marital dissolution case where the trial court assigned four of Morgan’s ERISA-governed retirement accounts to Christina through Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (QDROs). This assignment was to satisfy an award made against Morgan after the court found he breached his fiduciary duty to Christina, resulting in a loss of community property. The total amount ordered for reimbursement and attorney fees exceeded $2 million.The Superior Court of San Diego County initially issued QDROs dividing the community property interests in Morgan’s retirement accounts. After a trial on reserved financial disputes, the court found Morgan had mismanaged community property and awarded Christina $1,831,250 for her share of the lost assets and $230,000 in attorney fees. Christina later sought to enforce this award through new QDROs, which the trial court granted, assigning her 100% of Morgan’s remaining interests in the retirement plans.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Morgan argued that the QDROs did not relate to “marital property rights” and violated ERISA’s purpose of protecting retirement income. He also claimed the QDROs were invalid under California law and that the trial court did not value the retirement accounts. The appellate court rejected Morgan’s contentions, holding that the QDROs related to marital property rights, complied with ERISA, and that California laws cited by Morgan were either preempted by ERISA or did not invalidate the orders. The court also found that Morgan’s argument regarding the valuation of the retirement accounts was not raised in the trial court and could not be considered on appeal. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s orders. View "In re Marriage of DeBenedetti" on Justia Law

Shianna G. and Logan S. were in a relationship from 2017 to 2019 and had a child, R.A.S., in 2018. After their breakup, Shianna, who struggled with substance abuse, left R.A.S. with Logan while she sought treatment. Upon completing a 30-day program in January 2020, Shianna discovered Logan had moved and changed his contact information, making it impossible for her to reach him. Shianna relapsed, was arrested, and served jail time in 2021 and 2022. After her release, she continued to seek contact with R.A.S. but was unsuccessful. Logan filed a petition to terminate Shianna's parental rights in June 2023.The Fourth Judicial District Court in Elko County held a hearing and terminated Shianna's parental rights, finding clear and convincing evidence of parental fault on grounds of abandonment, neglect, unfitness, and token efforts, and concluded that termination was in the best interest of R.A.S. Shianna appealed the decision, challenging the findings and the admission of certain evidence.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and highlighted the differences between state-initiated and privately initiated termination petitions. The court emphasized the need for district courts to carefully consider the unique circumstances of private petitions. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court's findings of parental fault were not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, the court determined that Shianna had made significant efforts to contact R.A.S. and did not intend to abandon him. The court also found that R.A.S. was well cared for by Logan, negating the findings of neglect and unfitness. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court's order terminating Shianna's parental rights. View "IN RE: PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.A.S." on Justia Law