Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves a divorce dispute between Randall Thomas Bailey and Sara Elizabeth Bailey, now known as Ms. Larson. The couple married in 2005 and have three minor children. Ms. Larson filed for divorce in December 2022. The main issues in the case revolve around the district court's decisions on child custody, child support, and property division.The district court granted joint legal custody of the children, with the children's primary residence set with Ms. Larson. The court also calculated child support, imputing income to Mr. Bailey, and divided the couple's property, which was valued at approximately $2.2 million. The division required an equalization payment of $475,000 from Mr. Bailey to Ms. Larson.Mr. Bailey appealed the district court's decisions, arguing that the court abused its discretion in determining custody, calculating child support, and dividing the parties' property. He also contested the valuation of his gun collection, the valuation of accounts at the date of separation, and whether two properties in South Carolina should have been included in the marital estate.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court's decisions. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding the issues of custody, child support, and property division. The court also found that the evidence presented supported the district court's findings and conclusions, and that the property division was not so unfair or unreasonable as to shock the conscience. View "Bailey v. Bailey" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Damon Graham and Isiwat Adekoya over the primary parental rights and responsibilities (PRR) and parent-child contact (PCC) schedule for their child. The couple met in February 2021 and had a child in October 2021. After a strained relationship and a series of altercations, Adekoya moved to Texas with the child. Graham filed a parentage complaint in February 2022, and the parties agreed to a temporary PCC schedule of alternating two-week increments. The family court approved this arrangement. However, Graham appealed the family court's decision, arguing that it allowed Adekoya to control his PCC time with the child and that the provision requiring renegotiation of PCC as the child reached school age was premised on Adekoya's decision to enroll the child in preschool.The family court had awarded Adekoya primary PRR and set forth a PCC schedule. It found that the alternating biweekly schedule was in the child's best interests but recognized that maintaining this schedule indefinitely was not feasible due to the considerable physical distance separating the parents. The court ordered that the current PCC schedule would continue until the child entered preschool, at which point the schedule would automatically change. Graham argued that this decision gave Adekoya unilateral control over when the change in PCC would occur.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the family court's decision. It found that the family court did not suggest that Adekoya could dictate how Graham spends his PCC time with the child or control the child's daily routine or Graham's choice of childcare. The court also found that the family court had an evidentiary basis to conclude that the child's entrance to a certified preschool program was a proper future point for the parties to reconsider the PCC schedule. The court disagreed with Graham's claim that the family court improperly ruled on a future PCC schedule, stating that the language of the PCC order expressly left that task to a future court should the parties fail to agree on a PCC arrangement once the child is in preschool, turns four years old, or alternatively, enters kindergarten. View "Graham v. Adekoya" on Justia Law

Arious Turner, the biological mother of a four-year-old girl (AT), was convicted of kidnapping her daughter. In June 2019, the Bolivar County chancery court had awarded Turner’s former step-mother, Sharetha Kimber, primary physical custody of AT, granting Turner limited visitation rights. In September 2020, Turner failed to return AT to Kimber after the court-ordered visitation period, and AT's whereabouts were unknown for forty-four days. U.S. Marshals located AT in Greenwood, Mississippi, with the help of an informant.The case was initially tried in the Bolivar County Circuit Court, where Turner was indicted for felony kidnapping under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-53. Turner sought a directed verdict after the State rested its case, but the trial judge denied her motion. After deliberation, the jury returned a guilty verdict. The trial judge sentenced Turner to a term of one year in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, suspended Turner’s incarceration, and reduced her sentence to one year of nonreporting probation. Turner filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial, which were denied.The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. The main issue on appeal was whether the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Turner of kidnapping. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that a rational juror could reasonably find each element of kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented. The court rejected Turner's argument that the legislature did not intend for Section 97-3-53 to apply to her because she is AT’s natural parent, citing a precedent that a natural parent may be criminally liable for kidnapping their own child when a court decree denies them custody. View "Turner v. State" on Justia Law

A child, J.B., was born while both of his parents were incarcerated for the homicide of J.B.'s older sibling. The Department of Family Services (DFS) placed J.B. with Becky and Jay Whipple, friends of J.B.'s grandmother, who were not licensed foster parents at the time. The district court affirmed this placement, designating the Whipples as J.B.'s "fictive kin," a term referring to individuals who are not blood relatives but have a significant emotional and positive relationship with the child.Months later, after J.B.'s father's paternity was established, he requested that J.B. be placed with his own father, Miles Sr., in Illinois. The district court ordered J.B.'s placement with Miles Sr., asserting that blood relatives have a legal placement preference over fictive kin. The court made no factual findings related to J.B.'s best interest.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada granted a petition challenging the district court's decision. The Supreme Court clarified that the term "fictive kin" requires an evaluation of the relationship from the perspective of both the child and the adult. The court emphasized that placement decisions must be based on a child’s best interest. The court found that the district court had erred in asserting that blood relatives have a legal placement preference over fictive kin. The court also noted that the district court had abused its discretion by proceeding with a change in J.B.'s placement when J.B.'s counsel was absent. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order placing J.B. with Miles Sr. and ordered the case to be reassigned to a different judge for further proceedings. View "In re Matter of J.B." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Christopher P. (Father) and Amanda C. (Mother) over the custody of their two children. The Family Court of Upshur County was set to hold a final hearing on the matter, but a scheduling conflict arose for Mother's counsel, who was also due to appear in the Circuit Court of Webster County at the same time. Despite Mother's counsel notifying the courts of the conflict, the family court proceeded with the hearing in the absence of Mother and her counsel. The family court then ruled that the children should primarily reside with Father.Mother appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing that the family court had wrongly failed to yield its hearing time to the circuit court. The ICA granted Mother a new custody hearing, but based its decision on the conclusion that the family court had applied the wrong version of West Virginia Code § 48-9-206. Father then appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the ICA's decision in part, agreeing with the ICA that Mother is due a new hearing in family court, but disagreeing with the ICA's conclusion that the family court had applied the wrong version of the law. The Supreme Court found that the family court had abused its discretion by proceeding with the hearing in the absence of Mother and her counsel, and remanded the case back to the family court for a new hearing. View "Christopher P. v. Amanda C." on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, N.C.-F., who appealed a decision by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, regarding the placement of her children, M.F.-1, M.F.-2, and M.F.-3. The children's father had admitted to killing M.F.-3's mother, leading to an abuse and neglect case. The West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) placed M.F.-3 with his maternal aunt, S.M., while M.F.-1 and M.F.-2 remained in N.C.-F.'s physical custody, but their legal custody was with the DHS. The court terminated the father's parental rights and restored legal custody of M.F.-1 and M.F.-2 to N.C.-F. However, it denied N.C.-F.'s request for placement of M.F.-3 with her and his half-siblings.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County adjudicated M.F.-1, M.F.-2, and M.F.-3 as abused and neglected children based on the father's actions. The court terminated the father's parental rights and restored legal custody of M.F.-1 and M.F.-2 to N.C.-F. However, it denied N.C.-F.'s request for placement of M.F.-3 with her and his half-siblings, determining that maintaining M.F.-3’s placement with S.M. served his best interests.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision. It found that the circuit court did not err in its rulings, including the decision to maintain M.F.-3’s placement with S.M. The court also found that the circuit court did not violate N.C.-F.'s constitutional due process rights by placing custody of her children with the DHS during the abuse and neglect proceedings. The court concluded that the circuit court's decision to place M.F.-3 with S.M. was in the child's best interest and that the court had properly facilitated regular visitation between M.F.-3 and his half-siblings. View "In Re M.F.-1" on Justia Law

The case involves the paternal grandparents of a child, M.F. III, who sought to intervene in an abuse and neglect proceeding following the fatal stabbing of the child's mother by his father. The grandparents, who lived in Baltimore, Maryland, but had a second home in Charleston, West Virginia, filed three motions to intervene in the proceedings, seeking placement of the child and/or visitation rights. The Circuit Court of Kanawha County denied all three motions. The grandparents appealed, arguing that the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) failed to conduct a home study to determine their suitability as adoptive parents, as required by West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3).The Circuit Court of Kanawha County had previously reviewed the case. The court denied the grandparents' motions to intervene in the abuse and neglect proceedings. The court also did not order the DHS to conduct a home study to assess the grandparents' suitability as adoptive parents, despite the termination of the father's parental rights and the child's placement in the DHS's permanent custody.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision to deny the grandparents' motions to intervene, as they did not fall within the class of individuals who may seek permissive intervention under West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(h). However, the court found that the DHS had failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3) to consider the grandparents' suitability as adoptive parents. The court remanded the case with directions for the DHS to comply with the statute and for the circuit court to determine the child's best interests for permanent placement following the DHS's compliance. View "In Re M.F. III" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the issue of whether a guardian can initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of an incapacitated ward. Peter Galbraith, II, the ward, and Belinda Galbraith were married in 2015. Between 2018 and 2019, Mr. Galbraith became ill with Frontotemporal Dementia BV. Mrs. Galbraith obtained a power of attorney and later deeded the marital residence to her separate trust. In 2022, she asked Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother to take care of him, and he was moved out of the marital home. In 2023, Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother petitioned the court for a general guardianship over him and filed a Petition for the Dissolution of Marriage without first obtaining authorization from the guardianship court. Mrs. Galbraith filed a motion for summary judgment alleging the guardians lacked authority to initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of the ward. The trial court agreed and granted the motion.The trial court initially held that the guardian did not have the authority to file a divorce petition on behalf of the ward. After obtaining authorization from the guardianship court, the guardian refiled the petition. However, the trial court again dismissed the petition, stating that Oklahoma law does not allow a guardian to initiate a divorce on behalf of a ward. The guardian appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act does not explicitly disallow the guardianship court from authorizing a guardian to file a divorce petition on behalf of a ward. The court found that the guardian was acting to protect the ward's rights and manage his financial resources, which aligns with the purpose of the Act. The court also held that the addressed provisions of title 43 of the Oklahoma Statutes do not act as a bar to the initiation of such an action by the guardian. The court concluded that the guardianship court may authorize a guardian to initiate a divorce action on behalf of a ward. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "GALBRAITH v. GALBRAITH" on Justia Law

Nicole Costin, individually and on behalf of her minor son, filed a lawsuit against Glens Falls Hospital and several of its staff members. Costin alleged that the hospital discriminated against her due to her substance-abuse disorder, violating the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. She also raised state-law claims. Costin's allegations included the hospital conducting drug tests without informed consent, reporting her to the New York State Child Abuse and Maltreatment Register based on a false positive drug test, withholding pain relief, accelerating her labor without consent, and refusing to correct their actions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed Costin’s action, concluding that she failed to plausibly allege that she was discriminated against due to her disability. The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court agreed with the lower court's dismissal of Costin’s claims related to the denial of an epidural, acceleration of labor, and treatment of her newborn. However, the court disagreed with the dismissal of Costin’s claims related to the hospital's instigation of a Child Protective Services investigation and its administration of a drug test. The court found that Costin had plausibly alleged that these actions were based on discriminatory policies, not medical decisions. The court also vacated the lower court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Costin’s state-law claims. View "Costin v. Glens Falls Hospital" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Andrew P. Sabatine (plaintiff) and Colleen K. Sabatine (defendant) over the modification of a temporary custody order. The couple had two children and lived together in Traverse City until September 2020 when the defendant moved with the children to Fenton. The defendant switched the children's primary-care doctors and school enrollments without the plaintiff's knowledge. In January 2021, the trial court granted the parties joint legal custody, with the defendant having primary physical custody and the plaintiff having parenting time every other weekend and two nonconsecutive weeks during the summer. The plaintiff sought to have the children returned to the Traverse City area.The trial court, after an evidentiary hearing, issued an order granting the parties joint legal custody, with the defendant having primary physical custody. The court determined that the children had established custodial environments with both parents and that the parenting-time order would not upset these environments. The court's decision was based on the circumstances that existed at the time of its decision. In March 2022, the trial court entered a judgment of divorce that incorporated this custody and parenting-time order. Both parties appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's analysis of the best-interest factors but reversed the trial court's holding that the custody order would not change the children's established custodial environments. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to reassess its decision using the proper standard. The defendant sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court held that the question of whether a parenting-time provision modifies a child's established custodial environment should be answered based on the circumstances that exist at the time the trial court renders its custody decision. The court found that the Court of Appeals failed to give proper deference to the trial court's findings of fact and that the facts did not clearly preponderate against the trial court's factual findings that the parenting-time provision in the judgment of divorce did not alter the children's established custodial environments. The Supreme Court reversed part of the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Sabatine v. Sabatine" on Justia Law