Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Evan D., an Indian child, was born with significant health complications. Shortly after his birth, the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) filed an emergency petition to adjudicate him a child in need of aid due to his parents' history of neglect, substance abuse, and domestic violence. Evan was placed with foster parents Rosalind and Max M., who lived near a medical facility capable of addressing his health needs. The Native Village of Togiak, Evan’s tribe, was informed of the proceedings and later petitioned to transfer jurisdiction over Evan’s case to the tribal court.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, adjudicated Evan a child in need of aid and granted temporary custody to OCS. OCS petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Evan’s parents, and the Tribe petitioned to transfer jurisdiction. Rosalind and Max moved to intervene, arguing that the Tribe might place Evan with his grandmother, who they believed could not meet his health needs. The Superior Court denied their motion, stating that federal law prohibits considering potential placement changes when deciding whether to transfer jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that the foster parents' arguments against transferring jurisdiction were contrary to federal law, which prohibits considering whether transfer could affect the child's placement. The court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, stating that the foster parents did not present valid grounds to deny the transfer of jurisdiction and therefore did not share any issue of law or fact in common with the underlying proceedings that would justify their intervention. The court also addressed the procedure for staying transfer orders pending appeal, emphasizing the need to balance competing interests. View "Rosalind M. v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, the State of Idaho removed five minor children from their parents' home following allegations of physical abuse. The children ranged in age from sixteen years to fourteen months. Law enforcement responded to a report of an altercation between the mother and the eldest child, during which the mother admitted to hitting the child with a plastic hanger. Other children reported frequent physical discipline, including being hit with belts and hands. The children were declared to be in imminent danger and were removed from the home.The Bannock County Prosecutor’s Office filed a petition under the Child Protective Act (CPA) to place the children in the custody of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW). The magistrate court held a shelter care hearing and found reasonable cause to believe the children were in danger, placing them in temporary custody of IDHW. The parents objected, arguing that the removal violated their constitutional rights and that the magistrate court’s findings were unsupported by substantial evidence.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the magistrate court’s adjudicatory decree. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the initial removal because the parents failed to raise the issue in the lower court. The Court also found that the challenge to the shelter care order was moot because it was supplanted by the adjudicatory decree. The Court held that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the older children to remain in the courtroom during the hearing and found that substantial and competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s decision to vest legal custody of the children in IDHW. The Court also declined to consider the parents' argument under the Idaho Parental Rights Act because it was raised for the first time on appeal. View "IDHW v. Doe" on Justia Law

A father, H.S., was in federal custody during a hearing to terminate his parental rights to his child, A.S. He attended the hearing via Zoom, while the hearing was otherwise conducted in person. The father argued that his limited ability to participate in the hearing amounted to a due process violation.The Leavenworth District Court held a permanency hearing and concluded that reintegration was no longer a viable plan for A.S., and that permanent custodianship or adoption was in the child's best interests. Subsequently, the State moved to terminate the parental rights of both parents. During the termination hearing, the father attended remotely but was unable to testify or meaningfully participate. The district court found the father unfit and terminated his parental rights. The father appealed, claiming insufficient evidence and a due process violation. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, rejecting the father's claims.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and focused on the due process claim. The court held that the father's due process rights were violated because he was not given the opportunity to testify, communicate with counsel, or otherwise fully participate in the hearing. The court emphasized that a parent's right to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their child is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the risk of erroneous deprivation of this interest was high due to the procedures used, and that the State's interests did not justify the limitations placed on the father's participation.The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the district court, and remanded the case for a new termination hearing that ensures the father's due process rights are protected. View "In re A.S." on Justia Law

The case involves a divorce between Guy Morrison, III (Husband) and Tami Hinson-Morrison (Wife), who married in 2007. Before the marriage, they signed a premarital agreement stating that each party would retain their individual property, any property acquired from the proceeds or appreciation of their premarital property, and any property acquired by gift or inheritance. During the marriage, Husband formed three oil and gas companies and made various financial contributions to Wife's businesses and properties. Wife filed for divorce in 2022, leading to disputes over the interpretation and application of the premarital agreement and the equitable distribution of assets and debts.The District Court of Campbell County found the premarital agreement clear and unambiguous, except for its silence on commingling of funds. The court ruled that Husband's financial contributions to Wife's properties were spousal gifts and did not warrant compensation. The court divided the remaining marital assets and debts equitably, awarding Husband his businesses and other assets, while Wife retained her businesses and the marital home. The court also ordered the parties to file joint tax returns for 2021 and 2022 and bear their respective tax obligations proportionally.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the premarital agreement was clear and enforceable, and the district court correctly interpreted it without adding a commingling provision. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the equitable distribution of assets and debts, noting that the division left both parties in a comfortable financial position. The court declined to award Wife attorney fees, as the fee-shifting provision in the premarital agreement did not apply to the divorce proceedings. View "Morrison v. Hinson-Morrison" on Justia Law

A minor child, Rene V., was removed from the custody of his legal guardian, Dora V., by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) due to allegations of abuse and neglect. Dora was appointed as Rene's legal guardian by the juvenile court. After Rene's removal, the juvenile court ordered family reunification services for Dora, including visitation. However, Rene refused to participate in overnight visits and eventually refused all visitation with Dora.The juvenile court sustained the DCFS's petition and ordered family reunification services for Dora. At an 18-month review hearing, the court terminated Dora's reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing. Dora filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the juvenile court erred by allowing Rene to refuse visits and that no substantial evidence supported the finding that she received reasonable reunification services. The court issued an order to show cause but denied Dora's request to stay the section 366.26 hearing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that legal guardians appointed by the juvenile court are not entitled to a presumption of reunification services, unlike those appointed under the Probate Code. The court found that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying additional reunification services to Dora. The court emphasized that the statutory scheme for dependency guardianships does not mandate reunification services and that the juvenile court's decision was in Rene's best interests. Consequently, the petition for writ of mandate was denied. View "Dora V. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A 13-year-old boy, Oscar M., sought to intervene in his parents' custody dispute after the superior court granted primary interim custody to his father, Shawn M., with weekend visitation for his mother, Marilyn P. Oscar, through an attorney, moved to intervene, arguing that his preferences were not adequately represented by his parents or the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL). The superior court denied his motion, leading to this appeal.The superior court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, initially handled the custody dispute. After a series of domestic violence allegations and protective orders, the court granted Shawn primary custody and Marilyn weekend visitation. Oscar, through his attorney, filed a motion to intervene, claiming his interests were not adequately represented. The GAL also moved for the court to appoint counsel for Oscar, expressing concerns about potential manipulation by Marilyn. The court denied both motions, reasoning that Oscar's preferences were already adequately represented and that his intervention would complicate the proceedings.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Oscar's interests were adequately represented by his parents and the GAL. It noted that Alaska's statutory framework provides mechanisms for considering a child's preferences without making the child a party to the litigation. The court also found that allowing Oscar to intervene would likely cause undue delay and complicate the proceedings, which would not be in Oscar's best interests. The court concluded that the superior court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Oscar's motion to intervene. View "Oscar M. v. Marilyn P." on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of parental rights of an incarcerated father, Anton K., to his two daughters, Allie and Melissa, who are Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) removed the children from their parents' home due to allegations of abuse and neglect. Anton was later incarcerated on charges of physical and sexual assault against the children's mother, Keri K., and remained in custody throughout the proceedings.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, initially found probable cause to believe the children were in need of aid and that OCS had made active efforts to avoid removing them. OCS developed case plans for both parents and facilitated some initial visitation. However, after Anton's incarceration, OCS's efforts to facilitate visitation and provide rehabilitative services were limited, partly due to COVID-19 restrictions and miscommunications with the Department of Corrections (DOC). OCS continued to work with Keri and the children's Tribe, eventually placing the children with maternal relatives after efforts to place them with paternal relatives failed.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order terminating Anton's parental rights. The court held that OCS had made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family, considering the entirety of its efforts, including those directed at Keri and the children's extended family. The court acknowledged the significant gaps in OCS's efforts to facilitate visitation and provide services to Anton while incarcerated but concluded that the overall efforts, including those to reunify the children with Keri and place them with relatives, were sufficient under ICWA. View "Anton K. v. State" on Justia Law

A mother filed for sole custody of her two daughters, alleging the father, who resides in Guatemala, had abused, neglected, and abandoned the children. The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas granted her sole custody but denied her request for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) findings, which are necessary for the children to seek SIJ status with federal immigration authorities. The court found insufficient evidence of abuse, neglect, or abandonment under Pennsylvania law and questioned whether it was in the children's best interest to issue an SIJ order.The mother appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the lower court's decision. The Superior Court held that SIJ determinations could only be made in dependency proceedings, not in custody proceedings where one parent is awarded sole custody.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's decision. The Court clarified that under federal SIJ law, a child involved in custody proceedings resulting in sole custody being awarded to a parent in the United States can seek SIJ determinations in that context. The Court held that the Superior Court erred in limiting SIJ determinations to dependency proceedings and that the record supported the children's entitlement to predicate SIJ determinations.The Supreme Court directed the custody court to enter orders consistent with its opinion, including findings that reunification with the father is not viable due to abandonment and neglect, and that it is not in the children's best interest to return to Guatemala. The case was remanded to the custody court for entry of these orders. View "Velasquez v. Miranda" on Justia Law

Clifford Porter and Peggy Huckstadt were married from 1977 to 1994, during which Porter served in the military. Upon their divorce, the trial court awarded Huckstadt a fractional share of Porter’s military retirement pay. Porter retired from the military in 2002 and later worked as a surgeon. In 2009, he was involuntarily recalled to active duty, served for three years, and was promoted, which increased his retirement pay. Porter retired again in 2012. In 2022, Porter sought to clarify that Huckstadt’s share should be based on his 2002 retirement rank and salary, not the increased benefits from his 2012 retirement.The trial court disagreed, ruling that the increased benefits from Porter’s recall service were community property subject to division. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the salary increases during the recall period were based on 17 years of community efforts during the marriage.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that Porter’s rank and salary at his second retirement could not be used to calculate the community portion of the military pension. The court found that the “community efforts doctrine” did not apply under these specific circumstances, as the increased benefits were not a direct result of community effort and performance. The court also determined that the dissolution decree intended to value Huckstadt’s share based on Porter’s rank and salary at his first retirement in 2002, not his second retirement in 2012. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re Marriage of Porter" on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, Heather, who moved with her three children from Minnesota to Washington to escape domestic violence. After their arrival, the family experienced intermittent homelessness, and the children faced developmental and mental health challenges. Heather also struggled with mental health and substance abuse issues. The children's school reported potential physical abuse to the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), leading to the children being placed in emergency shelter care.The King County Superior Court ordered the children into emergency shelter care, and the Court of Appeals denied review. Heather sought review of the shelter care order in the Washington Supreme Court. Department II of the Supreme Court reversed the shelter care order due to the State's failure to apply the "active efforts" standard required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA). The case was remanded for further fact-finding. On remand, the trial court kept the children in shelter care, finding that returning them to Heather would place them in substantial and immediate danger.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed whether RCW 13.04.033(3) requires a lawyer to obtain "specific direction" from a client before seeking appellate review in child welfare cases. The court held that the statute does require such specific direction but does not mandate a separate sworn document or client signature. A notice of appeal or discretionary review filed under RAP 5.3 satisfies the requirement. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, which had dismissed the review due to the lack of a sworn, signed statement from Heather. However, as the case was moot, the Supreme Court remanded it to the trial court for any further necessary proceedings. View "In re Dependency of A.H." on Justia Law