Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a divorce judgment from the District Court in Biddeford, where the court disposed of the marital property and awarded Cynthia (Pray) Wood McKenna $8,400 per month in general spousal support for life. Thomas Pray appealed, arguing that the court double-counted the value of trucks used in his pest-control business, failed to account for the value of the business attributable to his personal goodwill, engaged in improper "double dipping" by relying on his income from the business to determine both the value of the business and the amount of spousal support, failed to consider all relevant spousal support factors, and abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Wood McKenna.The District Court awarded Wood McKenna the marital residence, several IRAs, bank accounts, and personal property, while Pray received an IRA, credit union accounts, the pest-control business, and trucks. To equalize the property division, Pray was ordered to pay Wood McKenna $288,150. The court also awarded Wood McKenna spousal support based on several statutory factors, including the length of the marriage, disparity in earnings, age difference, and her health condition. Pray filed a motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the court denied without altering its findings.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court erred in double-counting the trucks' value in the property allocation and in making insufficient findings to explain the spousal support award. The court vacated the property disposition and spousal support award and remanded for further consideration. The court dismissed Pray's appeal regarding attorney fees as not ripe for review. The court held that the lower court must reconsider its calculations and any effect on the division of marital property, and make specific findings regarding Pray's income and the income potential from the assets awarded to Wood McKenna. View "McKenna v. Pray" on Justia Law

Bradley M. Schofield (Husband) and Debbie S. Schofield (Wife) were married in 1979 and separated in May 2016. In June 2021, Wife filed for divorce, and in September 2022, the district court entered a stipulated decree of divorce, which included a property distribution spreadsheet. The spreadsheet did not specify individual asset values but provided a total value for each party's distribution. Husband later filed a motion to enforce the decree, claiming Wife had not transferred an account valued at $185,300. Wife countered that the account had been transferred to Husband in 2016. The district court denied Husband's motion, finding he failed to prove the account had not been transferred.Husband did not appeal this decision but instead filed a W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion, claiming mutual mistake regarding the account's value in the decree. He argued that both parties misunderstood the $185,300 value. The district court denied this motion, ruling it was barred by res judicata, untimely, and not supported by evidence of mutual mistake.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Husband's claim of mutual mistake was actually a dispute over the interpretation of the decree, not a mutual mistake of fact. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. Additionally, the court awarded Wife costs and attorney fees for defending the appeal, as allowed under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-111. View "Schofield v. Schofield" on Justia Law

David Efron and Madeleine Candelario were involved in a divorce proceeding in Puerto Rico, during which Efron was ordered to pay Candelario $50,000 per month. After the divorce was finalized, Candelario began a relationship with Judge Cordero, and Efron alleges that Candelario, her attorney, and Judges Cordero and Aponte conspired to reinstate the payments through a corrupt scheme. Efron claims this resulted in Candelario receiving approximately $7 million. Efron filed a federal lawsuit against Candelario and her attorney, asserting claims for deprivation of procedural due process, conspiracy to deny civil rights, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Efron’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court found that Efron’s claims were inextricably intertwined with the Puerto Rico court’s judgment and that granting relief would effectively nullify that judgment. The district court also rejected Efron’s argument that his claims fell under a fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Efron’s claims because they essentially sought to challenge the state court’s judgment. The court concluded that Efron’s claims for damages were not independent of the state court’s decision but were directly related to it, as they required the federal court to review and reject the state court’s judgment. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Efron v. Candelario" on Justia Law

The case involves Michelle Gilbank, who lost custody of her daughter, T.E.H., in state court proceedings in Wisconsin. Gilbank alleged that various officials involved in those proceedings violated her federal constitutional rights. The events began when Gilbank, who had a history of drug use, moved into her ex-partner Ian Hoyle's apartment. Following an anonymous tip, police and social workers investigated and found evidence of Gilbank's drug use. On August 21, 2018, Gilbank was arrested for drug possession, and her daughter was temporarily placed with Hoyle. Subsequent state court hearings resulted in the continued placement of T.E.H. with Hoyle until Gilbank regained custody in March 2020.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court found that some of Gilbank’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. The court also ruled that the remaining claims failed on the merits, including claims of unreasonable search, denial of due process, and unlawful eviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case en banc. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred claims based on injuries caused by state court judgments. The court also affirmed summary judgment on the merits for claims not barred by Rooker-Feldman, including those related to the urinalysis, interrogation without an attorney, and the removal of T.E.H. The court found that Gilbank had consented to the urinalysis, that her Fifth Amendment rights were not violated as her statements were not used in a criminal proceeding, and that there was no seizure of T.E.H. by government actors. The court also rejected the existence of a "fraud exception" to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. View "Gilbank v. Wood County Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

The case involves a petitioner who filed a miscellaneous petition in Family Court concerning a child whose parents are the respondent and the late Christine Hasselbrock. The petitioner, who had a long-standing platonic relationship with Ms. Hasselbrock, provided financial and emotional support to her and her child. After Ms. Hasselbrock's death, the petitioner sought to be declared a de facto parent or to have other parental rights recognized, but the respondent denied him access to the child.Initially, the petitioner filed an amended verified petition in Family Court, asserting both statutory and common law claims for de facto parentage. The first hearing justice dismissed the statutory claim due to lack of standing, as the petitioner had never resided with the child. The justice indicated that the petitioner could pursue his common law claims on the miscellaneous calendar. Consequently, the petitioner filed a new miscellaneous petition asserting various common law claims, including de facto parentage, in loco parentis, and visitation rights.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's orders. The Court held that the Rhode Island Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) supersedes common law de facto parentage claims, as the statute explicitly outlines the criteria for establishing de facto parentage. The Court also found that the petitioner lacked standing to pursue claims for visitation based on being an "unrelated caregiver" or "de facto relative," as there is no statutory authority granting such rights. Additionally, the Court affirmed the denial of the respondent's motion for attorneys' fees, finding no basis for such an award. View "De Vries v. Gaudiana" on Justia Law

Jason Anderson and Olivia Foss, who share a child but were never married, were involved in a legal dispute over modifications to their parenting plan. Foss sought sole decision-making responsibility, required Anderson to take their child to extracurricular activities during his parenting time, and sought reimbursement for health insurance premiums. Anderson countered with a motion to modify child support. The district court modified the parenting plan and child support obligations after a two-day evidentiary hearing.The district court set the commencement date for the modified child support to September 2023, rather than September 2022, without providing an explanation. Anderson appealed, arguing the date should be from when he filed the motion. The court also calculated Foss’s child support obligation based on a partial year’s income and a 32-hour work week without sufficient findings to support these calculations. Additionally, the court ordered Anderson to reimburse Foss for out-of-pocket medical expenses but did not explain how it arrived at the reimbursement amount.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s requirement for Anderson to take the child to extracurricular activities during his parenting time, clarifying that this did not modify his parenting time. However, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not provide sufficient findings to support the commencement date for the modified child support, the calculation of Foss’s income, and the reimbursement amount for medical expenses. The court also required further explanation for removing all day-to-day decision-making from Anderson.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed parts of the district court’s decision, reversed others, and remanded the case with instructions for the district court to provide additional findings within 30 days. View "Anderson v. Foss" on Justia Law

A father, involved in a custody dispute in Montana, subpoenaed his child's therapy records from a therapist in Wyoming. The therapist filed a motion to quash the subpoena, arguing that the records were privileged and confidential under Wyoming law and HIPAA, and that disclosing them would not be in the child's best interests. The district court in Park County partially granted the motion, allowing the father access to some records but withholding treatment notes, interviews, and process notes, citing the child's best interests.The district court's decision was based on the belief that protecting the child's best interests justified withholding certain records. However, Wyoming law does not recognize a child's best interests as a valid reason to deny a parent access to their child's therapy records if the parent has waived the privilege. The court did not provide any statutory or procedural basis for its decision, relying instead on a New Hampshire case, In re Berg, which is not binding in Wyoming and involved different legal standards.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court abused its discretion. The court held that Wyoming law, specifically W.R.C.P. 45 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-113, does not allow a court to quash a subpoena based on a child's best interests once the privilege has been waived by a parent. The court also clarified that HIPAA does not create a privilege that would prevent the disclosure of therapy records in judicial proceedings. Consequently, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case, instructing the lower court to issue an order fully denying the therapist's motion to quash the subpoena. View "Loyning v. Potter" on Justia Law

The Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) became involved with A.N.'s family after the Rhode Island State Police informed them that A.N.'s father, Francis N., had been arrested on felony charges, including indecent solicitation of a child and electronically disseminating indecent material to a minor. Following his arrest, DCYF initiated an investigation and found that Francis had admitted to soliciting sex from a fictitious 13-year-old girl online. Consequently, DCYF filed a neglect petition against Francis, alleging that he failed to provide A.N. with proper care and supervision.The Family Court granted DCYF temporary custody of A.N. and later held a permanency hearing, ordering that A.N. remain in DCYF's care. Despite DCYF's efforts to engage Francis in services and case planning, he refused to comply, including declining to submit to a sex offender evaluation. During the neglect petition hearing, Francis invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination multiple times when questioned about his criminal charges and his involvement with A.N. The Family Court found by clear and convincing evidence that Francis neglected A.N., citing his failure to provide care, supervision, or guardianship, and his lack of engagement with DCYF.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's decree. The Supreme Court held that it was proper for the Family Court to draw adverse inferences from Francis's invocation of his Fifth Amendment right in a civil proceeding. The Court found clear and convincing evidence supporting the Family Court's finding of neglect, noting Francis's refusal to engage in necessary services, his lack of financial support for A.N., and his displacement of A.N. from the family home. The Supreme Court concluded that Francis's actions demonstrated a disregard for A.N.'s safety and needs. View "In re A.N." on Justia Law

Dr. Earl Bostick Sr. and Josie Bostick married in 1970, and Dr. Bostick developed two successful dental practices in South Carolina. In 2009, he sold one practice and continued with the other until the couple separated in 2017, after which he sold the remaining practice for $569,000. The sales contract indicated that $424,140 of this amount was for goodwill and a non-compete agreement. The couple agreed to an equal division of the marital estate but disputed whether the goodwill was personal (nonmarital) or enterprise (marital) property.The Family Court granted the divorce and ruled that the goodwill in Dr. Bostick's practice was personal, thus not subject to division. The court based its decision on the evidence that the goodwill was tied to Dr. Bostick's personal reputation and professional skills. Josie Bostick appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the Family Court's decision, determining that the goodwill should be considered enterprise goodwill and thus marital property.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, reinstating the Family Court's ruling. The Supreme Court found that the goodwill was indeed personal, as it was closely tied to Dr. Bostick's reputation, community involvement, and professional skills. The Court emphasized that Josie Bostick did not present evidence to prove the goodwill was enterprise in nature. The presence of a non-compete agreement further supported the conclusion that the goodwill was personal. Consequently, the value of the goodwill was excluded from the marital estate, and the Family Court's judgment was reinstated. View "Bostick v. Bostick" on Justia Law

In March 2019, emergency personnel responded to a call at Arlo's home, where they found his two-year-old son, Daniel, unresponsive. Daniel was taken to the hospital and underwent emergency surgery for severe injuries, including a skull fracture and subdural hemorrhage. Arlo and his girlfriend, Tiffany, claimed Daniel had tripped and fallen. However, medical professionals found the injuries inconsistent with their account. The Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) removed Daniel from Arlo's custody, and Arlo was charged with endangering the welfare of a child. A grand jury later declined to indict Arlo, and his criminal records were expunged.The Division filed a Title 9 action seeking custody of Daniel. During the proceedings, the Division sought to use Arlo's expunged criminal records, arguing they were essential for the abuse and neglect factfinding trial. The trial court granted the Division's motion, finding good cause and compelling need based on specific facts, and noting the confidential nature of the Title 9 trial. Arlo appealed, but the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the Division met the statutory requirements for using the expunged records.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the Division demonstrated good cause and compelling need based on specific facts, as the criminal and civil proceedings concerned the same incident, and the expunged records were crucial due to the lack of other witnesses and Daniel's inability to recount the incident. The Court also noted that the use of the records was limited to the Title 9 trial and subject to confidentiality protections. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. A.P." on Justia Law