Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A natural mother filed a petition to set aside the adoption of her child, D.A.P., more than five years after the final adoption decree. She claimed that the adoption was based on fraudulent misrepresentations that it would be an "open" adoption, allowing her continued contact with the child. The adoption was finalized on July 6, 2017, and the mother alleged that she was misled into believing she would maintain contact with her child post-adoption.The Neshoba County Chancery Court denied the mother's request for access to adoption records in 2021, citing the statute of limitations and lack of good cause. In 2022, the mother filed a petition to set aside the adoption decree, claiming fraud, coercion, and misrepresentation. The court dismissed her petition, noting that the mother had not appealed the original adoption judgment and that setting aside the adoption would prejudice the adoptive parents and the child. The court found no evidence of fraud upon the court, as the adoption petition clearly stated the termination of the mother's parental rights.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the chancery court's decision. The court held that the mother's petition was untimely, as it was filed more than six months after the adoption decree, which is the statutory limit for challenging an adoption in Mississippi. The court also found no fraud upon the court, as there was no sworn testimony or filing indicating an open adoption. The court emphasized the importance of finality in adoption proceedings to ensure stability and security for the child. View "In the Matter of the Adoption of D.A.S." on Justia Law

Mark Rath and Heather Zins share a child, A.J.O., born in 2004. Zins was awarded primary residential responsibility, and Rath was ordered to pay child support. A.J.O. turned 18 in November 2022, ending Rath's ongoing support obligation, but he had accrued arrears. Rath was served with an order to show cause for civil contempt due to non-payment. After an evidentiary hearing, a judicial referee found Rath in contempt and ordered him to make monthly payments towards his arrears, with a suspended 20-day jail sentence contingent on a future hearing.Rath sought review by the District Court of Burleigh County, which adopted the judicial referee's findings. Rath appealed, arguing violations of his right to counsel, errors in child support calculations, and that the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act limits the State's ability to collect more than fifty percent of his income. He also claimed the defense of laches and third-party standing should prevent enforcement of his obligations.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case under a clearly erroneous standard. The court held that Rath's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated because the contempt hearing did not result in immediate incarceration, and procedural safeguards were followed. The court also found that Rath's child support obligation continued despite temporary custody by the division of juvenile services and that the doctrine of laches does not apply to child support arrearages. Additionally, the court ruled that the State and Zins have standing to collect arrears even after the child reached the age of majority, and the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act does not limit the State's collection efforts in this context. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Burleigh County Social Service Board v. Rath" on Justia Law

Bijan Boutiques, LLC (Bijan) appealed a summary judgment in favor of Rosamari Isong. Bijan sought to void the property distribution in the marital dissolution judgment between Isong and her former husband, Richard Milam Akubiro, under the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA). Bijan argued that the judgment was fraudulent as it awarded Isong the couple’s only U.S. property, making it difficult to enforce a judgment Bijan had against Akubiro without incurring significant expenses to pursue foreign assets.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County ruled that Bijan’s complaint was barred by Family Code section 916, subdivision (a)(2), which protects property received in a marital dissolution from being liable for a spouse’s debt unless the debt was assigned to the receiving spouse. The court found that the marital dissolution judgment was not a product of a negotiated settlement but was adjudicated by the court, thus not subject to the UVTA.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that Family Code section 916 precludes Bijan from enforcing its judgment against the property awarded to Isong. The court distinguished this case from Mejia v. Reed, which allowed UVTA claims against marital settlement agreements, noting that the dissolution judgment here was court-adjudicated, not a private agreement. The court also rejected Bijan’s arguments that the judgment was obtained by fraud and that the Chino property should not have been subject to division, affirming that the property was presumed to be community property under Family Code section 2581.The appellate court concluded that Bijan could not satisfy its judgment against Akubiro by executing on the property awarded to Isong and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Isong. View "Bijan Boutiques v. Isong" on Justia Law

Gregory R. Flagg filed for divorce from Shauna K. Bartlett in 2012, resulting in a settlement agreement that included shared parental rights and responsibilities, with a child support order requiring Flagg to pay $81 weekly. In 2021, Bartlett moved to modify the child support order, and Flagg cross-moved to modify the divorce judgment and child support order, citing substantial changes in circumstances. The District Court initially granted Flagg's motion, determining that Bartlett did not provide substantially equal care and awarded primary residence to Flagg without child support. Bartlett then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment.The District Court later amended its judgment, granting Bartlett's motion to modify child support and denying Flagg's cross-motion. The court found that although Flagg provided more care, the level of care had not significantly changed since the original agreement. The court concluded that the care provided by both parents was substantially equal and modified Flagg's child support obligation to $185 weekly. Flagg appealed, arguing that the court erred in determining that the parties provided substantially equal care.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court had abused its discretion by failing to properly assess whether the parties provided substantially equal care for the purpose of determining child support. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the amended judgment, the amended child support order, and the order denying Flagg's motions for findings of fact and conclusions of law. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the parties are providing substantially equal care and to make consistent findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "Flagg v. Bartlett" on Justia Law

The case involves a divorce proceeding between Gregory Landgraf (husband) and Natasha Landgraf (wife), who have two minor children. The wife challenges the Circuit Court's determination of the husband's temporary child support obligation, specifically regarding whether the husband's irregular income should be considered for child support purposes. The husband receives irregular income from New England Industries (NEI), a subchapter S corporation, to offset his shareholder tax liability and for succession insurance premiums.Initially, the trial court issued a final divorce decree in 2018, which included a child support award. The wife appealed, and the higher court vacated and remanded the trial court's determination regarding the husband's irregular income. On remand in 2020, the circuit court issued a new temporary child support order, requiring the husband to pay a percentage of his irregular income, which was less than the applicable percentage set forth in the child support formula. Both parties moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. The court treated NEI's distributions to the husband as "gross income" and invited the parties to prepare an interlocutory appeal statement.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court addressed two questions: whether cash distributions received by a corporate shareholder to pay personal tax liability and distributions for succession insurance premiums are available for child support purposes. The court answered both questions affirmatively, concluding that these distributions are dividends and bonuses, respectively, and are available for child support purposes. The court also clarified that "net income" for child support purposes is calculated using standard deductions published by the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, regardless of actual employer withholding.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Landgraf" on Justia Law

The case involves the divorce of Jose A. Saldana and Daisy M. DeJesus, who married in 2004 and separated in 2009. During their marriage, Saldana purchased a home on Whitmarsh Street, which was later transferred to include DeJesus on the title. After their separation, DeJesus moved to Pennsylvania and later returned to Rhode Island, purchasing another property on Atwells Avenue with her mother. DeJesus filed for divorce in 2018, and the Family Court awarded her the Whitmarsh property, while Saldana retained his pension.The Family Court granted the divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences and divided the couple's assets accordingly. Saldana did not appeal the final judgment. Later, DeJesus filed a motion to hold Saldana in contempt for not cooperating with refinancing the Whitmarsh property. Saldana filed a motion to vacate the final judgment, arguing that it did not reflect their agreement and that DeJesus had not disclosed all her assets. The Family Court magistrate denied this motion, and Saldana did not appeal.Saldana then filed a second motion to vacate, which was partially granted regarding the Atwells property but denied concerning the Whitmarsh property. The Family Court justice upheld the magistrate's decision, and Saldana appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court's order, noting that Saldana's second motion to vacate was untimely and should have been dismissed. The issue of the Atwells property remains pending for further proceedings. View "DeJesus v. Saldana" on Justia Law

Marina Palomarez and Matthew Wilcox were married for over 20 years before separating in 2015 and finalizing their divorce in 2019. During their marriage, they lived a middle-class lifestyle, raising two children and acquiring a family home. Palomarez primarily worked part-time jobs and stayed home to raise their children, while Wilcox managed a business, Premier Power Sports, which he purchased with loans. After their separation, the business grew significantly, and Wilcox's income increased. Palomarez, on the other hand, continued to work in lower-paying jobs.In the initial trial, the Yakima County Superior Court awarded Wilcox the business and Palomarez the family home and other assets. The court also ordered Wilcox to pay $1,000 per month in spousal maintenance for four years. Palomarez appealed, and the Washington Court of Appeals reversed the decision, instructing the trial court to reconsider Wilcox's income and the spousal maintenance award. On remand, the trial court awarded Palomarez $4,000 per month in spousal maintenance for 11 years, considering Wilcox's increased income and the disparity in their earning capacities.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that while a requesting spouse's need must be considered, it is not a prerequisite for awarding spousal maintenance. The court emphasized that the trial court must consider all statutory factors under RCW 26.09.090, including the financial resources of the requesting spouse, the standard of living during the marriage, and the ability of the paying spouse to meet their own needs while providing support. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $4,000 per month in spousal maintenance for 11 years, as it had considered all relevant factors and the specific circumstances of the case. The Court of Appeals' decision was affirmed. View "In re the Marriage of Wilcox" on Justia Law

Devon Arseneau and her ex-husband were involved in a child custody dispute in the St. Louis County Circuit Court. The court appointed Elaine Pudlowski and Brian Dunlop as guardians ad litem to represent the child's best interests and James Reid to conduct psychological evaluations. Following their testimonies, the court awarded sole legal custody to Arseneau’s ex-husband and joint physical custody to both parents. Arseneau subsequently filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Pudlowski, Dunlop, and Reid, alleging that their actions during the custody proceedings violated her constitutional rights.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed Arseneau’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that the defendants were entitled to absolute immunity and had not acted under color of state law. The district court did not address the defendants' arguments regarding Younger abstention or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court determined that Younger abstention did not apply because there were no ongoing state proceedings. It also bypassed the Rooker-Feldman issue, finding that the merits of the case warranted dismissal. The court held that the defendants, as guardians ad litem and a court-appointed psychologist, were entitled to absolute immunity for actions within the scope of their judicial duties, even if those actions were alleged to be wrongful or illegal. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of Arseneau’s § 1983 claims. View "Arseneau v. Pudlowski" on Justia Law

Two children, E.G. and J.J., through their guardian ad litem, John D. Elliott, filed a lawsuit against the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) and others, alleging that the children were sexually molested by P.M., the adopted son of Annie Montgomery, while in Montgomery's foster care. The plaintiffs claimed that DSS and Montgomery were negligent in placing and accepting the children into the foster home, knowing or having reason to know of P.M.'s history of sexually abusive behavior. They sought discovery of DSS's adoption files to support their claims.The circuit court issued a protective order for certain DSS foster care files but did not rule on the adoption files. The plaintiffs then filed a motion in family court to unseal the adoption files, which was denied. The family court ruled that the plaintiffs had no legal interest in the records and had not shown good cause under section 63-9-780(C) of the South Carolina Code. The court of appeals affirmed this decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the confidentiality provision in section 63-9-780(C) does not insulate DSS adoption files from civil discovery if they meet the criteria under the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The court determined that if the files are discoverable under Rule 26(b), then good cause exists for their inspection. The court reversed the court of appeals' decision, emphasizing that protective orders can be used to maintain confidentiality while allowing necessary discovery. View "E.G. v. SCDSS" on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, J.R., who appealed the juvenile court’s dispositional findings and orders concerning her son, Dominic. The Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department) had previously received multiple referrals alleging general neglect, sexual abuse, and at-risk sibling abuse within the family. The allegations primarily centered around the mother’s fiancé, Brandon, who was accused of sexually abusing the mother’s daughter, S.R., over several years. Despite these allegations, the mother denied any knowledge of the abuse and refused to cooperate with the Department’s investigations.The Superior Court of Riverside County found that the mother failed to protect her children from Brandon’s abuse and sustained allegations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The court removed Dominic from the mother’s custody, granted sole physical and legal custody to Dominic’s father, Richard, and ordered monitored visitation for the mother.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings under section 300(b)(1) and section 300(j) as to Dominic. The court noted that there was no evidence that Dominic was at substantial risk of physical harm or sexual abuse. The court emphasized that the allegations against the mother were specific to her failure to protect S.R. from sexual abuse, and there was no evidence that Dominic faced a similar risk.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as to S.R. as abandoned, reversed the dispositional findings and orders as to Dominic, and vacated the true findings on the jurisdictional allegations with directions to dismiss the petition as to Dominic. View "In re S.R." on Justia Law