Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves petitioners P.F. and R.F., who sought custody and visitation rights for their grandchild, A.F., following the termination of A.F.'s mother's parental rights due to abuse and neglect. The Department of Human Services (DHS) had previously removed A.F. from her mother's custody in 2017 due to deplorable living conditions in the home shared with the petitioners. In 2021, A.F. was again removed from her mother's custody and placed with foster parents, K.B. and M.B., who had previously cared for her. Petitioners moved to intervene and obtain custody and visitation in 2022, but the DHS opposed their motion, citing past maltreatment substantiations against petitioner R.F.The Circuit Court of Wood County initially denied petitioners' motion for visitation and directed the DHS to conduct a home study. Although the DHS initially denied the home study based on past substantiations, the DHS's Board of Review later reversed these substantiations and ordered a new home study, which was ultimately approved. Despite this, the DHS, guardian ad litem, and foster parents opposed placement with the petitioners, arguing that A.F. was thriving with the foster parents and had no bond with the petitioners.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court's order denying petitioners' motions for custody and visitation lacked sufficient findings to demonstrate that it properly considered the grandparent preference statute, West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3). The court emphasized that the statute presumes placement with grandparents is in the best interests of the child unless the record shows otherwise. The court vacated the circuit court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to conduct a new evidentiary hearing and make detailed findings regarding the grandparent preference and the best interests of A.F. View "In re A.F." on Justia Law

Megan E. Hawk and David P. Hawk were involved in a marital dissolution action where the district court ordered David to pay Megan a cash equalization payment of nearly $3 million in eight annual installments, with interest accruing at a rate of 7.264% per annum. Megan filed a motion to alter or amend the decree, which the court partially granted, specifying that each installment would include accrued interest. Megan later filed a motion requesting the court to clarify that payments be made through the court clerk and to attach an amortization schedule.The district court for Douglas County initially modified the decree to specify the payment schedule and interest accrual. After the court's term ended, Megan filed another motion, which the court treated as a request to alter or amend the judgment rather than a nunc pro tunc order. The court held a hearing and clarified that interest would start accruing from the date the first payment was due, not from the date of the decree. The court also directed the court clerk to record the judgment and calculate the balance and interest.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and determined that the district court had the inherent power to modify its judgment within the term, as extended by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2001(1). The court held that the rights of a party seeking relief under this statute become fixed at the time the motion is filed, even if the disposition occurs after the term ends. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to modify the interest accrual date and affirmed the order. View "Hawk v. Hawk" on Justia Law

Lea and Ann Brent were married in 1953 and divorced in 1983. As part of their divorce, Lea agreed to pay Ann $5,600 per month in permanent periodic alimony until her death or remarriage. Ann died in 2015, never having remarried. Lea began paying less than the required amount in 2002, but Ann never filed a contempt action for the unpaid alimony. Lea died in 2021, and Ann’s Estate filed a probate claim against Lea’s Estate for unpaid alimony totaling $358,700, covering the period from 2002 to 2015.The Washington County Chancery Court found that the claim for unpaid alimony was valid but limited it to the period from July 2014 to November 2015 due to the seven-year statute of limitations. The court awarded Ann’s Estate $139,104, which included the unpaid alimony for that period plus 8 percent interest per annum. However, the court denied Lea’s Estate credit for partial alimony payments totaling $51,000 made between July 2014 and November 2015 and for a $75,143.28 life insurance proceeds payment made to Ann’s Estate in 2019.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that the chancery court erred in denying Lea’s Estate credit for the partial alimony payments and the life insurance proceeds payment. The Supreme Court held that the total amount of credit exceeded the total amount owed for the relevant period, leaving no unpaid alimony to award Ann’s Estate. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the chancery court’s decision and rendered judgment in favor of Lea’s Estate. View "In re The Estate of Brent v. The Estate of Brent" on Justia Law

Mackenzie Pennington and Casey Weber, who married in 2011, have two children. In 2020, Weber initiated a divorce, and in 2021, the district court's judgment incorporated their settlement agreement, granting them equal and shared parenting responsibility with joint legal and alternating weekly physical custody. Pennington was required to exercise her parenting time in New Rockford during the school year due to the children's school location.In November 2021, Pennington moved for primary residential responsibility, citing the impracticality of the parenting schedule due to travel distance. The district court denied her motion and granted Weber's request for primary residential responsibility, modifying the parenting plan to allow Pennington parenting time on alternating weekends during the school year. In September 2024, Pennington again sought primary residential responsibility, alleging Weber's failure to meet the children's medical and educational needs. The district court denied her motion, concluding she did not demonstrate a prima facie case of a material change in circumstances adversely affecting the children.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Pennington failed to establish a prima facie case for modification of primary residential responsibility. The court noted that Pennington's complaints about Weber's parenting did not demonstrate a material change in circumstances that adversely affected the children or resulted in a general decline in their condition. The court also clarified that the standard for determining a material change in circumstances does not require evidence that the children are "suffering," but rather that the change has adversely affected them or resulted in a general decline in their condition. View "Weber v. Pennington" on Justia Law

General Jeffrey Bannister enlisted in the Army in 1979 and was married to Patricia Erickson from 1980 to 1996. As part of their divorce proceedings, General Bannister agreed to elect Ms. Erickson as his Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) annuity beneficiary. In 1998, General Bannister married Trese Bannister. In 2017, he requested voluntary retirement, effective May 31, 2018, and elected Mrs. Bannister as his SBP annuity beneficiary. However, General Bannister died on May 27, 2018, before his retirement. Both Ms. Erickson and Mrs. Bannister submitted claims for the SBP annuity, and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) awarded it to Ms. Erickson based on the 1996 separation agreement.Mrs. Bannister appealed to the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) and the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), both of which upheld the decision to award the annuity to Ms. Erickson. Mrs. Bannister then appealed to the United States Court of Federal Claims, which denied her motion and granted the government's motion, concluding that 10 U.S.C. § 1448(d)(3) precluded Mrs. Bannister from receiving the annuity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 10 U.S.C. § 1448(d) governs the entitlement to General Bannister’s SBP annuity because he died on active duty before retirement. The court determined that Mrs. Bannister is the correct beneficiary under § 1448(d)(1), which defaults to the surviving spouse. The court found that the exception under § 1448(d)(3) for a former spouse did not apply because Ms. Erickson failed to submit a timely written request for a deemed election as required by § 1450(f)(3). Consequently, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Federal Claims and remanded for a determination of the annuity benefits due to Mrs. Bannister. View "BANNISTER v. US " on Justia Law

K.B. (Mother) appealed the Thirteenth Judicial District Court's order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, P.E.W., arguing that the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services Child and Family Services Division (Department) failed to engage in active efforts to assist her in reunifying with her Indian child, and that the District Court wrongly approved a non-Native American foster placement for P.E.W., in violation of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).The District Court had removed K.B.'s children, B.J.B. and P.E.W., from her care due to allegations of physical neglect and abuse. The Department filed a petition for emergency protective services, adjudication as youth in need of care, and temporary legal custody. The court adjudicated P.E.W. as a youth in need of care, granted temporary legal custody to the Department, and determined that ICWA applied. The Department developed a treatment plan for K.B., but she failed to comply consistently. The Department made extensive efforts to assist K.B., including providing transportation, financial assistance, and facilitating visitations. Despite these efforts, K.B. struggled with chemical dependency, unstable housing, and compliance with treatment programs. The District Court extended temporary legal custody multiple times and ultimately terminated K.B.'s parental rights, finding that the Department had made active efforts as required by ICWA and that continued custody by K.B. would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to P.E.W.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the Department had made active efforts to reunify K.B. with her child, as required by ICWA, and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in terminating K.B.'s parental rights. The court also found that good cause existed to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences due to the lack of suitable ICWA-compliant placements and the specialized needs of P.E.W. View "In re P.E.W." on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to her child due to her ongoing struggles with substance abuse, domestic violence, and instability. The Department of Public Health and Human Services petitioned for emergency protective services and temporary legal custody of the child, who was already living with the paternal grandmother. Despite the mother’s participation in various treatment programs, she failed to maintain sobriety and stability, leading to the Department's petition to terminate her parental rights.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, held a contested termination hearing and subsequently issued an order terminating the mother's parental rights while denying the petition to terminate the father's rights. The mother appealed, arguing that the termination of her rights was not in the child's best interests, especially since the father's rights were not terminated.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case, focusing on whether the District Court abused its discretion in terminating the mother's parental rights while continuing reunification efforts with the father. The court found that the District Court made sufficient findings and conclusions to support its decision under the relevant statute, which allows for the termination of parental rights if the parent has not complied with or successfully completed a court-ordered treatment plan and if the parent's condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision, concluding that the termination of the mother's parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence and was in the child's best interests, regardless of the father's situation. View "In re B.J.B." on Justia Law

H.C. appealed an order terminating her parental rights, arguing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and public policy require the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence, or at least a preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in the best interests of the child. H.C.'s son, John, has significant medical and developmental needs, which H.C. failed to address. John was taken into custody at age two after numerous incidents of abuse and neglect. H.C. struggled with addiction, mental health issues, and was often absent from her group home. The State filed a petition to terminate H.C.'s parental rights, citing continuing CHIPS and failure to assume parental responsibility.The Milwaukee County Circuit Court found H.C. unfit and determined that terminating her parental rights was in John's best interests. The court of appeals affirmed, stating that the circuit court did not err in its discretion. However, the court of appeals also asserted that due process requires the child's best interests to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, with the burden of proof shared by all parties.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the best interests of the child during the dispositional phase of a TPR proceeding constitute a discretionary determination by the circuit court, with no burden of proof placed on any party. The court concluded that neither the Due Process Clause nor applicable statutory law imposes a burden of proof during the dispositional phase. The court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, agreeing that the circuit court committed no error in terminating H.C.'s parental rights but rejected the court of appeals' due process analysis. View "State v. H. C." on Justia Law

Marilyn Wilson and Milton Wilson were married in 1980, and Milton was employed as a police officer. They divorced in 1998, and their property settlement agreement stated that Marilyn would be the irrevocable beneficiary of Milton's survivor pension benefits. Milton later married Diane Wilson in 2007 and passed away in 2020. After his death, Marilyn sought survivor benefits from the City of Providence, which were being paid to Diane.The Family Court declined to rule on Marilyn's motion to compel the city to pay her the benefits, leading her to file a suit in the Superior Court. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Diane, ruling that she was the surviving spouse entitled to the benefits under Rhode Island General Laws § 45-21.3-1 and the Providence Code § 17-189(m)(6).The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the terms "surviving spouse" and "dependent spouse" in the statute and ordinance refer to the person lawfully married to the retiree at the time of death. The Court found that the property settlement agreement between Marilyn and Milton, which was incorporated but not merged into the final divorce judgment, could not override the statutory provisions. Therefore, Diane, as Milton's spouse at the time of his death, was entitled to the survivor benefits. View "Wilson v. The City of Providence" on Justia Law

Shawn Agnone subpoenaed third-party witness Kenneth Madick in a marital dissolution action against her former husband, Frank Charles Agnone II. During Madick’s remote deposition, his attorney refused to turn on his webcam, prompting Shawn to file a motion to compel compliance with the subpoena and request sanctions. Before Shawn filed her reply brief, she and Frank settled the dissolution action, rendering the motion to compel moot. Shawn withdrew her motion but argued that sanctions were still warranted due to Madick’s and his counsel’s conduct during the deposition. The trial court granted the request for sanctions in part, ordering Madick to pay Shawn $9,981.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and imposed sanctions on Madick. The court concluded that sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 did not independently authorize the trial court to impose monetary sanctions for discovery misuses. However, the Supreme Court granted Shawn’s petition for review and deferred further action pending consideration of a related issue in City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (PwC). The Supreme Court held that a trial court may invoke its independent authority to impose monetary sanctions under sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 for unusual forms of discovery abuse not addressed by method-specific sanctions provisions.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reconsidered the case in light of PwC and concluded that the trial court had the authority to impose sanctions against Madick. The court affirmed the order, holding that the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion to impose sanctions for the unusual form of discovery abuse that frustrated the deposition’s truth-seeking function. The court found that the trial court’s order was supported by substantial evidence and that Madick’s arguments were unconvincing. View "Agnone v. Agnone" on Justia Law