Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This case arises from a parental rights termination appeal in Texas. The father had been the primary caregiver for his three children, including one-year-old twins and a three-year-old daughter. However, the father tested positive for methamphetamine and the children were removed by the Department of Family and Protective Services due to the father's drug use and homelessness. Although the father initially complied with a service plan, which included drug testing and treatment, he eventually refused further treatment and missed subsequent drug tests. The trial court terminated the father's parental rights, but the court of appeals reversed the decision, arguing that the Department had failed to prove harm to the children as a direct result of their father's drug use.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation of "endanger" in the context of illegal drug use. It held that a parent's endangering conduct does not need to be directed at the child or result in actual injury to the child. Instead, endangerment encompasses a larger array of conduct that exposes a child to loss or injury, or jeopardizes the child's physical or emotional well-being. The court argued that the father's pattern of drug use, coupled with his homelessness, employment instability, and almost complete abandonment of his children for the six months preceding the trial, posed a substantial risk to the children's emotional well-being. Therefore, legally sufficient evidence supported the trial court's determination that the father's conduct endangered the children. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for a best-interest determination. View "In re R.R.A." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of sisters Tierzah, Charis, and Elisa Mapson in connection with a shooting incident. The victims were Joshua Thornton, the father of Tierzah's daughter, and his wife. The government charged the sisters with interstate domestic violence, interstate stalking, discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and conspiracy to commit these offenses. The jury found that the shooting was part of a scheme by the sisters to kill Mr. Thornton over a child custody dispute.In their appeal, the sisters argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. Charis also challenged the admission of testimony that she once owned a firearm, claiming it was prejudicial hearsay. Elisa and Charis contested the admissibility of data obtained from automated license plate readers (ALPRs), arguing that its acquisition constituted a warrantless search in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.The court of appeals found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdicts. The court also rejected Charis's challenge to the hearsay evidence, ruling it was admissible as an admission by a party opponent. The court further concluded that the ALPR data was admissible because the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, and its introduction did not require expert testimony. View "United States v. Mapson" on Justia Law

In a divorce case, the Supreme Court of Nevada was asked to consider whether a law firm, established by one spouse before the marriage and incorporated under a different name during the marriage, constitutes that spouse’s separate property. Robert Draskovich, a practicing criminal lawyer since 1997, married Laurinda Draskovich in 2012, at which point he had a 65% ownership stake in a firm. In 2018, that firm dissolved, and Robert incorporated the Draskovich Law Group (DLG) as his wholly owned corporation.During their divorce proceedings in 2022, DLG was the primary asset in dispute. The district court concluded that DLG was community property, based on the fact that DLG was incorporated during the marriage. The district court also rejected Laurinda’s request for alimony, in part because it determined that the share of community assets distributed to Laurinda would provide sufficient support through passive income.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the district court erred in determining that the law firm was entirely community property. The court found that the law firm was a continuation of the spouse’s original, separate property law practice, and thus, the presumption of community property does not properly apply. Therefore, the Court reversed the portion of the divorce decree pertaining to the DLG interests and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also vacated the district court’s alimony determination to be reconsidered in light of the changed circumstances surrounding DLG. View "Draskovich v. Draskovich" on Justia Law

Christine M. Nordgren's parental rights were terminated in a Minnesota state court. Instead of appealing this decision, she filed a federal lawsuit against the Minnesota Department of Human Services, Hennepin County, and various other parties involved in her case, alleging a range of constitutional, federal, and state claims. She sought multiple forms of damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs. The district court dismissed all federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims. Nordgren then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the district court interpreted as a request to reconsider and amend her pleadings, and denied it. Nordgren appealed this decision.The Hennepin County defendants moved to dismiss Nordgren's appeal as untimely, arguing that she did not appeal the judgment in a timely manner and that the district court's order denying her motion for reconsideration was not separately appealable and did not extend the appeal period. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the defendants, determining that Nordgren's motion did not qualify as an appealable motion under Rule 59(e), which is designed to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. As such, the appeal period began on the date the judgment was entered, and Nordgren's notice of appeal, filed beyond the 30-day appeal period, was untimely.Therefore, the Court of Appeals dismissed Nordgren's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Nordgren v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law

In the matter before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three, the defendant, W.K., appealed the issuance of a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) protecting his wife, N.M., and their daughter. The court was asked to consider whether a party who had already responded to a petition for a DVRO was entitled to a continuance of the hearing "as a matter of course" under Family Code, Section 245, subdivision (a).The court ruled that the trial court did not have a mandatory duty to grant a continuance under these circumstances and did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with the hearing. The court found that W.K., having already responded to the petition, was not entitled to a continuance to allow him to respond to the petition. The court also concluded that denial of a continuance did not deprive the defendant of a fair hearing, as he had declared himself prepared to proceed at an earlier hearing and was aware at least four days before the DVRO hearing that the text message exchanges between himself and his wife would be at issue.N.M. had alleged several incidents of domestic abuse. The court found her testimony credible and W.K.'s explanations not credible, concluding that the text messages alone, which W.K. acknowledged he wrote, provided sufficient basis for the DVRO. The trial court issued a restraining order for three years, with N.M. retaining custody of their child and W.K. granted supervised visitation twice a week. The court rejected W.K.'s remaining challenges to the DVRO, denied N.M.'s request to dismiss the appeal, and denied both parties' requests for sanctions. View "N.M. v. W.K." on Justia Law

The case pertains to a marital dissolution dispute in Indiana where the husband's police pension constituted the majority of the couple's marital estate. The husband was reluctant to share his pension with his wife, expressing his intention to disregard any court order mandating him to do so. As a response, the trial court ordered the husband to secure and subsidize a life insurance policy to ensure the wife received her share of the marital estate. The husband challenged the trial court's authority, arguing that the court did not consider the tax implications of his future pension payments.The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision. It ruled that the trial court had broad statutory authority to order a security or other guarantee, such as a life insurance policy, when necessary, to secure the division of property. The court also held that the husband had waived his challenge regarding the tax consequences of his future pension payments.The facts of the case reveal that the husband and wife had been married for nearly twenty-six years. The husband's police pension had a market value of over $1.1 million, constituting over 85% of the marital estate. The husband was unwilling to share his pension with his wife, and the wife expressed concern that she might not receive anything. The trial court ordered the husband to make monthly payments and obtain a life insurance policy that named her as owner and beneficiary. The husband contested this order, leading to the appeal. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, maintaining that the court had the authority to secure the wife's share of the marital estate through a life insurance policy. View "Cooley v. Cooley" on Justia Law

This case involves a minor plaintiff, identified as S.W., who suffered severe injuries inflicted by her father's girlfriend. The State of Montana's Department of Public Health and Human Services was sued based on claims that it negligently failed to remove S.W. from her father's home prior to the injuries. The District Court ruled that the state's child abuse investigation was negligent and had led to S.W.'s injuries. A jury awarded S.W. over $16 million in damages.Several issues were raised on appeal, including whether the District Court was correct in deciding that the state's immunity provision did not cover the State, but only individual persons, whether the state was negligent as a matter of law, and whether the assault on S.W. was foreseeable.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the District Court was correct in its interpretation that the state's immunity provision did not extend to the State. However, the Supreme Court found that the District Court erred in its summary judgment that the State was negligent as a matter of law and that the assault on S.W. was foreseeable as a matter of law. The Court ruled that these issues contained material factual disputes that should be left to a jury. The Supreme Court also held that the District Court abused its discretion by imposing a disproportionate sanction on the State for spoliation of evidence. The judgment was reversed, the jury’s verdict was vacated, and the case was remanded for a new trial. View "S. W. v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, F.K. (the Mother) filed a petition challenging the juvenile court's decision to terminate her reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing regarding her daughter, A.R. The Mother contended that the Santa Barbara County Department of Child Welfare Services (the department) did not adequately consider her grief over the death of A.R.'s twin sister and did not provide reasonable reunification services. She also claimed that six months of services were insufficient.The Mother had a history of untreated alcohol abuse, domestic violence, and criminal convictions related to these issues. The juvenile court ordered her to receive reunification services after finding the dependency petition true and removing A.R. from her custody. The services aimed at addressing her substance abuse and its impact on her ability to safely parent A.R.The juvenile court decided to terminate the reunification services at the six-month review hearing after concluding that the Mother failed to make substantial progress in the court-ordered treatment plan. The court reasoned that it did not have discretion to extend services unless the Mother showed substantial compliance with the case plan. The court also found that the department had made reasonable efforts to return A.R. to the Mother's custody by providing reasonable services.The Court of Appeal agreed with the Mother's contention that the juvenile court erred in terminating the reunification services. The court noted that, at the six-month review, the juvenile court had the discretion to continue the case and forego setting a hearing to terminate parental rights even if it did not find a substantial probability of the child returning to the parent. The court concluded that the juvenile court did not exercise its discretion because it incorrectly believed it was bound to terminate services due to the Mother's lack of substantial progress. The Court of Appeal ordered the juvenile court to conduct a new section 366.21 hearing. View "F.K. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Carol Sue Burris was convicted of mistreatment of a dependent adult and the second-degree reckless murder of her husband, Michael Burris, who suffered from dementia and other significant health issues. Carol, as Michael's sole caregiver, was found to have neglected his care and prevented others from helping him. Michael subsequently died of pneumonia with severe emaciation as a significant underlying factor.Carol appealed her conviction, arguing that her conviction for reckless but unintentional second-degree murder should be reversed, as it was based solely on a failure of care—that is, on things she did not do rather than affirmative acts she did. Her argument was premised on the idea that she had no duty to act—to provide the care at issue—under these facts.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that Carol owed a clearly defined legal duty of care to her husband, based on their marital relationship, her voluntary assumption of Michael's care, and her role as Michael's sole caregiver under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5417. The prosecutor's comments during closing arguments were found not to be in error, and thus, Carol's convictions were upheld.The court held that a person may be held criminally liable for a failure to act if that person owes a legal duty of care, which can arise out of either common law or legislative enactment. A legal duty of care is imposed at common law when a person is in a special relationship with another, such as marriage, or when a person has voluntarily assumed the care of another and has prevented others from rendering aid. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5417 imposes a legal duty of care on the primary caregivers of dependent adults. View "State v. Burris" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the conviction and sentence of Timothy Marbley for aggravated domestic violence. The case originated from an incident in April 2020, where officers responded to a disturbance at an apartment complex. They found Sherita Lynch, Marbley's girlfriend, with injuries and a trail of blood leading from the apartment. Marbley was not present at the scene. Lynch and Marbley both testified at the trial, providing different accounts of the incident.The court noted that Marbley's counsel had filed a brief asserting that there were no arguable issues for review and complied with the procedures set out in Lindsey v. State when an attorney believes there are no appealable issues. Despite being given an opportunity, Marbley did not file a pro se brief. After reviewing the entire record, the court concurred with Marbley's counsel and found no issues that warranted appellate review.Consequently, the court affirmed Marbley's conviction for aggravated domestic violence and his sentence of ten years, five of which were suspended with nonreporting, supervised probation. View "Marbley v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law