Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A couple married in 2002 after signing a prenuptial agreement that largely kept their finances separate, with the husband retaining significant assets and the wife having much less. The agreement, signed ten days before the wedding, stated that each party’s property and earnings would remain separate, and it limited the wife’s ability to seek attorney’s fees, spousal support, or an unequal division of marital property in the event of divorce. During the marriage, the husband committed multiple acts of domestic violence against the wife, which ultimately led to their separation and the wife filing for divorce after nearly eighteen years.The Alaska Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, held a divorce trial and found the wife’s testimony more credible, determining that the husband had committed four crimes of domestic violence. The court found the prenuptial agreement was voluntarily signed and not unconscionable at the time of execution, but concluded that changed circumstances—specifically, the husband’s domestic violence—made it unfair to enforce provisions barring the wife from seeking attorney’s fees, spousal support, or an unequal division of the marital estate. The court awarded the wife 75% of the marital estate, but did not include proceeds from a California timeshare in the division and counted $80,000 the wife withdrew at separation against her share. The court also based child support on the husband’s claimed tax rate without supporting evidence.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the prenuptial agreement was not unconscionable and was voluntarily signed, but that the superior court could strike certain terms due to changed circumstances, such as domestic violence, while enforcing others. The Supreme Court remanded for further explanation regarding which terms should be enforced, for inclusion of the California timeshare in the property division, for reconsideration of the $80,000 withdrawal, and for recalculation of child support based on proper tax evidence. View "Kilkenny v. Kilkenny" on Justia Law

A county agency filed a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights to his child. The father consented to the voluntary termination and submitted a written affidavit to that effect. At a subsequent hearing, he confirmed his consent and understanding of the consequences. The district court relied on his admission and other evidence to terminate his parental rights, finding the termination was in the child’s best interests. The father did not file any post-trial motions but initially appealed on jurisdictional grounds, later voluntarily dismissing and then seeking to reinstate his appeal. The Minnesota Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the termination, limiting its review to the jurisdictional issue.Over a year after the termination order became final, the father filed a motion in the district court to withdraw his admission, alleging it was obtained through fraud, undue influence, and duress. The district court struck the motion, reasoning that the father lacked standing because his parental rights had already been terminated and the time to challenge the order had expired. The Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal, agreeing that he lacked standing to file the motion after finality.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case to clarify the timeframe for withdrawing an admission to a petition for termination of parental rights under Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Protection Procedure 56.03, subdivision 5(b). The court held that a person may file a motion to withdraw such an admission at any time if withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice, regardless of other time limits in the rules. The court further held that the district court must determine whether the motion makes a prima facie showing of manifest injustice and, if so, must hold an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: B.D.D. and D.A.A." on Justia Law

A married couple with four children sought dissolution of their marriage after several years together. The wife, who had primarily cared for the children earlier in the marriage, was employed as a surgical nurse earning about $2,990 per month, while the husband worked as a carpenter earning approximately $7,250 per month. In the dissolution proceedings, the marital estate was divided, with the wife receiving a share of the husband’s retirement and half the equity in the marital home, while the husband retained the home and its associated debt. The court also ordered the husband to pay child support, spousal maintenance, and the wife’s attorney’s fees.The Fourth Judicial District Court of Montana conducted a bench trial and issued a decree that included the award of attorney’s fees to the wife. The only evidence regarding attorney’s fees was the wife’s testimony that she owed her attorney about $2,000 and could be responsible for her own fees, and the husband’s testimony that he had paid his attorney by borrowing from his parents. The District Court found that the husband had been able to pay his attorney’s fees and the wife had not, and ordered the husband to pay the wife’s attorney’s fees without further explanation or reference to legal standards. The husband appealed, and after partial resolution in appellate mediation, the sole issue on appeal was the propriety of the attorney’s fees award.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and held that the District Court abused its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees without grounding its decision in substantial evidence or applying the governing legal standards. The Supreme Court found that the District Court failed to make necessary findings regarding the necessity and reasonableness of the award and did not provide a sufficient factual or legal basis for its decision. The Supreme Court reversed the award of attorney’s fees. View "In re Marriage of Salois" on Justia Law

Two minor children’s maternal grandfather and step-grandmother, who were already their court-appointed guardians, filed a petition in March 2024 to terminate both parents’ rights and adopt the children under the Montana Adoption Act. At the time, the children’s father was incarcerated. He was personally served with the summons and petition but did not file a response. The Montana Twentieth Judicial District Court entered his default and set a termination hearing, sending notice to the father at the prison. The father had no attorney, did not appear at the hearing, and the court received no sworn testimony. The court terminated his parental rights by adopting the petitioners’ allegations.After the termination, the father obtained permission to file out-of-time appeals, which were consolidated. He argued that the District Court failed to appoint counsel as required by Montana precedent, did not comply with statutory notice requirements, and violated due process. The record showed that the District Court never advised the father of his right to counsel, made no inquiry into indigency, and did not provide the statutorily required notice warning that failure to appear could result in termination of parental rights. No proof of service of such notice was filed, and the court did not adjourn the hearing despite the father’s absence and lack of proof of service.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the District Court violated the father’s constitutional right to equal protection by failing to advise him of his right to counsel and to inquire into indigency before terminating his parental rights. The court also found that the District Court failed to comply with the Montana Adoption Act’s mandatory notice-of-hearing provisions. The Supreme Court reversed the termination orders and remanded the case, directing the District Court to provide proper advisement, conduct an indigency inquiry, ensure statutory notice, and require clear and convincing evidence before any further termination. View "In re Adoption of A.K.M. & R.J.M." on Justia Law

A petitioner filed for a declaration of invalidity of marriage, asserting that the respondent’s consent to the marriage had been induced by duress and fraud. The petition was drafted by the respondent but left unsigned, as she ultimately decided not to pursue it. The petitioner found the paperwork and filed it without the respondent’s knowledge or consent. The respondent was served with the unsigned petition and a consent form, but was not served with a summons or an automatic economic restraining order as required by statute. She did not respond to the petition or attend any hearings, later claiming she was unaware of the proceedings. The petitioner attested to the statements in the petition and consented to the entry of a decree of invalidity.The Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a final invalidity decree, concluding that the marriage was irretrievably broken due to serious marital discord and no reasonable prospect of reconciliation. The respondent appealed, arguing that she never signed the petition and that the court failed to consider her interests. The petitioner did not oppose the appeal and agreed that the district court’s judgment should be overruled.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred in declaring the marriage invalid because it failed to make findings under the statutory grounds for invalidity and instead relied solely on the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, which is not relevant to a declaration of invalidity. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s findings, conclusions, and decree of invalidity, and remanded with instructions to strike the unsigned petition and dismiss the cause. View "In re Marriage of Anderson" on Justia Law

The case concerns a family in Evanston, Wyoming, where the State intervened after a five-day-old infant, SP, was hospitalized with a cerebral hemorrhage. Law enforcement took SP and three other minor children into protective custody, suspecting abuse or neglect by their parents, particularly focusing on the father, who is hearing-impaired and sometimes requires an ASL interpreter. The State filed a petition alleging abuse, and both parents initially denied the allegations. The children were placed in the custody of the Department of Family Services, and a permanency plan for family reunification with the mother was adopted.The District Court of Uinta County held several hearings, ensuring the father had access to an interpreter and legal counsel. During the proceedings, concerns about the father’s competency arose, but no formal motion for a competency evaluation was made. The father ultimately stipulated to the adjudication of neglect after being advised of his rights and confirming his understanding and voluntariness. Later, the father’s counsel sought to withdraw, citing communication difficulties, but the court denied the motion, finding no extraordinary circumstances. When the father was incarcerated out of state, the court attempted to facilitate his participation in the disposition hearing, but he could only appear by phone, which was ineffective due to his hearing impairment. The court proceeded, denied the father’s motion to dismiss, and ordered the children to remain in state custody.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decisions. The Court held that deficiencies in the neglect petition did not deprive the juvenile court of subject matter jurisdiction, that a parent in neglect proceedings does not have a due process right to a competency evaluation, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying counsel’s withdrawal. The Court also found no due process violation in proceeding with the disposition hearing without the father’s physical presence, given the circumstances and his representation by counsel. View "In the Interest of SP v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the division of retirement benefits following the divorce of William S. Perreira and Gertrude B. Perreira (now Gertrude B. Haia). In 1990, the Family Court of the Third Circuit awarded Gertrude a percentage of William’s State of Hawai‘i Employees’ Retirement System (ERS) benefits, with payments to begin when William became eligible to retire. William qualified for retirement in 1999, but Gertrude did not receive payments. In 2008, she moved to enforce the division order. The family court granted her motion in 2012, awarding her 31% of William’s pension as valued at his retirement eligibility date. Gertrude later sought further relief in 2017, alleging William failed to disclose information and make payments, resulting in a 2019 order awarding her interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs.William appealed the 2019 orders to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing that Gertrude’s 2008 motion was barred by the ten-year statute of limitations under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 657-5. While the appeal was pending, Gertrude moved for entry of a Hawai‘i Domestic Relations Order (HiDRO) under HRS § 88-93.5, which the family court granted in 2021, directing ERS to pay her William’s entire monthly pension until her award was satisfied. William appealed the HiDRO order, contending that the statute could not be applied retroactively.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that Gertrude’s 2008 motion to enforce was not time-barred, as her right to enforce the judgment accrued when William became eligible to retire in 1999. The court further held that the application of HRS § 88-93.5 to effectuate the HiDRO was not an ex post facto violation, as the statute is civil and merely enforces existing rights. The ICA’s judgment was affirmed. View "Perreira v. Perreira" on Justia Law

Two children, born in Utah in 2016 and 2018 to parents who met as teenagers and struggled with substance abuse, moved with their mother and maternal grandparents to Maui in December 2019. The father relocated to Maui a few months later. Both parents had periods of sobriety and relapse, and the children were exposed to instability, including domestic violence involving the mother’s boyfriend. In 2021, the mother sought sole custody, alleging the father sexually abused the children. The father denied the allegations and sought sole custody and permission to relocate the children to Utah.The Family Court of the Second Circuit held a bench trial, during which the mother attempted to introduce testimony from fact and expert witnesses regarding the credibility of the children’s disclosures of abuse, as well as hearsay evidence about those disclosures. The court excluded this testimony, relying on State v. Batangan, which prohibits expert or lay testimony on the credibility of child sexual abuse victims. The court also excluded certain hearsay evidence, finding the mother failed to meet the requirements for exceptions under the Hawaiʻi Rules of Evidence. After considering the statutory best interest factors, the court awarded the father sole legal and physical custody, allowed him to relocate the children to Utah, and granted the mother supervised visitation. The court found no confirmed sexual abuse by the father and determined the mother had misused the protection from abuse process.The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the family court’s decision. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi also affirmed, holding that the family court properly excluded testimony regarding the children’s credibility, correctly applied evidentiary rules, and did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody and approving relocation. The court found the family court’s findings were supported by sufficient evidence and that the best interests of the children were served by the custody and relocation order. View "KP v. EM." on Justia Law

A married couple with three children sought dissolution of their marriage after nearly two decades together. The parties’ relationship had become highly contentious, with each parent seeking custody of the children and making allegations about the other’s parenting, mental health, and conduct. During the proceedings, a temporary protection order was issued, later modified, and the parties alternated between joint and sole custody arrangements for their children. At trial, both sides presented extensive evidence, including testimony from psychologists, therapists, family members, and friends, regarding the children’s best interests, the parents’ mental health, and allegations of alienation and abuse.The District Court for Lancaster County, Nebraska, conducted a bench trial and ultimately dissolved the marriage. The court awarded joint legal custody but granted primary physical custody and final decision-making authority over medical, educational, and religious matters to the mother. The court found that, while both parents had strengths and weaknesses, the mother generally acted in the children’s best interests, and the father’s actions had contributed to alienation of the children from their mother. The court also divided the marital estate, awarding the mother the marital home and the father a cabin, and ordered the father to pay alimony, a portion of the children’s extracurricular expenses, and attorney fees. Both parties filed post-trial motions, resulting in minor amendments to the decree.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo, applying an abuse of discretion standard. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that the custody determination, allocation of extracurricular expenses, division of property, alimony, and attorney fee awards were all within the trial court’s discretion and supported by the evidence. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court’s order in all respects. View "Scott v. Scott" on Justia Law

Gregory D. is the father of X.D., a child born in 2014. In 2015, Gregory D. kidnapped X.D. and her mother, assaulted the mother, and endangered X.D., leading to a prior dependency proceeding in which the mother was granted full custody and the father was allowed monitored visits, though he rarely exercised them. In December 2023, X.D.’s mother was killed during a violent incident, leaving X.D. without a parent to care for her. At that time, Gregory D. was incarcerated and had not been in contact with X.D. for years. X.D. was placed with her maternal grandmother.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County seeking dependency jurisdiction over X.D. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), citing the absence of a parent able to provide care. After Gregory D.’s whereabouts were discovered, he suggested his mother and brother as possible caregivers. The Department investigated and found the paternal grandmother’s home unsuitable due to her health and living conditions, and the paternal uncle was unresponsive and already caring for two young children. X.D. expressed fear of her father and no interest in living with his relatives.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that dependency jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (g), is appropriate when an incarcerated parent cannot arrange for suitable, reliable, or appropriate care for the child, even if the parent suggests relatives who are unwilling or unable to provide such care. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s order exerting dependency jurisdiction over X.D. and ordering reunification services for Gregory D. View "In re X.D." on Justia Law