Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the foster parents of a minor child, J, who were initially granted intervenor status in neglect proceedings concerning J. The trial court later removed them as intervenors based on the Appellate Court's decision in In re Ryan C., which concluded that nonrelative foster parents are precluded by statute from intervening in neglect proceedings. The foster parents appealed this decision, arguing that In re Ryan C. was wrongly decided. While their appeal was pending, the trial court held a hearing on a motion to revoke J's commitment to the Commissioner's custody and transferred guardianship to J's biological father. The foster parents also filed a writ of error challenging this decision.The trial court initially granted the foster parents' motion to intervene in the neglect proceedings. However, after the Appellate Court's decision in In re Ryan C., the trial court removed them as intervenors. The foster parents appealed this removal, claiming that the decision in In re Ryan C. was incorrect. Subsequently, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to revoke J's commitment and transferred guardianship to J's biological father. The foster parents were not allowed to attend the entire hearing or give a sworn statement after hearing the evidence, which they claimed violated their right to be heard under the statute.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that In re Ryan C. was wrongly decided and must be overruled. The court held that the statute does not bar a trial court from granting a foster parent's request for permissive intervention in the dispositional phase of a neglect proceeding. The court reversed the trial court's order removing the foster parents as intervenors and granted the writ of error, remanding the case for a new revocation hearing. The court also concluded that the foster parents' right to be heard includes the right to be present throughout the proceeding and to argue at the appropriate time as to the child's best interest in light of the evidence presented. View "In re Jewelyette M." on Justia Law

A woman, Sarah Ann Miles, entered into an oral traditional surrogacy agreement with Jeffrey Gerstein, a single gay man, to conceive and bear a child using her ova and his sperm. The agreement stipulated that Gerstein would be the sole parent, and Miles would not assume any parental role. The child, E., was born in December 2013, and both parties adhered to the terms of the agreement for seven years, with Gerstein acting as the sole parent and Miles having limited, non-parental interaction with E.The Superior Court of Sacramento County reviewed the case when Miles filed a petition in May 2021 to establish her parental relationship with E., seeking joint custody and visitation. Gerstein opposed, asserting the surrogacy agreement. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found clear and convincing evidence of a valid oral surrogacy agreement, determining that Miles was not E.'s parent under the agreement and that it was not in E.'s best interest for Miles to assume a parental role.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the oral traditional surrogacy agreement was enforceable under California law, which does not require all surrogacy agreements to be in writing. The court found that the agreement did not lack a lawful object and that Miles's parentage was not established under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) due to the clear intention and conduct of the parties. The court also concluded that enforcing the agreement did not violate public policy or Miles's constitutional rights, as she never assumed a parental role in E.'s life. The judgment was affirmed, and Miles was ordered to pay Gerstein's costs on appeal. View "Miles v. Gernstein" on Justia Law

Benjamin Jones and Melanie Jones were married in 2003 and have two minor children. They resided in Glenburn, North Dakota, and purchased a modular home and surrounding acreage from Melanie's parents under a contract for deed. During the COVID-19 pandemic, payments on the contract were suspended, and no payments have been made since, leaving an outstanding debt. In March 2023, Benjamin filed for divorce. In February 2024, Melanie's father notified the parties of his intention to declare default and cancel the contract for deed. The trial was held later that month.The District Court of Renville County granted the divorce, awarded primary residential responsibility of the children to Benjamin, and divided the property and debts. The court found zero equity in the marital home due to nonpayment and the intention to foreclose. It reserved ruling on the final value of the marital home and debt consolidation loan for six months. The court awarded Melanie spousal support of $900 per month for 10 years and ordered her to pay $590 per month in child support.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the award of primary residential responsibility to Benjamin, finding no clear error in the lower court's decision. However, it reversed the lower court's reservation of ruling on the marital home and debt consolidation loan valuations, as well as the valuation of the marital home and corresponding debt without specific findings on the valuation date. The Supreme Court also found error in the child support calculation for omitting spousal support and in-kind income.The Supreme Court remanded the case for the lower court to clarify the valuation date for the marital property and debt, make specific findings if another valuation date is fair and equitable, redistribute the marital estate if valuations change, reconsider spousal support in light of any redistribution, and recalculate child support to include spousal support. View "Jones v. Jones" on Justia Law

Crystal Lorene Limary and Shaun Patrick McLean were married in 2015 and had one child together. They moved into a house purchased by Shaun's parents in 2016, making monthly payments to them until 2019 when Shaun took out a mortgage to buy the house, using a $70,000 gift of equity from his parents as a down payment. Crystal filed for divorce, and the couple disagreed on the classification of the house, the $70,000 gift, a camper trailer, and the parenting schedule for their daughter.The magistrate court held a four-day trial, during which it extensively questioned the parties and witnesses. The court determined that the house and camper trailer were community property and that the $70,000 was a gift to both Crystal and Shaun. Shaun appealed, arguing that the magistrate court's conduct at trial was inappropriate and biased. The district court agreed, finding that the magistrate court's active participation obscured the reliability of its decision. The district court vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to reassign it to a different judge.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the district court's decision and affirmed it. The court held that the magistrate court abused its discretion by extensively questioning the parties and witnesses, which affected Shaun's right to a fair trial. The court concluded that the district court did not err in vacating the judgment and remanding the case for a new trial with a different magistrate judge. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal, but costs were awarded to Shaun as the prevailing party. View "Limary v. McLean" on Justia Law

Charlene Monfore petitioned for guardianship and conservatorship over her mother, Gerda Flyte, who suffers from dementia. Gerda’s son, Roger Flyte, objected and requested to be appointed instead. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found it was not in Gerda’s best interests to appoint either Charlene or Roger and instead appointed Black Hills Advocate, LLC (BHA), a for-profit corporation. Charlene appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by not appointing her and lacked statutory authority to appoint a for-profit organization.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Fall River County, South Dakota, initially appointed Charlene as temporary guardian and conservator. Roger objected, raising concerns about Gerda’s care under Charlene, including medical neglect and financial mismanagement. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the court found both Charlene and Roger unsuitable due to various concerns, including Charlene’s failure to provide necessary medical care and financial mismanagement, and Roger’s financial irresponsibility and anger issues. The court appointed BHA as guardian and conservator.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint Charlene, given the evidence of her inadequate care and financial mismanagement. However, the Supreme Court found that SDCL 29A-5-110 does not authorize the appointment of for-profit entities as guardians or conservators, except for qualified banks or trust companies as conservators. Therefore, the appointment of BHA was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also awarded Roger one-half of his requested appellate attorney fees. View "Guardianship And Conservatorship Of Flyte" on Justia Law

Pat Doe and Jarrod Burnham each filed complaints for protection from abuse against each other in December 2021. Doe's complaint was transferred to Portland for a consolidated hearing, where the court found that Burnham had abused Doe and granted her a two-year protection order effective until January 14, 2024. On January 4, 2024, Doe attempted to file a motion to extend the protection order in Bangor but was informed it needed to be filed in Portland. She mailed the motion on January 13, 2024, but it never arrived due to insufficient postage. Doe learned the order had not been extended on January 17, 2024, and filed a new protection from abuse action in Bangor.The District Court in Portland denied Doe's motion to extend the protection order, concluding it could not extend an expired order. Doe's motion for reconsideration was also denied, with the court finding that her failure to file on time was not excusable neglect and that the statute did not permit extending an expired order. Doe then filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing excusable neglect, which was also denied. The court stated that excusable neglect under M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) did not apply to statutory deadlines.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decisions, holding that 19-A M.R.S. § 4111(1) unambiguously prohibits extending an expired protection order. The court also held that a motion for relief from judgment cannot be used to circumvent statutory authority, and thus the trial court did not err in denying Doe's motion for relief from judgment. View "Doe v. Burnham" on Justia Law

Michaela Boland filed for divorce in October 2019. In September 2022, the parties reached a settlement agreement regarding the economic issues of their divorce, which was accepted by the court. The agreement included a provision for Nicholas Belair to transfer $50,000 annually to Michaela for five years, secured by a promissory note from Nicholas's father, Roland Belair. However, Roland later reneged on his commitment to fund the payments, leading Michaela to file a motion to enforce the settlement agreement.The District Court (Tice, J.) denied Michaela's motion to enforce the settlement agreement, finding that the agreement was based on a material mistake of fact and was therefore unenforceable. The court concluded that Nicholas could not make the payments without his father's assistance and set the matter for trial. Michaela appealed, but the appeal was dismissed as interlocutory. The court (D. Driscoll, J.) later held a bench trial and determined that Nicholas's interest in a real estate company was nonmarital property, leading to a final divorce judgment.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and held that the settlement agreement was enforceable. The court found that all requirements for a binding settlement agreement were met, as the parties had reported the agreement to the court, read its terms into the record, and expressed clear consent. The court concluded that there was no mistake of fact at the time the agreement was reached, as Roland had agreed to fund the payments. The court vacated the order denying Michaela's motion to enforce, vacated the divorce judgment, and remanded for incorporation of the settlement agreement into a divorce judgment. View "Boland v. Belair" on Justia Law

This case involves the termination of parental rights and an adoption proceeding. Jane Doe 1 ("Mother") and John Doe ("Father") had a child out of wedlock. Approximately eight months after the child's birth, Mother and her fiancé filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights and allow the fiancé to adopt the child. Mother did not serve the petition on Father, and he did not participate in the proceedings. The magistrate court terminated Father's parental rights and granted the adoption. Father later filed two motions to set aside the judgment, arguing that his due process rights were violated due to lack of notice. This appeal concerns Father's second motion.The magistrate court denied Father's second motion, finding it barred by res judicata. The district court disagreed, reversed the magistrate court's order, and remanded the matter for the magistrate court to consider the motion on its merits. Mother appealed, arguing that Father's motion was barred by procedural doctrines, including res judicata and waiver.The Supreme Court of Idaho held that Father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion alleged a fundamental error that deprived him of his right to procedural due process, which in turn violated his fundamental constitutional right to raise his child. The Court concluded that the fundamental error doctrine applies to create an exception to the doctrines of res judicata and waiver. The Court affirmed the district court's decision and remanded the matter to the magistrate court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion was timely and, if so, whether the termination and adoption judgment is void. The Court also awarded partial attorney fees to Father for defending against certain arguments raised by Mother on appeal. View "Doe v. Doe" on Justia Law

Petitioner mother C.V. appealed the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the reasons for termination were instances of noncompliance known to the Department of Human Services (DHS) throughout the proceedings but not raised until disposition. Specifically, Petitioner was directed to participate in mental health counseling but refused, and there were two isolated incidents of improper contact with the child. Despite these issues, DHS advised the court at various hearings that Petitioner was compliant and doing well with her improvement period. Petitioner underwent a psychological evaluation, which recommended intensive psychotherapy and medication management. Following this report, DHS sought termination of her parental rights.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County initially granted Petitioner an improvement period, during which she was reported to be compliant with services. However, after the psychological evaluation, DHS changed its position and sought termination based on her failure to seek mental health treatment and visitation violations. The circuit court terminated Petitioner’s parental rights, finding that she had not met her burden of proof and had not addressed her mental health issues.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court had impermissibly shifted the burden of proof onto Petitioner. The court emphasized that DHS always has the burden of proof in abuse and neglect cases and must provide clear and convincing evidence to support termination of parental rights. The court vacated the dispositional order and remanded the case for a new dispositional hearing, allowing for further exploration of Petitioner’s mental health treatment and current status. View "In re K.V." on Justia Law

In 2023, Basin Authority, a Wyoming Child Support Agency, notified Rodolfo P. Munoz that he was in arrears on his child support obligation and began garnishing his social security. Mr. Munoz filed a complaint against the State of Wyoming, the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS), and some of its employees, as well as Basin Authority and several of its employees. He alleged breach of contract and violations of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed Mr. Munoz’s complaint after a hearing.The district court of Big Horn County granted the motions to dismiss filed by the State Defendants and the Basin Authority Defendants. The court found that Mr. Munoz had not made allegations against the State Defendants and that they were not subject to suit under § 1983 because they are not “persons” within the meaning of the statute. The court also found that a breach of contract claim is not actionable under § 1983 and that the alleged agreement was void and unenforceable. Mr. Munoz’s objection and response to the State Defendants’ proposed order on the motion to dismiss and his motion for reconsideration were denied.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and summarily affirmed the district court’s decision. The court noted that Mr. Munoz failed to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure and did not present cogent arguments supported by pertinent authority. The court emphasized that even pro se litigants must adhere to procedural rules and present coherent arguments. The court concluded that summary affirmance was appropriate due to the deficiencies in Mr. Munoz’s brief and his failure to present relevant legal arguments. View "Munoz v. State of Wyoming" on Justia Law