Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Tara Starr petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to Thomas Starr, with the principal dispute centering on the date of separation—Tara claimed 2012 and Thomas asserted 2020. Tara’s original petition alleged a separation date of March 20, 2009, but after retaining counsel, she amended her petition to allege June 2, 2020, as the separation date. Throughout subsequent proceedings, including case management statements, trial briefs, and settlement conference statements, Tara consistently maintained that the actual separation occurred in 2012, and Thomas continued to dispute her position, claiming September 2020.The Contra Costa County Superior Court presided over pretrial and trial proceedings. The matter was bifurcated to first determine the separation date. At the trial, the court, sua sponte, raised the issue that Tara was bound by her amended petition’s allegation of June 2, 2020, as the separation date and suggested there was no controversy. Despite both parties previously treating the date as contested and preparing for trial on that issue, the court held Tara to the June 2020 date, after Thomas ultimately accepted it, and entered an order accordingly. Tara’s subsequent motion to set aside the order was denied, with the court finding her pleading to be a deliberate litigation strategy and not a mistake.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that Tara’s amended petition did not constitute a binding judicial admission regarding the date of separation, as Thomas had consistently contested the allegation throughout the litigation, and both parties prepared for trial on the disputed issue. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for further proceedings to determine the separation date, denying Tara’s request for reassignment to a different judge. Tara was awarded costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Starr" on Justia Law

Lucas Alzu and Amy Nichole Huff met in Colombia in 2018 and began a romantic relationship that led to Huff becoming pregnant. Both led highly nomadic lives, moving frequently and attending international gatherings. In July 2019, due to expiring Colombian visas, they decided to relocate to Argentina, where Alzu’s family lived, for the birth of their child. Huff moved to Argentina when six months pregnant, but soon left Alzu’s family home because of physical assault and lived independently before Alzu joined her again. Their child was born in March 2020, and the COVID-19 pandemic shortly thereafter restricted travel. Following a breakdown in their relationship in 2021, Huff was granted an order of protection and, after travel restrictions were lifted, obtained permission from an Argentinian court to travel with the child. Instead of returning, Huff remained in the United States and began working full-time.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri bifurcated proceedings to first determine the child’s habitual residence under the Hague Convention and International Child Abduction Remedies Act. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Alzu had not established Argentina as the child’s habitual residence and dismissed his petition for return of the child.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s determination for clear error, applying the totality-of-the-circumstances standard as required by Supreme Court precedent. The appellate court found that the district court properly weighed factors such as parental intentions, immigration status, the child’s age, residency, family relationships, and pandemic-related restrictions. The Eighth Circuit held that Alzu had not met his burden to show Argentina was the child’s habitual residence and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Alzu v. Huff" on Justia Law

A mother with a history of involvement with the Department of Family Services had her youngest child, BAR, removed from her care after police found her intoxicated, in possession of methamphetamine, and responsible for leaving children unattended in a running vehicle. She was subsequently arrested and convicted of child endangerment. The Department developed a reunification case plan focused on sobriety, mental health, stable housing, and parenting skills. Despite receiving significant support and services from the Department, the mother repeatedly failed to comply with her case plan. She did not maintain sobriety, attend counseling consistently, or secure stable housing, and her visitation with BAR was sporadic. Her progress was further hampered by recurring involvement in unstable and sometimes violent relationships and continued substance abuse.The District Court of Natrona County first placed BAR in the Department’s custody following an abuse and neglect petition. The juvenile court initially pursued a reunification plan but later shifted to a plan of adoption due to the mother’s lack of progress. After a five-day bench trial, the district court found clear and convincing evidence that BAR had been in foster care for at least fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and that the mother was unfit to have custody and control of BAR, citing ongoing instability, untreated mental health issues, substance abuse, and lack of consistent visitation. The court terminated the mother's parental rights under Wyoming Statute § 14-2-309(a)(v).On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming reviewed whether sufficient evidence supported termination under the statute. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that clear and convincing evidence established the statutory grounds for termination based on the mother’s unfitness and the duration of BAR’s time in foster care. View "B.A.R. v. State Ex Rel. Department of Family Services" on Justia Law

A married couple initiated divorce proceedings, with the primary dispute centering on the date of their separation. The wife, Tara, initially claimed in her petition that the separation occurred in 2009, while the husband, Thomas, claimed it was in September 2020. Tara later amended her petition, with the assistance of counsel, to allege a separation date of June 2, 2020. Despite this, in subsequent filings and during trial preparation, Tara consistently asserted that the actual separation occurred in 2012 and provided evidence and argument to support this claim. Both parties, through multiple attorneys and case management statements, continued to treat the date of separation as a contested issue, preparing for trial on whether the separation occurred in 2012 or 2020.The Contra Costa County Superior Court addressed the issue during a bifurcated trial. On the day of trial, the court, on its own initiative, declared that Tara was bound by the June 2, 2020 separation date alleged in her amended petition, characterizing it as a binding judicial admission. The court reasoned that Tara’s failure to formally amend her petition again prevented her from arguing a different date. When Thomas ultimately accepted the June 2, 2020 date to avoid trial, the court adopted this date as the legal separation and denied Tara’s subsequent motion to set aside the order or to permit another amendment to her petition.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that under the circumstances, the trial court erred in treating the separation date in the amended petition as a judicial admission binding Tara. The appellate court explained that a judicial admission requires the adverse party not to contest the allegation, which did not occur here, as Thomas continued to dispute the separation date throughout the proceedings until the trial began. The order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings to determine the actual date of separation. The appellate court declined to order reassignment to a different trial judge. View "Marriage of Starr" on Justia Law

A father and mother, previously married and sharing a child, were involved in an ongoing custody arrangement. After initial divorce proceedings, the mother was permitted unmonitored visitation with the child. In late 2023 and early 2024, the father alleged that the mother’s behavior had become increasingly erratic, including stalking, repeated unwanted visits to his home, entering his residence and car without permission, incessant calls and texts, following him and the child in her car, and making threats related to his employment and family. The father stated these actions caused fear for both himself and their child, prompting him to seek a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) and restored monitored visitation for the mother. The mother denied the allegations, attributing her actions to concern for the child’s safety and referencing her mental health history.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County heard testimony from both parties and considered evidence including text messages, videos, and the mother’s admissions. The court acknowledged that the mother’s conduct was obsessive and alarming but found that the behavior stemmed from her mental health condition rather than malicious intent. The court concluded that the father had not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the mother’s actions constituted abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), specifically focusing on whether her conduct was intentionally threatening or intimidating. The court denied the DVRO but ordered professionally monitored visitation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, found that the trial court misapplied the standard for abuse under the DVPA by requiring proof of intent to threaten or intimidate, rather than considering the totality of the circumstances and the effect of the conduct. The appellate court held that the uncontradicted evidence established abuse as defined by the DVPA and reversed the trial court’s order, remanding with directions to enter the requested DVRO. View "R.R. v. C.R." on Justia Law

Kathleen L. Jellison filed for divorce from Ralph E. Jellison, and the District Court incorporated the parties’ agreement regarding the division of marital assets. Kathleen was awarded the marital home, valued at $250,000 and subject to a $45,823.58 home equity loan, while Ralph received the Verso 401(k) account with a similar value. Both parties and the court agreed this was an equitable division, though Kathleen later contended she had not entered the agreement knowingly and voluntarily, and sought to hold Ralph responsible for half of the home equity debt.After the original judgment, Kathleen filed post-judgment motions, and the District Court amended its judgment to order Ralph to pay $30,000 from his 401(k) to Kathleen, which she was to apply to the home equity loan. Kathleen appealed, arguing the asset division remained inequitable. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the amended judgment in Jellison v. Jellison, Mem-24-115. Ralph did not cross-appeal.Subsequently, Ralph filed motions for relief from judgment under Rule 60(a) and then Rule 60(b), arguing that the provision requiring him to pay $30,000 was a mistake. The District Court granted relief under Rule 60(b), striking the payment provision and amending the judgment. Kathleen appealed this order.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the District Court erred in granting Ralph’s Rule 60(b) motion because it conflicted with the appellate mandate affirming the amended judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court clarified that a lower court may not modify matters expressly or impliedly disposed of on appeal, and Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for appellate review or a means to challenge issues not raised on direct appeal. The order granting Ralph’s motion for relief from judgment was vacated, and the case was remanded with instructions to deny the motion. View "Jellison v. Jellison" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a domestic-abuse complaint in Rhode Island District Court, alleging that the defendant forced her to engage in sexual relations by force or duress. An ex parte temporary protective order was issued, prohibiting contact and requiring the defendant to surrender firearms. Following a hearing, the District Court granted a final order of protection for three years, continuing the firearm restrictions under relevant Rhode Island statutes.The defendant appealed to the Kent County Superior Court, which held a de novo bench trial. At trial, the judge stated he would apply a clear and convincing evidence standard, rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard typically used in civil cases, due to the temporary deprivation of the defendant’s firearm rights. The judge concluded that the plaintiff did not meet this higher burden of proof, found the defendant’s evidence more credible, and dismissed the complaint, dissolving the protective order. The plaintiff then appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo, focusing solely on the appropriate burden of proof for civil protective orders involving temporary restrictions of firearm rights. The Court held that the preponderance of the evidence is the correct standard in such proceedings, notwithstanding the Second Amendment implications or statutory provisions regarding firearm surrender. The Court found no legislative intent to require a higher standard, and emphasized that temporary restrictions do not amount to a significant deprivation of liberty requiring heightened proof. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded for a new hearing under the preponderance of the evidence standard. View "Andrew v. Adorno" on Justia Law

A businessman and rancher in South Dakota, after dating a Colorado horse breeder for nearly a year, proposed marriage. Shortly before the wedding, he presented her with a prenuptial agreement drafted by his attorney. The agreement waived her right to any share of his estate after his death. The parties signed the agreement at the attorney’s office minutes before their civil ceremony. They were later married in Italy and had two children. The businessman died approximately eight years later. The surviving spouse then petitioned for an elective share of the estate and a family allowance, claiming her signature on the agreement was involuntary and the agreement was unconscionable.The Fourth Judicial Circuit Court of Dewey County, South Dakota, held a trial on her petition. The court granted her request for a family allowance but denied her petition for an elective share. The court found she voluntarily signed the agreement and that it was not unconscionable, emphasizing her education, business experience, and opportunity to review the agreement or consult independent counsel. The court also found that the financial disclosures provided were fair and reasonable, and that the terms of the agreement, including a provision for her in the event of divorce, were not disproportionate or unjust. Stephanie appealed the denial of her elective share.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court held that the prenuptial agreement was voluntarily executed and was not unconscionable under South Dakota law. It found no clear error in the circuit court’s factual findings and determined that the financial disclosure and circumstances surrounding execution of the agreement satisfied statutory requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed the validity and enforceability of the prenuptial agreement and the waiver of the elective share. View "Estate Of Webb" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Corey Raber and Michael Robert Raber married in Texas and later moved to Idaho, where their only child was born. After marital difficulties, Mother filed for divorce in Idaho in 2022. Initially, Child lived with Mother in Coeur d’Alene, while Father had weekend visitation. Mother resumed part-time legal work and began traveling with Child to Texas. A temporary custody schedule was modified in June 2023 to a week-on/week-off rotation, resulting in Child regularly traveling between Idaho and Texas. Following an evaluation by a psychologist recommending Mother be allowed to relocate to Texas with primary custody, the magistrate court proposed two alternative custody schedules depending on Mother’s residence, ultimately finalizing custody without articulating a best-interests-of-the-child analysis.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho previously vacated the magistrate court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the magistrate court to exercise discretion regarding the scope of proceedings. On remand, Judge Anna Eckhart declined to consider new evidence or hold a new trial, instead relying on previous records and issuing findings that prioritized Child’s remaining in Idaho and continuing a week-on/week-off schedule if Mother returned to Idaho. If Mother remained in Texas, the court applied the psychologist’s recommended visitation schedule for Father, granting Mother one long weekend per month. Judge Katherine Murdock later entered judgment memorializing this custody and child support order after Judge Eckhart’s retirement. Mother appealed, challenging the custody determination and child support calculation.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Idaho found the magistrate court abused its discretion by relying on a clearly erroneous factual finding regarding Child’s residence and by conducting an incomplete best-interests-of-the-child analysis. The court also found error in the child support calculation and its lack of supporting analysis. Thus, the Supreme Court of Idaho vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial before a different magistrate judge, instructing the court to consider all relevant evidence and properly analyze the child’s best interests. View "Raber v. Raber" on Justia Law

The case concerns a child, DC, who was removed from his parents’ care shortly after birth due to substantiated concerns about neglect, failure to thrive, domestic violence, mental health issues, substance abuse, and instability within the family. The child was placed with maternal grandparents, and a permanency plan for family reunification was established. The father, AC, was given a case plan with specific requirements addressing sobriety, mental health, parenting skills, stable housing, and employment. Over the next eighteen months, the father was incarcerated for nearly a year of that period, including a new sentence of five to seven years for felony offenses. He failed to make consistent progress on his case plan goals, particularly concerning mental health and substance abuse treatment, employment, and securing stable housing.The District Court of Platte County—sitting as a juvenile court—initially ordered reunification, then shifted to a concurrent goal of reunification and adoption as the father’s progress stalled and his incarceration continued. The Department of Family Services documented extensive, tailored efforts to facilitate reunification, including arranging for services while the father was both in and out of custody. Despite these efforts, the father did not meaningfully participate in or complete the required treatment, counseling, or parenting programs. At an evidentiary review hearing, the court found the Department’s efforts reasonable and accessible, and that it was in the child’s best interests to change the permanency plan to adoption. The father appealed the change, arguing insufficient efforts were made to accommodate his incarceration.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the juvenile court’s decision for abuse of discretion. It held that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify father and child, even considering the constraints of incarceration, and that the child’s need for stability outweighed the father’s incomplete progress. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s order changing the permanency plan to adoption. View "In the Interest Of: DC" on Justia Law