Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In this juvenile dependency case, the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) removed two children from their mother's home due to concerns of neglect. The juvenile court detained the children and ordered family reunification services for both parents, allowing CFS to provide relative visits as appropriate. The children were placed with their paternal grandmother. The maternal grandmother, R.H., frequently interfered with the parents' visitation schedules, leading to conflicts and an altercation at the children's school.The juvenile court found that visits with the maternal grandmother were detrimental to the children's well-being and ordered that she have no further visits. R.H. filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to reinstate her visits, but the court summarily denied the petition, finding no new evidence or changed circumstances and that visits were not in the children's best interest.R.H. appealed, claiming the juvenile court violated her due process rights by acting on an oral motion without following procedural requirements. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that grandparents who are not acting in a parental role have no constitutionally protected right to visit dependent children, and thus, R.H.'s due process challenge failed. The court also found that the juvenile court had the authority to modify the visitation order on its own motion and that any procedural error was harmless.The appellate court concluded that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that visits with the maternal grandmother were detrimental to the children's well-being. The orders denying her further visits and summarily denying her section 388 petition were not abuses of discretion. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's orders. View "In re R.M." on Justia Law

Kiril Lozanov and Capital City Renewables, Inc. (CCR) appealed a Superior Court decision granting summary judgment in favor of Lily B. Piel. Lozanov and CCR alleged that Piel, a former employee, accessed and disclosed Lozanov’s personal emails without authorization, which included confidential information about a wind project unrelated to CCR. Lozanov claimed that Piel’s actions led to increased child support obligations and health issues due to stress from related litigation.The Superior Court dismissed CCR’s claim for intrusion upon seclusion, as the company did not have a right to privacy in Lozanov’s emails. Lozanov’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was also dismissed, as the court found Piel’s conduct was not outrageous enough to warrant such a claim. The court allowed Lozanov’s intrusion upon seclusion claim to proceed but ultimately granted summary judgment for Piel on all counts, finding no evidence that Piel’s actions caused the alleged damages.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The court found no evidence that Piel breached any duty owed to CCR or that her actions caused the damages claimed by Lozanov and CCR. The court also concluded that CCR's and Lozanov’s damages were too remote and speculative to support their claims. Additionally, the court noted that public policy considerations barred recovery, as Lozanov’s attempt to hide assets in a child support proceeding was contrary to the best interests of the child and public policy. View "Capital City Renewables, Inc. v. Piel" on Justia Law

Sarah A. Backhaus and David R. Backhaus were married in 2010 and separated in February 2021. Sarah filed for divorce in April 2022. During the marriage, David received an inheritance, which he deposited into a jointly held savings account (account x4020). At the time of their separation, the account had a balance of $323,571.70. David claimed that the funds in the account were nonmarital, originating from his inheritance, while Sarah contended that the funds were marital property.The district court for Douglas County held a two-day trial in March 2023. David testified about his inheritance and its source, explaining that the funds were deposited into account x4020. He also described various expenditures made from the inheritance, including cars, his education, and the startup costs for Sarah's business. The district court found David's testimony credible and determined that the funds in account x4020 were nonmarital property, awarding the balance to David.Sarah appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court's decision. The Court of Appeals concluded that David's testimony was insufficient to establish the nonmarital nature of the funds in account x4020, as it lacked specific details about the inheritance amount, its expenditure, and the account into which it was deposited. The Court of Appeals directed that the funds be included in the marital estate and divided equitably.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that David's testimony, along with circumstantial evidence, was sufficient to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that the funds in account x4020 were nonmarital. The court emphasized that credible testimony alone can establish a nonmarital interest in property. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to affirm the district court's order. View "Backhaus v. Backhaus" on Justia Law

Suzanne Jane Nagle and Gene Murray Nagle were married and divorced twice. They first married in August 1982 and divorced in December 2018. They remarried in August 2022 and separated in February 2023. During their second marriage, Gene, who was disabled, paid most of the couple’s expenses. Suzanne, who was not working at the time of the second divorce, initiated the divorce action in June 2023.The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, treated the parties’ second marriage as a long-term marriage and found that a near equal distribution of the marital estate was fair and equitable. The court awarded Suzanne property that she had previously waived her rights to in their first divorce. Gene Nagle filed a motion in limine to exclude certain testimony, which was denied. The court relied on the totality of the parties’ relationship for property distribution purposes and denied Suzanne’s request for spousal support. Gene Nagle timely appealed the court’s property distribution.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and concluded that the district court’s equitable distribution of the marital estate under the Ruff-Fischer guidelines was clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred by treating the second marriage as long-term and by equally dividing the marital property without sufficient evidence to support such a division. The court emphasized that the duration of the marriage refers to the marriage being dissolved and should be considered separately from any prior marriages. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s property division and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, allowing the district court to reconsider the issue of spousal support in conjunction with the property division. View "Nagle v. Nagle" on Justia Law

County officials in Trinity County, California, obtained warrants to take Patricia and Stanley Miroth's children into protective custody, leading to the termination of their parental rights by a state court. The Miroths alleged that the officials failed to provide required social services and committed fraud in the state child custody proceedings, which led to the termination of their parental rights. After unsuccessful appeals in state court, the Miroths filed a federal lawsuit seeking money damages for these alleged wrongs.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed the federal claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. The district court found that the Miroths were essentially seeking relief from the state court judgments and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because the Miroths' claims did not seek relief from or reversal of the state court's order. Instead, they sought money damages for alleged legal wrongs by adverse parties that preceded the state court's order. The court emphasized that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is limited to cases where the federal plaintiff asserts injury caused by a state court judgment and seeks relief from that judgment. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings. View "MIROTH V. COUNTY OF TRINITY" on Justia Law

The case involves a divorce dispute between a husband and wife who married in 1993 and had two children. They lived in various locations, including Paris, France, due to the wife's job. In 2014, they moved to separate residences, with the wife claiming she intended to permanently separate and divorce her husband from that date. Despite participating in family activities together, the wife maintained that her intent to separate was continuous. The wife filed for divorce in 2019, citing a separation date of July 14, 2014, while the husband claimed the separation date was December 24, 2018, alleging adultery and desertion.The trial court ruled in favor of the wife, granting her a divorce based on the separation date of July 14, 2014. The husband appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, arguing that the intent to permanently separate must be continuous throughout the statutory period. The Court of Appeals held that the intent only needed to exist at the beginning of the separation period, affirming the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals' reasoning. The Supreme Court held that the intent to permanently separate must predominate throughout the statutory period, not just at the beginning. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, presuming that the trial court applied the correct standard and finding sufficient evidence to support the wife's continuous intent to separate. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the divorce decree on different grounds. View "Lisann v. Lisann" on Justia Law

Patrick Bolduc and Savannah Getchius were married in 2011 and have three minor children. Bolduc filed for divorce in 2021. After two unsuccessful mediations, a final divorce hearing was held in June 2023. The District Court awarded Bolduc sole parental rights and responsibilities and divided the marital property. The court found that Bolduc's property, purchased before the marriage, appreciated in value during the marriage due to both market forces and marital improvements.The District Court determined that the entire appreciation of the property during the marriage was marital property. The court also ordered Getchius to pay $325 weekly in child support and $10,000 of Bolduc's attorney fees. Bolduc filed motions for further findings and to alter the judgment, which the court mostly denied, except for making limited additional findings.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court's decision on the classification of the real property, agreeing that Bolduc did not meet his burden to prove that the appreciation was solely due to market forces. The court also upheld the child support order, finding no error in the calculation or the decision not to order Getchius to pay $1,800 for uninsured medical expenses. However, the court found that the attorney fee award was based on an affidavit that included fees unrelated to the divorce proceedings. The court vacated the attorney fee award and remanded for recalculation of the fees properly subject to an award in the divorce action. View "Bolduc v. Getchius" on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Resources filed a petition alleging that S.N.M. abused and neglected her three children, K.A, Jr., N.A, and J.B. The circuit court found abuse and neglect had occurred and terminated S.N.M.’s parental rights as to all three children. S.N.M. appealed, and the case was remanded with directions to determine if the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction as to J.B. and to rule on S.N.M.’s motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period. After remand, the circuit court denied the motion and terminated S.N.M.’s parental rights to J.B. again.The circuit court found that J.B.’s paternal grandmother had sought guardianship due to the parents' substance abuse and other issues. The court also found that J.B. visited her mother’s home and was subjected to the same conditions as her half-siblings. However, the record lacked evidence of when these visits occurred or if the conditions existed at the time of the petition’s filing. The circuit court denied a post-adjudicatory improvement period for S.N.M., citing her continued drug use, association with violent partners, and failure to acknowledge her substance abuse issues.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court’s decision to deny a post-adjudicatory improvement period for K.A., Jr., and N.A., finding no abuse of discretion. However, it reversed the termination of parental rights as to J.B., concluding that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court found that the circuit court’s findings were insufficient to establish jurisdiction over J.B. and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the petition regarding J.B. for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "In re K.A., N.A., and J.B." on Justia Law

In this case, the mother (K.G.) and father (J.G.) were involved in a custody dispute following their divorce. The mother was a victim of domestic violence perpetrated by the father, which triggered a rebuttable presumption under Family Code section 3044 that awarding custody to the father would be detrimental to the child's best interest. Despite this, the parents initially agreed to joint legal custody.The Superior Court of El Dorado County initially found that the father had committed domestic violence but awarded joint legal custody based on the parents' agreement. Later, the mother requested a modification to award her sole custody. A second judge reviewed the case and denied the mother's request, stating that the presumption had been rebutted, although no specific findings were made to support this conclusion.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the lower court had erred by not making the required findings to rebut the presumption under section 3044. The appellate court noted that the lower court failed to address the statutory factors and did not provide reasons for its decision in writing or on the record. The appellate court emphasized that the presumption is mandatory and must be properly applied, with specific findings made to determine if it has been rebutted.The appellate court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for a new hearing to reassess custody in light of the current circumstances and the presumption set forth in section 3044. The court directed the family court to enter a new custody order after applying the presumption and making the necessary findings. The mother was awarded her costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of J.G." on Justia Law

Christine Stary and Brady Ethridge divorced in 2018 and agreed to share custody of their three children. In March 2020, Stary was arrested and charged with felony injury to a child, but the charges were dismissed in February 2025. Ethridge applied for a civil protective order a week after Stary's arrest, alleging family violence and seeking an order lasting longer than two years. The trial court issued a temporary order preventing Stary from contacting her children. At the hearing, Ethridge testified about instances of Stary injuring the children, supported by medical records. Stary denied the allegations and testified on her own behalf. The trial court found that Stary committed felony family violence and issued a lifetime protective order prohibiting all contact between Stary and her children.The trial court's decision was appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas affirmed the order. The appellate court held that a lifetime protective order prohibiting a parent from contacting her children is not equivalent to terminating parental rights and does not require heightened procedural safeguards. One justice dissented, arguing that the order effectively terminated Stary's parental rights.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that constitutional due process requires clear and convincing evidence to support a protective order prohibiting contact between a parent and her children for longer than two years. The court emphasized that such orders profoundly interfere with a parent's fundamental right to care, custody, and control of their children. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, requiring the trial court to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard and consider the best interest of the children. View "STARY v. ETHRIDGE" on Justia Law