Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Two parents, both with ties to France and the United States, became embroiled in a contentious custody dispute over their twin children, who hold dual citizenship. After the parents’ relationship ended, the mother relocated with the children from France to Oregon. Both parents then initiated custody proceedings in their respective countries. The Oregon state court issued a restraining order preventing the father from removing the children from Oregon, but after a French court granted him joint custody and restricted the children’s departure from France, the father took the children back to France. The Oregon court subsequently granted the mother sole custody, held the father in contempt, and issued a warrant for his arrest. The mother later returned to France, took the children back to Oregon without the father’s consent, and French authorities began investigating her actions.The father filed a petition in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, seeking the return of the children to France. The mother moved to dismiss the petition, invoking the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine due to the father’s failure to resolve the Oregon arrest warrant and his absence from the state. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the petition, reasoning that the father’s conduct justified the harsh sanction of disentitlement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine must be narrowly applied in civil cases, and that the traditional justifications for the doctrine—enforceability, efficiency, dignity of the courts, deterrence, and abandonment—did not necessitate dismissal in this context. The court emphasized the importance of parental rights and the unique purposes of the Hague Convention. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for adjudication on the merits. View "PARIS V. BROWN" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between two parents, Molly and Bryan, over the termination of Bryan’s parental rights to their child, S.A.T. After their divorce, Molly had primary physical custody, and Bryan initially remained involved. In 2016, Bryan experienced a mental health crisis, resulting in an incident that led Molly to obtain a temporary protective order (TPO) against him, later extended to require Bryan to undergo psychological evaluation and counseling before resuming contact. Bryan, facing financial and legal barriers, did not see or communicate with the children for several years, though he made efforts to seek legal help and eventually complied with the TPO’s requirements once he had the means. In 2021, after Bryan completed the required treatment and paid child support arrears, Molly filed a petition to terminate his parental rights. The petition proceeded only as to S.A.T. after the other child, K.W.T., emancipated and subsequently passed away.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, reviewed the petition. After an evidentiary hearing, the court found that Molly failed to prove any grounds of parental fault—abandonment, neglect, or only token efforts to communicate or support—by clear and convincing evidence. The court noted that Bryan’s lack of contact was influenced by the TPO, financial hardship, and Molly’s actions to limit access, and that S.A.T. was well cared for in Molly’s custody.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that in private termination actions, severing parental rights based solely on token efforts to communicate or support is disfavored, especially when the child is safe and well cared for. The court also held that a parent does not admit a parental-fault ground merely by failing to oppose it in response to a termination petition. The order denying the petition to terminate Bryan’s parental rights was affirmed. View "In re Parental Rights as to S.A.T." on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization sought access to confidential court records from child protective and adoption proceedings involving a young girl who died after being placed in foster care and later adopted. The girl was reported missing in 2021, and her death was confirmed in 2023. The records also contained information about her siblings. The siblings, through their counsel, did not object to disclosure as long as their identities were protected through redactions. The Department of Human Services and the adoptive father opposed disclosure, arguing that the records were confidential and that redactions would not sufficiently protect privacy.The Family Court of the First Circuit denied the request, reasoning that releasing redacted records would be misleading and would not serve the public interest in understanding the response of agencies and the court to child abuse and neglect. The court concluded that the records should remain sealed, citing concerns about the completeness and potential for misunderstanding of the redacted information.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that, under Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes §§ 587A-40 and 578-15, public access to confidential child protective and adoption records is permitted when a foster child is missing, has suffered a near fatality, been critically injured, or has died, provided that information about living siblings is redacted to protect their privacy. The court overruled prior precedent to the extent it limited disclosure to only those purposes that further the best interests of the child, clarifying that a “legitimate purpose” for disclosure can exist independently. The court ordered the release of the redacted records and provided guidance for future requests, affirming the family court’s authority to require agencies to prepare redacted versions for public access. View "Public First Law Center v. Viola" on Justia Law

A child, X.D., was born in May 2022 and immediately placed for adoption by his biological mother, Jessica, due to her history of physical and verbal abuse by the child’s biological father, Raymon. Jessica had left Raymon after a violent incident during her pregnancy and sought refuge in a domestic violence shelter, cutting off communication with him. Raymon, who had a significant criminal history and ongoing substance abuse issues, was unaware of X.D.’s birth and believed Jessica had miscarried. The prospective adoptive parents, Cliff and Rebecca, cared for X.D. from birth. Jessica identified Raymon as the possible father in adoption documents but did not provide his contact information.After being notified of the adoption proceedings in January 2023, Raymon opposed the adoption, claiming he qualified as a “Kelsey S. father”—a status that would require his consent for adoption if he had demonstrated a full commitment to parental responsibilities. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found in Raymon’s favor, ruling that he qualified as a Kelsey S. father based on his financial and emotional support and that Jessica’s actions had prevented him from asserting his parental rights. The court ordered supervised visits for Raymon with X.D. and required that Raymon be introduced as a family friend, not as X.D.’s father.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the exclusion of key evidence—screenshots of Raymon’s threatening text messages—and the sufficiency of evidence supporting Raymon’s status as a Kelsey S. father. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in excluding the text message evidence, which was relevant and sufficiently authenticated. Considering this evidence, the appellate court found insufficient support for Raymon’s claim to Kelsey S. status and determined that it was not in X.D.’s best interest for Raymon to retain parental rights. The appellate court reversed the lower court’s order and directed that the adoption proceed. View "In re Adoption of X.D." on Justia Law

After the birth of a child who qualified as an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) in Alaska took emergency custody due to the mother’s substance use during pregnancy. Initially, no relatives were available for placement, so the child was placed with a non-relative foster parent. Nearly two and a half years later, the mother requested that the child be placed with his great-grandmother. OCS denied this request, citing unsafe conditions in the great-grandmother’s home, including excessive clutter that posed safety risks. The great-grandmother made some improvements but did not sufficiently address the concerns. OCS also expressed doubts about her judgment and ability to protect the child, referencing past incidents involving other family members.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, held a placement review hearing after the great-grandmother requested judicial review of OCS’s denial. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that OCS did not abuse its discretion in denying the placement, determining that the great-grandmother’s home remained unsuitable and that her past actions raised concerns about her ability to prioritize the child’s needs. The court also concluded that OCS was not required to provide the great-grandmother with reasonable efforts to make her home suitable, as she was not the child’s parent or guardian.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska considered whether ICWA required OCS to demonstrate “active efforts” to assist the great-grandmother in overcoming obstacles to placement. The court held that ICWA’s active efforts requirement applies to preserving or reunifying the family unit with a parent or Indian custodian, not to extended family members seeking placement. Therefore, OCS was not required to provide active efforts to the great-grandmother in this context. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision upholding OCS’s denial of placement. View "Betsy F. v. State" on Justia Law

Law enforcement responded to a report that a father struck his nine-year-old daughter, LC, in the head, causing her to fall and hit the floor. LC also reported verbal abuse, fear of retaliation, and concerns about inappropriate sexual behavior by her father, who is a registered sex offender. LC had a history of sexual exploitation or abuse by family members. The Wyoming Department of Family Services removed LC from the home, and the State filed a petition alleging physical and verbal abuse. The juvenile court placed LC in the Department’s custody and ordered supervised visits. The father admitted to the abuse allegations, and LC was adjudicated as a neglected child. A case plan was developed for the father, requiring him to complete a psychosexual evaluation, attend counseling, and meet other conditions. The father failed to complete the evaluation on time and did not engage in therapy, despite multiple referrals and reminders.The District Court of Goshen County initially ordered reunification as the permanency plan. After the father eventually completed the psychosexual evaluation, the Multidisciplinary Team recommended changing the plan to adoption, citing the father’s high risk of re-offending and ongoing safety concerns. The Department reported that the father had not made meaningful progress on his case plan, and LC’s therapist testified to LC’s fear of her father. Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court found the Department made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification, but those efforts were unsuccessful due to the father’s lack of engagement and risk factors. The court changed the permanency plan to adoption and ceased reunification efforts.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. It held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in changing the permanency plan from reunification to adoption, as the Department’s efforts were reasonable and reunification was not in LC’s best interest. The court also held that the juvenile court did not commit plain error by declining to adopt a concurrent permanency plan. The decision of the juvenile court was affirmed. View "L.C. v. State" on Justia Law

After their 2021 divorce, the parties agreed to joint custody of their two minor children and set a child support amount above the statutory presumptive level, with the father paying $1,700 per month. The father owns two businesses: an S-corporation and a limited liability company, both structured as pass-through entities, meaning their income is reported on his individual tax return. In 2023, the father sought to modify visitation due to changes in his work schedule, while the mother counter-petitioned to modify child support, ultimately dismissing her requests regarding custody and visitation.The District Court of Johnson County held a bench trial and denied the father’s request to modify visitation, finding no material change in circumstances. The court granted the mother’s petition to modify child support, calculating the father’s net monthly income at $40,110.66 and ordering him to pay $5,292 per month in child support. In reaching this figure, the court included both the pass-through income from the father’s businesses and the distributions reported on his individual tax return, as well as depreciation and amortization amounts from the LLC.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming found that the district court abused its discretion by effectively doubling the father’s income when it included both the pass-through amounts from the businesses and the distributions already reported on his tax return. The Supreme Court held that only the amounts reported on the father’s individual tax return should be included, and that adding both sources resulted in double counting. The court affirmed the inclusion of depreciation and amortization in the income calculation. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s child support order and remanded for further proceedings to recalculate the father’s net income and presumptive child support, instructing the lower court to obtain all relevant tax returns to ensure a complete financial picture. View "Stenson v. Stenson" on Justia Law

A couple married in 2002 after signing a prenuptial agreement that largely kept their finances separate, with the husband retaining significant assets and the wife having much less. The agreement, signed ten days before the wedding, stated that each party’s property and earnings would remain separate, and it limited the wife’s ability to seek attorney’s fees, spousal support, or an unequal division of marital property in the event of divorce. During the marriage, the husband committed multiple acts of domestic violence against the wife, which ultimately led to their separation and the wife filing for divorce after nearly eighteen years.The Alaska Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, held a divorce trial and found the wife’s testimony more credible, determining that the husband had committed four crimes of domestic violence. The court found the prenuptial agreement was voluntarily signed and not unconscionable at the time of execution, but concluded that changed circumstances—specifically, the husband’s domestic violence—made it unfair to enforce provisions barring the wife from seeking attorney’s fees, spousal support, or an unequal division of the marital estate. The court awarded the wife 75% of the marital estate, but did not include proceeds from a California timeshare in the division and counted $80,000 the wife withdrew at separation against her share. The court also based child support on the husband’s claimed tax rate without supporting evidence.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the prenuptial agreement was not unconscionable and was voluntarily signed, but that the superior court could strike certain terms due to changed circumstances, such as domestic violence, while enforcing others. The Supreme Court remanded for further explanation regarding which terms should be enforced, for inclusion of the California timeshare in the property division, for reconsideration of the $80,000 withdrawal, and for recalculation of child support based on proper tax evidence. View "Kilkenny v. Kilkenny" on Justia Law

A county agency filed a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights to his child. The father consented to the voluntary termination and submitted a written affidavit to that effect. At a subsequent hearing, he confirmed his consent and understanding of the consequences. The district court relied on his admission and other evidence to terminate his parental rights, finding the termination was in the child’s best interests. The father did not file any post-trial motions but initially appealed on jurisdictional grounds, later voluntarily dismissing and then seeking to reinstate his appeal. The Minnesota Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the termination, limiting its review to the jurisdictional issue.Over a year after the termination order became final, the father filed a motion in the district court to withdraw his admission, alleging it was obtained through fraud, undue influence, and duress. The district court struck the motion, reasoning that the father lacked standing because his parental rights had already been terminated and the time to challenge the order had expired. The Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal, agreeing that he lacked standing to file the motion after finality.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case to clarify the timeframe for withdrawing an admission to a petition for termination of parental rights under Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Protection Procedure 56.03, subdivision 5(b). The court held that a person may file a motion to withdraw such an admission at any time if withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice, regardless of other time limits in the rules. The court further held that the district court must determine whether the motion makes a prima facie showing of manifest injustice and, if so, must hold an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: B.D.D. and D.A.A." on Justia Law

A married couple with four children sought dissolution of their marriage after several years together. The wife, who had primarily cared for the children earlier in the marriage, was employed as a surgical nurse earning about $2,990 per month, while the husband worked as a carpenter earning approximately $7,250 per month. In the dissolution proceedings, the marital estate was divided, with the wife receiving a share of the husband’s retirement and half the equity in the marital home, while the husband retained the home and its associated debt. The court also ordered the husband to pay child support, spousal maintenance, and the wife’s attorney’s fees.The Fourth Judicial District Court of Montana conducted a bench trial and issued a decree that included the award of attorney’s fees to the wife. The only evidence regarding attorney’s fees was the wife’s testimony that she owed her attorney about $2,000 and could be responsible for her own fees, and the husband’s testimony that he had paid his attorney by borrowing from his parents. The District Court found that the husband had been able to pay his attorney’s fees and the wife had not, and ordered the husband to pay the wife’s attorney’s fees without further explanation or reference to legal standards. The husband appealed, and after partial resolution in appellate mediation, the sole issue on appeal was the propriety of the attorney’s fees award.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and held that the District Court abused its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees without grounding its decision in substantial evidence or applying the governing legal standards. The Supreme Court found that the District Court failed to make necessary findings regarding the necessity and reasonableness of the award and did not provide a sufficient factual or legal basis for its decision. The Supreme Court reversed the award of attorney’s fees. View "In re Marriage of Salois" on Justia Law