Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Richard DuCharme and Jennifer Brick are the parents of two minor children, S.D. and B.D. Their dissolution began in 2017, and since then, Brick has repeatedly refused to honor court-ordered parenting time. In June 2023, after a dispute about summer parenting time, Brick emailed S.D. claiming her father was keeping the girls illegally. Brick's behavior escalated to physical violence when she grabbed S.D.'s hair and punched her. S.D. escaped and reported the incident to the Bozeman Public Safety Center. Brick was charged with Partner Family Member Assault, and DuCharme filed for a temporary order of protection for both children.The District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County, granted a temporary restraining order and later held a hearing where S.D. testified about ongoing emotional abuse and the physical assault. The court granted a two-year Order of Protection for S.D. and a six-month Order of Protection for B.D., which was later extended indefinitely due to Brick's violation of the order.Brick appealed, presenting eight issues, including judicial bias, legal entrapment, misuse of court orders, due process violations, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and erroneous sentencing. The Montana Supreme Court addressed three main categories: the Order of Protection, related proceedings, and judicial bias.The court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Order of Protection based on the history of emotional and physical abuse. Brick's arguments related to criminal proceedings and the parenting matter were not considered as they were not properly before the court. The court also rejected Brick's claim of judicial bias, noting that adverse rulings alone do not constitute bias.The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision. View "Ducharme v. Brick" on Justia Law

A man and woman who had been in a long-term domestic partnership ended their relationship and sought a distribution of partnership assets. Each initially disputed whether certain property items were part of the domestic partnership estate or owned separately by one of the parties. After prompting by the court, the parties stipulated to the value of many items and that the man would receive them. However, the stipulation did not clearly address whether those items were included in the partnership estate, and the court did not receive evidence to indicate whether or not the property items belonged to the man or the partnership. The court nonetheless treated the items as partnership property and awarded the items as the parties had agreed, resulting in a substantial equalization payment owed by the man to the woman. The man appeals, asserting that two items of property were his separate property, not property of the partnership.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, initially reviewed the case. The court scheduled a two-day trial, which was later reduced to one day. During the trial, the parties discussed a property spreadsheet listing various items, their values, and proposed distributions. The court asked the man if he had reviewed the spreadsheet and if he agreed with its contents, to which he responded affirmatively. The court then proceeded to review each property item, noting changes on the spreadsheet and confirming agreements on valuations and assignments. The court ultimately concluded that all assets on the spreadsheet were partnership assets and available for distribution, resulting in an equalization payment owed by the man to the woman.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court found that the record did not support the conclusion that the man stipulated that the two disputed items were partnership property. The court noted that the property spreadsheets and the record did not reflect an agreement by the man that the items were part of the partnership estate. The court vacated the Superior Court's property distribution order and remanded for further proceedings to allow the parties to present evidence regarding the proper characterization of the disputed property items. View "Gallagher v. Majors" on Justia Law

Paul Martinez and Jennifer Martinez divorced in California in 2015, with Jennifer receiving primary physical custody of their child, L.M., due to Paul's health issues. Paul and Jennifer shared joint legal custody. After Jennifer moved to Nevada with L.M., Paul requested a custody evaluation, which resulted in maintaining the existing custody arrangement but with Paul entitled to visitation one weekend per month. The parties were to split transportation costs equally. In 2020, the custody matter was transferred to Nevada.The Nevada district court denied Paul's motion for primary physical custody and Jennifer's countermotion for supervised visitation, instead increasing Paul's visitation. The court ordered Jennifer to bear all transportation costs for L.M.'s visits to Paul, citing her relocation. Jennifer's motion to alter this determination was denied, leading her to appeal. The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order, and Jennifer petitioned for review by the Nevada Supreme Court.The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that transportation costs must be considered as part of the overall child support determination under NAC 425.150. The court found that the district court erred by imposing all transportation costs on Jennifer without considering the parties' financial situations or the established child support obligations. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the order imposing transportation costs on Jennifer and remanded the matter for further proceedings to apply the NAC 425.150 framework. The court affirmed the district court's decision to modify visitation, finding no abuse of discretion and no violation of Jennifer's due process rights. View "Martinez v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Amanda Mitchell filed for a civil protection order against Nicholas Ramlow in October 2020, alleging that he was stalking her by tracking her movements and placing a tracking device on her car. The magistrate court issued a temporary ex parte protection order and scheduled a hearing. Due to COVID-19 mask mandates, Ramlow was denied entry to the courthouse for refusing to wear a mask, leading to the hearing being rescheduled. At the rescheduled hearing, Ramlow was again absent, and the magistrate court issued a one-year protection order requiring him to attend a 52-week domestic violence course and review hearings.Ramlow filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then appealed to the district court. The protection order was extended but expired before the district court heard the appeal. The district court requested supplemental briefing on mootness and ultimately dismissed the appeal as moot, finding no applicable exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Ramlow appealed the district court's decision, arguing that his appeal still presented justiciable issues and fell within exceptions to the mootness doctrine.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the appeal was moot because the protection order had expired, and no exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. The court found that the issues were too fact-specific to be capable of repetition yet evading review, there were no collateral legal consequences, and the case did not raise issues of substantial public interest. The court also declined to vacate the expired protection order and denied attorney fees to both parties, awarding costs to Mitchell as the prevailing party. View "Mitchell v. Ramlow" on Justia Law

Appellant C.C. petitioned the family court to establish himself as a presumed father and a third parent to a child born from his sperm donation, more than a decade after consenting to terminate his parental rights. He argued that his post-adoption conduct entitled him to parenting rights and that recent amendments to the Family Code provided a path for him to establish his relationship with the child. Respondents L.B. and R.B., a married lesbian couple, had chosen C.C. as their sperm donor and had a written agreement that he would have no paternal rights. After the child's birth, L.B. adopted the child, and C.C. waived his parental rights.The family court granted respondents' motion to quash C.C.'s amended petition, finding that the donor agreement allowed visitation privileges but not parental rights, and that C.C.'s voluntary consent to the termination of his parental rights was final and irrevocable. The court did not address the estoppel argument, as it believed it was relevant only to a post-adoption contact agreement, which C.C. conceded did not exist.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that C.C. did not have standing to seek presumed parent status or third parent status under the Family Code, as his parental rights had been terminated by the adoption order. The court also found that equitable estoppel did not apply, as the donor agreement explicitly stated that C.C. relinquished all parental rights. Additionally, the court ruled that C.C. lacked standing to initiate an action for visitation as a nonparent under the Family Code. The judgment was affirmed, and respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "C.C. v. L.B." on Justia Law

Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action. The Superior Court of Orange County granted Wolf's request and later compelled Mercado to undergo the evaluation. Mercado filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to order the evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request for a vocational evaluation and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the evaluation. Mercado opposed the request, arguing it was improper under the relevant statutes and that child support issues were being handled by the Department of Child Support Services (DCSS). The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it had the authority to order the evaluation.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Wolf did not establish entitlement to a vocational evaluation under any relevant statutory authority, including sections 3558, 4331, and 4058 of the Family Code. The court noted that section 3558 does not authorize vocational evaluations, section 4331 applies only to spousal support in dissolution or legal separation cases, and section 4058 requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation would be in the best interests of the children, which Wolf did not provide. The court also found that Evidence Code section 730 did not support the order as it pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court, not retained experts.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the Superior Court to vacate its orders requiring Mercado to undergo a vocational evaluation and to enter a new order denying Wolf's request. The stay order was dissolved, and Mercado was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In June 2019, the petitioner's 13-year-old daughter, T., disclosed to a friend, a teacher, a police officer, and a caseworker from the New York City Administration for Children's Services (ACS) that the petitioner had struck her with an extension cord. The caseworker took photographs of T.'s injuries, and a physician confirmed that the injuries were consistent with being struck by an extension cord. ACS initiated a Family Court article 10 neglect proceeding against the petitioner and her husband. The Family Court authorized an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD), and the case was dismissed in February 2020 after the petitioner complied with the court's conditions.The police officer reported the incident to the Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (SCR). In July 2019, ACS determined the report against the petitioner was indicated. The petitioner challenged this determination, but the New York State Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) upheld it after an internal review. A fair hearing was held in August 2020, and OCFS concluded that the allegations were substantiated by a fair preponderance of the evidence.The petitioner then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge OCFS's determination. The Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to the Appellate Division, which confirmed OCFS's determination, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding. The Appellate Division held that the petitioner had no constitutional right to assigned counsel during the SCR hearing and that the statutory changes to Social Services Law § 422 did not apply retroactively.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court held that the petitioner had no constitutional right to assigned counsel during the SCR administrative hearing. It also concluded that the statutory amendments to Social Services Law § 422 (8) (b) (ii) did not apply retroactively to OCFS determinations rendered before the effective date of the amendments. The Court further held that OCFS's determination was supported by substantial evidence. View "Matter of Jeter v. Poole" on Justia Law

Christian L. Gilbert filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against his former attorney, Christopher M. Johnson, and Johnson’s law firm, Cordell & Cordell, P.C. Gilbert had hired Johnson to represent him in a paternity action in the district court for Lancaster County, where the mother of his child sought to establish paternity and obtain custody and child support. The court issued a temporary custody order granting the mother custody and Gilbert parenting time every other weekend. Gilbert claimed he never agreed to this arrangement and wanted custody. He alleged that Johnson negligently or knowingly misadvised him that the court would not award him custody and failed to advocate for his interests. Gilbert eventually retained new counsel, but the court awarded the mother sole custody, subject to Gilbert’s parenting time. Gilbert claimed that Johnson’s negligence resulted in him not being awarded more than parenting time.The case was initially filed in state court but was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska. The federal court inferred that Gilbert was injured by the custody orders but not economically. Finding no Nebraska precedent on whether noneconomic damages are recoverable in legal malpractice actions, the federal court certified the question to the Nebraska Supreme Court.The Nebraska Supreme Court determined that noneconomic damages in a legal malpractice action arising from a child custody dispute, where no physical injury has been sustained, may be recoverable only if the attorney engages in egregious conduct or conduct intended to essentially destroy a parent-child relationship. This decision recognizes the intrinsic value of the parent-child relationship and the foreseeability of emotional harm from its loss, but limits recovery to the most serious cases of attorney misconduct. View "Gilbert v. Johnson" on Justia Law

M.M. and J.B., Sr. were once married and had a daughter, L.B. After their divorce, J.B., Sr. married P.B. L.B. gave birth to J.J.W.B. in May 2018, but the child was removed from her custody due to her drug addiction. In August 2018, L.B.'s brother sought custody of J.J.W.B., and temporary custody was placed with J.B., Sr. and P.B. M.M. sought visitation rights in September 2018. The court granted custody to J.B., Sr. and P.B. and visitation rights to M.M. in October 2018. In July 2019, custody was again placed with J.B., Sr. and P.B., with continued visitation for M.M.In October 2020, J.B., Sr. and P.B. filed for voluntary termination of parental rights and adoption of J.J.W.B., which was granted in December 2020 without notifying M.M. M.M. filed a petition for contempt in January 2021 for not being allowed visitation, and later, in February 2022, she filed a motion to set aside the adoption. The Smith County Chancery Court denied the motions to dismiss filed by J.B., Sr. and P.B., reasoning that M.M. should have been notified of the adoption proceedings and that her visitation rights were not terminated by the adoption order.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The court held that M.M.'s motion to set aside the adoption was untimely and that she was not a necessary party to the adoption proceedings. Therefore, the court reversed the denial of the motion to dismiss M.M.'s motion to set aside the adoption. However, the court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss M.M.'s contempt action, holding that the adoption did not extinguish her visitation rights. The case was remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings to determine visitation post-adoption. View "In Re The Adoption of J.J.W.B." on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of parental rights of S.D.P. and I.T.A. regarding their medically fragile child, I.T.A. Jr., who suffered a catastrophic brain injury at eight months old. The injury occurred while the child was in the care of his mother, S.D.P., and his maternal grandmother. The child was later diagnosed with numerous severe medical conditions, including blindness, deafness, and quadriplegia, requiring extensive and constant care. The parents provided inconsistent explanations for the injury, and the treating physicians found these explanations inconsistent with the child's injuries.The Harrison County Youth Court entered an emergency custody order, placing the child in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (MDCPS). The court found the injury resulted from nonaccidental trauma and that the parents failed to comply with service agreements designed to prepare them to care for their child's medical needs. Despite efforts by MDCPS to reunify the family, the parents did not substantially comply with the service plan, leading the court to change the plan to adoption.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the youth court's decision to terminate the parental rights of both parents. The court found clear and convincing evidence that the parents were unfit to care for the child due to their insufficient understanding and ability to manage the child's extensive medical needs. The court emphasized that the child's survival depended on specialized care that the parents were unable to provide, despite having been given ample opportunity to learn. The court also dismissed the parents' argument regarding the insufficiency of the guardian ad litem's investigation, noting that the parents had waived this argument by not raising it in the lower court. View "S.D.P. v. Harrison County Department of Child Protection Services" on Justia Law