Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves a mother, D.R., who appealed jurisdiction and disposition orders related to her six children, all of whom were adjudged dependents of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. D.R. argued that the dependency petitions were deficient, some of the sustained jurisdictional allegations lacked substantial evidence, and her constitutional rights were violated by depriving her of her right to present additional evidence at the continued jurisdiction and disposition hearing for two of the children, and by what she characterized as a violation of her due process right to a speedy contested jurisdictional hearing.The children's fathers were not parties in this appeal. The children were born to three different fathers, referred to as father M., father V., and father H. The mother had been married to father H., but they separated after an incident of domestic violence. Father H. had a history of alcohol abuse and criminal offenses, mostly related to driving under the influence. The mother had sole legal and physical custody of the two children she had with father H., G.H. and B.H.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two found that some of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings lacked the support of substantial evidence, requiring reversal of the jurisdictional and dispositional orders for four of the children. The court otherwise affirmed and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "In re B.H." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the Estate of Donelson C. Glassie. The plaintiff, Marcia Sallum Glassie, was married to Donelson C. Glassie, and they divorced in 1993. According to their property-settlement agreement, the testator was to execute a will that would treat his obligations under the agreement as a claim against his estate and bequest to the plaintiff an amount equal to said obligations. A dispute arose over what the agreement required of the testator’s will. In 1997, a Family Court justice determined that the plaintiff was entitled to a bequest of a sum equal to the testator’s obligations. The testator died in 2011, and the plaintiff filed a claim for $2,000,000 against the testator’s estate a year later, which the defendant disallowed.The case was previously reviewed by the Superior Court, which awarded the plaintiff $2,000,000, less the proceeds of a life insurance policy that she received upon the testator’s death and attorneys’ fees. However, this judgment was vacated by the Supreme Court on multiple grounds, including that the disputed provision in the will was ambiguous and required factfinding and conclusions of law with respect to the testator’s intent.In the current review by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice made numerous prejudicial evidentiary rulings that prevented her from presenting her case. After reviewing the record and considering the parties’ arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court found no error in the trial justice’s decisions to prevent the plaintiff from presenting evidence regarding a trust, to allow the defendant to withdraw certain admissions, to admit evidence of a life insurance policy, and to allow evidence of the defendant’s post-death conduct. The court also found that the plaintiff had not preserved her argument regarding the trial justice’s decision to prevent her from examining the defendant about his counterclaim. View "Glassie v. Doucette" on Justia Law

In this case, a couple, Joseph R. and his wife, sought to adopt the wife's two minor children and terminate the parental rights of the children's biological father. The mother had been granted sole parental rights and responsibilities in a 2016 divorce judgment, and the biological father, who resides in Scotland, had not had contact with the children or the mother since the divorce. The couple married in 2017 and filed their petitions for adoption, change of name, and termination of parental rights in the York County Probate Court in April 2023.The York County Probate Court dismissed the couple's petitions, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to recent legislative changes. Specifically, the court cited the enactment of 19-A M.R.S. § 1658(1-A) in 2021, which it interpreted as giving exclusive jurisdiction to the District Court in cases involving one parent's attempt to terminate another parent's parental rights to a minor child. The couple appealed this decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of the statute. The court noted that the Probate Court has exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for adoption and termination of parental rights proceedings brought pursuant to section 9-204. The court found that the language in section 1658(1-A) does not divest the Probate Court of subject matter jurisdiction in this matter. The court further examined the legislative history of section 1658 and concluded that section 1658(1-A) applies only to termination petitions brought pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1658 and does not divest the Probate Court of its subject matter jurisdiction over termination petitions filed in conjunction with adoption proceedings under 18-C M.R.S. § 9-103. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Adoption by Joseph R." on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, Brittany B., who appealed from juvenile court orders that found her two children, B.D. and C.D., to be persons described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and placed them under the supervision of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The juvenile court sustained a petition based on allegations that C.D. was born with a positive toxicology screen for opiates, and that the mother’s substance abuse placed both children at substantial risk of serious physical harm. The mother contended that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s jurisdictional findings.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County had previously reversed the orders. The mother had tested positive for opiates during her pregnancy and at the time of C.D.'s birth. However, C.D. did not display any symptoms of withdrawal, and the mother was attentive to both children. The DCFS did not seek to detain the children, but it did open a case and seek court supervision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three agreed with the mother's contention and reversed the juvenile court's orders. The court found that while the mother had used prescription drugs during her pregnancy, there was no substantial evidence that the children had suffered or were at risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness as a result of the mother's substance abuse. The court also found that the mother's refusal to voluntarily submit to drug testing did not provide sufficient evidence of a substantial risk of harm to the children. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b). View "In re B.D." on Justia Law

Ian Simpson purchased a life insurance policy from Transamerica Life Insurance Company and named his then-fiancée, Holly Moore, as the primary beneficiary and his father, Jeffrey Simpson, as the contingent beneficiary. After Ian and Holly married and subsequently divorced, Ian died without changing the policy beneficiaries. The divorce decree stipulated that Holly was divested of all rights to Ian's life insurance policies. After Ian's death, both Holly and Jeffrey claimed the policy proceeds, leading Transamerica to file an interpleader action in federal court.The district court ruled in favor of Holly, holding that Texas Family Code § 9.301, which generally strips an ex-spouse of beneficiary interests in insurance policies after a divorce, only applies if the insured and the beneficiary were married when the insurance policy was purchased. The court reasoned that since the policy was purchased before Ian and Holly's marriage, Holly was not considered "the insured's spouse" at the time of the policy's inception, and therefore, the divorce decree did not divest her of the insurance proceeds.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court interpreted § 9.301 to focus on the marital relationship at the time of the divorce decree's rendition, regardless of when the insurance policy was purchased. The court held that since Holly was Ian's spouse at the time of the divorce decree, § 9.301 divested her of her beneficiary interest in the policy. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of Jeffrey Simpson, the contingent beneficiary. View "Simpson v. Moore" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over visitation rights between a mother and her three children, Anna, Chris, and Margaret. The Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) had investigated the mother and the father of Anna for maintaining an injurious environment and neglecting the children through improper discipline. The parents admitted to forcing Margaret to stand in a corner for many hours, whipping her with a belt, and making her sleep on a bare floor. The trial court adjudicated Margaret as abused and neglected, and Anna and Chris as neglected. The mother had not entered a case plan with DHHS for reunification with any of her children by the time of the November 2019 disposition order.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order, stating that the trial court improperly admitted some hearsay evidence. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's reasoning was so heavily reliant on the hearsay evidence that the proper remedy was to vacate the trial court's order and remand for a new hearing with respect to Margaret. The Court of Appeals also ordered the trial court to dismiss the petitions directed at Margaret's younger siblings.The Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had made numerous errors, including misstating the standard of review, requiring the trial court to make specific findings for each parent regarding unfitness or conduct inconsistent with their parental rights, and addressing the constitutional rights of respondents without any briefing or argument from the parties. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case directly to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re A.J.L.H., C.A.L.W., M.J.L.H." on Justia Law

This case involves a mother, Leah B., who appealed from the order of the county court for Dodge County, Nebraska, sitting as a juvenile court, denying her challenge to the validity of her relinquishment of parental rights to her child, Jordon B. Jordon was removed from Leah's care shortly after his birth in 2020 and placed into the temporary custody of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Leah relinquished her parental rights to Jordon in November 2022. The State then filed a motion to terminate Leah's parental rights based on the relinquishment, which the court granted. Leah subsequently filed a pro se motion to rescind the termination order, alleging that she signed the relinquishment involuntarily and under duress and that she was developmentally disabled and should have been appointed a guardian ad litem.The juvenile court denied Leah's motion, finding that she lacked standing to file her motion because she was no longer a party to the action after she relinquished her parental rights. The court also found that Leah's relinquishment was validly executed and that there was no evidence to demonstrate that Leah was under any duress when she signed the relinquishment.Leah appealed, arguing that the juvenile court erred in determining that she lacked standing to file her motion, in denying her motion on the merits, and in not affording her due process by ruling on the motion without providing her with a reasonable opportunity to be heard and a meaningful evidentiary hearing.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the juvenile court's decision, finding that Leah's motion was a substantive challenge to the validity of the relinquishment of her parental rights and not a challenge to the court's order terminating her parental rights. The court held that Leah had standing to file her motion and that the court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The court also held that Leah was not provided a meaningful hearing on her motion challenging the validity of the relinquishment of her parental rights, and therefore, her due process rights were violated. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Interest of Jordon B." on Justia Law

Mitchell Rataiczak and Gwendolyn Parker, who were never married, are the biological parents of two minor children. After their relationship ended, Parker moved to Wyoming with the children, while Rataiczak remained in Arizona. Rataiczak filed a petition to establish paternity, custody, visitation, and child support. The District Court of Park County awarded joint legal custody to both parents, primary physical custody to Parker, and visitation rights to Rataiczak. The court also ordered Rataiczak to pay child support.The district court's visitation schedule was graduated, requiring Rataiczak to visit the children in Wyoming for a certain number of days each year, with no overnights initially allowed. The court also ordered Rataiczak to be solely responsible for transportation costs, but made no adjustment to his child support obligation.Rataiczak appealed to the Supreme Court of Wyoming, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in setting the visitation schedule and in not adjusting his child support obligation in light of the transportation costs. The Supreme Court found that the visitation provisions were not clear enough to promote understanding and compliance, and that the graduated visitation schedule was unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence. The court also found that the district court should have considered whether an adjustment to Rataiczak's child support obligation or the allocation of transportation costs was appropriate in light of the visitation determination. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Rataiczak v. Parker" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Julie and Gary Liebel, who married in 2010 and divorced in 2022. Prior to their marriage, they had signed a premarital agreement stating that each party's assets would remain separate and under their sole control, even after the marriage. The agreement also stated that neither party would acquire any interest in the other's property due to the marriage. The couple divorced on the grounds of adultery, and the circuit court applied the premarital agreement in dividing their assets. Julie appealed, arguing that the court erred in applying the agreement to the property division in the divorce and abused its discretion in classifying and distributing the parties’ property.The circuit court had found the premarital agreement to be valid and enforceable in the context of divorce. It also found that the agreement unambiguously governed the division of property in the event of divorce. The court treated the marital home, which was held jointly, as marital property, but most of the remaining property was treated as nonmarital. Gary received the bulk of the nonmarital property valued at $713,705. Upon division of the net marital assets, Julie was awarded marital property valued at $35,482, while Gary received marital property valued at $134,535. The court ordered Gary to make a cash equalization payment to Julie in the amount of $49,526, less $2,062.80 in attorney fees awarded to Gary for defending a protection order that the court determined Julie filed maliciously.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. It found that the premarital agreement unambiguously provided that neither spouse may claim an interest in the separate property of the other, whether it was acquired before or during the marriage. This could only be understood to mean that the other spouse would not obtain any interest in separately owned property under any circumstances, including divorce, unless mutually agreed to by creating a joint tenancy in any property. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the lower court's division of property. View "Liebel v. Liebel" on Justia Law

This case involves the termination of parental rights of a father, B.W., to his son, Bob. The State of Wisconsin filed a petition to terminate B.W.'s parental rights on the grounds that Bob was a child in continuing need of protection or services and that B.W. failed to assume parental responsibility. B.W. entered a no-contest plea to the grounds for termination. At the dispositional hearing, the court terminated B.W.'s parental rights, finding it was in Bob's best interest.B.W. filed a post-disposition motion to withdraw his no-contest plea, arguing that the plea colloquy was defective because the court miscommunicated the burden of proof required at the dispositional phase. He also argued that the court improperly relied on the proposed adoptive parent's assurance that she would allow B.W. to continue to visit Bob. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that B.W. failed to make a prima facie showing that the plea colloquy was defective. The court also concluded that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by relying on the proposed adoptive parent's testimony. The court held that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion, considering the testimony and weighing the statutory dispositional factors. View "State v. B. W." on Justia Law