Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) became involved with A.N.'s family after the Rhode Island State Police informed them that A.N.'s father, Francis N., had been arrested on felony charges, including indecent solicitation of a child and electronically disseminating indecent material to a minor. Following his arrest, DCYF initiated an investigation and found that Francis had admitted to soliciting sex from a fictitious 13-year-old girl online. Consequently, DCYF filed a neglect petition against Francis, alleging that he failed to provide A.N. with proper care and supervision.The Family Court granted DCYF temporary custody of A.N. and later held a permanency hearing, ordering that A.N. remain in DCYF's care. Despite DCYF's efforts to engage Francis in services and case planning, he refused to comply, including declining to submit to a sex offender evaluation. During the neglect petition hearing, Francis invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination multiple times when questioned about his criminal charges and his involvement with A.N. The Family Court found by clear and convincing evidence that Francis neglected A.N., citing his failure to provide care, supervision, or guardianship, and his lack of engagement with DCYF.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's decree. The Supreme Court held that it was proper for the Family Court to draw adverse inferences from Francis's invocation of his Fifth Amendment right in a civil proceeding. The Court found clear and convincing evidence supporting the Family Court's finding of neglect, noting Francis's refusal to engage in necessary services, his lack of financial support for A.N., and his displacement of A.N. from the family home. The Supreme Court concluded that Francis's actions demonstrated a disregard for A.N.'s safety and needs. View "In re A.N." on Justia Law

Dr. Earl Bostick Sr. and Josie Bostick married in 1970, and Dr. Bostick developed two successful dental practices in South Carolina. In 2009, he sold one practice and continued with the other until the couple separated in 2017, after which he sold the remaining practice for $569,000. The sales contract indicated that $424,140 of this amount was for goodwill and a non-compete agreement. The couple agreed to an equal division of the marital estate but disputed whether the goodwill was personal (nonmarital) or enterprise (marital) property.The Family Court granted the divorce and ruled that the goodwill in Dr. Bostick's practice was personal, thus not subject to division. The court based its decision on the evidence that the goodwill was tied to Dr. Bostick's personal reputation and professional skills. Josie Bostick appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the Family Court's decision, determining that the goodwill should be considered enterprise goodwill and thus marital property.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, reinstating the Family Court's ruling. The Supreme Court found that the goodwill was indeed personal, as it was closely tied to Dr. Bostick's reputation, community involvement, and professional skills. The Court emphasized that Josie Bostick did not present evidence to prove the goodwill was enterprise in nature. The presence of a non-compete agreement further supported the conclusion that the goodwill was personal. Consequently, the value of the goodwill was excluded from the marital estate, and the Family Court's judgment was reinstated. View "Bostick v. Bostick" on Justia Law

In March 2019, emergency personnel responded to a call at Arlo's home, where they found his two-year-old son, Daniel, unresponsive. Daniel was taken to the hospital and underwent emergency surgery for severe injuries, including a skull fracture and subdural hemorrhage. Arlo and his girlfriend, Tiffany, claimed Daniel had tripped and fallen. However, medical professionals found the injuries inconsistent with their account. The Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) removed Daniel from Arlo's custody, and Arlo was charged with endangering the welfare of a child. A grand jury later declined to indict Arlo, and his criminal records were expunged.The Division filed a Title 9 action seeking custody of Daniel. During the proceedings, the Division sought to use Arlo's expunged criminal records, arguing they were essential for the abuse and neglect factfinding trial. The trial court granted the Division's motion, finding good cause and compelling need based on specific facts, and noting the confidential nature of the Title 9 trial. Arlo appealed, but the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the Division met the statutory requirements for using the expunged records.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the Division demonstrated good cause and compelling need based on specific facts, as the criminal and civil proceedings concerned the same incident, and the expunged records were crucial due to the lack of other witnesses and Daniel's inability to recount the incident. The Court also noted that the use of the records was limited to the Title 9 trial and subject to confidentiality protections. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. A.P." on Justia Law

Mother, Lidia P., appealed the juvenile court's denial of her request for a restraining order against Father, Luis M., despite findings of domestic violence. The court found that Father had committed multiple acts of domestic violence against Mother and one of her children but declined to issue a restraining order, reasoning it was unnecessary since the parents no longer lived together. Instead, the court orally ordered both parents to stay away from each other.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, alleging that the children, A.P. and D.P., were at substantial risk of harm due to domestic violence between the parents, Mother's mental and emotional problems, Father's severe epilepsy, improper use of child safety restraints, marijuana use, and physical abuse of A.P. The juvenile court sustained some of these allegations, including those related to domestic violence and physical abuse, and removed the children from both parents. Mother then sought a restraining order, which the court initially granted temporarily but later denied permanently, opting instead for a mutual stay-away order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court found that the juvenile court erred in denying the restraining order based on the parents' physical separation and the issuance of a non-CLETS stay-away order. The appellate court held that physical separation and non-CLETS orders are not adequate substitutes for the protections provided by a restraining order, which is enforceable by law enforcement. The appellate court reversed the juvenile court's decision and remanded the case for a new hearing on Mother's restraining order request, emphasizing that the juvenile court must use the correct legal standard in its determination. View "In re A.P." on Justia Law

Dylan H. initiated a legal proceeding to establish paternity of a minor child, P.C., against Brooke C., the child's natural mother. Brooke's partner, Brandon B., intervened, claiming paternity based on a notarized acknowledgment he had signed. Dylan then filed a third-party complaint to disestablish Brandon's paternity, alleging fraud and material mistake of fact. The district court for Nemaha County bifurcated the issues and held an evidentiary hearing on the disestablishment claim. The court found fraud and material mistake of fact, disestablishing Brandon's paternity, and later denied a motion for a new trial.The district court's decision to disestablish Brandon's paternity was appealed by Brooke and Brandon. They also appealed the denial of their motion for a new trial. However, the district court had not resolved all claims in the case, including Dylan's action to establish paternity, custody, and support. The Nebraska Court of Appeals had previously dismissed an appeal related to genetic testing, determining it was not filed within the required timeframe and did not affect a substantial right.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the appeal and determined that the orders appealed from did not resolve all claims and involved multiple parties, thus implicating Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1). This statute requires certification for an order to be appealable when it adjudicates fewer than all claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all parties. The district court had not provided such certification. Consequently, the Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the requirements for a final, appealable order under § 25-1315(1) were not met. View "Dylan H. v. Brooke" on Justia Law

In 2018, a juvenile court removed seven children from their biological parents' custody due to abuse and neglect. The children were returned in early 2019 but removed again a few months later after continued issues. The five oldest children were eventually placed with their grandparents in New Mexico, while the two youngest, Alice and Liam, were placed with a foster family in Utah. In October 2020, the juvenile court held a termination trial to determine the best permanent placement for Alice and Liam. The court decided it was in their best interest to terminate the biological parents' rights and allow the foster family to adopt them.The biological parents appealed the decision. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the termination order, concluding that the juvenile court's decision was against the clear weight of the evidence. The appellate court also held that termination must be "materially better" than any other option. Because it reversed on the merits, the court of appeals did not address other issues raised by the parents, such as ineffective counsel.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and found several errors in the court of appeals' reasoning. First, it rejected the "materially better" standard, stating that the correct standard is whether termination is "strictly necessary" to promote the child's best interest. Second, the court of appeals exceeded its scope by reweighing evidence and considering evidence outside the record. Third, the court of appeals erred in concluding that the juvenile court's decision was against the clear weight of the evidence. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case for consideration of the remaining issues in the biological parents' initial appeal. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

Steven and Jennifer Condron were granted a divorce in September 2019. The divorce decree included a division of assets and ordered Steven to pay Jennifer a combination of permanent and rehabilitative alimony. Steven was also required to pay $3,218 per month in child support. Three years later, Steven petitioned to modify the child support, arguing that the alimony payments should be considered in the child support calculation. The child support referee declined to include the alimony payments in Jennifer’s income and refused to exclude them from Steven’s income, treating the payments as part of the property division rather than alimony. The circuit court adopted the referee’s findings and conclusions.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, initially handled the case. The court found that Steven’s gross annual income exceeded $1,000,000, while Jennifer had no income. The court ordered Steven to pay Jennifer $15,000 per month in alimony for four years, followed by $11,000 per month in permanent alimony. Steven later filed a petition to modify child support due to a significant reduction in his income after being terminated from his job. The child support referee found Steven’s new gross monthly income to be approximately $45,639.42 and Jennifer’s income to be $1,638. Despite these findings, the referee treated the alimony payments as part of the property division and did not adjust the parties’ incomes for child support purposes. The circuit court upheld this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the monthly payments were indeed alimony and not part of the property division. The court noted that the payments were consistently referred to as alimony and were terminable upon significant life events, such as death or remarriage, which is characteristic of alimony. The court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case for recalculating child support, including the alimony payments in Jennifer’s income and excluding them from Steven’s income. View "Condron v. Condron" on Justia Law

The plaintiff and defendant were married in 1976 and divorced in 1999. Their marital settlement agreement (MSA) stipulated that their marital home would be sold, and the proceeds divided equally. The plaintiff was responsible for household expenses until the sale. The home was not sold until 2019, after the defendant filed a partition action. The defendant then sought specific performance, alleging the plaintiff breached the MSA by preventing repairs and refusing to divide property. The plaintiff counterclaimed, seeking reimbursement for expenses incurred due to the delayed sale and other breaches by the defendant.The Family Court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion for summary judgment. It found the MSA clear and unambiguous, except for the clause about splitting the pool bill. The court ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to reimbursement for expenses related to the marital home, as the MSA did not specify such obligations. The court awarded the defendant the 1982 Mercedes Benz and ordered the division of remaining funds and personal property. The plaintiff was awarded additional amounts for storage costs and attorney fees.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the Family Court's orders, agreeing that the MSA was clear and unambiguous regarding household expenses and that the plaintiff failed to pursue the proper remedy of specific performance for the defendant's alleged breaches. The court also upheld the award of the Mercedes Benz to the defendant and the distribution of funds and personal property. The plaintiff's additional claims for storage costs and contempt were not addressed due to procedural issues and lack of adequate argumentation. View "Jeremiah v. Estate of Jeremiah" on Justia Law

A mother, K.G., gave birth to twins in September 2020. Due to concerns about her mental health and ability to care for the children, Muskingum County Adult and Child Protective Services (the agency) took emergency temporary custody of the children. The children were placed with their maternal aunt. The juvenile court adjudicated the children as dependent and continued the agency's temporary custody. K.G. was required to undergo a psychological evaluation, which revealed several mental health conditions that could impair her parenting abilities.The juvenile court later transferred temporary legal custody to the maternal aunt, with the agency maintaining protective supervision. The agency then moved for the maternal aunt to be granted legal custody and for the agency's supervision to be terminated. At the hearing, the agency presented a psychological report by Dr. Wolfgang, which K.G. objected to, arguing she should be able to cross-examine the psychologist. The juvenile court admitted the report and granted legal custody to the maternal aunt.The Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court's decision, holding that K.G.'s due process rights were violated because she was not able to cross-examine Dr. Wolfgang. The agency appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the appellate court's decision, holding that the juvenile court was permitted to consider the psychologist’s report under the statutory scheme governing legal-custody proceedings. The court found that K.G. was not denied an opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Wolfgang and that her due process rights were not violated. The case was remanded to the appellate court for consideration of K.G.'s remaining assignment of error. View "In re R.G.M." on Justia Law

Harrison Sanders and Trinity Turner, divorced parents of two children, were involved in a legal dispute over compliance with a Family Court Order of Protection From Abuse (PFA Order) against Turner. The PFA Order required Turner to undergo evaluations by a certified treatment program and obtain a psychological evaluation. Turner failed to comply, leading to a contempt finding and a daily fine of $200 until compliance.The Family Court Commissioner found Turner in contempt twice. The first contempt order imposed a daily fine for noncompliance, and the second contempt order calculated the total fine at $51,200 for continued noncompliance. Initially, the Commissioner directed that the fine be paid to Sanders. Turner sought review by a Family Court Judge, who upheld the contempt finding and fine amount but ruled that the fine should be paid to the court, not Sanders. Sanders filed a motion for reargument, which the court denied, maintaining that the fine was to be paid to the court as it was intended to coerce compliance with the court's order.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's decision. The court held that coercive contempt fines, unless compensatory in nature, should be paid to the court. The court reasoned that it is the court's authority being vindicated through such fines, not the rights of a private litigant. The court also addressed procedural arguments, concluding that the Family Court Judge had the authority to review and modify the Commissioner’s orders and that Sanders suffered no prejudice from the court’s decision to consider the payment recipient issue. The Supreme Court denied Sanders' request for attorneys' fees, affirming the Family Court's judgment. View "Sanders v. Turner" on Justia Law