Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Devon Arseneau and her ex-husband were involved in a child custody dispute in the St. Louis County Circuit Court. The court appointed Elaine Pudlowski and Brian Dunlop as guardians ad litem to represent the child's best interests and James Reid to conduct psychological evaluations. Following their testimonies, the court awarded sole legal custody to Arseneau’s ex-husband and joint physical custody to both parents. Arseneau subsequently filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Pudlowski, Dunlop, and Reid, alleging that their actions during the custody proceedings violated her constitutional rights.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed Arseneau’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that the defendants were entitled to absolute immunity and had not acted under color of state law. The district court did not address the defendants' arguments regarding Younger abstention or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court determined that Younger abstention did not apply because there were no ongoing state proceedings. It also bypassed the Rooker-Feldman issue, finding that the merits of the case warranted dismissal. The court held that the defendants, as guardians ad litem and a court-appointed psychologist, were entitled to absolute immunity for actions within the scope of their judicial duties, even if those actions were alleged to be wrongful or illegal. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of Arseneau’s § 1983 claims. View "Arseneau v. Pudlowski" on Justia Law

Two children, E.G. and J.J., through their guardian ad litem, John D. Elliott, filed a lawsuit against the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) and others, alleging that the children were sexually molested by P.M., the adopted son of Annie Montgomery, while in Montgomery's foster care. The plaintiffs claimed that DSS and Montgomery were negligent in placing and accepting the children into the foster home, knowing or having reason to know of P.M.'s history of sexually abusive behavior. They sought discovery of DSS's adoption files to support their claims.The circuit court issued a protective order for certain DSS foster care files but did not rule on the adoption files. The plaintiffs then filed a motion in family court to unseal the adoption files, which was denied. The family court ruled that the plaintiffs had no legal interest in the records and had not shown good cause under section 63-9-780(C) of the South Carolina Code. The court of appeals affirmed this decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the confidentiality provision in section 63-9-780(C) does not insulate DSS adoption files from civil discovery if they meet the criteria under the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The court determined that if the files are discoverable under Rule 26(b), then good cause exists for their inspection. The court reversed the court of appeals' decision, emphasizing that protective orders can be used to maintain confidentiality while allowing necessary discovery. View "E.G. v. SCDSS" on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, J.R., who appealed the juvenile court’s dispositional findings and orders concerning her son, Dominic. The Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department) had previously received multiple referrals alleging general neglect, sexual abuse, and at-risk sibling abuse within the family. The allegations primarily centered around the mother’s fiancé, Brandon, who was accused of sexually abusing the mother’s daughter, S.R., over several years. Despite these allegations, the mother denied any knowledge of the abuse and refused to cooperate with the Department’s investigations.The Superior Court of Riverside County found that the mother failed to protect her children from Brandon’s abuse and sustained allegations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The court removed Dominic from the mother’s custody, granted sole physical and legal custody to Dominic’s father, Richard, and ordered monitored visitation for the mother.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings under section 300(b)(1) and section 300(j) as to Dominic. The court noted that there was no evidence that Dominic was at substantial risk of physical harm or sexual abuse. The court emphasized that the allegations against the mother were specific to her failure to protect S.R. from sexual abuse, and there was no evidence that Dominic faced a similar risk.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as to S.R. as abandoned, reversed the dispositional findings and orders as to Dominic, and vacated the true findings on the jurisdictional allegations with directions to dismiss the petition as to Dominic. View "In re S.R." on Justia Law

The case involves a divorce judgment from the District Court in Biddeford, where the court disposed of the marital property and awarded Cynthia (Pray) Wood McKenna $8,400 per month in general spousal support for life. Thomas Pray appealed, arguing that the court double-counted the value of trucks used in his pest-control business, failed to account for the value of the business attributable to his personal goodwill, engaged in improper "double dipping" by relying on his income from the business to determine both the value of the business and the amount of spousal support, failed to consider all relevant spousal support factors, and abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Wood McKenna.The District Court awarded Wood McKenna the marital residence, several IRAs, bank accounts, and personal property, while Pray received an IRA, credit union accounts, the pest-control business, and trucks. To equalize the property division, Pray was ordered to pay Wood McKenna $288,150. The court also awarded Wood McKenna spousal support based on several statutory factors, including the length of the marriage, disparity in earnings, age difference, and her health condition. Pray filed a motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the court denied without altering its findings.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court erred in double-counting the trucks' value in the property allocation and in making insufficient findings to explain the spousal support award. The court vacated the property disposition and spousal support award and remanded for further consideration. The court dismissed Pray's appeal regarding attorney fees as not ripe for review. The court held that the lower court must reconsider its calculations and any effect on the division of marital property, and make specific findings regarding Pray's income and the income potential from the assets awarded to Wood McKenna. View "McKenna v. Pray" on Justia Law

Bradley M. Schofield (Husband) and Debbie S. Schofield (Wife) were married in 1979 and separated in May 2016. In June 2021, Wife filed for divorce, and in September 2022, the district court entered a stipulated decree of divorce, which included a property distribution spreadsheet. The spreadsheet did not specify individual asset values but provided a total value for each party's distribution. Husband later filed a motion to enforce the decree, claiming Wife had not transferred an account valued at $185,300. Wife countered that the account had been transferred to Husband in 2016. The district court denied Husband's motion, finding he failed to prove the account had not been transferred.Husband did not appeal this decision but instead filed a W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion, claiming mutual mistake regarding the account's value in the decree. He argued that both parties misunderstood the $185,300 value. The district court denied this motion, ruling it was barred by res judicata, untimely, and not supported by evidence of mutual mistake.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Husband's claim of mutual mistake was actually a dispute over the interpretation of the decree, not a mutual mistake of fact. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. Additionally, the court awarded Wife costs and attorney fees for defending the appeal, as allowed under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-111. View "Schofield v. Schofield" on Justia Law

David Efron and Madeleine Candelario were involved in a divorce proceeding in Puerto Rico, during which Efron was ordered to pay Candelario $50,000 per month. After the divorce was finalized, Candelario began a relationship with Judge Cordero, and Efron alleges that Candelario, her attorney, and Judges Cordero and Aponte conspired to reinstate the payments through a corrupt scheme. Efron claims this resulted in Candelario receiving approximately $7 million. Efron filed a federal lawsuit against Candelario and her attorney, asserting claims for deprivation of procedural due process, conspiracy to deny civil rights, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Efron’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court found that Efron’s claims were inextricably intertwined with the Puerto Rico court’s judgment and that granting relief would effectively nullify that judgment. The district court also rejected Efron’s argument that his claims fell under a fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Efron’s claims because they essentially sought to challenge the state court’s judgment. The court concluded that Efron’s claims for damages were not independent of the state court’s decision but were directly related to it, as they required the federal court to review and reject the state court’s judgment. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Efron v. Candelario" on Justia Law

The case involves Michelle Gilbank, who lost custody of her daughter, T.E.H., in state court proceedings in Wisconsin. Gilbank alleged that various officials involved in those proceedings violated her federal constitutional rights. The events began when Gilbank, who had a history of drug use, moved into her ex-partner Ian Hoyle's apartment. Following an anonymous tip, police and social workers investigated and found evidence of Gilbank's drug use. On August 21, 2018, Gilbank was arrested for drug possession, and her daughter was temporarily placed with Hoyle. Subsequent state court hearings resulted in the continued placement of T.E.H. with Hoyle until Gilbank regained custody in March 2020.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court found that some of Gilbank’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. The court also ruled that the remaining claims failed on the merits, including claims of unreasonable search, denial of due process, and unlawful eviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case en banc. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred claims based on injuries caused by state court judgments. The court also affirmed summary judgment on the merits for claims not barred by Rooker-Feldman, including those related to the urinalysis, interrogation without an attorney, and the removal of T.E.H. The court found that Gilbank had consented to the urinalysis, that her Fifth Amendment rights were not violated as her statements were not used in a criminal proceeding, and that there was no seizure of T.E.H. by government actors. The court also rejected the existence of a "fraud exception" to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. View "Gilbank v. Wood County Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

The case involves a petitioner who filed a miscellaneous petition in Family Court concerning a child whose parents are the respondent and the late Christine Hasselbrock. The petitioner, who had a long-standing platonic relationship with Ms. Hasselbrock, provided financial and emotional support to her and her child. After Ms. Hasselbrock's death, the petitioner sought to be declared a de facto parent or to have other parental rights recognized, but the respondent denied him access to the child.Initially, the petitioner filed an amended verified petition in Family Court, asserting both statutory and common law claims for de facto parentage. The first hearing justice dismissed the statutory claim due to lack of standing, as the petitioner had never resided with the child. The justice indicated that the petitioner could pursue his common law claims on the miscellaneous calendar. Consequently, the petitioner filed a new miscellaneous petition asserting various common law claims, including de facto parentage, in loco parentis, and visitation rights.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's orders. The Court held that the Rhode Island Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) supersedes common law de facto parentage claims, as the statute explicitly outlines the criteria for establishing de facto parentage. The Court also found that the petitioner lacked standing to pursue claims for visitation based on being an "unrelated caregiver" or "de facto relative," as there is no statutory authority granting such rights. Additionally, the Court affirmed the denial of the respondent's motion for attorneys' fees, finding no basis for such an award. View "De Vries v. Gaudiana" on Justia Law

Jason Anderson and Olivia Foss, who share a child but were never married, were involved in a legal dispute over modifications to their parenting plan. Foss sought sole decision-making responsibility, required Anderson to take their child to extracurricular activities during his parenting time, and sought reimbursement for health insurance premiums. Anderson countered with a motion to modify child support. The district court modified the parenting plan and child support obligations after a two-day evidentiary hearing.The district court set the commencement date for the modified child support to September 2023, rather than September 2022, without providing an explanation. Anderson appealed, arguing the date should be from when he filed the motion. The court also calculated Foss’s child support obligation based on a partial year’s income and a 32-hour work week without sufficient findings to support these calculations. Additionally, the court ordered Anderson to reimburse Foss for out-of-pocket medical expenses but did not explain how it arrived at the reimbursement amount.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s requirement for Anderson to take the child to extracurricular activities during his parenting time, clarifying that this did not modify his parenting time. However, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not provide sufficient findings to support the commencement date for the modified child support, the calculation of Foss’s income, and the reimbursement amount for medical expenses. The court also required further explanation for removing all day-to-day decision-making from Anderson.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed parts of the district court’s decision, reversed others, and remanded the case with instructions for the district court to provide additional findings within 30 days. View "Anderson v. Foss" on Justia Law

A father, involved in a custody dispute in Montana, subpoenaed his child's therapy records from a therapist in Wyoming. The therapist filed a motion to quash the subpoena, arguing that the records were privileged and confidential under Wyoming law and HIPAA, and that disclosing them would not be in the child's best interests. The district court in Park County partially granted the motion, allowing the father access to some records but withholding treatment notes, interviews, and process notes, citing the child's best interests.The district court's decision was based on the belief that protecting the child's best interests justified withholding certain records. However, Wyoming law does not recognize a child's best interests as a valid reason to deny a parent access to their child's therapy records if the parent has waived the privilege. The court did not provide any statutory or procedural basis for its decision, relying instead on a New Hampshire case, In re Berg, which is not binding in Wyoming and involved different legal standards.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court abused its discretion. The court held that Wyoming law, specifically W.R.C.P. 45 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-113, does not allow a court to quash a subpoena based on a child's best interests once the privilege has been waived by a parent. The court also clarified that HIPAA does not create a privilege that would prevent the disclosure of therapy records in judicial proceedings. Consequently, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case, instructing the lower court to issue an order fully denying the therapist's motion to quash the subpoena. View "Loyning v. Potter" on Justia Law