Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Jared Peterka, a neighbor and tenant of John and Irene Janda, assumed the lease of their farmland in 2012. The lease was renewed every three years, and in 2019, a right of first refusal for Peterka to purchase the land was added. In October 2018, the Jandas established a living trust and conveyed the property into it, with their daughters as residuary beneficiaries. In June 2021, the Jandas and Peterka executed an option to purchase the property. Shortly after, guardianship proceedings were initiated, and the Jandas were found incapacitated. The guardians rescinded the option to purchase.Peterka filed a complaint for declaratory judgment to validate the option to purchase. The Defendants counterclaimed, arguing the option was the result of undue influence and that the Jandas lacked capacity. After a four-day bench trial, the District Court of Traill County found the option to purchase was facially valid and not a product of undue influence. However, it ruled the option was voidable under N.D.C.C. § 14-01-02 due to the Jandas' lack of capacity and dismissed Peterka’s complaint.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. Peterka argued the district court erred in its findings on capacity. The Supreme Court clarified that the capacity to enter into a contract and the capacity under N.D.C.C. § 14-01-02 are distinct. The court found the district court did not misstate the law and its findings were supported by evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the option to purchase was voidable under N.D.C.C. § 14-01-02 due to the Jandas being of unsound mind but not entirely without understanding. View "Peterka v. Janda" on Justia Law

Christian D., the father of a three-year-old child, appealed a judgment by the District Court (South Paris) that terminated his parental rights. The court found him unfit as a parent and determined that termination was in the child's best interest. The father argued that the court abused its discretion by not making specific findings of fact to support its decision and by not adequately considering a permanency guardianship as an alternative to termination.The District Court found that the father was unfit based on three grounds under 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii), and (iv). The court noted that the child had been in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for 26 of his 35 months and that the child needed permanency, which the father could not provide in a timely manner. The child had been living in a stable and nurturing foster home with his maternal grandparents, who were willing to adopt him.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that the District Court properly exercised its discretion and that the record supported the findings that termination of the father's parental rights and adoption were in the child's best interest. The court also rejected the father's argument that Rule 52(a) precluded reliance on inferences or implicit findings, noting that the trial court's findings were sufficient to support the judgment. The court emphasized the importance of permanency for the child and found that the father's inability to provide a stable environment justified the termination of his parental rights. View "In re Child of Christian D." on Justia Law

Mother conceived M.N. with Father in summer 2020. Before M.N. was born, Mother and her boyfriend initiated adoption proceedings without informing the adoption agency about Father. M.N. was born on March 23, 2021, and Father requested a DNA test at the hospital. In April 2021, Mother and her boyfriend signed adoption consent forms, and the adoption agency petitioned for termination of parental rights. After being identified as a potential father, Father was served notice of the adoption and filed a paternity action within the required timeframe. Genetic testing confirmed Father as the biological father.The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights, finding he failed to file with the putative fathers registry. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding the juvenile court improperly terminated Father’s rights under § 8-533(B)(6) without considering his rights as a potential father under § 8-106. The court of appeals held that genetic testing established Father as a presumed legal father, exempting him from filing with the putative fathers registry.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case to determine if a potential father served with a § 8-106 notice must file a notice of a claim of paternity with the putative fathers registry under § 8-106.01. The court held that a potential father identified and served notice under § 8-106(G) is not required to file with the putative fathers registry. The court emphasized that the potential fathers statute and the putative fathers statute address separate classifications of fathers, each with distinct rights and obligations. The court vacated parts of the court of appeals’ opinion, reversed the juvenile court’s termination order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.N." on Justia Law

A father of four was accused of sexually abusing his 12-year-old daughter, leading to the removal of his children from the home. The primary issue was whether the father's conduct, including washing his daughter's breasts during lengthy showers, could be considered normal caretaking or affection. The father argued that the superior court relied on facts not in evidence, violated his Fifth Amendment rights by drawing an adverse inference from his refusal to testify, and erred in concluding that his conduct amounted to sexual abuse.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kenai, found all four children in need of aid on grounds of sexual abuse and neglect. The court noted that the father had invoked his right to remain silent, and it drew a negative inference from his silence, concluding that sexual contact had occurred. The court also found that the children were at substantial risk of being sexually abused because the mother failed to stop the father's conduct and continued to support him. The court issued a temporary custody and adjudication order, and later granted the State's petition for release of the children from state custody.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court's adjudication order. The court held that the superior court did not clearly err in making its factual findings and that it was permissible to draw an adverse inference from the father's refusal to testify. The court concluded that the father's conduct could not be reasonably construed as normal caretaking, interaction, or affection, and thus, the children were in need of aid due to sexual abuse. The court did not address other arguments raised by the father, as the adjudication of one child in need of aid was sufficient to sustain the order. View "Brad S. v. State" on Justia Law

A grandmother petitioned for guardianship of her adult granddaughter, who had developmental disabilities and other health issues. In 2012, the Superior Court of Alaska found the granddaughter incapacitated and appointed the grandmother as her guardian. However, the guardianship was terminated in 2014 after the grandmother failed to submit a required report. From 2014 to 2022, the grandmother and the granddaughter’s sister provided informal care. In 2022, Adult Protective Services (APS) and medical providers raised concerns about the granddaughter’s care, leading APS to file a new petition for guardianship.The Superior Court of Alaska initially appointed a temporary guardian and later granted APS’s petition for full guardianship without a new finding of incapacity, relying on the 2012 determination. The granddaughter requested a jury trial on the issue of her capacity, but the court denied this request, applying the doctrine of issue preclusion, which prevents relitigation of issues already decided.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and found that the Superior Court erred in applying issue preclusion to the granddaughter’s capacity. The court noted that capacity can change over time and that there was insufficient evidence to determine whether the facts regarding the granddaughter’s capacity were the same in 2012 and 2022. The court emphasized that APS, as the petitioner, had the burden of proving the granddaughter’s current incapacity. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s order appointing a permanent guardian and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the granddaughter’s capacity. View "In re Protective Proceeding of S.J." on Justia Law

Lizette Aguilar petitioned for a domestic abuse protection order against Ana Valdez-Mendoza, her daughter's stepmother, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-924. Aguilar alleged that Valdez-Mendoza physically assaulted her during a visit to drop off her daughter at the home of her ex-husband, Fernando Mendoza, who is married to Valdez-Mendoza. The district court issued an ex parte protection order, which was affirmed after a hearing. Valdez-Mendoza appealed, arguing that the court erred in concluding that she and Aguilar were related by "affinity" under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-903.The district court for Madison County found that Aguilar and Valdez-Mendoza had a relationship by "affinity" because Aguilar is related to her daughter, and the daughter's father is married to Valdez-Mendoza. The court overruled Valdez-Mendoza's motion to dismiss and affirmed the protection order, reasoning that the statutory phrase "related by affinity" was broad enough to include their relationship.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in its interpretation of "affinity." The court defined "affinity" as the relationship arising from the marriage contract between one spouse and the blood relations of the other, not extending to Aguilar herself, who is not related by consanguinity to Mendoza. Therefore, Aguilar and Valdez-Mendoza were not related by affinity under § 42-903. The court reversed the district court's decision and vacated the protection order. View "Aguilar v. Valdez-Mendoza" on Justia Law

Leanne Nester and Cody Gamble divorced in 2022, with custody arrangements for their two minor children outlined in the divorce decree. Gamble later moved to modify custody, and during the proceedings, a press organization requested media access, which the district court granted. Nester moved for reconsideration, seeking to close the hearing to protect sensitive information about the children, including medical and Child Protective Services records. The district court denied her motion, interpreting a previous case, Falconi v. Eighth Judicial District Court, as precluding closure of family law proceedings.The district court concluded it lacked discretion to close the hearing, stating there was no statute or rule allowing it. Nester then sought writ relief from the Supreme Court of Nevada, arguing that the district court misinterpreted Falconi and failed to consider her privacy interests and those of her children.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its interpretation of Falconi. The court clarified that Falconi does not prohibit the closure of family law proceedings but requires a case-by-case analysis to determine if closure is warranted. The court outlined that closure is permissible if it serves a compelling interest, there is a substantial probability that the interest could be harmed without closure, and no alternatives to closure would adequately protect the interest.The Supreme Court of Nevada granted Nester's petition, directing the district court to vacate its order denying the motion to close the hearing and to reconsider the motion using the test outlined in Falconi. The court emphasized the need for the district court to properly apply the factors to determine whether closure is justified. View "NESTER VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

The State of Wyoming filed a petition against MF (Mother) and JF (Father) on June 22, 2020, alleging neglect of their minor children, JF and TF. Following a shelter care hearing, the juvenile court removed the children from the home and placed them in foster care. After a disposition hearing, the children remained in the custody of the Department of Family Services (the Department), with a permanency plan of family reunification. On January 19, 2024, after an evidentiary permanency hearing, the juvenile court changed the permanency plan to adoption.The juvenile court found that the Department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, but these efforts were unsuccessful. The court noted that Mother had made some progress but ultimately failed to consistently address the children's needs and safety concerns. The court also found that the children's best interests were served by changing the permanency plan to adoption, given their progress in foster care and the lack of stability and safety in Mother's care.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The court held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in changing the permanency plan to adoption, as the Department had made reasonable efforts at reunification, which were unsuccessful. The court also found that the juvenile court's decision to cease reunification efforts with Mother was supported by Wyoming law, which allows for discontinuation of such efforts when they are inconsistent with the permanency plan.Additionally, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that Mother's due process rights were not violated by the denial of a continuance of the permanency hearing or by the juvenile court's evidentiary rulings. The court found that Mother had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, and the juvenile court's decisions were within the bounds of reason. The court also declined to adopt Mother's request for a change in procedures to require compliance with the Wyoming Rules of Evidence in evidentiary permanency hearings. View "In the Interest of: JF v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

Taylor M. appealed a judgment from the District Court terminating her parental rights to her child, arguing that her due process rights were violated and that the court failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The child, born prematurely with various medical conditions, required extensive care. Taylor M., a registered member of the Mi’kmaq Nation, was largely absent during the child’s initial hospitalization. The Department of Health and Human Services filed for a child protection order, which was granted, and the child was placed with resource parents.The District Court held a jeopardy hearing in January 2023, finding clear and convincing evidence of jeopardy due to Taylor M.’s inability to care for the child. The court scheduled several hearings, but delays occurred, and the child’s resource parents moved out of state with the Department and tribe’s agreement. In October 2023, the Department filed a petition to terminate Taylor M.’s parental rights. At the consolidated hearing in January 2024, the court heard testimony from various parties, including the ICWA director for the Mi’kmaq Nation.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court complied with ICWA requirements. The court determined that the Department made active efforts to reunify the family and that Taylor M. did not take significant steps to address the jeopardy. The court also found beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody by Taylor M. would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. The court affirmed the termination of Taylor M.’s parental rights, concluding that the child’s placement with the resource parents was appropriate and in the child’s best interest. View "In re Child of Taylor M." on Justia Law

Bonnie Campbell, a federal employee, and Michael Campbell, her ex-husband, entered into a divorce property settlement agreement in which Mr. Campbell waived his rights to Ms. Campbell's Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) account. Despite this agreement, Ms. Campbell did not remove Mr. Campbell as the beneficiary of her TSP account before her death. After her death, Mr. Campbell received the balance of the TSP account. The estate of Ms. Campbell (the Estate) sued Mr. Campbell for breach of contract to enforce the terms of the divorce settlement agreement.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted summary judgment in favor of the Estate on its breach of contract claim, awarding money damages. The court rejected Mr. Campbell's argument that the Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986 (FERSA) preempted the Estate's claim. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, holding that FERSA preempted the Estate's breach of contract claim.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that FERSA does not preempt the Estate’s post-distribution breach of contract action. The court found that FERSA’s purposes, which include establishing a federal employee retirement plan and ensuring it is fully funded and financially sound, do not concern plan beneficiaries. The court also noted that FERSA’s provisions elevate the requirements of a qualifying state property settlement agreement over a deceased participant’s designated beneficiary, provided notice is given before payment. The court concluded that a post-distribution suit to enforce contractual obligations in a divorce property settlement agreement does not hinder any governmental interest in administrative convenience or avoiding double payment. The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed, and the Circuit Court's judgment was affirmed. View "In re Isely" on Justia Law