Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This case concerns a dispute between two women, P.S. and C.E., who were in a romantic relationship for over a decade but never married. During their relationship, P.S. gave birth to three children through artificial insemination. The couple executed a shared-custody agreement for their first child but not for the twins born later. After the relationship ended in early 2015—before same-sex marriage was recognized in Ohio—C.E. sought to be legally recognized as a parent of all three children.In the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, a magistrate denied C.E.’s request to be named a legal parent and for shared custody of the twins but awarded her companionship time. The court also declined to terminate the shared-custody agreement for the older child. On objections, the trial court largely upheld the magistrate’s decision but found, through the parties’ words and conduct, that a shared-custody agreement existed for all three children. Both parties appealed.The First District Court of Appeals held that the trial court should determine whether the parties “would have been married” at the time of conception but for Ohio’s ban on same-sex marriage. If so, the court reasoned, C.E. could be recognized as a parent under Ohio’s artificial insemination statute, as required by United States Supreme Court precedent. The court of appeals remanded the case for this determination without addressing other issues raised on appeal.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the First District’s judgment, holding that Ohio’s non-spousal artificial insemination statute, by its plain language, applies only to married couples and cannot be retroactively extended to unmarried same-sex partners. The court found no authority in United States Supreme Court precedent to rewrite the statute or to require a “would have been married” inquiry. The cause was remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of the remaining assignments of error. View "In re L.E.S." on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between two parents, Briana Hernandez and Luis Loarca, who share a ten-year-old daughter and have a history of contentious family court proceedings. Hernandez, employed as a paraprofessional at her daughter’s school, alleged that Loarca harassed her by making negative statements about her to the school’s teacher and principal. These included misrepresenting her comments about the teacher’s abilities and reporting her to the school principal for allegedly helping their daughter with a book report during work hours, resulting in Hernandez receiving a written warning for plagiarism and admonishments regarding her conduct at work.After these events, Hernandez obtained an ex parte order of protection from the Superior Court in Maricopa County, which was continued in effect after a contested hearing. The Superior Court found that Loarca’s actions were not motivated by concern for their daughter or his role in her education but were instead calculated to cause Hernandez professional harm.The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, reversed, holding that Loarca’s communications were not “directed at” Hernandez as required by Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-2921(E), since the statements were made to third parties and not directly to Hernandez. The appellate court did not address other arguments concerning modification of family court orders or First Amendment rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona granted review to determine whether communications made to third parties can qualify as being “directed at” a victim under § 13-2921(E). The Court held that such communications may be “directed at” a victim if they are intended to provoke an adverse consequence against that person, regardless of whether the communication is made directly or through a third party. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded for further proceedings on unresolved issues. View "HERNANDEZ v. LOARCA" on Justia Law

After the birth of S.S. in December 2023, the West Virginia Department of Human Services filed a petition alleging that S.S. was abused and neglected, primarily based on the mother’s substance abuse, S.S. being born drug exposed, and instability in the mother’s life. The petitioner, B.M., was named as the alleged father, and paternity was later confirmed through testing. The amended petition included allegations against B.M. of criminal convictions, a lengthy criminal history, and substance abuse, as well as noting his absence from S.S.’s life due to incarceration. At an adjudicatory hearing, B.M. stipulated to abusing drugs and not providing for S.S. because of his incarceration.Following adjudication, B.M. moved for a post-adjudicatory improvement period—a statutory opportunity to demonstrate behavioral change and correct the conditions of abuse and neglect. At the dispositional hearing, B.M. testified about his efforts at rehabilitation while incarcerated, including drug recovery and parenting classes, obtaining his GED, and preparing for release. The Circuit Court of Randolph County denied his motion for an improvement period, found that he could not participate due to incarceration, and terminated his parental rights, citing his lack of relationship with S.S., failure to acknowledge addiction, and the length of time since the case began.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court’s decision rested on several clearly erroneous factual findings. The higher court concluded that B.M. could have participated in an improvement period upon his imminent release, that he had acknowledged and addressed his substance abuse problem, and that delays in the proceedings were not his fault. The court held that denying the improvement period was an abuse of discretion, vacated the order terminating parental rights, reversed the denial of the improvement period, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In Re S.S." on Justia Law

After two children lost their parents in a helicopter accident, their maternal and paternal grandmothers were appointed as coguardians. Over time, the relationship between the grandmothers deteriorated, leading the paternal grandparents to file a petition to adopt the children. The maternal grandmother intervened in that proceeding, then, together with her husband, filed a separate adoption petition. The paternal grandmother received proper legal notice of this competing adoption proceeding, which warned her that she needed to intervene within thirty days if she wished to contest the adoption or risk losing all rights regarding the children. Despite this notice, she did not file a motion to intervene.The Eighth District Court consolidated the cases briefly, then separated them to proceed independently. After deconsolidation, the maternal grandparents served notice again, but the paternal grandmother still did not intervene. The maternal grandmother moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the paternal grandmother should be barred from pursuing her adoption petition due to her failure to intervene. The district court agreed and barred both paternal grandparents from proceeding. The paternal grandmother petitioned for interlocutory review, and the Utah Court of Appeals reversed, holding that barring the paternal grandmother but not the paternal grandfather from maintaining their petition produced an absurd result, given the statutory scheme.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case and reversed the appellate court’s decision. It held that the plain language of the Utah Adoption Act’s intervention provision requires a person who receives notice of an adoption proceeding and wishes to contest it to intervene within thirty days, or forfeit all rights to the adoptee, including the ability to bring or maintain any related action. The court found that the appellate court’s application of the absurdity doctrine was based on a hypothetical scenario, not the actual district court ruling, and concluded that the statutory result was not so overwhelmingly absurd as to justify departure from the statute’s plain language. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. View "In re Adoption of R.P." on Justia Law

Amelia Johnson sought a protection-from-abuse order for herself and her minor child against Michael Osseyran, the child’s father. She filed her complaint in December 2024, alleging that Osseyran’s actions toward her and their child constituted abuse. The court issued a temporary protection order and temporarily awarded Johnson parental rights. At a final hearing, Johnson testified about incidents where Osseyran physically disciplined the child, describing grabbing and yelling. An investigations caseworker from the Department of Health and Human Services and a friend of Osseyran’s also testified. The court reviewed evidence including text messages between the parties.The District Court (Portland) found that while the parties’ child was difficult to parent and Osseyran’s actions may have been offensive, Osseyran had not engaged in stalking, threatening, or harassing behavior toward Johnson or the child. The court concluded that his actions were attempts to parent, not abuse, relying on statutory language that allows a parent to use a reasonable degree of force when disciplining a child. The court declined to issue a final protection-from-abuse order and dismissed the temporary order. Johnson appealed, arguing that the evidence required a finding in her favor, the District Court misapplied the statute, and that it had admitted inadmissible hearsay evidence.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It held that the evidence did not compel a finding that Johnson was entitled to a protection-from-abuse order, that the District Court correctly interpreted the statutory definitions of abuse, and that although hearsay evidence was admitted in error, it did not result in prejudice warranting reversal. The Court modified the judgment to correct a clerical error regarding the parties’ attendance at the hearing but otherwise affirmed the District Court’s judgment. View "Johnson v. Osseyran" on Justia Law

A woman and a man, both originally from the Middle East, met in the United States and traveled to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, in 2019 for a religious marriage ceremony conducted remotely by an imam in Maine. No religious official was present in person in Dubai. The ceremony followed Islamic traditions, and the imam issued a certificate of religious marriage. The couple later held a wedding reception in Turkey, where they and two witnesses signed the certificate. They returned to Maine but did not complete any ceremony or licensing required by Maine law, though the woman attempted unsuccessfully to certify the marriage at a local city hall before filing for divorce.The woman then filed for divorce in the Maine District Court in 2024. The man moved to dismiss, arguing there was no lawful marriage. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court (Biddeford) granted the motion, finding the parties had not complied with Maine’s marriage statutes and were not legally married in Maine or elsewhere. The court also rejected the argument that any exception under Maine law applied, and dismissed the divorce complaint. The woman timely appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and held that the validity of a marriage is determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the marriage ceremony occurred, not Maine law, unless the marriage is contrary to Maine’s basic public policies. Since the ceremony was in Dubai, the question was whether the marriage was valid under the laws of the United Arab Emirates. The Court found that the woman had not addressed this question at trial or on appeal and therefore waived the argument. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment dismissing her complaint for divorce. View "Aldarraji v. Alolwan" on Justia Law

A married couple entered into a premarital agreement prior to their 2015 wedding. The agreement stated that each party’s property, including business interests owned prior to or acquired during the marriage, would remain separate and nonmarital. It also included a provision anticipating that the husband would purchase a condominium, which would become the marital home and, in the event of divorce, its value would be split equally. During the marriage, the couple resided in the condominium, but it remained owned by the husband’s mother, and the husband never purchased it. The couple separated in 2020, and the husband filed for divorce in 2021. Throughout the marriage, the husband acquired and managed various business interests, while both parties maintained separate finances.The Maine District Court in Portland held several hearings to resolve issues related to spousal support, discovery sanctions, and the interpretation and validity of the premarital agreement. The parties stipulated that the agreement was valid but disputed its scope, particularly regarding business interests and the condominium provision. The District Court found that the wife had waived any claim to the husband’s business interests and any increase in their value, and that the agreement did not require the husband to purchase the condominium. The court also determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider the wife’s breach-of-contract claim regarding the condominium and awarded her a portion of her requested attorney fees.Upon appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the District Court’s judgment in part. It held that the wife had clearly waived any claim to the husband’s business interests and their increases in value. However, the Supreme Judicial Court determined that the lower court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction over the breach-of-contract claim concerning the condominium and in interpreting the agreement as not requiring its purchase. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Hutchinson v. Gomez" on Justia Law

An Afghan infant was orphaned and injured during a joint U.S.-Afghan military operation and received emergency care at a U.S. military hospital. A U.S. Marine Corps Judge Advocate, Major Joshua Mast, and his wife, Stephanie Mast, initiated custody proceedings and ultimately obtained a Virginia adoption order for the child. Separately, the U.S. Embassy gave custody to a man claiming to be the child's uncle, and the infant was subsequently cared for by John and Jane Doe, who later evacuated from Afghanistan to the United States with the child during Operation Allies Refuge. After arriving in the U.S., the Masts took custody of the child. The Does then challenged the adoption in Virginia state court, but the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected their challenge.Following the state proceedings, the Does filed a federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia, seeking, among other things, a protective order to prevent the defendants from disclosing their identities. The district court granted the protective order, concluding that disclosing the Does’ identities would pose a substantial risk to their safety and that of their family in Afghanistan. The order prohibited the defendants and their representatives from revealing any information that could directly or indirectly identify the Does or their family members unless a non-disclosure agreement was executed. After the Does engaged with the media while maintaining anonymity, the Masts moved to vacate or modify the protective order, arguing it was an unconstitutional restraint on speech. The district court denied the motion and held Joshua Mast in contempt for violating the order.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Fourth Circuit held that the protective order, while a content-based prior restraint, fit within a narrow exception because it was narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling interest in national security—specifically, the protection of individuals perceived as U.S. collaborators. The court found the order survived strict scrutiny and was not unconstitutionally vague. View "Doe v. Mast" on Justia Law

A child and her sister, both recognized as Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), were removed from their parents due to concerns about their welfare. After an unsuccessful initial foster placement, the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) placed the children with their mother’s cousin, Petra, in Seattle. Petra is a member of the children’s tribe. Upon arrival, the children had dental and nutritional issues. Although Petra arranged dental surgery for one child, she did not obtain follow-up care for the other child, Ax adée, whose dental problems persisted untreated during two years in Petra’s care. Petra also imposed dietary restrictions on Ax adée, resulting in significant stagnation in the child’s growth.After Petra requested that the other child be moved due to behavioral concerns, OCS placed both children with Chastity, a licensed therapeutic foster parent and tribal member in Alaska. Following this transfer, Ax adée received extensive dental treatment and began gaining weight after dietary restrictions were lifted. Petra challenged OCS’s decision in the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, First Judicial District, Ketchikan, arguing she was a suitable foster parent and that OCS had not justified the placement change.After a six-day evidentiary hearing, the superior court found that Petra had failed to address Ax adée’s dental and nutritional needs, leading to significant health concerns. The court concluded that Petra was not a suitable foster parent and upheld OCS’s decision to place the child in a lower-preference ICWA foster home.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s order. The main holding is that clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that Petra was not a suitable foster parent due to her failure to meet the child’s basic dental and nutritional needs, justifying placement in a lower-preference home under ICWA. View "Petra J. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

Three children were removed multiple times from the home of their parents, S.S. and T.C., due to concerns about drug use and domestic violence. Initially, two children were removed in 2018, and all three children were subsequently placed in and out of care between 2018 and 2023. After a guardianship arrangement expired in 2023, law enforcement again found evidence of drug use in S.S.’s home, leading to another removal of the children in early 2024. The children were placed in the care of the Mountrail McKenzie Human Service Zone (MMHSZ).The State petitioned in 2025 to terminate the parental rights of both S.S. and T.C. Following a trial, the Juvenile Court of McKenzie County, Northwest Judicial District, found that the children were in need of protection and had been in care for the statutory number of nights required under North Dakota law. The juvenile court issued an order terminating S.S.’s parental rights. S.S. appealed, arguing that the juvenile court abused its discretion by not making a specific finding that reasonable efforts were made to reunify him with his children.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that, under the relevant statutes, a specific finding on reasonable efforts to reunify is not required at the time of termination of parental rights when the statutory criteria of need for protection and number of nights in care are met. The court further concluded that the juvenile court’s findings demonstrated sufficient consideration of the efforts made by social services and that its decision to terminate S.S.’s parental rights was not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination order. View "Interest of W.S." on Justia Law