Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

After marrying in July 2014, a husband and wife executed a postnuptial agreement two days after their wedding, intending to keep their respective properties separate during the marriage. Prior to marriage, they jointly purchased land, with the wife contributing a down payment and the remainder financed by a mortgage. After marriage, they constructed a home and acquired several vehicles, with the husband contributing substantially more toward improvements and purchases. The couple separated in late 2020, and the husband filed for divorce in early 2021. Disputes arose concerning the enforceability and interpretation of the postnuptial agreement, as well as the division and valuation of marital assets, especially the marital residence.The District Court of Albany County first granted summary judgment, finding the postnuptial agreement enforceable, rejecting the wife’s arguments of unconscionability and unilateral mistake due to lack of sufficient evidence. However, the court denied the husband’s subsequent request for summary judgment on the property distribution, interpreting the agreement to allow equitable division of assets acquired during the marriage. After a bench trial, the court divided the vehicles and the marital residence between the parties, awarded credits for their respective contributions, and ordered a current appraisal to determine the property’s value for final division. The court ultimately set the marital residence’s value at $925,000 and split the remaining equity equally after accounting for the parties’ contributions.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that the postnuptial agreement was enforceable, that its terms required the court to exercise discretion in distributing property acquired during the marriage, and that there was no abuse of discretion in the court’s valuation and division of the marital residence. The Supreme Court found the lower court’s findings and application of the law to be proper and supported by the record. View "Young v. Jones" on Justia Law

After the birth of G.W., he resided with his mother at her parents’ home, and the father was frequently present. DCYF investigated an earlier incident involving the child rolling off a couch and closed it as unfounded. When the child was approximately five weeks old, he was seen by his pediatrician after his parents reported bleeding in his mouth, but no cause was identified. Later that day, following an argument, the mother witnessed the father throw the child onto a bed but left him in the father’s care overnight. The next day, the mother noticed the child’s left arm was immobile; she delayed seeking medical care despite advice from a pediatric nurse, only taking the child to the emergency room after further prompting. Medical examination revealed a broken left humerus, healed oral injuries, and a minor eye hemorrhage, with no medical explanation other than trauma.The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed petitions alleging abuse and neglect against both parents. At the 9th Circuit Court-Goffstown Family Division, a hearing was held on these petitions. The mother moved to suppress her statements to child protective service workers, arguing statutory violations during the investigation. The trial court denied the motion and, after hearing testimony from both parents, medical experts, and other witnesses, found by a preponderance of the evidence that the mother had both abused and neglected the child.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether there was sufficient evidence for both findings and whether the statutory violations by DCYF required exclusion of certain evidence. The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the mother committed an abusive act under circumstances indicating harm or threatened harm to the child’s life, health, or welfare, and reversed the abuse finding. However, it found sufficient evidence of neglect and determined that any statutory violations by DCYF were harmless error. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire thus affirmed the neglect finding and reversed the abuse finding. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

A woman filed for dissolution of her marriage after six months, seeking a permanent domestic violence restraining order against her husband. The parties share a young daughter, S.R., and the wife has two other daughters, K.R. and D.R., from a prior relationship. The wife alleged that K.R., age 13, had disclosed incidents of sexual abuse by the husband. K.R. described being touched inappropriately by the husband on two occasions, one occurring recently and one two years prior. These allegations were relayed to law enforcement and a school counselor, and the wife filed a declaration detailing K.R.’s statements as part of her restraining order request.The Superior Court of Orange County held an evidentiary hearing in which the wife testified about K.R.’s statements. The trial court admitted these statements over the husband’s hearsay objections, found the wife credible, and granted a restraining order protecting the wife, K.R., D.R., and S.R. The order included sole legal and physical custody of S.R. to the wife, with the husband permitted professional monitored visitation with S.R. once a month, citing concerns that the monitor could not understand Spanish, S.R.’s primary language. The trial court also took judicial notice of pending criminal charges against the husband, and subsequently entered judgment dissolving the marriage.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that K.R.’s out-of-court statements were admissible for their truth under the child dependency hearsay exception recognized in In re Cindy L., and clarified that this exception applies in domestic violence restraining order proceedings involving sexual abuse of a minor. The court found error in the trial court’s reliance on pending criminal charges as substantive evidence, but determined the error was not prejudicial. The appellate court reversed the part of the restraining order limiting visitation with S.R., concluding the trial court misapplied the law regarding professional monitors’ language requirements, and remanded for reconsideration of visitation. The restraining order was otherwise affirmed. View "Marriage of M.P. and M.C." on Justia Law

Venticinque and Lair, long-term romantic partners living in Savannah, decided to start a family together in 2018. They selected a sperm donor resembling Lair, with Venticinque to be the biological mother. Lair contributed to fertility treatment costs, participated in events marking the pregnancy, and was involved in the child’s birth and early care. Both women were publicly identified as parents of the child, L.V., in birth announcements and social media posts. However, after L.V.’s birth in July 2021, Venticinque’s behavior changed, and in November 2022, she left Savannah with L.V., ceased contact between Lair and the child, and alleged abuse by Lair.Following this, Lair filed a petition in the Superior Court seeking equitable caregiver status under OCGA § 19-7-3.1. Venticinque opposed the petition and challenged the statute’s constitutionality. The trial court denied Venticinque’s motion to dismiss and held that the statute was constitutional, relying on precedent from Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587 (2001). The trial court found that Lair met the statutory requirements for equitable caregiver status and awarded her joint legal custody, visitation, and ultimately primary physical custody of L.V. after a subsequent bench trial. Venticinque appealed the final order, and the Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia due to the constitutional questions involved.The Supreme Court of Georgia determined that the trial court had applied the wrong legal standard under OCGA § 19-7-3.1 by placing the burden of proving harm to the child on Venticinque, rather than on Lair, the petitioner. The Supreme Court vacated both the equitable caregiver and custody orders and remanded the case for the trial court to apply the correct statutory standard. The constitutional issues were not addressed, as resolution of the statutory issue was dispositive. View "VENTICINQUE v. LAIR" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were divorced in 2018. Following the divorce, one party, Mr. Dasler, repeatedly attempted to relitigate matters that had already been resolved by final court orders, filing numerous motions for reconsideration and appeals, most of which were denied for lack of new arguments or facts. He also made unsubstantiated allegations against his former spouse, Ms. Knapp, and initiated related litigation in multiple courts over substantially similar issues. Based on this conduct, a trial court found that Mr. Dasler engaged in abusive litigation intended to harass or intimidate Ms. Knapp and issued an order restricting his ability to file further litigation against her without meeting certain conditions.Ms. Knapp then requested attorney’s fees and costs under Vermont’s abusive-litigation statute, 15 V.S.A. § 1184(b)(1), submitting detailed billing records to support her claim. Mr. Dasler objected, arguing that some fees were unrelated, excessive, and that he could not afford to pay them. The Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Family Division, reviewed the fees, applied the lodestar method, and limited the award to fees connected to the abusive litigation proceedings. The court found the fees reasonable, declined to adjust the amount based on Mr. Dasler’s financial circumstances, and awarded $5940 in attorney’s fees plus $30 in costs. Mr. Dasler’s motion for reconsideration, which argued the court was required to make specific findings regarding his ability to pay, was denied.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that when awarding attorney’s fees under 15 V.S.A. § 1184(b)(1), the proper standard is reasonableness and there is no requirement for individualized findings regarding the litigant’s ability to pay. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s analysis or fee award. The judgment in favor of Ms. Knapp was affirmed. View "Knapp v. Dasler" on Justia Law

Four minor children were placed in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (the Department) by the Warren County Youth Court in 2015. The children were subsequently placed in the care of their maternal aunt, Lesley Prince. In 2018, Prince and the children moved to Florida, where the Florida Department of Children and Families monitored them under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. After parental rights were terminated in 2019 and adoption packages were issued in 2023, Prince sought to adopt the children but was unable to secure a court to adjudicate the petitions due to confusion over whether Mississippi or Florida had jurisdiction.Prince initially submitted adoption petitions to the Warren County Chancery Court, which declined to set a hearing, stating that Florida had jurisdiction since the children resided there. After efforts to find Florida counsel proved unsuccessful and receiving conflicting advice from the Florida authorities, Prince filed the petitions in Hinds County Chancery Court, which transferred the cases to Warren County. The Warren County Chancery Court again refused to set a hearing, maintaining it lacked jurisdiction. Prince then sought a permanency hearing in Warren County Youth Court to create a record for appeal. The Youth Court granted an interlocutory order, effectively ruling it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the adoptions.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the interlocutory appeal from the Warren County Youth Court. The Court held that exclusive jurisdiction over adoptions lies with the chancery courts under Mississippi law and statute, and not with youth courts. Therefore, it affirmed the Warren County Youth Court’s ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to finalize the adoptions. The Supreme Court did not address the merits of the adoption petitions or issue a directive to the chancery court, as only the jurisdictional question from the youth court’s order was properly before it. View "In The Matter of L.L.T." on Justia Law

The parties in this case are the parents of a ten-year-old daughter and share equal residential care for her. Their original 2016 order set a child support obligation for the father, but a 2020 amended agreement reduced this obligation to zero, reflecting their arrangement of equal parenting time. In December 2023, both parties filed motions seeking modification of the parental rights and responsibilities order. During the pendency of these motions, the father had a son with another person, but the son was not covered by the child support order at issue.Following a hearing, the Maine District Court (Biddeford) ordered the father to resume paying child support to the mother and denied his request for a downward adjustment based on his obligation to support his new son. The District Court reasoned that under Maine’s statutory scheme, only a nonresidential parent—rather than a coresidential parent like the father—could receive such an adjustment. The court subsequently denied the father’s motion to alter or amend the judgment.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the statutory interpretation of 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(5)(A) de novo. The Court held that when both parents provide substantially equal care, neither is the “primary care provider” referenced in the statute. Therefore, the statutory provision allowing a child support adjustment for a parent who is not the primary care provider applies. Because the father was legally obligated to support his son in his household and neither party was the primary care provider for their daughter, the Court determined he was entitled to the statutory adjustment. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the District Court’s child support order and remanded the matter for recalculation consistent with its interpretation. View "Waterman v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

A married couple with two young children went through divorce proceedings after the mother filed for divorce. During the marriage, the mother was the primary caregiver, staying home with the children, while the father worked long hours as a mechanic and business owner. Both parties presented evidence at trial regarding their respective parenting abilities, disciplinary approaches, and their differing views on matters such as medical care and education. Testimony addressed concerns about each parent’s past drinking, interactions with the children, willingness to facilitate contact with the other parent, and incidents involving the children’s care.The District Court of Washakie County conducted a bench trial and, after evaluating the statutory best interest factors, awarded joint legal custody of the children to both parents. The court designated the mother as the primary residential caregiver and final decision-maker for major matters, granting the father regular parenting time, including certain weekends, evenings, holidays, and summer periods. The father appealed the custody determination, arguing that the court violated his constitutional rights by not granting equal parenting time and claiming the court abused its discretion in its allocation of parenting time.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the appeal. It held that, in custody disputes between two fit parents, the constitutional principles cited in cases like Troxel v. Granville do not require courts to allocate equal parenting time. Instead, the court reaffirmed that Wyoming law requires custody to be determined according to the best interests of the children, without any presumption in favor of equal or shared custody. The Supreme Court found that the district court had thoroughly considered the statutory factors, acted within its discretion, and did not violate the father’s fundamental rights. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s custody order. View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between two formerly married individuals regarding possession of their cat, Yasmine, following their divorce in 2015. Their Marital Property Settlement Agreement (MPSA) specified that the wife would be awarded possession of the cat, but the husband would care for Yasmine until the wife requested possession. If the husband’s new residence did not permit cats after the sale of the marital home, he was required to notify the wife, who then had 20 days to take custody or arrange for the cat’s care. After the marital home was sold in 2016, the husband notified the wife, but she was unable to take possession or arrange care for Yasmine immediately and requested more time. The husband agreed to a short extension, but the wife did not act within that period, and the cat remained with the husband. Several years later, in 2023, the wife sought custody of Yasmine, but the husband refused, claiming she had forfeited her rights under the MPSA.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, held a hearing in January 2024 on the wife’s motion for contempt, alleging the husband violated the MPSA. The court found that the husband had provided proper notice, the wife was aware of this, and she failed to take the cat or arrange for its care within the agreed-upon timeframe. The court denied the contempt motion and issued its findings and order in February 2024. Subsequent motions by the wife for reconsideration and an out-of-time appeal were denied or deemed denied.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the MPSA did not grant the wife an indefinite right to possess Yasmine and that her rights under the agreement expired months after the time extension, not years later. The court found no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial of the contempt motion. View "Marriage of Burgard & Jacobsen" on Justia Law

After the Department of Public Health and Human Services received a report that the mother of a fourteen-year-old, J.D., had been arrested for allegedly making numerous inappropriate calls to a sheriff’s dispatch over two years, J.D. was left without another adult with legal custody. The Department placed J.D. with his aunt, T.M., on an emergency basis. The Department’s case focused on concerns about the mother’s mental health, including reports of erratic behavior during her custody and prior departmental involvement. The Department filed a petition for emergency protective services, adjudication of J.D. as a youth in need of care (YINC), and temporary legal custody, supported by an affidavit describing alleged neglect and the need for immediate protection due to the mother’s mental health.The Fifth Judicial District Court, Beaverhead County, held a show cause hearing in March 2023, where the mother denied the allegations but stipulated to cause. At an adjudicatory hearing in April 2023, the Department presented testimony primarily regarding the mother’s mental health and past incidents, such as throwing objects, but did not establish any present physical or psychological harm to J.D. or substantial risk thereof. J.D.’s counsel advised the court that J.D. was not afraid of his mother. The District Court adjudicated J.D. as a YINC, finding the mother’s mental health issues presented a risk to J.D.’s well-being and granted the Department temporary legal custody, later imposing a guardianship.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana applied an abuse of discretion standard. The Court held that the District Court’s finding of abuse and neglect was not supported by substantial evidence, as the Department failed to demonstrate a specific, imminent risk of harm to J.D. resulting from the mother’s conduct. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed and vacated both the adjudication of J.D. as a YINC and the subsequent guardianship order. View "Matter of J.D." on Justia Law