Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A couple divorced in 2019, with the husband required to pay monthly alimony to the wife under the terms of their agreement. After the sale of the marital home, the husband’s alimony obligation was set at $13,500 per month. In 2023, the husband relocated to Texas, left his previous employment, and experienced a significant decrease in income. He struggled to meet his alimony obligations, missing several payments, and ultimately sought a reduction in his alimony due to his changed financial circumstances. The wife, whose dental hygiene license had lapsed and who was not employed, relied primarily on alimony for her income and filed a motion for contempt based on the missed payments.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County, South Dakota, reviewed the parties’ motions. After considering testimony and financial documentation, the court found the husband’s account of his reduced income credible and determined that his move and employment changes were not made in bad faith or to avoid alimony. The court also found that the wife’s claimed financial needs were not fully credible, noting that some expenses were inflated or related to adult children. The court reduced the husband’s alimony obligation to $6,000 per month effective January 1, 2025, denied the wife’s contempt motion, and declined to make the modification retroactive, reasoning that the wife should have time to adjust to the reduced payments.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decisions. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the alimony obligation, did not clearly err in denying the contempt motion, and did not abuse its discretion in refusing to apply the modification retroactively. The court’s findings were supported by the evidence and were within the permissible range of judicial decisions. View "Peery v. Peery" on Justia Law

A child, X.D., was born in May 2022 and immediately placed with prospective adoptive parents, Cliff and Rebecca, after his biological mother, Jessica, relinquished him for adoption. Jessica had suffered repeated physical and emotional abuse from X.D.’s biological father, Raymon, including an incident where Raymon struck her in the face two weeks after learning of her pregnancy. Following this, Jessica left Raymon, sought refuge in a domestic violence shelter, and cut off communication. Raymon was unaware of X.D.’s birth and believed Jessica had miscarried after she told him the baby “is not here no more.” Throughout Jessica’s pregnancy, Raymon made sporadic attempts to contact her but did not provide support for the pregnancy or the child.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the adoption petition and Raymon’s opposition, in which he claimed status as a “Kelsey S. father”—an unwed biological father who is constitutionally entitled to block adoption if he promptly demonstrates a full commitment to parental responsibilities. The trial court found Raymon qualified as a Kelsey S. father, reasoning that Jessica’s actions prevented him from asserting his rights and that he had shown sufficient emotional and financial commitment. The court excluded key evidence—screenshots of Raymon’s threatening text messages—on authentication and hearsay grounds.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred in excluding the text message evidence, which was sufficiently authenticated and relevant. Upon considering the full record, including the excluded evidence, the appellate court found insufficient support for Raymon’s claim to Kelsey S. status. The court further determined that it was not in X.D.’s best interest for Raymon to retain parental rights. The judgment was reversed and remanded with directions to allow the adoption to proceed. View "Adoption of X.D." on Justia Law

Ashley McCall Hart and Steven Hart, who were married and have two children, became involved in a series of legal disputes following Ashley’s filing for dissolution of marriage in October 2017. On the same day, Ashley requested a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Steven, which the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted temporarily. Steven responded by filing his own DVRO request against Ashley, but after hearings, the court denied Steven’s request and granted Ashley a one-year DVRO. Ashley later dismissed a renewal request in accordance with a settlement agreement. In July 2023, Ashley again sought a DVRO, and the court issued a nine-month order. Before its expiration, Ashley requested renewal, which was granted for another nine months.Ashley appealed the renewal duration, arguing that Family Code section 6345 requires a minimum five-year renewal period for DVROs. The Superior Court had found Ashley demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of future abuse but believed it had discretion to renew the DVRO for less than five years.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that under Family Code section 6345, subdivision (a), a court may renew a DVRO only for five or more years, or permanently, at its discretion, but not for a period less than five years. The court found that the statutory language and legislative history clearly establish a mandatory minimum renewal period of five years, and the trial court’s discretion is limited to choosing between five years, a longer period, or permanent renewal. The appellate court reversed the lower court’s order to the extent it provided for a nine-month renewal and remanded with instructions to modify the order to provide for a five-year renewal. View "Hart v. Hart" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were in a long-term relationship and had two children together. During the relationship, the mother was a stay-at-home caregiver while the father was the sole wage earner. After their separation, the father initiated legal proceedings to determine residential responsibility, parenting time, and child support. The mother and children moved out in April 2024. The parties agreed on most issues, including that the mother would have primary residential responsibility and the father would pay $2,885 per month in child support. However, disputes remained regarding the effective date of the child support obligation and whether the father should receive credit for $9,150 in payments he made for the children’s needs after the separation but before the final judgment.The District Court of Stark County resolved the remaining issues based on written submissions. It set the child support obligation to begin on April 1, 2024, but denied the father credit for the $9,150 in voluntary payments. The court justified this by noting the father’s higher income and its discretion to set the commencement date for support. The father appealed, challenging only the refusal to credit his voluntary payments.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and held that, as a matter of law, a district court must credit voluntary child support payments made by the obligor during the pendency of the action when calculating past-due support. The court clarified that its prior decision in Richter v. Houser, 1999 ND 147, 598 N.W.2d 193, established this rule and that failure to provide such credit results in impermissible double recovery. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to reduce the father’s past-due child support obligation by $9,150. View "Sutherby v. Astanina" on Justia Law

Elena Kouvabina and Jacob Veltman, both attorneys, were married in 2010, had a child in 2012, and separated in 2017. Since their separation, Kouvabina, acting as a self-represented litigant, initiated a series of contentious legal proceedings related to their dissolution, custody, support, and related family law matters. Over a five-year period, she commenced, prosecuted, or maintained eleven appeals and writs in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three. Of these, nine—comprising five appeals and four writ petitions—were finally determined adversely to her, including repeated unsuccessful efforts to disqualify trial judges and appeals from orders on spousal support, child support, custody, visitation, and attorney fees.The San Mateo County Superior Court previously handled the underlying family law proceedings, issuing various orders and judgments that Kouvabina challenged through appeals and writs. In each instance, the appellate court either affirmed the lower court’s decisions or summarily denied her writ petitions. These adverse outcomes formed the basis for the appellate court’s review of her litigation conduct.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, on its own motion, reviewed whether Kouvabina met the statutory definition of a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391(b)(1). The court found that she had, within the preceding seven years, while self-represented, commenced at least five litigations that were finally determined adversely to her. The court rejected her arguments that appeals do not constitute “litigation” under the statute and that family law matters should be treated differently. The court declared Kouvabina a vexatious litigant and imposed a prefiling order prohibiting her from filing new litigation in California courts while self-represented without first obtaining leave from the presiding judge or justice. No costs were awarded. View "in re Marriage of Kouvabina" on Justia Law

An unwed couple had a child in July 2013. The father’s name was not listed on the birth certificate, and he died about a year and a half later. The child’s paternal grandmother remained involved in the child’s life and provided support to the mother. In 2018, the grandmother petitioned for visitation and to establish the father’s paternity, submitting a DNA report indicating a high likelihood of paternity. After a hearing, the mother and grandmother, both represented by counsel, submitted an agreed order to the Porter Superior Court. The mother agreed to change the child’s surname, add the father’s name to the birth certificate, and acknowledged in open court that the father was the child’s father. The trial court approved the agreed order.Subsequent disputes arose regarding visitation, leading to contempt motions and further hearings. The trial court maintained the agreed order, found the mother in contempt, and later appointed a guardian ad litem following additional petitions. At a final hearing, the guardian ad litem recommended joint legal custody with the grandmother as primary custodian. The trial court requested briefing, after which the grandmother filed her brief and the mother moved to dismiss the visitation petition, arguing the grandmother lacked standing under the Grandparent Visitation Act (GVA). The trial court denied the mother’s motion, finding she had waived any challenge to standing by stipulating to the agreed order. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding the grandmother lacked standing because paternity had not been formally established.The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Supreme Court held that the mother was equitably estopped from denying the father’s paternity due to her prior stipulations and conduct. Therefore, the grandmother had standing under the GVA to petition for visitation. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "O'Connell v. Clay" on Justia Law

After being arrested and jailed following an alleged assault on hospital staff, an individual was found incompetent to proceed in a criminal case and was civilly committed as mentally ill. The district court appointed counsel to represent him in the civil commitment proceedings. Under Minnesota law at the time, civilly committed patients in jail were entitled to priority admission to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the commitment order. Despite this, the individual remained in jail for over a month. His court-appointed counsel then petitioned for writs of mandamus and habeas corpus to enforce his statutory right to timely admission to a treatment facility.The district court granted the writ of mandamus, ordering the Commissioner of Human Services to admit the patient to a treatment facility, and directed the county sheriff to transport him accordingly. When the county refused to pay the appointed counsel for work performed in the extraordinary writ proceedings, the district court ordered the county to pay, finding that the counsel’s work was directly related to the civil commitment and that representation extended to all proceedings under the relevant statute.The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order regarding payment for the extraordinary writ proceedings, holding that such proceedings were not “under” the civil commitment statute and thus did not entitle the patient to court-appointed counsel or require payment by the county. However, the appellate court affirmed the order for payment for representation in the initial commitment proceedings.The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision, holding that a petition for an extraordinary writ to enforce a civilly committed patient’s right to timely admission to a state-operated treatment program is a proceeding under the civil commitment statute. Therefore, the patient is entitled to the assistance of court-appointed counsel in such proceedings, and the county must pay a reasonable sum for that representation. View "In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Swope" on Justia Law

A former federal employee retired before age sixty-two and began receiving an annuity supplement under the Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act (FERS). Years earlier, a Colorado state court had issued a divorce decree awarding his ex-wife a pro rata share of his “gross monthly annuity” and any benefit earned from his special service, but the decree did not specifically mention the annuity supplement. For nearly thirty years, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) only divided the annuity supplement between former spouses if a court order expressly required it. In 2016, OPM changed its policy, deciding that if a court order divided the basic annuity, the annuity supplement would also be divided in the same way, even if the order was silent on the supplement. OPM applied this new interpretation retroactively, resulting in a demand that the retiree pay his ex-wife nearly $25,000.The retiree challenged OPM’s decision before the Merit Systems Protection Board. The Board’s administrative judge found that OPM could only divide the annuity supplement if a court order expressly provided for such division. The Board affirmed this decision, rejecting OPM’s new interpretation. OPM then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that, under 5 U.S.C. §§ 8421(c) and 8467(a), OPM may apportion a federal retiree’s annuity supplement to a former spouse only when a court order expressly provides for such division. The court reasoned that the statutory text, structure, and history require the annuity supplement to be treated in the same way as the basic annuity, which is only divided if expressly ordered by a court. The court affirmed the Board’s decision. View "OPM v. MOULTON " on Justia Law

Two parents, both with ties to France and the United States, became embroiled in a contentious custody dispute over their twin children, who hold dual citizenship. After the parents’ relationship ended, the mother relocated with the children from France to Oregon. Both parents then initiated custody proceedings in their respective countries. The Oregon state court issued a restraining order preventing the father from removing the children from Oregon, but after a French court granted him joint custody and restricted the children’s departure from France, the father took the children back to France. The Oregon court subsequently granted the mother sole custody, held the father in contempt, and issued a warrant for his arrest. The mother later returned to France, took the children back to Oregon without the father’s consent, and French authorities began investigating her actions.The father filed a petition in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, seeking the return of the children to France. The mother moved to dismiss the petition, invoking the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine due to the father’s failure to resolve the Oregon arrest warrant and his absence from the state. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the petition, reasoning that the father’s conduct justified the harsh sanction of disentitlement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine must be narrowly applied in civil cases, and that the traditional justifications for the doctrine—enforceability, efficiency, dignity of the courts, deterrence, and abandonment—did not necessitate dismissal in this context. The court emphasized the importance of parental rights and the unique purposes of the Hague Convention. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for adjudication on the merits. View "PARIS V. BROWN" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between two parents, Molly and Bryan, over the termination of Bryan’s parental rights to their child, S.A.T. After their divorce, Molly had primary physical custody, and Bryan initially remained involved. In 2016, Bryan experienced a mental health crisis, resulting in an incident that led Molly to obtain a temporary protective order (TPO) against him, later extended to require Bryan to undergo psychological evaluation and counseling before resuming contact. Bryan, facing financial and legal barriers, did not see or communicate with the children for several years, though he made efforts to seek legal help and eventually complied with the TPO’s requirements once he had the means. In 2021, after Bryan completed the required treatment and paid child support arrears, Molly filed a petition to terminate his parental rights. The petition proceeded only as to S.A.T. after the other child, K.W.T., emancipated and subsequently passed away.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, reviewed the petition. After an evidentiary hearing, the court found that Molly failed to prove any grounds of parental fault—abandonment, neglect, or only token efforts to communicate or support—by clear and convincing evidence. The court noted that Bryan’s lack of contact was influenced by the TPO, financial hardship, and Molly’s actions to limit access, and that S.A.T. was well cared for in Molly’s custody.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that in private termination actions, severing parental rights based solely on token efforts to communicate or support is disfavored, especially when the child is safe and well cared for. The court also held that a parent does not admit a parental-fault ground merely by failing to oppose it in response to a termination petition. The order denying the petition to terminate Bryan’s parental rights was affirmed. View "In re Parental Rights as to S.A.T." on Justia Law