Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The parties in this case were divorced in 2018. Following the divorce, one party, Mr. Dasler, repeatedly attempted to relitigate matters that had already been resolved by final court orders, filing numerous motions for reconsideration and appeals, most of which were denied for lack of new arguments or facts. He also made unsubstantiated allegations against his former spouse, Ms. Knapp, and initiated related litigation in multiple courts over substantially similar issues. Based on this conduct, a trial court found that Mr. Dasler engaged in abusive litigation intended to harass or intimidate Ms. Knapp and issued an order restricting his ability to file further litigation against her without meeting certain conditions.Ms. Knapp then requested attorney’s fees and costs under Vermont’s abusive-litigation statute, 15 V.S.A. § 1184(b)(1), submitting detailed billing records to support her claim. Mr. Dasler objected, arguing that some fees were unrelated, excessive, and that he could not afford to pay them. The Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Family Division, reviewed the fees, applied the lodestar method, and limited the award to fees connected to the abusive litigation proceedings. The court found the fees reasonable, declined to adjust the amount based on Mr. Dasler’s financial circumstances, and awarded $5940 in attorney’s fees plus $30 in costs. Mr. Dasler’s motion for reconsideration, which argued the court was required to make specific findings regarding his ability to pay, was denied.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that when awarding attorney’s fees under 15 V.S.A. § 1184(b)(1), the proper standard is reasonableness and there is no requirement for individualized findings regarding the litigant’s ability to pay. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s analysis or fee award. The judgment in favor of Ms. Knapp was affirmed. View "Knapp v. Dasler" on Justia Law

Four minor children were placed in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (the Department) by the Warren County Youth Court in 2015. The children were subsequently placed in the care of their maternal aunt, Lesley Prince. In 2018, Prince and the children moved to Florida, where the Florida Department of Children and Families monitored them under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. After parental rights were terminated in 2019 and adoption packages were issued in 2023, Prince sought to adopt the children but was unable to secure a court to adjudicate the petitions due to confusion over whether Mississippi or Florida had jurisdiction.Prince initially submitted adoption petitions to the Warren County Chancery Court, which declined to set a hearing, stating that Florida had jurisdiction since the children resided there. After efforts to find Florida counsel proved unsuccessful and receiving conflicting advice from the Florida authorities, Prince filed the petitions in Hinds County Chancery Court, which transferred the cases to Warren County. The Warren County Chancery Court again refused to set a hearing, maintaining it lacked jurisdiction. Prince then sought a permanency hearing in Warren County Youth Court to create a record for appeal. The Youth Court granted an interlocutory order, effectively ruling it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the adoptions.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the interlocutory appeal from the Warren County Youth Court. The Court held that exclusive jurisdiction over adoptions lies with the chancery courts under Mississippi law and statute, and not with youth courts. Therefore, it affirmed the Warren County Youth Court’s ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to finalize the adoptions. The Supreme Court did not address the merits of the adoption petitions or issue a directive to the chancery court, as only the jurisdictional question from the youth court’s order was properly before it. View "In The Matter of L.L.T." on Justia Law

The parties in this case are the parents of a ten-year-old daughter and share equal residential care for her. Their original 2016 order set a child support obligation for the father, but a 2020 amended agreement reduced this obligation to zero, reflecting their arrangement of equal parenting time. In December 2023, both parties filed motions seeking modification of the parental rights and responsibilities order. During the pendency of these motions, the father had a son with another person, but the son was not covered by the child support order at issue.Following a hearing, the Maine District Court (Biddeford) ordered the father to resume paying child support to the mother and denied his request for a downward adjustment based on his obligation to support his new son. The District Court reasoned that under Maine’s statutory scheme, only a nonresidential parent—rather than a coresidential parent like the father—could receive such an adjustment. The court subsequently denied the father’s motion to alter or amend the judgment.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the statutory interpretation of 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(5)(A) de novo. The Court held that when both parents provide substantially equal care, neither is the “primary care provider” referenced in the statute. Therefore, the statutory provision allowing a child support adjustment for a parent who is not the primary care provider applies. Because the father was legally obligated to support his son in his household and neither party was the primary care provider for their daughter, the Court determined he was entitled to the statutory adjustment. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the District Court’s child support order and remanded the matter for recalculation consistent with its interpretation. View "Waterman v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

A married couple with two young children went through divorce proceedings after the mother filed for divorce. During the marriage, the mother was the primary caregiver, staying home with the children, while the father worked long hours as a mechanic and business owner. Both parties presented evidence at trial regarding their respective parenting abilities, disciplinary approaches, and their differing views on matters such as medical care and education. Testimony addressed concerns about each parent’s past drinking, interactions with the children, willingness to facilitate contact with the other parent, and incidents involving the children’s care.The District Court of Washakie County conducted a bench trial and, after evaluating the statutory best interest factors, awarded joint legal custody of the children to both parents. The court designated the mother as the primary residential caregiver and final decision-maker for major matters, granting the father regular parenting time, including certain weekends, evenings, holidays, and summer periods. The father appealed the custody determination, arguing that the court violated his constitutional rights by not granting equal parenting time and claiming the court abused its discretion in its allocation of parenting time.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the appeal. It held that, in custody disputes between two fit parents, the constitutional principles cited in cases like Troxel v. Granville do not require courts to allocate equal parenting time. Instead, the court reaffirmed that Wyoming law requires custody to be determined according to the best interests of the children, without any presumption in favor of equal or shared custody. The Supreme Court found that the district court had thoroughly considered the statutory factors, acted within its discretion, and did not violate the father’s fundamental rights. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s custody order. View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between two formerly married individuals regarding possession of their cat, Yasmine, following their divorce in 2015. Their Marital Property Settlement Agreement (MPSA) specified that the wife would be awarded possession of the cat, but the husband would care for Yasmine until the wife requested possession. If the husband’s new residence did not permit cats after the sale of the marital home, he was required to notify the wife, who then had 20 days to take custody or arrange for the cat’s care. After the marital home was sold in 2016, the husband notified the wife, but she was unable to take possession or arrange care for Yasmine immediately and requested more time. The husband agreed to a short extension, but the wife did not act within that period, and the cat remained with the husband. Several years later, in 2023, the wife sought custody of Yasmine, but the husband refused, claiming she had forfeited her rights under the MPSA.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, held a hearing in January 2024 on the wife’s motion for contempt, alleging the husband violated the MPSA. The court found that the husband had provided proper notice, the wife was aware of this, and she failed to take the cat or arrange for its care within the agreed-upon timeframe. The court denied the contempt motion and issued its findings and order in February 2024. Subsequent motions by the wife for reconsideration and an out-of-time appeal were denied or deemed denied.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the MPSA did not grant the wife an indefinite right to possess Yasmine and that her rights under the agreement expired months after the time extension, not years later. The court found no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial of the contempt motion. View "Marriage of Burgard & Jacobsen" on Justia Law

After the Department of Public Health and Human Services received a report that the mother of a fourteen-year-old, J.D., had been arrested for allegedly making numerous inappropriate calls to a sheriff’s dispatch over two years, J.D. was left without another adult with legal custody. The Department placed J.D. with his aunt, T.M., on an emergency basis. The Department’s case focused on concerns about the mother’s mental health, including reports of erratic behavior during her custody and prior departmental involvement. The Department filed a petition for emergency protective services, adjudication of J.D. as a youth in need of care (YINC), and temporary legal custody, supported by an affidavit describing alleged neglect and the need for immediate protection due to the mother’s mental health.The Fifth Judicial District Court, Beaverhead County, held a show cause hearing in March 2023, where the mother denied the allegations but stipulated to cause. At an adjudicatory hearing in April 2023, the Department presented testimony primarily regarding the mother’s mental health and past incidents, such as throwing objects, but did not establish any present physical or psychological harm to J.D. or substantial risk thereof. J.D.’s counsel advised the court that J.D. was not afraid of his mother. The District Court adjudicated J.D. as a YINC, finding the mother’s mental health issues presented a risk to J.D.’s well-being and granted the Department temporary legal custody, later imposing a guardianship.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana applied an abuse of discretion standard. The Court held that the District Court’s finding of abuse and neglect was not supported by substantial evidence, as the Department failed to demonstrate a specific, imminent risk of harm to J.D. resulting from the mother’s conduct. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed and vacated both the adjudication of J.D. as a YINC and the subsequent guardianship order. View "Matter of J.D." on Justia Law

A credit union recorded a judgment lien against an individual, Troy Lewis, in January 2017. Several months later, the Alaska Department of Revenue, Child Support Services Division (CSSD), recorded a child support lien against Lewis’s property. Subsequently, a law firm acting as trustee initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure on Lewis’s property to satisfy a deed of trust held by a bank. After paying the bank, the trustee was left with surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sale. Both the credit union and CSSD claimed entitlement to these surplus funds, with the credit union asserting priority based on the earlier recording of its lien, and CSSD asserting priority under statutes specific to child support liens and withholding orders.The District Court of the State of Alaska, Anchorage, ruled in favor of CSSD, finding that the statutory provisions governing child support liens and withholding orders gave CSSD priority to the surplus funds, despite its lien being recorded after the credit union’s. The district court also found that CSSD’s withholding order applied to the surplus. The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, affirmed this decision, relying primarily on the child support withholding order statute as more specific and therefore controlling over the general lien priority statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that CSSD’s withholding order was ineffective in this scenario because, at the relevant time, the surplus funds were not “due, owing, or belonging” to Lewis, as required by the statute. However, the court ruled that the statutory prohibitions on transferring property subject to a CSSD child support lien (AS 25.27.230(d)) do apply to judgment lienholders in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. This effectively grants CSSD’s lien priority over other judgment liens, regardless of recording order. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Alaska USA Federal Credit Union v. The Sayer Law Group, P.C." on Justia Law

The defendant, Eric Honors, was accused of sexually assaulting his sixteen-year-old stepdaughter, B.J., both in the sleeper cab of his semi-truck outside their Wichita, Kansas home and during a subsequent drive from Kansas to Texas. Throughout these events, Honors held B.J. captive, repeatedly assaulted her, and made various videos documenting the abuse. Three such videos were recovered by investigators, all recorded in Kansas; other videos described by B.J. that were made in Oklahoma and Texas were not recovered.Honors was indicted by a federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas on two counts: transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity and production of child pornography. At trial, the jury convicted him on both counts. The district court sentenced Honors to a total of sixty years in prison and ten years of supervised release. It also imposed a special condition prohibiting Honors from contacting B.J. or her family, including his wife and four biological children, during supervised release. Initially, the district court declined to extend the no-contact order to his prison term, reasoning it lacked authority, but later reconvened and imposed the order during incarceration as a civil injunction.Honors appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, raising three issues: (1) whether the jury instructions constructively amended the indictment by omitting language limiting the offense to Kansas, (2) whether the district court had authority to impose the no-contact order during incarceration, and (3) whether there was sufficient justification for prohibiting contact with his wife and children during supervised release. The Tenth Circuit held that any error regarding the jury instructions was not plain, affirmed the conviction on Count 2, vacated the custodial no-contact order in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction, and vacated the supervised release condition prohibiting contact with his wife and biological children, finding no compelling justification. View "United States v. Honors" on Justia Law

The biological parents of a minor child, born in January 2018, have a contentious history involving allegations of abuse, criminal charges, and a ten-year order of protection against the father, Daniel Whitby, based on the mother's allegations of assault and rape. The mother, Reina Irene Cazabal-Boe, petitioned for a parenting plan that would exclude Whitby from all contact and visitation with the child, citing safety concerns. Whitby counter-petitioned, alleging drug use and abuse by Cazabal-Boe. A hearing was held in 2018, but Whitby did not attend, and the Standing Master adopted the mother’s proposed plan, giving her sole parenting rights and denying Whitby any contact.Following Whitby’s guilty pleas to various offenses against Cazabal-Boe, he twice sought to modify the parenting plan, alleging changed circumstances such as rehabilitation, sobriety, completion of anger management courses, and psychological evaluations. Both times, the Standing Master—first in 2019 and again in 2025—denied his motions without an evidentiary hearing, finding no change in circumstances affecting the child and awarded attorney fees against Whitby, labeling his repeated motions as vexatious. The Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court adopted these findings, denying a hearing and refusing to amend the plan.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case, applying abuse of discretion and clearly erroneous standards. It found that Whitby’s affidavits, if true, plausibly alleged a change in circumstances that required a hearing under Montana law. The Court held that the District Court erred by denying a hearing and by awarding attorney fees without proper findings. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s denial of a hearing, vacated the merits denial of amendment, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine if modification of the parenting plan is warranted, also reversing the attorney fees award. View "In re Parenting of A.M.B." on Justia Law

C.M.B., a child born in 2018, was removed from her mother’s care following repeated reports and incidents of domestic violence, substance abuse, and unsafe conditions in her home. Law enforcement and Child and Family Services (CFS) intervened after a particularly concerning event in May 2023, finding the home unsanitary and the children exposed to potentially violent situations. Over several years, the family had been subject to multiple investigations for neglect and abuse. After removal, C.M.B. and her siblings were placed in foster or kinship care. The mother was unable to consistently participate in visits or comply fully with her treatment plan, partially due to her own legal and housing difficulties.The Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, adjudicated C.M.B. as a youth in need of care and granted temporary legal custody to the Department. The mother stipulated to the initial petition but later struggled to engage with required services. After extensive proceedings, including testimony from therapists and social workers, the district court found that the mother did not provide a safe or stable home, failed to make meaningful progress on her treatment plan, and that her conditions were unlikely to change within a reasonable time. The court terminated parental rights and granted permanent legal custody to the Department.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the mother challenged both her standing to assert ineffective assistance of counsel claims on behalf of C.M.B. and the district court’s findings regarding her ability to change. The Supreme Court held that the mother lacked standing to assert C.M.B.’s statutory and constitutional rights to counsel, as she did not show a personal constitutional violation. Additionally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating parental rights, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination and permanent custody order. View "In re C.M.B." on Justia Law