Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries
Matter of M.S.
M.H. is the mother of two children, M.S. and G.H. In 2022, Erie County Department of Social Services initiated abuse proceedings against M.H. and her former boyfriend, D.K., after videos surfaced appearing to show D.K. sexually abusing M.S. The videos, dated from 2019, were not found in the family home but rather on the computer of B.W., an individual in Syracuse who claimed to have hacked into the family's security cameras and who was under investigation for trading child pornography. The FBI recovered the videos, which depicted incidents in the family’s living room. Neither child disclosed abuse during interviews; M.S. denied any sexual contact, and G.H. was unaware of any abuse. The police collected photographs of the home that matched details in the videos, and M.H. identified the people in screenshots as D.K. and M.S.Erie County Family Court admitted the videos into evidence over objection, relying on testimony from the FBI agent who recovered the videos and a police investigator who confirmed the setting matched the family home. The court found that M.H. had abused M.S. by failing to protect her from D.K. and derivatively abused G.H. Both children were placed in foster care, and M.H.’s contact was limited to supervised visits. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that any uncertainty regarding the videos’ authenticity went to their weight and not their admissibility.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The Court held that the videos were not properly authenticated because Erie County failed to provide sufficient evidence establishing their reliability. Unlike in prior cases where authentication was found lacking, here the videos’ chain of custody was more tenuous and the testimony presented did not meet the threshold required for authentication. As a result, the Court reversed the orders of the Appellate Division and dismissed the petitions against M.H. View "Matter of M.S." on Justia Law
United States v. Green
During a contentious divorce and custody dispute, Amanda Hovanec, who had returned to Ohio from South Africa with her children, conspired with Anthony Theodorou, her romantic partner, to kill her husband, T.H. After failed attempts to hire hitmen in South Africa, Theodorou, at Hovanec’s direction, obtained and shipped etorphine, a dangerous animal tranquilizer, to the United States. Hovanec ultimately used the drug to fatally inject T.H. at her mother Anita Green’s home. Green assisted after the murder by helping to select a burial site, driving the others to dig a grave, and later transporting them and the body for burial. The group also undertook efforts to conceal the crime, including disposing of T.H.’s belongings and misleading authorities. All three were arrested after an investigation revealed dashcam footage of the crime.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Hovanec pleaded guilty to multiple controlled-substance offenses resulting in death, and Green pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact. Hovanec received a 480-month sentence; Green received 121 months and was ordered to pay restitution for psychological care for T.H.’s and Hovanec’s children. Both defendants appealed their sentences and, in Green’s case, the restitution order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentences for both Hovanec and Green. The appellate court upheld the denial of a sentencing reduction for Green based on her lack of candor regarding knowledge of the murder plan. The court also affirmed the sentencing enhancements for Hovanec’s leadership role and obstruction of justice. However, the court reversed the restitution order against Green, holding that under federal law, restitution for psychological care requires evidence of bodily injury, defined as physical harm or physical manifestations of psychological harm, and remanded for further factual findings on this issue. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law
Kingstone v. Kingstone
A father with a high monthly income was ordered to pay $5,000 per month in child support for his minor child, which included a $1,500 upward deviation above the presumptive guideline amount. The deviation was based on the child’s significant disabling conditions and the father’s substantial income and assets. In addition, the father was required to maintain a $750,000 life insurance policy to secure his child support obligation. The mother documented considerable ongoing expenses for the child’s developmental and medical needs, including frequent travel for therapy and care. The District Court of Eddy County initially entered this support order, but on appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota found the lower court’s findings insufficient to support the upward deviation and remanded for more explicit findings and reconsideration of the life insurance amount. On remand, the district court provided additional findings, detailing the child’s medical needs, the family’s prior standard of living, and specific expenses justifying the deviation. The court again found the deviation in the child’s best interest due to her lifelong health conditions and the desire for her to maintain a standard of living similar to that before the divorce. The court attributed $750 per month to the child’s medical needs and $750 per month to maintaining her standard of living, and reinstated the $750,000 life insurance requirement. Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court’s findings were explicit and supported by evidence. The court affirmed that the upward deviation in child support and the life insurance requirement were in the child’s best interest and not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s order in all respects. View "Kingstone v. Kingstone" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law, North Dakota Supreme Court
State v. Maher
The defendant was charged with terrorizing—domestic violence, a class C felony, after an incident involving his ex-wife, who is also the mother of his minor child. The district court imposed a pre-dispositional order prohibiting contact with the victim, initially for thirty days. After the defendant pled guilty, the court sentenced him to two years, including three days to serve (with credit for time served) and two years of supervised probation. As a condition of probation, the court extended the no-contact order for two years, prohibiting all direct or indirect contact with the victim, including communication relevant to their minor child.After sentencing, the defendant requested an exception to allow necessary communications with the victim regarding court-ordered parenting time with their child. The district court declined, stating the defendant was not prohibited from having contact with his child but failed to provide any method for arranging parenting time, given the victim’s residential responsibility and the communication restrictions. The defendant appealed the judgment and the order extending the no-contact provision.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that, although the district court acted within statutory limits and did not rely on any impermissible factor (so the sentence was not illegal), it abused its discretion by failing to provide a means for the defendant to arrange contact with his child or to explain why no such method was allowed. The court determined that, under these circumstances, the blanket prohibition on contact with the victim—including for purposes of exercising parental rights—was arbitrary and not the result of a reasoned decision. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the criminal judgment and the order extending the order prohibiting contact and remanded for resentencing, instructing the district court to consider alternatives that would permit the defendant to exercise his parental rights. View "State v. Maher" on Justia Law
Vetter v. Vetter
The case concerns divorced parents who share a minor child. After their 2019 divorce, the mother was awarded primary residential responsibility, with the judgment affirmed on appeal. In 2024, the father moved to modify the custody arrangement, citing a material change in circumstances and seeking joint, and later, primary residential responsibility. Following hearings in 2025, the District Court of Burleigh County granted the father primary residential responsibility, established a parenting plan for the mother, and entered a second amended judgment. The mother appealed, arguing that the district court erred by modifying custody without finding a material change in circumstances, violated her due process rights, improperly delegated authority to the child and a counselor regarding parenting time, and suspended child support without adequate findings. She also asserted cumulative errors and alleged parental alienation. The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court’s findings on the material change of circumstances, best interests factors, and award of primary residential responsibility were not clearly erroneous. The court determined that most of the mother’s arguments were inadequately briefed and thus were not considered on appeal, except for her claim regarding the delegation of parenting time authority. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court improperly delegated its authority over parenting time to both the minor child and her therapist, allowing them to determine the conditions and occurrence of the mother’s contact with the child. The court found that the district court failed to provide sufficient findings or a clear link between the mother’s conduct and potential harm to the child that would justify such a restriction. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for further proceedings limited to parenting time. View "Vetter v. Vetter" on Justia Law
Mast v. A.A.
An infant girl was discovered severely wounded on an Afghan battlefield by U.S. forces in 2019. With no known surviving family and urgent medical needs, she was transferred to U.S. military care. Joshua and Stephanie Mast, learning of her plight while stationed in Afghanistan, initiated legal proceedings in Virginia, ultimately receiving an adoption order in 2020. The initial court found compelling evidence that the child was stateless, her parents were deceased, and Afghan authorities were unwilling or unable to care for her. The Masts were found credible, and the adoption was supported by the Department of Social Services and a guardian ad litem. Later, A.A. and F.A. filed a petition to vacate the adoption, claiming Afghan law made them the child’s guardians and the adoption was procured by fraud. The Circuit Court of Fluvanna County, and subsequently the Court of Appeals of Virginia, found that Code § 63.2-1216—which bars collateral or direct attacks on adoption orders after six months—did not apply, relying on various legal theories including “de facto parent” status and federal preemption. On review, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Code § 63.2-1216’s plain language bars all attacks on final adoption orders after six months, including those based on alleged fraud, procedural errors, or lack of jurisdiction, unless the challenger is a legal parent with a fundamental liberty interest. The Court rejected the “de facto parent” constitutional argument, found no federal preemption, and determined that neither the factual record nor law supported exempting the challengers from the statute of repose. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals and dismissed the petition to vacate the adoption order with prejudice. View "Mast v. A.A." on Justia Law
In re S.A. and J.P.
A father and mother came to the attention of child protective authorities in Montana due to ongoing methamphetamine use, domestic violence, and criminal behavior. In 2019, the Department of Public Health and Human Services removed their two young children from a home where multiple adults were abusing drugs. Both children were eligible for tribal enrollment and thus protected under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Despite efforts, no suitable ICWA-compliant placement was found, so the children remained in licensed foster care. The father was frequently incarcerated or otherwise unavailable, and both parents struggled to comply with treatment plans designed to facilitate reunification. Over the course of more than five years, the father participated intermittently in services but repeatedly relapsed, became homeless, and was arrested for new criminal offenses.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, adjudicated the children as youths in need of care, granted temporary legal custody to the Department, and repeatedly extended custody while reviewing the parents’ compliance with treatment plans. After failed attempts at reunification and kinship placement, and after considering the possibility of guardianship, the court terminated the mother’s parental rights (she did not appeal). The Department then petitioned to terminate the father’s rights, presenting evidence of the father's noncompliance and ongoing instability. Tribal representatives were given notice and opportunities to intervene and express their preference for guardianship over termination, but did not actively participate in the final hearing.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s decision to terminate the father’s parental rights. The Court held that the Department had made “active efforts” as required by ICWA, the father failed to complete his treatment plan and was unlikely to become fit within a reasonable time, and continued custody would likely result in serious harm to the children. The Court also held that the father lacked standing to assert claims based on tribal preference for guardianship, as those claims belonged to the tribes or children. View "In re S.A. and J.P." on Justia Law
Marriage of Allen
After a divorce in 1996, a father was ordered by the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court to pay both family and child support. Over the ensuing years, he failed to fully comply with the court’s orders, moved out of state and later out of the country, and was declared in contempt for his failure to pay support. Nearly two decades later, after the youngest child had reached the age of majority, the father and mother discussed resolving the outstanding child support arrearages, which, including interest, totaled approximately $545,000. The father agreed to pay half that amount, and made several payments, but when he requested that the mother sign a written accord and satisfaction releasing him from any remaining arrearages, she declined.The father then filed a request in the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, seeking a ruling that there was an enforceable agreement to resolve the arrearages. The superior court denied his request, finding that the parties did not reach a final, binding agreement and that there was no bona fide dispute as to the amount owed. The court also concluded that any purported accord and satisfaction was unenforceable under California law.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the superior court’s order. The appellate court held that, consistent with California’s strong public policy, parents are precluded from contractually waiving or forgiving past due child support arrearages, even after the child has reached the age of majority and there is no longer a current support order. The court further found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s findings that there was no bona fide dispute regarding the amount owed, and no enforceable agreement was formed. The appellate court also rejected the father’s arguments for waiver and estoppel. The order was affirmed. View "Marriage of Allen" on Justia Law
Posted in:
California Courts of Appeal, Family Law
Hughes v. Waters
David Hughes and Dana Waters were in a relationship beginning in 2016 while living in Washington. During their relationship, Hughes raised Waters’s son, C.H., as his own, and later they had another son, D.H. Following their separation, they shared custody on a rotating basis. Hughes moved to North Dakota in late 2020, and the children visited him there during holidays and summers. In April 2023, Waters moved with the children to California. That summer, Hughes flew the children to North Dakota for vacation and later informed Waters he would not return them, citing concerns for their safety.After Hughes’s decision to keep the children, both parties initiated legal proceedings: Waters filed a complaint in California on August 9, 2023, but did not serve Hughes until October 20, 2023. Hughes began a child custody action in North Dakota by serving Waters on August 30, 2023. The California court issued ex parte orders for the return of the children, first claiming emergency jurisdiction, then issuing a non-temporary order, both before Hughes was served. The North Dakota District Court of McKenzie County held a hearing, invited arguments on jurisdiction, and communicated with the California court. Eventually, California transferred its case to Washington, although there was no evidence of a pending Washington action.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The court held that neither California nor North Dakota was the children’s “home state,” and no other state had a pending child custody action or declined jurisdiction. North Dakota properly assumed jurisdiction under N.D.C.C. § 14-14.1-12(1)(d). The court affirmed the district court’s order granting primary residential responsibility of D.H. and C.H. to Hughes and rejected Waters’s additional challenges. View "Hughes v. Waters" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law, North Dakota Supreme Court
MORRISON v. MORRISON
A divorced couple’s agreed decree required them to sell community property, including their marital home, and divide the proceeds equally. The decree further required each party to deliver certain personal property to a receiver and specified that if either failed to deliver or damaged property, the fair market value of the missing or damaged items would be assessed against that party and “accounted for” out of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home. After the divorce, the wife alleged that the husband had damaged and failed to deliver certain property. The trial court found numerous violations, but rather than determining the specific value of the loss, it awarded the wife all proceeds from the sale of the marital home.The trial court, a district court in Texas, conducted hearings and ultimately ordered the entirety of the marital home’s sale proceeds be given to the wife, along with attorney’s fees and costs, without making findings about the fair market value of the alleged losses. The husband appealed, contending that the trial court had exceeded its jurisdiction by impermissibly modifying the substantive property division in the decree. The Twelfth Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the trial court’s order effectively redivided property in violation of Texas Family Code Section 9.007, and vacated the order, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Texas held that the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce the decree and award damages for breach, but it erred by reallocating all proceeds from the marital home without evidence of actual damages. The high court reversed the appellate court’s decision, clarified that the trial court’s error did not deprive it of enforcement jurisdiction, and remanded the matter for further proceedings to determine actual damages as required by the decree and statute. View "MORRISON v. MORRISON" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law, Supreme Court of Texas