Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Kathleen M. Barron filed for divorce from John D. Barron in April 2022. The District Court in Bangor held a contested bench trial where both parties testified and submitted evidence, including proposed calculations for the division of assets. The court ordered John to make a $57,790.17 payment to Kathleen to equalize the division of property, or the marital home, which also houses John's business, would be sold.John appealed the decision, arguing that the court did not make sufficient findings to support the equalization payment. He had filed a post-judgment motion for further findings of fact, which the trial court denied. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court noted that the divorce judgment lacked specific findings regarding the valuation and classification of assets, making appellate review impossible. The court highlighted that the trial court must provide express factual findings based on the record to support its decisions.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in part and remanded the case for further findings. The court emphasized that the trial court must independently assess the valuation evidence before equitably dividing marital property. The judgment was vacated concerning the distribution of property, while the remainder of the judgment was affirmed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, allowing the trial court discretion to reopen the evidence if necessary. View "Barron v. Barron" on Justia Law

Sandra Malone (Grandmother) filed a lawsuit against Salvador Galvan (Father) seeking visitation rights with ALG, the child of her deceased daughter. Father and Mother had a child, ALG, in July 2022. They regularly attended family dinners with Mother’s family, including Grandmother. After Mother’s death in an ATV accident caused by Father, Grandmother accused Father of killing Mother and supported his criminal prosecution. Father, concerned about Grandmother’s negative impact on ALG, stopped attending family dinners and discontinued visits between ALG and Grandmother, although he maintained relationships with other family members.The District Court of Albany County held a trial and granted Grandmother visitation rights. The court found that Grandmother had a significant preexisting relationship with ALG and concluded that Father’s decision to discontinue visits with Grandmother was harmful to ALG. The court awarded Grandmother visitation despite acknowledging concerns about her animosity towards Father and the potential negative impact on ALG.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in its findings. It emphasized that Grandmother needed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father’s decision to restrict visitation was harmful to ALG. The court found that Grandmother did not present any evidence of harm, while Father’s expert testified that visitation with Grandmother could harm ALG due to the hostile relationship between Father and Grandmother. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court violated Father’s constitutional rights as a parent by granting Grandmother visitation without sufficient evidence of harm to ALG.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the lower court clearly erred in finding that Grandmother established harm by clear and convincing evidence. View "Galvan v. Malone" on Justia Law

Tara Gentele and Christopher Gentele were involved in divorce proceedings and attempted to resolve their disputes through mediation. Christopher claimed that a settlement agreement was reached during mediation, but Tara denied this. Christopher then asked the district court to enforce the settlement agreement. The district court found that a settlement agreement had been reached and entered a dissolution decree based on its terms. The decree required Christopher to make equalization payments to Tara and to divide certain credit card rewards points between them. Christopher made the first payment and transferred the rewards points, which Tara accepted. Tara then filed an appeal, arguing that the district court erred in enforcing the settlement agreement.The district court for Lancaster County found that the parties had reached an enforceable settlement agreement during mediation and entered a dissolution decree based on that agreement. Tara accepted the benefits provided by the decree but subsequently filed an appeal challenging the enforcement of the settlement agreement.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that Tara's appeal was precluded by the acceptance of benefits rule. This rule generally prevents an appellant from accepting the benefits of a judgment and then appealing the parts of the judgment that are unfavorable. The court found that Tara's acceptance of the equalization payment and rewards points was inconsistent with her appeal. The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the acceptance of benefits rule applied and barred Tara from challenging the decree. View "Gentele v. Gentele" on Justia Law

Brandon and Amanda Sullivan, the biological parents of three young children, passed away, leaving the children in the care of Amanda's parents, Suzanne and August Nicolas. The Nicolases were appointed as the children's emergency and then permanent guardians. Subsequently, they adopted the children. After the adoption, Brandon's parents, Jayne Mecque and Daniel Francis Sullivan, sought and were granted grandparent visitation rights. The Nicolases later moved to vacate this visitation order, arguing that the Sullivans lacked standing to seek visitation post-adoption.The domestic relations court denied the Nicolases' motion, finding that the Sullivans had standing to seek grandparent visitation. The Nicolases appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the Sullivans retained their standing to seek visitation despite the adoption. The Nicolases then sought review from the Supreme Court of Colorado.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and determined that under section 19-1-103(70)(a), C.R.S. (2021), grandparent standing is limited to those who are currently the parents of a child's father or mother. The court held that following an adoption, the parents of a child's former mother or father are no longer considered "grandparents" under the statute. Therefore, the Sullivans lacked standing to seek grandparent visitation after the Nicolases adopted the children. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re The Parental Responsibilities Concerning Children K.M.S." on Justia Law

In September 2023, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a report that a child, A.O., had visible bruises on his face. A.O. told officers that his mother, F.O., had hit him. DCFS investigated and found multiple injuries on A.O. Mother claimed the injuries were from a ball hitting A.O. at a park. A.O. was removed from Mother's custody and placed in foster care. DCFS filed a petition alleging physical abuse by Mother. Mother denied the allegations but later pleaded "no contest" to an amended petition that alleged inappropriate discipline.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County detained A.O. from Mother and ordered that visits occur in a therapeutic setting. DCFS faced challenges in arranging these visits due to difficulties in finding a suitable therapist. Despite these efforts, Mother had no contact with A.O. from the time of detention until the six-month review hearing. At this hearing, the court found that DCFS had provided reasonable services and continued reunification services for Mother. Mother appealed, arguing that DCFS had not provided reasonable services.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Mother could appeal the reasonable services finding because an erroneous finding could impair her ability to request an extension of reunification services and potentially lead to the termination of her parental rights. The court found that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that DCFS had provided reasonable services, despite the lack of visits, due to the efforts made to arrange therapeutic visits and the challenges faced. The court affirmed the juvenile court's order. View "In re A.O." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two former spouses regarding the interpretation of their separation agreement, which was incorporated into their dissolution judgment. The plaintiff sought modification of child support and alimony based on an alleged substantial change in the defendant's income, specifically his bonuses and profit sharing. The separation agreement included provisions for additional child support and alimony based on the defendant's bonuses and profit sharing, with a cap on gross earned income at $700,000 per year.The trial court found the relevant provisions of the separation agreement to be ambiguous and sided with the plaintiff's interpretation, which calculated additional child support and alimony based on the difference between the $700,000 cap and the defendant's base draw of $298,686. The court issued remedial orders for the defendant to pay arrearages and ongoing support based on this interpretation. The defendant appealed, arguing that the agreement unambiguously capped his total gross earned income at $700,000, beyond which no additional support was owed.The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that the separation agreement unambiguously capped the defendant's total gross earned income at $700,000, thus relieving him of any obligation to pay additional child support and alimony if his income exceeded this amount. The Appellate Court remanded the case for recalculation of the defendant's obligations based on this interpretation.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and disagreed with the Appellate Court's conclusion. The Supreme Court found that the provisions of the separation agreement were ambiguous and that both parties' interpretations were plausible. The court held that the ambiguity required a factual determination of the parties' intent, necessitating a remand to the trial court for consideration of extrinsic evidence regarding the parties' intent at the time of the agreement's formation. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Simpson v. Simpson" on Justia Law

The case involves petitioners P.F. and R.F., who sought custody and visitation rights for their grandchild, A.F., following the termination of A.F.'s mother's parental rights due to abuse and neglect. The Department of Human Services (DHS) had previously removed A.F. from her mother's custody in 2017 due to deplorable living conditions in the home shared with the petitioners. In 2021, A.F. was again removed from her mother's custody and placed with foster parents, K.B. and M.B., who had previously cared for her. Petitioners moved to intervene and obtain custody and visitation in 2022, but the DHS opposed their motion, citing past maltreatment substantiations against petitioner R.F.The Circuit Court of Wood County initially denied petitioners' motion for visitation and directed the DHS to conduct a home study. Although the DHS initially denied the home study based on past substantiations, the DHS's Board of Review later reversed these substantiations and ordered a new home study, which was ultimately approved. Despite this, the DHS, guardian ad litem, and foster parents opposed placement with the petitioners, arguing that A.F. was thriving with the foster parents and had no bond with the petitioners.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court's order denying petitioners' motions for custody and visitation lacked sufficient findings to demonstrate that it properly considered the grandparent preference statute, West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3). The court emphasized that the statute presumes placement with grandparents is in the best interests of the child unless the record shows otherwise. The court vacated the circuit court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to conduct a new evidentiary hearing and make detailed findings regarding the grandparent preference and the best interests of A.F. View "In re A.F." on Justia Law

Megan E. Hawk and David P. Hawk were involved in a marital dissolution action where the district court ordered David to pay Megan a cash equalization payment of nearly $3 million in eight annual installments, with interest accruing at a rate of 7.264% per annum. Megan filed a motion to alter or amend the decree, which the court partially granted, specifying that each installment would include accrued interest. Megan later filed a motion requesting the court to clarify that payments be made through the court clerk and to attach an amortization schedule.The district court for Douglas County initially modified the decree to specify the payment schedule and interest accrual. After the court's term ended, Megan filed another motion, which the court treated as a request to alter or amend the judgment rather than a nunc pro tunc order. The court held a hearing and clarified that interest would start accruing from the date the first payment was due, not from the date of the decree. The court also directed the court clerk to record the judgment and calculate the balance and interest.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and determined that the district court had the inherent power to modify its judgment within the term, as extended by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2001(1). The court held that the rights of a party seeking relief under this statute become fixed at the time the motion is filed, even if the disposition occurs after the term ends. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to modify the interest accrual date and affirmed the order. View "Hawk v. Hawk" on Justia Law

Lea and Ann Brent were married in 1953 and divorced in 1983. As part of their divorce, Lea agreed to pay Ann $5,600 per month in permanent periodic alimony until her death or remarriage. Ann died in 2015, never having remarried. Lea began paying less than the required amount in 2002, but Ann never filed a contempt action for the unpaid alimony. Lea died in 2021, and Ann’s Estate filed a probate claim against Lea’s Estate for unpaid alimony totaling $358,700, covering the period from 2002 to 2015.The Washington County Chancery Court found that the claim for unpaid alimony was valid but limited it to the period from July 2014 to November 2015 due to the seven-year statute of limitations. The court awarded Ann’s Estate $139,104, which included the unpaid alimony for that period plus 8 percent interest per annum. However, the court denied Lea’s Estate credit for partial alimony payments totaling $51,000 made between July 2014 and November 2015 and for a $75,143.28 life insurance proceeds payment made to Ann’s Estate in 2019.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that the chancery court erred in denying Lea’s Estate credit for the partial alimony payments and the life insurance proceeds payment. The Supreme Court held that the total amount of credit exceeded the total amount owed for the relevant period, leaving no unpaid alimony to award Ann’s Estate. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the chancery court’s decision and rendered judgment in favor of Lea’s Estate. View "In re The Estate of Brent v. The Estate of Brent" on Justia Law

Mackenzie Pennington and Casey Weber, who married in 2011, have two children. In 2020, Weber initiated a divorce, and in 2021, the district court's judgment incorporated their settlement agreement, granting them equal and shared parenting responsibility with joint legal and alternating weekly physical custody. Pennington was required to exercise her parenting time in New Rockford during the school year due to the children's school location.In November 2021, Pennington moved for primary residential responsibility, citing the impracticality of the parenting schedule due to travel distance. The district court denied her motion and granted Weber's request for primary residential responsibility, modifying the parenting plan to allow Pennington parenting time on alternating weekends during the school year. In September 2024, Pennington again sought primary residential responsibility, alleging Weber's failure to meet the children's medical and educational needs. The district court denied her motion, concluding she did not demonstrate a prima facie case of a material change in circumstances adversely affecting the children.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Pennington failed to establish a prima facie case for modification of primary residential responsibility. The court noted that Pennington's complaints about Weber's parenting did not demonstrate a material change in circumstances that adversely affected the children or resulted in a general decline in their condition. The court also clarified that the standard for determining a material change in circumstances does not require evidence that the children are "suffering," but rather that the change has adversely affected them or resulted in a general decline in their condition. View "Weber v. Pennington" on Justia Law