Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A woman alleged that her boyfriend assaulted her during their relationship and filed a petition for protection from abuse (PFA) in Madison Circuit Court. Judge Linda F. Coats, serving as a special circuit-court judge, granted an ex parte protection order and scheduled a hearing. Subsequently, the boyfriend was charged criminally with domestic violence arising from the same incident. At the PFA hearing, Judge Coats held a pretrial immunity hearing under Alabama’s stand-your-ground statute, determined the boyfriend acted in self-defense, and denied the PFA petition, stating he was immune from criminal and civil prosecution.In the criminal case, Judge Patricia D. Demos dismissed the charge against the boyfriend, relying on Judge Coats’s immunity determination from the PFA case. The State, through the Madison County District Attorney’s Office, petitioned the Madison Circuit Court for a writ of mandamus, arguing Judge Coats lacked authority to grant immunity in the PFA proceeding without notice to the State and that Judge Demos erroneously dismissed the criminal charge based on the PFA order. The Madison Circuit Court (Judge Donna S. Pate) granted the writ, ordering Judge Coats to vacate the immunity portion of her PFA order and Judge Demos to reinstate the criminal case.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed appeals by Judge Coats and the boyfriend. The Court held that Judge Coats lacked standing to appeal and that the portion of the circuit court’s mandamus order directed to Judge Coats was void, as Judge Pate did not have supervisory jurisdiction over a special circuit-court judge. The Court dismissed Judge Coats’s appeal and the corresponding part of the boyfriend’s appeal. The remaining portion of the boyfriend’s appeal, which concerned the mandamus to Judge Demos in the criminal case, was transferred to the Court of Criminal Appeals, as it fell under its appellate jurisdiction. View "Coats v. State of Alabama" on Justia Law

A 76-year-old man petitioned to adopt a 40-year-old woman whom he had known for six years. The parties participated in evidentiary hearings, and a court-appointed investigator prepared a report. Testimony revealed inconsistencies regarding the stated purpose of the adoption, particularly concerning the petitioner’s claim that the adoption would allow the adoptee to care for him, despite evidence that the adoptee’s health issues prevented her from working. The court also noted that the adoptee was unaware adoption would sever her legal relationship with her mother, with whom she lived and received financial support. Additionally, concerns arose regarding the petitioner’s mild cognitive impairment and unaccounted trust distributions.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, reviewed the petition and evidence. The court found that the adoption was not in the best interests of the adoptee, considering the potential negative impact on her relationship with her biological mother, possible contentious inheritance issues, and inconsistencies in the petitioner’s stated goals. The court also considered the medical evidence and concluded the doctor’s report did not sufficiently address the petitioner’s cognitive capacity or awareness of the adoption’s implications. Based on these findings, the court denied the adoption petition.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota applied the clearly erroneous standard to the district court’s factual findings and reviewed the denial of the adoption decree for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, nor did the court abuse its discretion or misapply the law. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the adoption petition. View "In re Adoption of K.J.K." on Justia Law

A couple who had served as resource parents for a child involved in a protective custody proceeding filed a petition to adopt the child. Their petition was denied by the District Court, which instead granted adoption to another couple. The District Court based its decision on its determination that adoption by the other couple was in the child’s best interest. The resource parents appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed the District Court’s decision, finding no clear error or abuse of discretion.Almost a year later, the resource parents filed several motions in the District Court, including a motion under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) seeking relief from the adoption judgment. They argued that the adoptive parents had fraudulently misrepresented the nature of their relationship during the adoption proceedings and that new evidence supported their claim. The District Court denied these motions with prejudice, later providing a more detailed explanation. The court found the proffered evidence to be either discoverable at the time of trial, related to events occurring after judgment, or insufficient to prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence. The court also declined to hold an evidentiary hearing and ordered the resource parents to pay the adoptive parents’ attorney fees and costs.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion and the attorney fee award de novo. It concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief from judgment or in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing, as the evidence was either not newly discovered or did not meet the heightened standard for fraud. However, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the order awarding attorney fees, finding no basis for a sanction, and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Adoption by Kathleen C." on Justia Law

A mother sought to terminate the parental rights of the father to their minor child under Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act. The father had been convicted of child-related offenses, including possession of child pornography and failing to register as a sexual offender, resulting in imprisonment and lifetime registration as a sexual offender. Following their divorce, the mother had primary physical custody, while the father had supervised custody, later limited further during his incarceration. The mother filed a petition to involuntarily terminate the father’s parental rights, but she did not indicate that an adoption of the child was contemplated, nor did she intend to relinquish her own parental rights.The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ Court Division, held a hearing and granted the mother's petition, finding grounds for termination under the Act and invoking the “cause shown” exception in Section 2901 to excuse the lack of a contemplated adoption. The court reasoned that the father’s criminal convictions justified applying the exception so the mother could protect her child. The father appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in excusing the adoption requirement.The Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the trial court’s order, holding that the mother’s petition was not cognizable under the Act because she had not demonstrated a contemplated adoption, as required by Section 2512(b)(2). The Superior Court found no legal impediment preventing the mother from meeting statutory requirements, aside from her unwillingness to relinquish her parental rights.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling. The Court held that Section 2901’s “cause shown” exception applies only when there is a contemplated adoption of the child. Since no adoption was contemplated, the mother’s petition was not cognizable under the Act, and the trial court’s termination of the father’s parental rights was erroneous. View "In Re: M.L.R." on Justia Law

M.H. is the mother of two children, M.S. and G.H. In 2022, Erie County Department of Social Services initiated abuse proceedings against M.H. and her former boyfriend, D.K., after videos surfaced appearing to show D.K. sexually abusing M.S. The videos, dated from 2019, were not found in the family home but rather on the computer of B.W., an individual in Syracuse who claimed to have hacked into the family's security cameras and who was under investigation for trading child pornography. The FBI recovered the videos, which depicted incidents in the family’s living room. Neither child disclosed abuse during interviews; M.S. denied any sexual contact, and G.H. was unaware of any abuse. The police collected photographs of the home that matched details in the videos, and M.H. identified the people in screenshots as D.K. and M.S.Erie County Family Court admitted the videos into evidence over objection, relying on testimony from the FBI agent who recovered the videos and a police investigator who confirmed the setting matched the family home. The court found that M.H. had abused M.S. by failing to protect her from D.K. and derivatively abused G.H. Both children were placed in foster care, and M.H.’s contact was limited to supervised visits. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that any uncertainty regarding the videos’ authenticity went to their weight and not their admissibility.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The Court held that the videos were not properly authenticated because Erie County failed to provide sufficient evidence establishing their reliability. Unlike in prior cases where authentication was found lacking, here the videos’ chain of custody was more tenuous and the testimony presented did not meet the threshold required for authentication. As a result, the Court reversed the orders of the Appellate Division and dismissed the petitions against M.H. View "Matter of M.S." on Justia Law

During a contentious divorce and custody dispute, Amanda Hovanec, who had returned to Ohio from South Africa with her children, conspired with Anthony Theodorou, her romantic partner, to kill her husband, T.H. After failed attempts to hire hitmen in South Africa, Theodorou, at Hovanec’s direction, obtained and shipped etorphine, a dangerous animal tranquilizer, to the United States. Hovanec ultimately used the drug to fatally inject T.H. at her mother Anita Green’s home. Green assisted after the murder by helping to select a burial site, driving the others to dig a grave, and later transporting them and the body for burial. The group also undertook efforts to conceal the crime, including disposing of T.H.’s belongings and misleading authorities. All three were arrested after an investigation revealed dashcam footage of the crime.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Hovanec pleaded guilty to multiple controlled-substance offenses resulting in death, and Green pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact. Hovanec received a 480-month sentence; Green received 121 months and was ordered to pay restitution for psychological care for T.H.’s and Hovanec’s children. Both defendants appealed their sentences and, in Green’s case, the restitution order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentences for both Hovanec and Green. The appellate court upheld the denial of a sentencing reduction for Green based on her lack of candor regarding knowledge of the murder plan. The court also affirmed the sentencing enhancements for Hovanec’s leadership role and obstruction of justice. However, the court reversed the restitution order against Green, holding that under federal law, restitution for psychological care requires evidence of bodily injury, defined as physical harm or physical manifestations of psychological harm, and remanded for further factual findings on this issue. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

A father with a high monthly income was ordered to pay $5,000 per month in child support for his minor child, which included a $1,500 upward deviation above the presumptive guideline amount. The deviation was based on the child’s significant disabling conditions and the father’s substantial income and assets. In addition, the father was required to maintain a $750,000 life insurance policy to secure his child support obligation. The mother documented considerable ongoing expenses for the child’s developmental and medical needs, including frequent travel for therapy and care. The District Court of Eddy County initially entered this support order, but on appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota found the lower court’s findings insufficient to support the upward deviation and remanded for more explicit findings and reconsideration of the life insurance amount. On remand, the district court provided additional findings, detailing the child’s medical needs, the family’s prior standard of living, and specific expenses justifying the deviation. The court again found the deviation in the child’s best interest due to her lifelong health conditions and the desire for her to maintain a standard of living similar to that before the divorce. The court attributed $750 per month to the child’s medical needs and $750 per month to maintaining her standard of living, and reinstated the $750,000 life insurance requirement. Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court’s findings were explicit and supported by evidence. The court affirmed that the upward deviation in child support and the life insurance requirement were in the child’s best interest and not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s order in all respects. View "Kingstone v. Kingstone" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with terrorizing—domestic violence, a class C felony, after an incident involving his ex-wife, who is also the mother of his minor child. The district court imposed a pre-dispositional order prohibiting contact with the victim, initially for thirty days. After the defendant pled guilty, the court sentenced him to two years, including three days to serve (with credit for time served) and two years of supervised probation. As a condition of probation, the court extended the no-contact order for two years, prohibiting all direct or indirect contact with the victim, including communication relevant to their minor child.After sentencing, the defendant requested an exception to allow necessary communications with the victim regarding court-ordered parenting time with their child. The district court declined, stating the defendant was not prohibited from having contact with his child but failed to provide any method for arranging parenting time, given the victim’s residential responsibility and the communication restrictions. The defendant appealed the judgment and the order extending the no-contact provision.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that, although the district court acted within statutory limits and did not rely on any impermissible factor (so the sentence was not illegal), it abused its discretion by failing to provide a means for the defendant to arrange contact with his child or to explain why no such method was allowed. The court determined that, under these circumstances, the blanket prohibition on contact with the victim—including for purposes of exercising parental rights—was arbitrary and not the result of a reasoned decision. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the criminal judgment and the order extending the order prohibiting contact and remanded for resentencing, instructing the district court to consider alternatives that would permit the defendant to exercise his parental rights. View "State v. Maher" on Justia Law

The case concerns divorced parents who share a minor child. After their 2019 divorce, the mother was awarded primary residential responsibility, with the judgment affirmed on appeal. In 2024, the father moved to modify the custody arrangement, citing a material change in circumstances and seeking joint, and later, primary residential responsibility. Following hearings in 2025, the District Court of Burleigh County granted the father primary residential responsibility, established a parenting plan for the mother, and entered a second amended judgment. The mother appealed, arguing that the district court erred by modifying custody without finding a material change in circumstances, violated her due process rights, improperly delegated authority to the child and a counselor regarding parenting time, and suspended child support without adequate findings. She also asserted cumulative errors and alleged parental alienation. The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court’s findings on the material change of circumstances, best interests factors, and award of primary residential responsibility were not clearly erroneous. The court determined that most of the mother’s arguments were inadequately briefed and thus were not considered on appeal, except for her claim regarding the delegation of parenting time authority. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court improperly delegated its authority over parenting time to both the minor child and her therapist, allowing them to determine the conditions and occurrence of the mother’s contact with the child. The court found that the district court failed to provide sufficient findings or a clear link between the mother’s conduct and potential harm to the child that would justify such a restriction. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for further proceedings limited to parenting time. View "Vetter v. Vetter" on Justia Law

An infant girl was discovered severely wounded on an Afghan battlefield by U.S. forces in 2019. With no known surviving family and urgent medical needs, she was transferred to U.S. military care. Joshua and Stephanie Mast, learning of her plight while stationed in Afghanistan, initiated legal proceedings in Virginia, ultimately receiving an adoption order in 2020. The initial court found compelling evidence that the child was stateless, her parents were deceased, and Afghan authorities were unwilling or unable to care for her. The Masts were found credible, and the adoption was supported by the Department of Social Services and a guardian ad litem. Later, A.A. and F.A. filed a petition to vacate the adoption, claiming Afghan law made them the child’s guardians and the adoption was procured by fraud. The Circuit Court of Fluvanna County, and subsequently the Court of Appeals of Virginia, found that Code § 63.2-1216—which bars collateral or direct attacks on adoption orders after six months—did not apply, relying on various legal theories including “de facto parent” status and federal preemption. On review, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Code § 63.2-1216’s plain language bars all attacks on final adoption orders after six months, including those based on alleged fraud, procedural errors, or lack of jurisdiction, unless the challenger is a legal parent with a fundamental liberty interest. The Court rejected the “de facto parent” constitutional argument, found no federal preemption, and determined that neither the factual record nor law supported exempting the challengers from the statute of repose. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals and dismissed the petition to vacate the adoption order with prejudice. View "Mast v. A.A." on Justia Law