Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A minor child, Rene V., was removed from the custody of his legal guardian, Dora V., by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) due to allegations of abuse and neglect. Dora was appointed as Rene's legal guardian by the juvenile court. After Rene's removal, the juvenile court ordered family reunification services for Dora, including visitation. However, Rene refused to participate in overnight visits and eventually refused all visitation with Dora.The juvenile court sustained the DCFS's petition and ordered family reunification services for Dora. At an 18-month review hearing, the court terminated Dora's reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing. Dora filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the juvenile court erred by allowing Rene to refuse visits and that no substantial evidence supported the finding that she received reasonable reunification services. The court issued an order to show cause but denied Dora's request to stay the section 366.26 hearing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that legal guardians appointed by the juvenile court are not entitled to a presumption of reunification services, unlike those appointed under the Probate Code. The court found that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying additional reunification services to Dora. The court emphasized that the statutory scheme for dependency guardianships does not mandate reunification services and that the juvenile court's decision was in Rene's best interests. Consequently, the petition for writ of mandate was denied. View "Dora V. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A 13-year-old boy, Oscar M., sought to intervene in his parents' custody dispute after the superior court granted primary interim custody to his father, Shawn M., with weekend visitation for his mother, Marilyn P. Oscar, through an attorney, moved to intervene, arguing that his preferences were not adequately represented by his parents or the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL). The superior court denied his motion, leading to this appeal.The superior court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, initially handled the custody dispute. After a series of domestic violence allegations and protective orders, the court granted Shawn primary custody and Marilyn weekend visitation. Oscar, through his attorney, filed a motion to intervene, claiming his interests were not adequately represented. The GAL also moved for the court to appoint counsel for Oscar, expressing concerns about potential manipulation by Marilyn. The court denied both motions, reasoning that Oscar's preferences were already adequately represented and that his intervention would complicate the proceedings.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Oscar's interests were adequately represented by his parents and the GAL. It noted that Alaska's statutory framework provides mechanisms for considering a child's preferences without making the child a party to the litigation. The court also found that allowing Oscar to intervene would likely cause undue delay and complicate the proceedings, which would not be in Oscar's best interests. The court concluded that the superior court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Oscar's motion to intervene. View "Oscar M. v. Marilyn P." on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of parental rights of an incarcerated father, Anton K., to his two daughters, Allie and Melissa, who are Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) removed the children from their parents' home due to allegations of abuse and neglect. Anton was later incarcerated on charges of physical and sexual assault against the children's mother, Keri K., and remained in custody throughout the proceedings.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, initially found probable cause to believe the children were in need of aid and that OCS had made active efforts to avoid removing them. OCS developed case plans for both parents and facilitated some initial visitation. However, after Anton's incarceration, OCS's efforts to facilitate visitation and provide rehabilitative services were limited, partly due to COVID-19 restrictions and miscommunications with the Department of Corrections (DOC). OCS continued to work with Keri and the children's Tribe, eventually placing the children with maternal relatives after efforts to place them with paternal relatives failed.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order terminating Anton's parental rights. The court held that OCS had made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family, considering the entirety of its efforts, including those directed at Keri and the children's extended family. The court acknowledged the significant gaps in OCS's efforts to facilitate visitation and provide services to Anton while incarcerated but concluded that the overall efforts, including those to reunify the children with Keri and place them with relatives, were sufficient under ICWA. View "Anton K. v. State" on Justia Law

A mother filed for sole custody of her two daughters, alleging the father, who resides in Guatemala, had abused, neglected, and abandoned the children. The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas granted her sole custody but denied her request for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) findings, which are necessary for the children to seek SIJ status with federal immigration authorities. The court found insufficient evidence of abuse, neglect, or abandonment under Pennsylvania law and questioned whether it was in the children's best interest to issue an SIJ order.The mother appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the lower court's decision. The Superior Court held that SIJ determinations could only be made in dependency proceedings, not in custody proceedings where one parent is awarded sole custody.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's decision. The Court clarified that under federal SIJ law, a child involved in custody proceedings resulting in sole custody being awarded to a parent in the United States can seek SIJ determinations in that context. The Court held that the Superior Court erred in limiting SIJ determinations to dependency proceedings and that the record supported the children's entitlement to predicate SIJ determinations.The Supreme Court directed the custody court to enter orders consistent with its opinion, including findings that reunification with the father is not viable due to abandonment and neglect, and that it is not in the children's best interest to return to Guatemala. The case was remanded to the custody court for entry of these orders. View "Velasquez v. Miranda" on Justia Law

Clifford Porter and Peggy Huckstadt were married from 1977 to 1994, during which Porter served in the military. Upon their divorce, the trial court awarded Huckstadt a fractional share of Porter’s military retirement pay. Porter retired from the military in 2002 and later worked as a surgeon. In 2009, he was involuntarily recalled to active duty, served for three years, and was promoted, which increased his retirement pay. Porter retired again in 2012. In 2022, Porter sought to clarify that Huckstadt’s share should be based on his 2002 retirement rank and salary, not the increased benefits from his 2012 retirement.The trial court disagreed, ruling that the increased benefits from Porter’s recall service were community property subject to division. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the salary increases during the recall period were based on 17 years of community efforts during the marriage.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that Porter’s rank and salary at his second retirement could not be used to calculate the community portion of the military pension. The court found that the “community efforts doctrine” did not apply under these specific circumstances, as the increased benefits were not a direct result of community effort and performance. The court also determined that the dissolution decree intended to value Huckstadt’s share based on Porter’s rank and salary at his first retirement in 2002, not his second retirement in 2012. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re Marriage of Porter" on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, Heather, who moved with her three children from Minnesota to Washington to escape domestic violence. After their arrival, the family experienced intermittent homelessness, and the children faced developmental and mental health challenges. Heather also struggled with mental health and substance abuse issues. The children's school reported potential physical abuse to the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), leading to the children being placed in emergency shelter care.The King County Superior Court ordered the children into emergency shelter care, and the Court of Appeals denied review. Heather sought review of the shelter care order in the Washington Supreme Court. Department II of the Supreme Court reversed the shelter care order due to the State's failure to apply the "active efforts" standard required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA). The case was remanded for further fact-finding. On remand, the trial court kept the children in shelter care, finding that returning them to Heather would place them in substantial and immediate danger.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed whether RCW 13.04.033(3) requires a lawyer to obtain "specific direction" from a client before seeking appellate review in child welfare cases. The court held that the statute does require such specific direction but does not mandate a separate sworn document or client signature. A notice of appeal or discretionary review filed under RAP 5.3 satisfies the requirement. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, which had dismissed the review due to the lack of a sworn, signed statement from Heather. However, as the case was moot, the Supreme Court remanded it to the trial court for any further necessary proceedings. View "In re Dependency of A.H." on Justia Law

Regina Goeden and Wayne Goeden were involved in a divorce proceeding where Wayne contested the circuit court's decisions on the validity of their premarital agreement, the valuation and division of marital property, the treatment of his veterans' disability benefits, and the grounds for divorce. Regina and Wayne had been married since 2017, and both had adult children from previous marriages. They lived together in a home owned by Wayne, and prior to their marriage, Wayne physically assaulted Regina, leading to a temporary breakup and legal charges against Wayne.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Minnehaha County, South Dakota, found the premarital agreement void and unenforceable, determining that Regina did not execute it voluntarily and that it was unconscionable. The court also found that Wayne did not provide a fair and reasonable disclosure of his property and financial obligations. The court divided the marital property equally, giving Wayne credit for certain premarital assets but rejecting his claims for additional credits related to the marital home and other expenses. The court also found that Wayne violated a temporary restraining order by using marital funds for personal expenses.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court's decisions. The court held that the premarital agreement was unconscionable and that Wayne did not provide adequate disclosure of his assets. The court also upheld the equal division of the marital estate, finding no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's valuation and division of property. Additionally, the court agreed with the circuit court's treatment of Wayne's veterans' disability benefits, determining that they lost their exclusionary status when commingled with marital funds. Finally, the court affirmed the grant of divorce to Regina on the grounds of extreme cruelty, based on credible evidence of Wayne's emotional abuse. View "Goeden v. Goeden" on Justia Law

The Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of a father to his three sons, B.M., A.M., and N.M., based on allegations of unfitness. The petitions cited that the children had been in DCYF care for over twelve months without a substantial probability of returning to the father within a reasonable period. The father had moved out of state, inconsistently engaged in required services, and failed to maintain regular visitation with his children. The children were placed in a foster home where they thrived and expressed a desire not to return to their father.The Family Court held a bench trial over several days, admitting various exhibits and hearing testimonies from DCYF caseworkers, therapists, and the father. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that the father was unfit due to his failure to complete required services, inconsistent visitation, and inability to provide a stable environment. The court also found that the children were well-adjusted and bonded with their foster mother, and it was in their best interests to terminate the father's parental rights.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's decree. The Supreme Court found that there was competent evidence supporting the Family Court's findings of unfitness, DCYF's reasonable efforts to reunify the family, and that termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The Supreme Court noted that the father’s inconsistent engagement with services and visitation, along with the children’s expressed wishes and well-being in their foster home, justified the termination of his parental rights. View "In re B.M." on Justia Law

A six-year-old child, Z.K., was removed from the custody of Yumila Cardenas-Garcia due to unlivable conditions in her home. Cardenas-Garcia was charged with felony child abuse, neglect, or endangerment. She pleaded no contest at the custody hearing, and Z.K. remained in protective custody. In a separate criminal case, she pleaded guilty to the felony as part of a plea agreement, which allowed her to withdraw the felony plea after completing probation and instead plead guilty to a misdemeanor.The Eighth Judicial District Court held an evidentiary hearing to determine if Cardenas-Garcia had rebutted the statutory presumption against reunification under NRS 432B.555, which applies to parents convicted of felony child abuse. The court found she had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that Z.K. would not be harmed by reunification. After completing probation and withdrawing her felony plea, Cardenas-Garcia again sought a determination on the presumption's applicability. The district court maintained that the presumption still applied because she had not rebutted it at the prior hearing.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that NRS 432B.555 applies to anyone who has ever been convicted of felony child abuse, regardless of the legal status of that conviction. The court emphasized that the statute's use of the word "ever" means it applies even if the conviction was later voided. The court concluded that the presumption against reunification remains unless the parent can prove by clear and convincing evidence that no harm will come to the child. The petition was denied, affirming the district court's application of the statutory presumption. View "CARDENAS-GARCIA VS. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA" on Justia Law

Leslie Torgerson, a non-Indian, and Terri Torgerson, an enrolled member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate Tribe (SWO), were married in South Dakota. Terri filed for divorce in the SWO tribal court, while Leslie filed for divorce in Roberts County. Leslie moved to dismiss the tribal court proceedings, arguing lack of jurisdiction and improper service, but the tribal court denied his motion. Subsequently, Terri moved to dismiss Leslie’s state court proceedings, and the circuit court granted her motion, recognizing the tribal court’s order under the principle of full faith and credit. Leslie appealed this decision.The circuit court concluded that it shared concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with the tribal court over the divorce but deferred to the tribal court’s order, which it believed had obtained valid personal jurisdiction first. The court also found that the tribal court’s order was entitled to full faith and credit, despite Leslie’s arguments to the contrary.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the circuit court erred in extending full faith and credit to the tribal court’s order. Instead, the court should have applied the principles of comity under SDCL 1-1-25, which requires clear and convincing evidence that the tribal court had proper jurisdiction and that the order was obtained through a fair process. The Supreme Court found that the tribal court lacked both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over Leslie, a non-Indian, and that the tribal court’s order did not meet the requirements for comity. Consequently, the tribal court’s order was not enforceable, and the circuit court’s dismissal of Leslie’s divorce action was reversed. View "Torgerson v. Torgerson" on Justia Law