Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Ryan S. and Marie S. married in 2011 and have three minor children. They separated in 2019, and Marie was awarded temporary primary physical and legal custody. Ryan participated in supervised visits, which were terminated due to policy violations. In early 2020, the district court found Ryan unfit for custody, partly due to self-diagnosed PTSD, and allowed Marie to relocate with the children to California. Ryan's virtual visits were also terminated due to financial constraints. Despite his efforts to comply with custody evaluations and provide support, Ryan had not interacted with his children since June 2020.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County, terminated Ryan's parental rights, finding him unfit and concluding that he had abandoned and neglected his children, making only token efforts to support or communicate with them. The court applied NRS 128.107 and NRS 128.109, which outline factors for terminating parental rights and create a presumption that termination is in the child's best interest when the child has been placed outside the home.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that NRS 128.107 and NRS 128.109 were inapplicable because the children were in the custody of a parent, not placed outside the home under NRS Chapter 432B. The court concluded that the district court erred in applying these statutes and that the findings of abandonment, neglect, and token efforts were not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order terminating Ryan's parental rights and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to order the destruction of any amended birth certificates and restore the children's names. View "In re Parental Rights to L.R.S., J.M.S. and J.L.S." on Justia Law

Jose Cardona appealed a trial court order granting Karina Soto, the mother of his child, a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against him. The DVRO, which expired in November 2023, protected Soto and their daughter. The appeal was not moot despite the DVRO’s expiration because the finding of domestic violence created a five-year statutory presumption against Cardona’s custody of their daughter.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially granted the DVRO based on an incident where Cardona, while drunk, beat his current wife in the presence of their daughter, who he also slapped. Soto claimed Cardona had verbally abused their daughter and forced her to carry his gun on multiple occasions. Cardona admitted to the incident but denied ongoing abuse and claimed Soto was lying to gain full custody. During the hearing, the court interviewed the daughter in chambers without the parties present, and the interview was not reported or documented.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, found that Cardona’s due process rights were violated because he was not informed of the substance of his daughter’s testimony and thus could not respond to it. The court emphasized that while in-chambers interviews of minors are permissible, there must be safeguards to ensure the parent can respond to the testimony. The failure to make any record of the daughter’s testimony left the evidentiary basis for the DVRO unreviewable on appeal. Consequently, the court reversed the DVRO due to the due process violation, though it did not preclude future reliance on other evidence of domestic violence presented. View "Cardona v Soto" on Justia Law

The parties were married in October 1996, and John A. Jewell Sr. filed for divorce in February 2018. The divorce judgment, entered in March 2019, required Jewell to pay Carol L. Brewer $2,000 per month in spousal support indefinitely. Jewell was found to have an earning capacity of $80,000, while Brewer was deemed fully disabled with no formal education or training. Jewell later moved to modify the spousal support, citing decreased earning capacity and Brewer’s cohabitation, but his motion was denied in June 2021. Jewell appealed, but the denial was upheld.In December 2022, Jewell filed another motion to modify the spousal support, again alleging Brewer’s cohabitation. The District Court (Bangor, Szylvian, J.) held a hearing in August 2023 and found that Jewell’s income had decreased to $52,000 per year and that Brewer had the capacity to work, despite her disability claims. The court terminated Jewell’s spousal support obligation but required him to pay $500 per month towards arrearages and attorney fees.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that there was no evidentiary support for the District Court’s finding that Brewer had the capacity to earn income. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for the District Court to reevaluate whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the most recent judgment. If such a change is found, the court must then determine whether to modify the spousal support based on the new findings. View "Jewell v. Brewer" on Justia Law

C.C. and D.V., who share two children, had joint legal and physical custody established in 2016. In January 2022, C.C. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against D.V., alleging persistent harassment, including sending explicit images and verbal abuse. The court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) granting C.C. sole legal and primary physical custody. The parties later stipulated to extend the TRO and address custody separately. In April 2023, they agreed to a one-year restraining order after hearing (ROAH), which did not address custody.The Marin County Superior Court issued a joint custody order in September 2022, despite C.C.'s pending DVRO request and her invocation of Family Code section 3044, which presumes that awarding custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence is detrimental to the child's best interest. C.C. appealed the ROAH and the subsequent July 2023 custody order, arguing the court erred by not determining D.V. had overcome the section 3044 presumption.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that the presumption in section 3044 is triggered whenever an ROAH is issued, even if stipulated. The court found that the trial court did not err in issuing the ROAH without modifying custody, as custody was addressed separately. However, the court erred in its July 2023 order by not determining that D.V. had overcome the section 3044 presumption before awarding joint custody. The appellate court reversed the July 2023 order but affirmed the April 2023 ROAH. The case was deemed moot due to subsequent legal proceedings, but the appellate court retained the appeal to resolve the significant legal issue. C.C. was awarded her costs on appeal. View "C.C. v. D.V." on Justia Law

Bobby Feehan sought extraordinary writ relief from the trial court’s order denying them temporary visitation during the pendency of their petition to establish a parental relationship with minor L.S. Feehan and Lauren Seto were in a romantic relationship while Seto was pregnant with L.S., who was later adopted by Seto’s partner, Jude Guide. Feehan claimed to have acted as a parent to L.S. from birth until the relationship with Seto ended, after which Seto cut off almost all contact between Feehan and L.S. Feehan filed a petition to determine their parental relationship and requested temporary visitation, which Seto and Guide opposed.The Superior Court of Alameda County denied Feehan’s request for temporary visitation, citing a lack of authority under Family Code sections 7604 and 6436 to order pendente lite custody and visitation. The court rejected Feehan’s argument that it had equitable authority to issue such orders when a prima facie case for parentage is made. Feehan then filed a petition for writ of mandate, which led to the current appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and found that the trial court had broad equitable authority to grant pendente lite visitation in parentage cases under Family Code sections 3022 and 3100, subdivision (a). The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in determining it lacked authority to grant Feehan’s request. The court held that trial courts have discretion to enter temporary visitation orders if the requesting party makes a preliminary showing of being a presumed parent and if the order is in the best interests of the child. The appellate court issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the trial court to vacate its order and reconsider Feehan’s request for pendente lite visitation. View "Feehan v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Elizabeth T. was taking her three children to see their father when she fell on a bus after consuming alcohol. An anonymous caller reported her to the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), alleging she was intoxicated and her children were neglected. Elizabeth denied being heavily intoxicated and claimed her children were well cared for. DCFS filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), alleging Elizabeth's substance abuse posed a risk to her children.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the petition, citing a prior sustained allegation of substance abuse from 2018. The court ordered informal supervision under section 360, subdivision (b). Elizabeth appealed, arguing that one incident of alcohol abuse did not support the finding that she posed a risk to her children at the time of the jurisdiction hearing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence of the bus incident, along with the four-year-old allegation, did not support the finding that Elizabeth's conduct created a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness to her children. The court noted that Elizabeth had cooperated with DCFS, submitted to drug and alcohol testing, and her children were healthy and well cared for. The court concluded that there was no substantial evidence of a current risk to the children and reversed the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings and disposition orders. View "In re Gilberto G." on Justia Law

In this case, a mother sought to set aside a family division order that terminated her parental rights to her daughter, G.L. The mother alleged that the Department for Children and Families (DCF) committed fraud on the court by withholding information about G.L.'s foster parents. The trial court denied her motion, and she appealed.The Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Family Division, initially terminated the mother's parental rights in December 2021, citing her volatile behavior and inconsistent contact with G.L. The court found that the mother had not made sufficient progress toward her case plan goals and that it was in G.L.'s best interests to terminate parental rights. The mother appealed this decision, but the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the termination order in June 2022.The mother then filed a motion to set aside the termination order, arguing that DCF had committed fraud on the court by not disclosing negative information about the foster parents. She claimed that this information was relevant to the termination proceedings and that DCF's failure to disclose it constituted fraud. The family division held an evidentiary hearing and found that DCF's practice of storing certain records separately was not intended to hide information. The court also found that the DCF worker and attorneys were not aware of the negative information during the termination proceedings.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the family division's decision. The court held that fraud on the court requires a showing of intentional deception or a deliberate scheme to defraud. The court found that the mother failed to prove that DCF engaged in such conduct. The court also noted that the information about the foster parents was not central to the termination decision, which was based primarily on the mother's inability to resume parenting within a reasonable time. Therefore, the court concluded that the family division did not abuse its discretion in denying the mother's motion to set aside the termination order. View "In re G.L." on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of a father's parental rights to his four minor children. The children were adjudicated as children in need of care (CINC) and placed in foster care due to the mother's suspected drug use, the family's unstable living situation, and noncompliance with a medical safety plan for one child's special needs. Over three years, the father relied on the mother as the primary contact with agencies and maintained that she would be the primary caretaker upon reintegration. However, the mother was repeatedly incarcerated, failed drug tests, and submitted falsified documents. The father, although appropriate during visits, was not engaged in the reintegration process and failed to meet the goals of his court-ordered reintegration plan.The Johnson District Court extended the parents' reintegration plans three times without sufficient progress and terminated parental rights after two failed attempts to place the children in Missouri, where the parents had bought a home. The Court of Appeals affirmed the termination decision for both parents. The father petitioned for review, questioning whether the district court properly considered his unfitness separate from the mother's and whether the termination was an abuse of discretion.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and found no error. The court held that the father was unfit by clear and convincing evidence due to his failure to engage in the reintegration process, reliance on the mother despite her issues, and failure to provide a sustainable childcare plan. The court also found that the father's unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, given the three-year period without significant progress. The court concluded that termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children, considering their need for permanency and the father's inability to provide a stable and safe environment. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of both the Court of Appeals and the district court. View "In re D.G." on Justia Law

The case involves Angelica A. (mother) and Luis C. (father), who have two children, Dezi C. and Joshua C. In 2019, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed petitions to assert dependency jurisdiction over the children due to the parents' substance abuse and domestic violence issues. Both parents denied having Indian heritage, and the juvenile court initially found that ICWA did not apply. The children were removed from their parents' custody, and parental rights were eventually terminated in January 2022, with the children deemed adoptable by their paternal grandparents.The mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the Department failed to comply with its duty under ICWA and related California provisions to inquire about the children's possible Indian ancestry from extended family members. The Court of Appeal acknowledged the Department's deficient inquiry but concluded that the error was harmless unless the record contained information suggesting a reason to believe the children might be Indian children.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and held that an inadequate initial ICWA inquiry requires conditional reversal of the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights. The court directed the Department to conduct an adequate inquiry and document it properly. If the juvenile court finds the inquiry proper and concludes that ICWA does not apply, the order terminating parental rights will be reinstated. If the inquiry reveals a reason to know the children are Indian children, the court must proceed in conformity with ICWA and California implementing provisions. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Dezi C." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Sharon Mitzel, Alan Mitzel, and Eric Mitzel, filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against Vogel Law Firm and Jerilynn Brantner Adams, alleging negligence in a divorce action involving the disposition of land known as Section 19. Fred and Sharon Mitzel, who were married and had two sons, formed a family limited partnership and conveyed their farm, including Section 19, to it. During their divorce, they agreed that Section 19 would go to Fred, subject to deeding it to their sons upon his death. However, a subsequent quiet title action determined that the family partnership owned Section 19, nullifying the divorce judgment's property distribution.The District Court of Cass County granted partial summary judgment dismissing Alan and Eric Mitzel’s claims, ruling they lacked standing as non-clients to sue for legal malpractice. The court also granted judgment as a matter of law dismissing Sharon Mitzel’s claims, concluding she presented no evidence that she gave up any marital property to secure the agreement for Section 19 to be deeded to her sons upon Fred’s death. Sharon Mitzel’s claim for attorney’s fees and costs incurred due to Vogel’s alleged malpractice was also dismissed.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss Alan and Eric Mitzel’s claims, agreeing they lacked standing. The court also upheld the measure of damages used by the lower court, which was based on what Sharon Mitzel gave up to secure Section 19 for her sons. However, the Supreme Court found that the lower court erred in determining Sharon Mitzel presented no evidence of incurring attorney’s fees and costs due to Vogel’s alleged malpractice. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Mitzel v. Vogel Law Firm" on Justia Law