Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's property division order in this divorce proceeding, holding that the court abused its discretion in excluding farmland Wife purchased with Husband from the marital estate.A relative of Husband sold the farmland at issue to the parties at a discounted purchase price. Because of the discount the circuit court determined that the transfer was a partial gift solely to Husband. Wife appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding $1,526,000 of the farm's appraised value from the marital estate. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the circuit court applied a rule that would conclusively prevent the entire value of the farm from ever being considered marital property regardless of Wife's contributions, and that the rule is in irreconcilable tension with existing decisional law. View "Field v. Field" on Justia Law

After police arrested their mother, 10-year-old J. and her half-brothers were found at a homeless encampment and detained by the Alameda County Social Services Agency, which filed a juvenile dependency petition. At a paternity inquiry, Mother testified that Father is J.’s father. Mother and Father lived together until J. was two years old. Father had participated in Nevada child support proceedings, acknowledged J. as his child, and was subject to a child support order. Father had regular visits with J. After the Agency filed an amended petition naming Father as J.’s alleged father, the court declared the children dependents of the court, and placed the children with their maternal grandfather. The court held a later hearing, ordered a legal guardianship by the grandfather, then dismissed the dependency.During the proceedings, Father maintained his relationship with J. and consistently stated that he wanted custody. Father repeatedly contacted the Agency and provided a birth certificate showing his name as J.’s father. Court-appointed attorneys represented Father but he was unrepresented during critical proceedings and none of the attorneys took action on his behalf. At the dismissal hearing, the court noted that no counsel was present on Father’s behalf and acknowledged that the prior proceeding, without Father's counsel present "was an error.” Contrary to Welfare and Institutions Code 316.2(b), and California Rule 5.635(g), the court clerk never provided Father with notice of the procedure he should follow to establish that he is J.’s father and to protect his parental rights. The court of appeal reversed the juvenile court orders, finding that Father was prejudiced by the failure to comply with the notice requirements. View "In re J.W.-P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court to terminate a 2013 stipulated parental agreement that had afforded Grandparents contact and visitation rights with respect to their grandchild (Child), holding that the district court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court correctly determined that the parties' agreement was a grandparent visitation agreement formed under Mont. Code Ann. 40-9-102 rather than a parental interest agreement under Mon. Code Ann. 40-4-228; and (2) the district court correctly applied the legal standard for termination of a section 40-9-102 grandparent visitation agreement. View "In re Parenting of K.J.K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Father's parental rights to his two children, holding that the district court err and that Father did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred when it allowed the children's guardian ad litem (GAL) to question witnesses at Father's termination hearing, but despite the error, the district court properly terminated Father's parental rights without consideration of the information learned from the GAL's examination of the witnesses; (2) the Department of Public Health and Human Services provided reasonable efforts to reunify Father with the children; (3) the district court did not err in terminating Father's parental rights; (4) the district court did not err in extending temporary legal custody of the children to the Department; and (5) Father did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to indicate how the alleged claim prejudiced his substantial rights. View "In re B.F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court awarding custody of a child to an individual standing in loco parentis and, in this opinion, refined the standard for an exceptional case where a child's best interests can negate the parental preference principle.Father was awarded physical custody of Child. Mother later filed a complaint to modify child custody seeking to be awarded sole physical custody. After being allowed to intervene, Jo filed a complaint alleging that she was Child's primary caretaker and that she stood in loco parentis over Child. After a trial, the court placed legal and physical custody with Jo. Mother appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by awarding custody to Jo rather than to Mother. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, holding (1) when a fit parent has not forfeited her or his superior right to custody, the best interests of the child will negate the parental preference principle only in an exceptional case; and (2) an exceptional case requires proof of serious physical or psychological harm or a substantial likelihood of such harm. View "State ex rel. Tina K. v. Adam B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the juvenile court terminating Father's parental rights to his child, holding that Father was not unfairly penalized for working too hard.After the child was removed from Mother's custody and was adjudicated in need of assistance Father received services. Father worked two full-time jobs on weekdays from 6 a.m. until midnight and lacked a driver's license or the ability to get a driver's license. The juvenile court terminated Father's parental rights to the child under Iowa Code 232.116(1)(h). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State proved the child had been removed from the physical custody of the child's parents and that the child could not be placed in Father's custody at the time of the termination hearing; and (2) termination was in the child's best interests. View "In re Z.P." on Justia Law

George Ray, Sr., and Johnnita Ray were divorced on the ground of irreconcilable differences, and the chancery court decided issues of property settlement. George appealed, arguing that the chancellor erred by not crediting him for supporting Johnnita’s children, by finding him solely responsible for their joint debt, and by including his military-retirement income into the alimony determination. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s judgment. View "Ray v. Ray" on Justia Law

The "[Indian Child Welfare Act] ICWA and [Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act] WICWA were enacted to remedy the historical and persistent state-sponsored destruction of Native families and communities. . . . The acts provide specific protections for Native children in child welfare proceedings and are aimed at preserving the children’s relationships with their families, Native communities, and identities. The acts also require states to send notice to tribes so that tribes may exercise their independent rights and interests to protect their children and, in turn, the continuing existence of tribes as thriving communities for generations to come." At issue in this case was whether the trial court had “reason to know” that M.G and Z.G. were Indian children at a 72-hour shelter care hearing. The Washington Supreme Court held that a trial court had “reason to know” that a child was an Indian child when a participant in the proceeding indicates that the child has tribal heritage. "We respect that tribes determine membership exclusively, and state courts cannot establish who is or is not eligible for tribal membership on their own." The Court held that an indication of tribal heritage was sufficient to satisfy the “reason to know” standard. Here, participants in a shelter care hearing indicated that M.G. and Z.G. had tribal heritage. The trial court had “reason to know” that M.G. and Z.G. were Indian children, and it erred by failing to apply ICWA and WICWA standards to the proceeding. View "In re Dependency of Z.J.G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's denial of Appellant's petition for guardianship of her nephew, holding that the district court evaluated under the incorrect standard Appellant's request for predicate factual findings necessary for an individual to apply for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services of the Department of Homeland Security.In her petition, Appellant requested that the district court make the predicate factual findings for an individual to apply for SIJ status, including a finding that reunifying her nephew with his mother in his country of origin was not viable due to abuse or neglect. The district court denied the request after applying the heightened standard of proof applicable in proceedings for the termination of parental rights under Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 128. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a party requesting predicate factual findings under Nev. Rev. Stat. 3.2203 need only show that such findings are warranted by a preponderance of the evidence. View "In re Guardianship of B.A.A.R." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's dispositional order removing son and daughter from father's custody. The court heeded the holding of Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995–996, establishing that when a statute requires a fact to be found by clear and convincing evidence, and when there is a substantial evidence challenge, the reviewing court must determine whether the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the existence of that fact to be highly probable.In this case, the court held that a reasonable trier of fact could have found it highly probable that placement of the minors with father would pose a substantial risk of them being harmed by exposure to future domestic violence, and that there were no reasonable means to protect the minors without removal from father's physical custody. The court rejected father's arguments to the contrary and his argument that the juvenile court's failure to state the facts it relied upon is reversible error. Because the last incident of domestic violence involving father was so dangerous and troubling, it is not reasonably probable that the juvenile court would have reached a different conclusion if it stated the facts it relied upon. View "In re V.L." on Justia Law