Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Mother petitioned under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 388 and 390 to set aside jurisdiction findings concerning her alcohol abuse and mental instability and to terminate dependency jurisdiction after a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation found that she was not mentally ill and did not meet the diagnostic criteria for alcohol use disorder.The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court's order summarily denying mother's section 388 petition and held that the juvenile court incorrectly characterized her petition as an untimely new trial motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 659. The court remanded for the juvenile court to determine whether mother has made the required prima facie showing that terminating dependency jurisdiction would be in the child's best interests. If such a showing has been made, the juvenile court is to conduct a hearing on the merits of the petition. View "In re Samuel A." on Justia Law

Sharpe and Westmoreland were married and had a child, A.S. The marriage was dissolved in 2013. Sharpe and Westmoreland agreed to a joint parenting agreement. The parents shared equal parenting time. A.S.’s legal residence was with Sharpe. Sharpe entered into a civil union with Fulkerson. A.S. continued to reside with Sharpe, Fulkerson, and Fulkerson’s children. Sharpe died in 2017. After Sharpe’s death, Westmoreland no longer let A.S. live with or visit Fulkerson and Fulkerson’s children. Fulkerson sought visitation and an allocation of parental responsibilities. The appellate court responded to certified questions, finding that a party to a civil union lacks “step-parent” standing as defined by the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/101, to request visitation with her deceased partner’s child or to request parental responsibilities.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. in enacting the Civil Union Act, the General Assembly intended to create an alternative to marriage that was equal in all respects. That intent was not limited to partners’ rights as to each other. When a child’s parent enters into a civil union with an individual who is not the child’s other parent, that individual becomes the child’s stepparent as defined by the Dissolution Act and meets that aspect of the standing requirement to petition the court for visitation, allocation of parental responsibilities, or both. View "Sharpe v. Westmoreland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Mother's Wyo. R. Civ. P. 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment requiring that the parties' child name not be changed after the court previously granted Father's motion to change the child's name, holding that the district court abused its discretion.Siobham Jerding (Mother) was married to someone else when she entered into a relationship with Terrance Brown (Father). Mother later gave birth to MFJ. The birth certificate listed Mother's husband as the child's father. Father filed a petition to establish paternity, custody, and visitation and to change MFJ's surname to Brown. The district court granted Father's motion to change MFJ's name to Brown. Thereafter, Mother filed her Rule 59 motion, arguing that the district court did not make a finding of good cause. The district court granted Motion's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that none of the grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion were present in this case. View "Brown v. Jerding" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals setting aside the adoption decree in this case, holding that the district court's conclusions of law in support of the adoption decree were inadequate.Mother, a Montana resident, gave birth to a child in Montana. Mother placed the child for adoption with Respondents, two Utah residents. On a form required under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC), Utah Code 62a-4a-701 to -711, Mother did not list Petitioner, the child's legal father, as the child's father. Respondents filed an adoption petition and petitioned to terminate Petitioner's parental rights. The district court terminated Petitioner's parental rights and finalized the adoption. The court of appeals set aside the adoption decree because it did not state that the requirements of the ICPC had been complied with, as required by the Adoption Act. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the case, holding (1) there was no jurisdictional defect under the ICPC or the Adoption Act; but (2) the district court's conclusions of law in support of the adoption decree were inadequate. View "In re Adoption of B.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court terminating Appellant's parental rights, holding that the district court violated Appellant's due process rights when it determined the best interests of the child without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.The district court found that the Department of Family Services established statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. On appeal, Appellant argued that he was not given an opportunity to be heard on the question of whether termination was in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court held (1) neither the termination statutes nor Wyoming case law require a separate hearing to determine the best interests of the child; but (2) Appellant's due process rights were violated when he was deprived of the opportunity to be heard on the question of best interests. View "Niland v. State, ex rel. Department of Family Services" on Justia Law

Tim O’Keeffe appealed district court orders denying his motion to terminate spousal support and awarding attorney’s fees to Kari O’Keeffe. Because the district court erred in concluding spousal support was rehabilitative rather than permanent, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the order denying Tim O’Keeffe’s motion to terminate spousal support. The Court affirmed the award of attorney’s fees. View "O'Keeffe v. O'Keeffe" on Justia Law

Abbey Gifford appealed a judgment granting her and Brian Woelfel equal residential responsibility for their minor child and determining child support. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred by including an “automatic” change of custody provision that purported to modify the original residential responsibility decision without consideration of the child’s best interests at the time of a potential move. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Woelfel v. Gifford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part the judgment of the district court finding Bradley Jenkins in contempt for failing to follow the terms of its stipulated divorce decree and remanded for the district court to clarify its order as it pertained to refinancing the marital home, holding that it was unclear whether the court intended to impose the refinancing obligation on Bradley.The divorce decree awarded the marital home to Jonnie Jenkins and required her to refinance it and pay Bradley his share of the equity. Jonnie was unable to obtain refinancing because of numerous liens attached to the home. Jonnie asked the district court to hold Bradley in contempt for failing to comply with the divorce decree. The district court held both parties in contempt and ordered Bradley to release all judgment liens on the title to the marital home and assume the second mortgage. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) the district court did not err by requiring Bradley to make reasonable and consistent efforts to release the liens on the marital home; and (2) it was unclear which party was obligated to obtain refinancing for the marital home. View "Jenkins v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action brought by plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the County and DCFS violated plaintiff's due process and privacy rights by maintaining unfounded child abuse allegations against plaintiff in California's Child Welfare Services Case Management System (CWS/CMS) without providing him notice or a hearing to challenge them.The panel held that the County has a strong interest in maintaining all reports of suspected child abuse in CWS/CMS—even those that result in "unfounded" dispositions—because doing so helps its child welfare and law enforcement agencies protect children from abuse and neglect. In this case, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of material fact that the records of his "unfounded" allegations in CWS/CMS caused him reputational harm, or that they are used by the County to alter or extinguish his rights to employment, child placement, or child visitation. Therefore, plaintiff failed to show that his inclusion in CWS/CMS implicates his liberty interests so as to require procedural due process. Furthermore, plaintiff has not shown that the County publicly disseminates or misuses his information in a manner that would violate his constitutional right to privacy. View "Endy v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court denying TE's petition to establish paternity of AE on the grounds that TE had not timely filed his petition and remanded for an order adjudicating TE as AE's father, holding that while the district court has discretion to determine the timeliness of a paternity petition before ordering testing, the statutes do not afford the district court discretion on the timeliness of a petition after ordering genetic testing.The Department of Family Services later took protective custody of AE and sought to terminate the rights of AE's parents. Mother and the presumed father voluntarily relinquished their parental rights to AE. TE, who was listed on the termination petition as the alleged father, filed a petition to establish paternity. Genetic testing was conducted and disclosed a 99.99 percent probability of paternity. After a trial, the district court found that TE's petition was not timely filed and denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Department lacked standing to contest TE's petition to establish paternity; and (2) the district court lacked the discretion to adjudicate parentage after it was presented with court-ordered genetic testing results that complied with the statutes and indicated that TE was AE's biological father. View "TE v. State, Department of Family Services" on Justia Law