Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders, holding that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) does not apply here. Mother contends that the juvenile court and DCFS failed to satisfy the formal notice requirements under the ICWA and related California law.In this case, the initial inquiry conducted by the juvenile court created a "reason to believe" the children possibly are Indian children; DCFS's repeated efforts to gather information concerning the children's maternal ancestry constitutes substantial evidence that DCFS met its duty of further inquiry; but the juvenile court and DCFS's further investigation did not yield results that pushed their reason to believe the children are Indian children, to reason to know the children are Indian children. The court explained that a suggestion of Indian ancestry is not sufficient under ICWA or related California law to trigger the notice requirement. Because DCFS was not required to provide formal notice to the pertinent tribes, the court did not reach Mother's argument that the ICWA notices may have lacked necessary information. View "In re Dominic F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the probate court terminating the parental rights of Parents in anticipation of adoption pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 18-A, 9-204, holding that the court did not err or exceed the bounds of its discretion.The child's maternal aunt and uncle - the child's legal guardians - petitioned to terminate Parents' parental rights and for adoption of the child. After a hearing, the court entered judgment terminating both Parents' parental rights, finding that both parents abandoned the child and that termination of Parents' parental rights was in the child's best interest. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court's findings that Parents were unfit to parent the child were supported by competent evidence. View "Adoption by Jessica M." on Justia Law

In 2005, Ballard Smith (Husband) and Charlie Smith (Wife) stipulated to a final divorce order that required the parties to sell real property located in Salt Lake City, Utah and allocate the net proceeds to both parties on an equal basis. In subsequent orders, Husband was tasked with marketing and selling the Salt Lake Property. Without Wife’s knowledge, Husband moved the Salt Lake Property in and out of various business entities and unilaterally sold a six-acre portion of the Salt Lake Property. After the majority of the Salt Lake Property remained unsold for nearly a decade, Wife petitioned the magistrate court to modify its prior order, requesting that the magistrate court: (1) direct that the Salt Lake Property be appraised and that Husband pay her one-half the appraised value; or (2) in the alternative, appoint a receiver to sell the Salt Lake Property and divide the net proceeds equally. Husband opposed the petition by arguing the magistrate court never had subject matter jurisdiction over the Salt Lake Property when it entered its original final divorce order. The magistrate court granted Wife’s petition to modify and appointed a receiver to handle all matters relating to the Salt Lake Property. Additionally, the magistrate court ordered Husband to pay Wife one-half of the net proceeds from the sale of the six-acre portion of the Salt Lake Property and awarded Wife attorney fees. Husband appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the magistrate court and awarded Wife attorney fees for her intermediate appeal. Husband then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (department) filed a petition seeking to remove an 18-month old girl based on mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues and noncustodial father’s failure to provide for her. However, after the child was detained, father came forward and said he had been trying to reunify with her since mother took the child when she was about four months old. He also said he had established his paternity through a genetic test and had been paying child support to mother throughout their separation. Father said he couldn’t yet take custody of the child because his housing, transportation, and employment weren’t stable, but he indicated he had obtained work and was attempting to find suitable housing. He also indicated he would return to Chicago, his home city, and live with relatives who were willing to help him raise her once he obtained custody. The department amended the petition to remove the allegations against father before the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, nonetheless maintained the child should be removed from both parents, and asked the trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence that placing the child with her parents would pose a substantial danger to her health, safety or well-being. Rights to the child were ultimately terminated, but the father appealed, averring his situation had changed: he obtained full-time employment with benefits and a permanent place to live. The court denied his motion, concluding he had shown his circumstances were changing, but had not changed. Before the Court of Appeal, father argued the entire procedure violated his due process rights and there wasn’t adequate support for the trial court’s finding that giving him custody would be detrimental to the child. The Court held a juvenile court could not terminate parental rights based on problems arising from the parent’s poverty, "a problem made worse, from a due process standpoint, when the department didn’t formally allege those problems as a basis for removal." Absent those impermissible grounds for removal the Court found there wasn’t clear and convincing evidence that returning the child to father would be detrimental to her. Termination of father’s rights was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law

Angela and Kim Thiele married in February 2009 and separated in January 2016. Angela filed for divorce in February 2016. Kim received a Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine degree in 1980. After working as an employee in another doctor’s practice, he established his own professional corporation in 2001; he worked as an independent contractor at other practices for the next ten years. During this time his business had few fixed assets because the doctors that employed him covered most of the overhead of running the medical practice. Kim’s business received 30% of the revenue he brought in from seeing patients, which Kim deposited into the corporation’s bank account. Business expenses were paid out of the corporate bank account, as was Kim’s salary. In 2011 Kim decided to open his own practice rather than continue to work as an independent contractor. He obtained a business license and hired an office manager to help him with the transition. At about the same time Angela contributed $15,000 of her own funds to the marital estate. She helped Kim decorate the office, and she participated in discussions with Kim about taking over another doctor’s practice or starting his own practice. Angela also worked as a receptionist and administrative assistant, answering the phone, greeting patients, and performing other administrative tasks as needed. The primary dispute in the couple's divorce centered on the classification of Kim's practice as separate or marital property. The superior court determined that the practice had neither transmuted nor actively appreciated during marriage and therefore was not marital property. The court also declined to award Angela attorney’s fees or reimbursement for the cost of an expert witness. Angela appealed the court’s determination that the medical practice was not marital property and its refusal to award attorney’s fees or costs. Finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on both issues. View "Thiele v. Thiele" on Justia Law

After Appellant appealed an order of the district court finding him in contempt of court and modifying terms of a parenting plan, the Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal from an order of commitment and a purge order containing a reduction in Appellant's parenting time, holding that, as to the first appeal, there was no abuse of discretion, and that, as to the second appeal, there was no final order.The district court found Appellant in contempt of court for violating parenting provisions of a dissolution decree, imposed a suspended jail sentence, and modified terms of the parenting plan in this case. Appellant appealed this order. While the appeal was pending, the court entered an order of commitment and a purge order reducing Appellant's parenting time but setting the matter for a future review hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed as to the first appeal and dismissed the second appeal for lack of a final order, holding (1) the modifications at issue in the first appeal were part of the equitable relief the court had the authority to provide; and (2) the second appeal was not taken from a final order. View "Yori v. Helms" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed a series of orders fixing fees for court-appointed counsel in a juvenile proceeding, holding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.After Mother's children were adjudicated under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) the State moved to terminate Mother's parental rights. The juvenile court denied the State's motion following a trial. The court of appeals affirmed. Thereafter, Mother filed three fee applications seeking payment for services rendered by court-appointed counsel. The court found Mother's requested fees were fair and reasonable and allowed the fee applications. The Supreme Court affirmed after clarifying the statutory framework for appealing such orders, holding that there was no abuse of discretion. View "In re Claim of Roberts for Attorney Fees" on Justia Law

A July 2017 petition under Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b)(1) concerned J.P., born in 2013. J.P.’s mother had been arrested for DUI. J.P. and his younger half-brother, A.A., were taken into protective custody. The court found mother’s ex-boyfriend Albert to be A.A.’s presumed father and found L.P. to be J.P.’s presumed father. Albert indicated that he wanted to be designated as J.P.’s presumed parent. Mother opposed the request. Police had responded to disturbances between mother and Albert. In November 2017, J.P. and A.A. were moved from foster care to the home of Albert’s parents. L.P.'s whereabouts were unknown; he had not visited J.P. The Department reported positive interactions between the children and Albert. In September 2018, Albert asked the court to recognize him as J.P.’s presumed father. The court determined that Albert did not qualify as J.P.’s presumed father under Family Code 7611(d) but ordered weekly visitation between J.P. and Albert.Months later, Albert renewed his request to be considered a de facto parent to J.P. The court stated that after another hearing, it believed that Albert qualified as a presumed parent to J.P. Mother did not dispute the court’s authority to revisit its prior order. The Department and J.P.’s counsel supported Albert's motion. The court of appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s order granting Albert presumed parent status for J.P. The juvenile court had authority under Welfare and Institutions Code 3851 to reconsider its prior order. View "In re J.P." on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Supreme Court accepted review of the Division for Children, Youth and Families' (DCYF) petition in its original jurisdiction to determine whether the superior court erred in denying DCYF's motions to dismiss respondent's claims on statute of limitation grounds. While under the care of DCYF, separate individuals sexually assaulted respondent on two separate occasions. The first assault occurred in February 2011, when respondent was approximately 12 years old, after DCYF placed her in the care of a foster family. While living with the foster family, a neighbor’s cousin raped respondent. The second assault occurred in June 2015 when respondent was approximately 16 years olf, after DCYF placed her in a children's home. An employee of the children’s home inappropriately touched, threatened, and raped respondent. In November and December 2018, the respondent filed two complaints alleging, in relevant part, claims of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and vicarious liability against DCYF, all relating to the sexual assaults that occurred while she was in DCYF custody. DCYF moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that they were barred by the three-year statute of limitations provided in RSA 541-B:14, IV. The respondent objected and argued, among other things, that she could not have discovered DCYF’s potential legal fault until December 19, 2016, when an independent audit of DCYF was publicly released that detailed DCYF’s various shortcomings regarding child welfare and safety. The Supreme Court determined the discovery rule in RSA 508:4, I (2010) applied to actions brought under RSA chapter 541-B (2007 & Supp. 2019), and, accordingly, affirmed the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Petition of New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth & Families" on Justia Law

In this abuse and neglect matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Mother's post-termination visitation motion, holding that filing a post-termination visitation motion does not extend the timeframe to appeal a final disposition order and that the circuit court did not err in denying Mother's post-termination visitation motion.The circuit court entered an order terminating Mother's parental rights and prohibited Mother from having further contact with her child. Mother subsequently filed a post-termination motion. The circuit court denied the motion. Mother appealed, alleging that the circuit court erred by terminating her parental rights and by denying her post-termination visitation motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mother's appeal of the final disposition order was untimely, and Mother's filing of the post-termination visitation motion did not extend the timeframe to appeal the underlying final disposition order; and (2) the circuit court did not err by denying Mother's post-termination visitation motion. View "In re S.L." on Justia Law