Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In this dependency, abuse, and neglect proceeding, the Supreme Court held that Ky. Rev. Stat. 620.100(1)(b) does not entitle an indigent parent to state-funded expert assistance in dependency, neglect, and abuse (DNA) cases but that, under certain circumstances, parents are entitled to reasonably necessary expert assistance under the due process provisions of the Kentucky and United States Constitutions.The Cabinet for Health and Family Services filed DNA petitions on behalf of Parents' children based on risk of harm. The family court determined that Mother and Father were indigent, but when counsel for both parties requested funds to hire a medical expert the court denied the request. The court then found that Parents' three children were neglected or abused. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that section 620.100(1)(b) grants indigent parents a right to funding for reasonably necessary expert assistance. The Supreme Court reversed insofar as the court's holding relied on Ky. Rev. Stat. 620.100 but affirmed the court's reversal of the family court on constitutional grounds, holding that whether due process requires a court-appointed expert is best left to the judgment of the trial court. The Court remanded the case for new DNA proceedings with instructions for the family court to analyze the need for expert assistance prior to adjudication. View "Commonwealth, Cabinet For Health & Family Services v. K.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court terminating Father's parental rights to his daughter, holding that the the trial justice was not clearly wrong to conclude that there was parental unfitness and did not err in determining that termination of Father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Father was not denied the effective assistance of counsel where Father failed to allege any basis for a finding that he did not knowingly give up his right to counsel; and (2) the trial justice did not err in finding that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of parental unfitness and that there was no substantial probability that the child could be placed in Father's care within a reasonable period of time. View "In re Mandy M." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that father's failure to reunify with D.N. was due solely to poverty, and terminating reunification services for father was not in D.N.'s best interests. The court also held that these errors caused the juvenile court to make a premature finding of detriment that could affect father in future dependency proceedings. Finally, the court rejected DCFS's assertion that an order returning D.N. to mother's physical custody issued after the filing of this appeal renders the instant appeal moot. Therefore, the court reversed the denial of father's request for a continuance of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.22 permanency review hearing, the juvenile court's finding of detriment, and the order terminating reunification services, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re D.N." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court granting Pat Doe a protection from abuse order against Appellant on behalf of Doe's two minor children, holding that the district court erred as a matter of fact and law by finding that Appellant committed abuse within the meaning of Me. Rev. Stat. 19-A, 4002.Doe filed a complaint for protection from abuse on behalf of his two minor children against Appellant, the children's maternal grandmother. The court issued a protection order prohibiting Appellant from having any contact with the children after determining that Appellant's actions in taking the children to Arizona and keeping them there after their mother's death constituted abuse within the meaning of the protection from abuse statute. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding that, on this record, there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that Appellant knowingly restricted the children's movement without consent or lawful authority to do so. View "Doe v. Batie" on Justia Law

In this dissolution of marriage action, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's judgment of civil contempt rendered against Plaintiff, holding that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court properly found Plaintiff in contempt of court and properly denied the parties' joint motion to open and vacate the judgment of contempt. One year after Plaintiff commenced a dissolution action Defendant filed a motion for contempt, arguing that Plaintiff committed a willful violation of a court order when he withdrew approximately $70,000 from the parties' joint account and placed it into a separate, personal account. The court granted the motion after a hearing. Plaintiff filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the decision, which the trial court denied. Later, the parties filed a joint motion to open and vacate the judgment of contempt in part. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court did not err in finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Plaintiff in contempt and failing to open and vacate the judgment of contempt. View "Hall v. Hall" on Justia Law

In its initial custody decision, the superior court found that a father had a history of committing domestic violence, and therefore established benchmarks for him to meet before he could begin supervised visitation with his children. The father did not appeal that decision. He nonetheless sought to relitigate the domestic violence finding in subsequent proceedings, but the superior court ruled that relitigation of the issue was barred by collateral estoppel. Following an extended evidentiary hearing, the superior court found the father had met the benchmarks set by the earlier order and conditionally granted his request that he be allowed to begin supervised visitation. But the superior court also said that because of the “challenging” nature of the case it could not approve a visitation plan without more detail, such as the identity of individuals willing to act as counselors and visitation coordinators and how the parties would pay for their services. The father appealed the superior court’s order granting in part his motion for supervised visitation, including its application of collateral estoppel to the earlier finding of domestic violence. Because the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err, it affirmed its visitation order. View "Robert A. v. Tatiana D." on Justia Law

The superior court awarded the husband the marital home and ordered him to make a corresponding equalization payment to the wife. About a year later the husband sought relief from judgment, arguing that newly discovered evidence showed the court had mis-valued the home. The court denied the requested relief and the husband appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the court’s decision. View "Schindler v. Schindler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the juvenile court terminating Mother's parental rights to her two children, holding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of parental rights.After a termination hearing, the juvenile court entered an order terminating Mother's parental rights, finding that the State proved grounds for termination under Neb. Stat. 43-292(2), (4), and (6) as to both children and that termination of parental rights was in the children's best interests. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the juvenile court erred in determining that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State adduced clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests and that the State proved a statutory ground for termination. View "In re Interest of Leyton C." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, appellant's request for a civil harassment restraining order. The court held that appellant is not permitted to use the civil harassment order process to collaterally attack a confidential child dependency and adoption proceeding concerning her biological daughter.In this case, appellant's parental rights were terminated in a child dependency proceeding after appellant refused cancer treatment for her daughter and threatened the caregiver and case worker. The juvenile court then denied appellant's petition to reinstate service, freed the daughter for adoption, and placed her with a confidential caregiver. After the court affirmed the dependency order, appellant tried to intervene in the adoption proceeding by requesting a civil harassment restraining order. The court held that appellant may not use the civil harassment order process to mount a collateral attack on the Welfare & Institution Code section 366.26 order terminating parental rights, the selection of a confidential caregiver, or the adoptive placement. View "Leah B. v. Michael V." on Justia Law

In 2018, a dependency petition was filed alleging that A.M.-S' father had physically abused the child. Although the father denied the allegations against him, he stipulated to a finding of dependency “given the nature of the allegations and the possibility of criminal charges.” The court ordered the father to engage in a “[p]sychological evaluation with a parenting component” and reserved ruling on other possible evaluations. The father asked the trial court to go beyond the RCW 26.44.053(2)'s requirements and prohibit not only the “use” of his statements during his court-ordered evaluation but also any “derivative use” of those statements in connection with a dependency hearing. The county prosecutor objected, and the trial court denied the father’s motion. The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed in a published opinion. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: under these circumstances, the trial court was not required to grant derivative use immunity over the prosecutor’s objection. View "In re Dependency of A.M.-S." on Justia Law