Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (MDCPS) sought to terminate involuntarily the parental rights of Jack Bynum, the putative father of a child in MDCPS' custody. The chancery court determined Bynum was both indigent and entitled to counsel. The chancellor appointed Bynum counsel and ordered MDCPS to pay his attorney's fees. MDCPS appealed. The agency argued Covington County should have paid for Bynum’s representation, just as it would if Bynum were an indigent criminal defendant. But the Mississippi Supreme Court found this was not a criminal case. "And the statutory scheme that directs the initiating county in criminal prosecutions to pay for indigent representation is expressly limited. It only applies to those 'charged with a felony, misdemeanor punishable by confinement for ninety (90) days or more, or commission of an act of delinquency.'” Thus, absent a legislative directive to assess an indigent parent’s attorney’s fees to Covington County, the chancery court did not abuse its legislatively conferred discretion by ordering MDCPS to pay Bynum’s attorney’s fees. View "Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services v. Bynum" on Justia Law

In November 1999, the SSA filed a dependency petition on behalf of plaintiff and her sister against their parents. The juvenile dependency court assumed jurisdiction over the children, but permitted them to remain in their mother's custody and to have supervised visitation with their father. In February 2000, the dependency court ordered that the children be removed from mother's custody. In 2001, mother filed an action in California superior court alleging that Orange County social workers violated her constitutional right to familial association. The jury returned verdicts in favor of mother against all defendants except one. Plaintiff filed this 2013 federal action alleging that defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to familial association and her Fourth Amendment right against wrongful seizure.The Ninth Circuit held that where constitutional familial rights are at stake, there are identical companionship rights between a parent and child that could allow a plaintiff to invoke issue preclusion to bar relitigation of issues previously decided. However, in this case, plaintiff cannot assert issue preclusion because mother litigated more than just the overlapping companionship rights in her state court case and the panel cannot determine the basis for the jury's verdict. Therefore, plaintiff failed to establish that the issues litigated in the prior state proceeding were identical to the issues raised in her federal case. View "Hardwick v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for international parental kidnapping and passport fraud. After determining that defendant's vagueness challenge fails insofar as it is premised on deficient notice, the court held that the International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act (IPKCA) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. In this case, the IPKCA is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to someone who retains children abroad without first abducting them, when the children had not been in the United States for several years prior to the unlawful retention.The court also held that the district court properly applied two Sentencing Guidelines enhancements for substantial interference with the administration of justice and for fraudulent use of a United States passport. View "United States v. Houtar" on Justia Law

In this marital dissolution action, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals to the extent it affirmed the district court's disposition of Husband's 401K accounts, holding that the court of appeals and the district court erred in their application of the active appreciation rule.In its dissolution decree, the district court found that Wife should be awarded $10,500 from a 401K account owned by Husband but otherwise awarded Husband all funds in his retirement and investment accounts. The court of appeals affirmed the decree. The Supreme Court reversed in part, arguing that although the value of the 401K account at issue at the time of the parties' marriage was Husband's nonmarital property, under the active appreciation rule, the growth in that account during the marriage was marital. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the increase in the value of the 401K account should have been treated as marital property subject to equitable division, and the lower courts abused their discretion in finding otherwise. View "Higgins v. Currier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court removing the child B.A. from the custody of Petitioners, foster parents, holding that the circuit court properly considered Petitioners' finances but that remand was required for a full analysis of the facts within the framework of the sibling preference contained in W. Va. Code 49-4-111(e) and the holding in In re Carol B., 550 S.E.2d 636 (W. Va. 2001).Petitioners had already adopted B.A.'s older sibling when B.A. was placed in their foster care. The guardian ad litem appointed to represent B.A. later discovered a number of liens and judgments against Petitioners, as well as more than $46,000 in unpaid child support. The guardian recommended that B.A. be removed from Petitioners' custody due to those issues. The circuit court directed that B.A. be removed from Petitioners' custody, finding that Petitioners would not meet the prerequisites to adopt the child under W. Va. Code 48-22-701(d). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in its apparent failure to place any weight on Petitioners' adoption of B.A.'s sibling and that Petitioners' home was the only home B.A. had ever known. The Court remanded the case for the circuit court to perform a best interests analysis making detailed consideration of the sibling preference. View "In re B.A." on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered issues relating to appellate review of a trial court’s appointment of legal counsel under Section 2313(a) of the Adoption Act relating to whether, and how, an appellate court should review, sua sponte, appointed counsel’s representation of children’s legal interests in a termination of parental rights proceeding. Specifically, the Supreme Court addressed, inter alia, whether reviewing courts must determine sua sponte whether a conflict existed in an attorney’s representation of a child’s best interests and legal interests, and whether counsel’s advocacy for the child’s legal interests included placing the child’s preferred outcome on the record. Appellant T.L.G. (“Mother”) was the mother of four children: A.M.G., S.A.G., K.M.G., and J.C.C (collectively “the Children”). Children and Youth Services ("CYS") filed dependency petitions for all four children, citing the parents' inability to provide proper care, especially in regard to their medical care and school attendance. A termination of parental rights was held in 2018; the children had been placed with their paternal aunt and uncle who were willing to adopt them. Mother appealed termination of her parental rights, arguing the trial court erred in concluding CYS proved the grounds for termination. In addition, she raised her 2313(a) argument. The Supreme Court held that while an appellate court should verify the orphans' court appointed counsel to represent the child's legal interests, it could not assess, sua sponte, the performance of that representation. The Court affirmed the termination of parental rights in this case. View "Adoption of A.M.G., S.A.G., K.M.G. & J.C.C" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court awarding almost $400,000 in this action to enforce a divorce judgment, holding that the trial court's factual findings were supported by competent evidence.In 2018, Frances Quirk filed a motion to enforce her divorce judgment from 1973. Quirk alleged that John Quirk, her ex-husband, was obligated to pay her forty-five dollars weekly in spousal support and owed her $97,875 in arrears. John asserted laches as an affirmative defense. The court awarded Frances spousal support, interest, and attorney fees, finding that John had not made payments since 1977, that Frances had not pursued the payments because of John's threatening behavior, and that John had not been prejudiced by Frances's delay in enforcing the obligation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) John's laches defense failed; (2) the court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the full amount of post-judgment interest to Frances; (3) the statutory presumption of satisfaction was overcome in this case; and (4) the court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Frances all of her attorney fees. View "Quirk v. Quirk" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court's order affirming the order of the family court refusing Petitioner's motion for a downward modification of his monthly child support obligation to Respondent for the benefit of their three children, holding that the circuit court erred in allowing the family court to refuse to modify the parenting plan and child support award on the basis of Respondent's higher income and the current custodial arrangement.Specifically, the Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the circuit court's order leaving unchanged the amount of income attributed to Petitioner in the parties' original child support order; but (2) reversed the portion of the circuit court's order failing to modify child support based upon the fact that two of the parties' children now reside with Petitioner and his family instead of Respondent and that Respondent's income had substantially increased since the entry of the child support order. The Court remanded this case for the family court to hold a hearing, make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding child support, and to enter a modified child support order in accordance with the provisions of this opinion. View "Hassan G. v. Tamra P." on Justia Law

Ashlie Brannan appealed a trial court’s determination that Ashton Peralta was a de facto parent of A.Z. pursuant to 15C V.S.A. 501. She argued the court erred both in denying her motion to dismiss and in evaluating the factors set forth in section 501(a). Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Peralta v. Brannan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held in this case, as in In re M.F., 312 Kan. __ (this day decided), that the same-sex romantic partner of a woman who conceives through artificial insemination and gives birth during the couple's relationship can be recognized as a legal parent under the Kansas Parentage Act (KPA) even if the couple has not entered into a coparenting agreement.M.S., the same-sex partner here, sought judicial recognition of her legal parentage relationship with the child. The district court judge denied parentage of M.S. A panel of the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that M.S. can be recognized as a legal parent through use of Kan. Stat. Ann. 23-2208(a)(4) if M.S. can demonstrate that she notoriously recognized her maternity and the rights and duties attendant to it at the time of the child's birth. View "In re W.L. " on Justia Law