Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to her minor child, holding that the trial court's conclusion that one statutory ground for termination existed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1) was sufficient in and of itself to support termination of Mother's parental rights.The trial court entered an order determining that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights on the grounds of neglect, dependency, and willful abandonment. The court further concluded that it was in the child's best interests that Mother's parental rights be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by adjudicating that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights. View "In re R.L.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to her minor child, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests.Based on findings of fact made by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, the trial court adjudicated several statutory grounds for termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1)-(2) and (7) and concluded that it was in the child's best interests for Mother's parental rights to be terminated. On appeal, Mother argued that the court erred at disposition by concluding that it was in the child's best interests that her rights be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother's parental right. View "In re A.M.O." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Rajwant Kaur's motion to set aside a 2004 divorce decree, holding that the district court erred because it did not consider the traditional judicial estoppel factors before considering Rajwant's defense of duress and coercion.In 2004, Rajwant and Jaswinder Singh filed a joint petition for divorce. The district court entered the divorce decree without holding a hearing. In 2019, Rajwant filed a motion to set aside the 2004 divorce decree, arguing that Jaswinder forced her to sign the divorce decree so it was obtained by fraud. The district court denied the motion, finding that, under Vaile v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 44 P.3d 506 (Nev. 2002), Rajwant was judicially estopped from challenging the decree. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erroneously applied Vaile, in concluding that judicial estoppel precluded Rajwant's motion and failed to consider whether the five-factor test favored application of judicial estoppel. View "Kaur v. Singh" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's judgment terminating Mother's parental rights on the basis of the statutory factor enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. 36-1-113(g)(14), holding that the statute is ambiguous and that In re Ayden S., No. M2017-01185-COA-R3- PT, 2018 WL 2447044, 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018), is overruled.Section 36-1-113(g)(14) requires a person seeking termination of parental rights to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a "parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child." In In re Ayden S., the court of appeals interpreted this language as requiring proof that a parent was both unable and unwilling personally to assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of a child. In In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COA- R3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280, 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018), the court of appeals construed the statute as requiring proof that a parent was either unable or unwilling to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of a child. The Supreme Court held that the In re Amynn K. interpretation best effectuated legislative intent and thus reversed. View "In re Neveah M." on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) petitioned the New Hampshire Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to prevent a circuit court from joining DCYF as a party to an ongoing guardianship case and from ordering the agency to provide services for the benefit of private litigants. This petition arose from a guardianship case involving an ongoing dispute between the father of a three-year-old child and the child’s guardians, who were the child’s maternal grandparents. The father alleged the child’s guardians were willfully interfering with his rights to unsupervised parenting time and notice of his child’s medical appointments as established by previous court orders. The circuit court credited the father’s allegations and expressed concern that the case “has not progressed” since the last hearing in September 2018. The trial court was ordered to provide services on a weekly basis to father, and joined DCYF as a party to the case. DCYF contended the circuit court lacked the authority to join the agency to the private case because no statute authorized the circuit court to do so. The Supreme Court agreed and, accordingly, granted DCYF’s petition for a writ of prohibition. View "Petition of New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families" on Justia Law

At issue in these two appeals is whether the juvenile court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services complied with their duties of inquiry and notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and related California law.The Court of Appeal agreed that the Department failed to adequately investigate mother's claim of Indian ancestry and the juvenile court failed to ensure an appropriate inquiry had been conducted before concluding, if it ever actually did, ICWA did not apply to these proceedings. Therefore, the court disagreed with the holding In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 888-889, that amendments enacted by Assembly Bill No. 3176 were intended to limit the Department's robust duty of inquiry. The court conditionally reversed the orders for legal guardianship and remanded the matters to allow the Department and the juvenile court to rectify their errors and to take all other necessary corrective actions. View "In re T.G." on Justia Law

Husband appealed the parties’ final divorce order relating to property division, arguing that the family division erred by: (1) barring him from conducting discovery of a non-party concerning a trust in which wife had an interest; and (2) awarding wife a lump sum as a retroactive temporary spousal award even though wife had neither requested nor been granted temporary spousal maintenance. The Vermont Supreme Court determined: (1) the Wife's interest in the trust was not vested or subject to modification or divestment as long as Wife's father was alive, so Husband was not entitled to discovery relating to the trust; and (2) the lump-sum payment as part of the property division was "well within" the trial court's discretion, and "any error by the court in characterizing the challenged $18,000 lump-sum award as a payment in lieu of a retroactive award of temporary maintenance is harmless." Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Noble v. Noble" on Justia Law

Christine Barton (Jorgensen) appealed a chancery court ruling, arguing it was an abuse of the court's discretion in failing to enter a final domestic-violence protection order and by failing to appoint a guardian ad litem. The pleadings revealed that Jorgensen not only failed to seek an extension of the temporary domestic-abuse protection order previously issued by a justice court judge but she also failed to request a final domestic-violence protection order. By statute, the justice court order expires thirty days after entry, as here, when the party seeking protection and the respondent have minor children in common. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded there was no abuse of discretion and affirmed. View "Barton a/k/a Jorgensen v. Barton" on Justia Law

In this opinion, the Court of Appeal addressed three consolidated appeals relating to a judgment for the return of a child in an international custody dispute. This case was retried after the Court reversed an earlier judgment marred by due process violations. After remand, the trial court again granted father’s petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the Convention) and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), for return of the child to her father’s custody in Denmark, her country of habitual residence. The court also awarded father his attorney fees and other expenses as the prevailing party under the Convention and ICARA. Mother filed separate appeals of the return order and the fees award and two post judgment sealing orders related to the parties’ use of the transcript of the trial judge’s confidential interview with the child during the trial. The Court of Appeal determined mother’s appeal of the return order was moot because the child was nearly 18 years old, and the Convention did not apply after the child who was the subject of the return petition turns 16. The Court reversed the fees award, because mother had no opportunity for a full and fair hearing on father’s motion for fees. As for mother’s appeal of the postjudgment sealing orders, the Court found no merit to the appeal and affirmed the orders. View "Noergaard v. Noergaard" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the opinion of the Appellate Division concluding that, in appropriate circumstances, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law (DRL) 111(1)(a) permits a court to approve an adoption even absent the consent of an adult adoptee and held that that discretion was not abused in this case.Petitioners commenced this proceeding seeking to adopt Marian, a sixty-six-year-old woman with a profound intellectual disability. Mental Hygiene Legal Services objected to the adoption on the ground that Marian's consent was required under DRL 111(1)(a) and that Marian lacked the capacity to consent. Surrogate's Court did not find that Marian possessed the capacity to consent but concluded that the guardian ad litem had the implied authority to consent on Marian's behalf. The court then approved the adoption petition. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that DRL 111(1)(a) authorizes a court, in the appropriate exercise of its discretion, to dispense with an adult adoptee's consent to the adoption. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division correctly concluded that the statute provided express statutory authority to dispense with Marian's consent and that the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that her inability to consent should not prevent this adoption. View "In re Marian T." on Justia Law