Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In this discretionary appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked to determine the burden of proof for a settlor of an irrevocable trust in order to void the trust on grounds of fraudulent inducement in the creation of the trust. The corpus of the Trust at issue here consisted of numerous assets totaling approximately $13 million, including two real estate property companies called Japen Holdings, LLC, and Japen Properties, LLP (collectively “Japen”). Although acquired during the marriage, Japen was owned 100% by Husband. Unbeknownst to Wife, among Japen’s assets were two residential properties in Florida. When presented with the Trust inventory of assets, Wife did not question its contents, which included Japen, but not a listing of its specific holdings, e.g., the Florida Properties. Approximately four months after the creation of the Trust, Wife discovered that Husband had been having an affair and that his paramour was living in one of the Florida Properties. Wife promptly filed for divorce. A month after that, she filed an emergency petition for special relief to prevent dissipation of the marital assets, including assets in the Trust. Wife argued that Husband’s motive in creating the Trust was to gain control over the marital assets and avoid equitable distribution. A family court judge accepted Wife’s argument by freezing certain accounts included in the Trust and directing Husband to collect rent from his paramour. The Supreme Court held that a settlor averring fraud in the inducement of an irrevocable trust had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of common-law fraud. In doing so, the Court rejected the analysis set forth in In re Estate of Glover, 669 A.2d 1011 (Pa. Super. 1996), because it represented an inaccurate statement of the elements required to establish fraud in the inducement. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling that the complaining settlor did not prove fraud in the inducement. View "In Re: Passarelli Family Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ohio Rev. Code 2151.352 is unconstitutionally underinclusive as applied to indigent parents facing the loss of their parental rights in probate court and that indigent parents are entitled to counsel in adoption proceedings in probate court as a matter of equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Ohio Const. art. I, 2.Petitioners filed petitions in the probate court to adopt Mother's two children. Mother filed a request for appointed counsel, which the probate court denied. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Mother's request for appointed counsel, concluding that equal protection and due process guarantees are inapplicable to requests for appointed counsel in adoption causes brought by private petitioners. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the disparate treatment between indigent parents faced with losing parental rights in a custody proceeding in juvenile court, who are entitled to appointed counsel, and indigent parents faced with losing parental rights in an adoption proceeding in probate court, who are not entitled to appointed counsel, violates equal protection guarantees. View "In re Adoption of Y.E.F." on Justia Law

Anna Navarrete is the 33-year-old adult child of Maria Navarrete (mother) and Rodolfo Navarrete, Sr. (father), who had cerebral palsy and a speech disorder which limit her ability to answer questions and express her needs and desires. Mother has been her primary caregiver. Mother and father split up during the dispute that lead to this appeal. Mother filed a petition asking to be appointed Navarrete’s probate conservator. Navarrete’s father and older brother objected to mother’s petition, and her brother filed a competing petition asking to be appointed instead. Mother and father also sought domestic violence restraining orders against each other. An accusation was lodged against the father, that he sexually assaulted and raped Navarrette. At trial, Navarrete’s therapist, mother, and younger brother, Adrian Navarrete (Adrian), said Navarrete told them her father sexually assaulted and raped her and she fears her father. Father testified and denied the accusations. The trial court interviewed Navarrete, but concluded she wasn’t a competent witness before eliciting any testimony from her about the assaults. In the end, though the court expressed uncertainty about what had happened, it found mother hadn’t proven the accusations of sexual assault by a preponderance of the evidence, but also found Navarrete had genuine fear of her father and didn’t want to see him. The trial court appointed mother as Navarrete’s probate conservator and denied the brother’s petition. Later, after further hearings, the trial court granted father visitation and ordered Navarrete to attend joint counseling sessions with her father. The court concluded, over the objection of Navarrete, her conservator, and her attorney, that such visits were in her best interest because it would allow reconciliation in the event the accusations of sexual assault weren’t true. The visitation order was the only part of the case challenged on appeal. The Court of Appeal held trial court didi not have the authority to order Navarrete to attend joint counseling sessions with her father, and therefore reversed the order. View "Conservatorship of Navarrete" on Justia Law

Based on a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b)(1) petition, A.G, then four years old, was placed into protective custody after his mother, S.B., twice drove a car in which A.G. was a passenger while she was under the influence. Mother's reunification services were terminated at the 12-month review hearing. At a selection and implementation hearing, S.G. requested a contested hearing on statutory exceptions to adoption and the termination of parental rights: the beneficial parental relationship and the sibling relationship. The court found her offer of proof insufficient, denied her request for a contested hearing, found the minor adoptable, and terminated S.G.'s parental rights.The court of appeal reversed the denial of a contested hearing. The offer of proof must address two components of the parental relationship exception: the parent’s regular contact with the child and the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship. It need not address whether the existence of that relationship constitutes a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child. S.G.'s offer of proof was adequate, addressing both her regular contact with A.G. and the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship. Because the termination of parental rights is at stake, the court, particularly where the parent’s regular contact with the child is not in dispute, should exercise caution before denying a contested hearing and should construe the parent’s offer of proof liberally. View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

A divorcing couple had a community property trust holding title to two rental properties: a fourplex and a mobile home park. The husband had owned these properties before marriage. The superior court divided the marital estate equally, awarding the rental properties to the husband and a large equalization payment to the wife. Both parties appealed. The husband argued the superior court erred when it found that a bank account in the names of the husband and the mobile home park was marital. The wife argued the court erred in its interpretation of the Alaska Community Property Act when it held that income and appreciation from the rental properties in the community property trust remained the husband’s separate property; she also argued the court clearly erred in some findings of fact and abused its discretion when it failed to invade the husband’s separate property in order to reach an equitable division. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err in its interpretation of the relevant statutes, did not clearly err in its findings of fact, and did not abuse its discretion when dividing the marital estate. View "Philips v. Bremner Philips" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the district court determining that termination of Father's parental rights was not in the child's best interests and dismissing Bethany Christian Services' petition to terminate parental rights, holding that a challenged portion of one of the trial court's findings of fact was erroneous.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court’s admission of the guardian ad litem’s report during the dispositional stage of the termination proceeding without allowing the child's guardian ad litem to be cross-examined about the report was not an abuse of discretion; and (2) the trial court’s written order contained a key finding of fact that lacked evidentiary support in the record and could be read as reflecting an inappropriate bias against adoption, and this inappropriate finding was prejudicial. View "In re R.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to her minor daughter, holding that Petitioners did not prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights and that the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(6) and (7) were not met in this case.The trial court ultimately appointed Petitioners as the child's legal permanent guardians pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-600. Petitioners filed a petition seeking to terminate Mother's parental rights in order to adopt the child. The district court terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(6) and (7). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the requirements of section 7B-1111(a)(6) were not met because the child resided with legal permanent guardians and that the record lacked any evidence supporting a conclusion that Mother acted willfully within the meaning of section 7B-1111(a)(7). View "In re A.L.L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to his two biological children, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the existence of the ground for termination of neglect.On appeal, Defendant argued that his guardian ad litem, appointed pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 17 and N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1101.1, did not participate sufficiently to satisfy the statutory requirements, and therefore, the trial court erred in advancing the adjudication and disposition proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Father did not identify any actions his guardian ad litem could have taken that would have improved Father's chances to obtain a decision in his favor and did not show that the guardian ad litem did not otherwise adequately assist him in executing his legal rights; and (2) the ground of neglect supported the termination of Father's parental rights. View "In re W.K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the orders of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights in her two children, holding that, given the very limited inquiry inquiry that the trial court undertook before allowing Mother's counsel's withdrawal motion, the trial court erred by allowing that motion.During the termination proceedings, Mother retained Roy Dawson to represent her. Dawson later filed motions seeking leave to withdraw as Mother's counsel in the proceedings. The trial court granted the request without further inquiry. After a termination of parental rights hearing, Mother's parental rights were terminated. Mother appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to make a proper inquiry before allowing Dawson's withdrawal motion. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the trial court erred by allowing Mother's counsel to withdraw his representation of Mother without (1) making an adequate inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the making of that motion; and (2) inquiring, at the time Mother appeared at the termination hearing, whether she was represented by counsel, whether she wished to apply for court-appointed counsel, or whether she wished to represent herself. View "In re K.M.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental rights, holding that the trial court did not err in determining that Mother's parental rights in the children were subject to termination on the basis of neglect pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1) and that termination of Mother's parental rights would be in the children's best interests.The trial court concluded that Mother's parental rights were subject to termination on the basis of neglect and that termination of Mother's parental rights would be in the children's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's ultimate findings that there was current ongoing neglect and a likelihood of repetition of neglect were supported by the record evidence; and (2) the trial court's evidentiary and ultimate findings had sufficient record support. View "In re J.J.H." on Justia Law