Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Petitioners' verified petition for adoption requesting that the court enter an order of adoption recognizing MB's medically established age and directing the issuance of a Wyoming birth certificate with an accurate date of birth, holding that the district court erred.Petitioners adopted a minor, MB, from the Henan Province, Zhengzhou, People's Republic of China. The United States Department of State issued a Hague Adoption Certificate certifying the adoption. Later, MB's pediatrician determined that MB's documented age was incorrect and that MB was actually two years younger than the age listed on the official paperwork. Petitioners then filed the petition at issue. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that approval of the adoption was moot because the Hague Convention adoption must be recognized as valid and final. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) had subject matter jurisdiction to approve The Hague Convention adoption; and (2) was statutorily authorized to issue a decree of adoption allowing MB to obtain a Wyoming birth certificate with an accurate date of birth. View "In re Adoption of MAJB" on Justia Law

A mother and father appealed the termination of their parental rights after proceedings at the Families with Infants and Toddlers Court (FIT Court). They argued their rights were violated when the FIT Court’s “rigid, non-fact driven,” 12-month timeline governed the progression of the Child in Need of Aid (CINA) cases of their two children. After review of the FIT Court record, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded it was error to adhere to a preset timeline rather than making an individualized assessment of whether the parents had a reasonable time to remedy based on the facts of their children’s cases, as required by statute. Furthermore, the Court concluded the parents did not knowingly and voluntarily waive that statutory requirement. View "Edna L. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services (Office of Children's Services)" on Justia Law

Two of L.K.’s three children were Indian children for the purposes of federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA). L.K. claimed the State Department of Children, Youth, and Families (Department) removed her children without making "active efforts" to keep the family together as was required under the two laws. The Court of Appeals did not address this issue but, instead, sua sponte found that under the invited error doctrine, L.K. was precluded from raising this issue on appeal, holding that because L.K. repeatedly contended she did not need services, she could not now claim on appeal that the Department did not provide her sufficient services under ICWA and WICWA. It did not reach the issue of whether the Department provided active efforts. The Washington Supreme Court reversed appellate court's holding regarding "invited error." With respect to "active efforts," the Supreme Court found the Department did not engage in the statutorily required active efforts to prevent the breakup of an Indian family. Accordingly, the dispositional order continuing L.R.C.K.-S. and D.B.C.K.-S.’s foster care placement was vacated. The matter was remanded for immediate return of these two children to their mother, unless the trial court finds returning the children put them in “substantial and immediate danger or threat of such danger.” The finding of dependency was unaffected. View "In re Dependency of A.L.K., L.R.C.K.-S., D.B.C.K.-S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Father's motion to dismiss a petition to adjudicate a newborn child neglected on the basis of "predictive neglect" when the parents relocated to another state before the child's birth, holding that the Connecticut trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.After the Commissioner of Children and Families filed a petition seeking to terminate Respondents' parental rights, Respondents drove to Florida and signed a one-year lease for an apartment. Two days after the child's birth, the Florida Department of Children and Families took custody of the child. The Connecticut trial court then filed a petition seeking to adjudicate the child neglected. The motion was denied on the ground that the child was not in Connecticut. Thereafter, the Florida department filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction to the Connecticut trial court, which the magistrate granted. Thereafter, Father filed a motion to dismiss the pending neglect petition on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Connecticut trial court denied Father's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a Connecticut trial court could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the neglect petition because any neglect of the child would never occur in Connecticut. View "In re Teagan K.-O." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order of the family court in this divorce action, holding that the family court miscalculated the combined monthly income for purposes of setting child support.On appeal, Appellant challenged the family court's classification and division of marital property, calculation of maintenance, and calculation of child support. The court of appeals affirmed the family court's decision in its entirety. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) the family court erred in classifying Appellee's restricted stock units and thus miscalculated the combined monthly income in setting child support; and (2) the family court did not abuse its discretion by not considering Appellee's income as an independent factor for increasing directed maintenance or computing Appellant's reasonable needs. View "Normandin v. Normandin" on Justia Law

At issue before the Idaho Supreme Court in this matter was what portion of a military retirement benefit was subject to division following divorce. Specifically, the Court was asked to decide whether a 2017 amendment to the federal statutory scheme governing military retirement applied to the division of a benefit entered as part of a divorce decree in 2008 but not calculated until the husband’s retirement in 2018. The Supreme Court determined a 2017 amendment to 10 U.S.C. 1408 did not apply retroactively to alter the division of the military benefit at issue here. Furthermore, the district court did not err in concluding that the magistrate court’s mischaracterization of the 2008 divorce decree was harmless error because it did not impact the outcome of litigation. View "Bromund v. Bromund" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing with prejudice a complaint for protection from abuse that Plaintiff brought on behalf of her three minor children against the children's father (Father), holding that due process did not require that the court dismiss this matter with prejudice.After Plaintiff filed her complaint for protection from abuse on behalf of her children, Father was arrested. Father's bail conditions prohibited contact between Father and the children. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the complaint without prejudice given that Father's bail conditions protected the children. The court denied Plaintiff's motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that it did not have the discretion to grant Plaintiff's motion. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court erred as a matter of law when it determined that due process and Me. Rev. Stat. 4006(1) required it to either hold the hearing as scheduled or dismiss the complaint with prejudice and that, pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), the court had the authority and discretion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice. View "Doe v. Hills-Pettitt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the divorce judgment entered by the district court, holding that district court did not err in its property distribution between the parties.On appeal, Dorothy Lovell argued (1) the district court erred when it determined that Paul Lovell was not judicially estopped from arguing that a retirement account was marital property, despite a contrary provision in a previous divorce judgment; (2) she received insufficient notice of the district court's intention to reevaluation the distribution of the entire marital estate; and (3) the district court committed obvious error when it determined that part of the retirement account was marital property. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the doctrine of judicial estoppel did not apply here; (2) Dorothy's due process argument was waived; and (3) the district court did not err in its property distribution. View "Lovell v. Lovell" on Justia Law

In this discretionary appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked to determine the burden of proof for a settlor of an irrevocable trust in order to void the trust on grounds of fraudulent inducement in the creation of the trust. The corpus of the Trust at issue here consisted of numerous assets totaling approximately $13 million, including two real estate property companies called Japen Holdings, LLC, and Japen Properties, LLP (collectively “Japen”). Although acquired during the marriage, Japen was owned 100% by Husband. Unbeknownst to Wife, among Japen’s assets were two residential properties in Florida. When presented with the Trust inventory of assets, Wife did not question its contents, which included Japen, but not a listing of its specific holdings, e.g., the Florida Properties. Approximately four months after the creation of the Trust, Wife discovered that Husband had been having an affair and that his paramour was living in one of the Florida Properties. Wife promptly filed for divorce. A month after that, she filed an emergency petition for special relief to prevent dissipation of the marital assets, including assets in the Trust. Wife argued that Husband’s motive in creating the Trust was to gain control over the marital assets and avoid equitable distribution. A family court judge accepted Wife’s argument by freezing certain accounts included in the Trust and directing Husband to collect rent from his paramour. The Supreme Court held that a settlor averring fraud in the inducement of an irrevocable trust had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of common-law fraud. In doing so, the Court rejected the analysis set forth in In re Estate of Glover, 669 A.2d 1011 (Pa. Super. 1996), because it represented an inaccurate statement of the elements required to establish fraud in the inducement. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling that the complaining settlor did not prove fraud in the inducement. View "In Re: Passarelli Family Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ohio Rev. Code 2151.352 is unconstitutionally underinclusive as applied to indigent parents facing the loss of their parental rights in probate court and that indigent parents are entitled to counsel in adoption proceedings in probate court as a matter of equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Ohio Const. art. I, 2.Petitioners filed petitions in the probate court to adopt Mother's two children. Mother filed a request for appointed counsel, which the probate court denied. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Mother's request for appointed counsel, concluding that equal protection and due process guarantees are inapplicable to requests for appointed counsel in adoption causes brought by private petitioners. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the disparate treatment between indigent parents faced with losing parental rights in a custody proceeding in juvenile court, who are entitled to appointed counsel, and indigent parents faced with losing parental rights in an adoption proceeding in probate court, who are not entitled to appointed counsel, violates equal protection guarantees. View "In re Adoption of Y.E.F." on Justia Law