Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Elderserve, Inc.'s petition for a writ of mandamus directing the family court to grant its motion to amend an annulment petition to include a petition for dissolution of the marriage of Charles Brooks and Taylor Toney, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to amend.On Brooks' behalf, Elderserve sought to amend the annulment petition to include a petition for a dissolution of the marriage of Brooks and Toney. In denying the motion to amend, the family court cited the prohibition in Johnson v. Johnson, 170 S.W.2d 889 (Ky. 1943), against guardians initiating an action for divorce on behalf of their wards. Elderserve then sought the writ of mandamus at issue. The court of appeals denied the writ, also relying on the holding in Johnson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's denial of the motion to amend the annulment petition was not in error because Johnson was good precedent at the time the court entertained Elderserve's petition; (2) changes to the Kentucky guardianship statutes since Johnson's rendering no longer justify its complete prohibition of guardian-initiated divorces. The opinion then described legal steps a guardian must follow before it can petition for a divorce of its ward. View "Brooks v. Honorable Tara Hagerty" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the family court's finding of neglect against M.C. regarding his three teenaged children and vacated the family court's orders, holding that the family court's finding that M.C. neglected his children was an abuse of discretion.The family court found that the three children in this case were neglected by M.C. under Ky. Rev. Stat. 600.020(1)(a)2, 3, 4, and 8. The court of appeals affirmed, holding, among other things, that there was sufficient evidence of risk of physical or emotional injury to support a finding of neglect in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there was no evidence that M.C.'s children were at a risk of physical or emotional injury; (2) there was no evidence that M.C.'s substance use disorder rendered him incapable of caring for his children or meeting their needs; and (3) no reasonable argument could be made that M.C. neglected his children under either section 600.020(1)(a)4 or 8. View "M.C. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's petition for grandparent visitation on grounds that Appellant lacked standing to seek formal visitation after the adoption of his grandchild had been finalized, holding that the stepparent exception set forth in Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1989), should be applied to grandparents under the facts appearing in this matter.Appellant was the paternal grandfather of Child. Child's maternal grandmother petitioned the family court to adopt Child with the consent of Mother, who also consented to the termination of her parental rights. Before the adoption was finalized, Father passed away. Thereafter, the family court granted the adoption petition. Appellant subsequently petitioned the family court for grandparent visitation pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 405.021, the grandparent visitation statute. The family court dismissed the petition, finding that Appellant lacked standing to seek visitation under section 405.021 because his grandparent rights terminated upon finalization of the adoption. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 405.021 does not contemplate the situation at hand; and (2) the public policy considerations of the stepparent exception articulated in Hicks extend equally to an intra-family grandparent adoption, such as the one in this case. View "Blackaby v. Barnes" on Justia Law

William Fletcher, Jr. challenged a Family Court denial of his petition to modify or terminate alimony payments to his ex-wife, Melissa Feutz. Fletcher argued the Family Court erred by ruling that: (1) Feutz was appropriately employed; (2) there was not a substantial change in circumstances that warranted the termination or modification of alimony; (3) Feutz was not cohabitating with her paramour; and (4) Feutz was entitled to the attorney’s fees awarded. After review, the Delaware Supreme Court held the Family Court did not err in finding that Feutz was properly employed and that she was not cohabitating with her paramour. The Court remanded the issue of whether there was a substantial change in circumstances. In addition, the Court found the Family Court erredin awarding Feutz attorney’s fees for the defense of Fletcher’s Motion to Modify or Terminate Alimony. View "Fletcher v. Feutz" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting the government's request to garnish Appellant's husband's 401(k) account and apply the proceeds to his nearly four million dollar criminal restitution obligations, holding that Appellant had no vested legal interest in her husband's account.Appellant's husband (Husband) pleaded guilty to eight counts of wire fraud, money laundering, and unlawful monetary transactions. The district court sentenced him to a term of incarceration and ordered him to pay $3,879,750 in restitution. The government later asked the district court for a writ of garnishment directed at Husband's 401(k) plan, which Husband held individually in his own name. The district court rejected Appellant's objections and issued a garnishment order. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Massachusetts law did not give Appellant a vested legal interest in Husband's 401(k) account; and (2) it was not plain error for the district court to issue the writ of garnishment without compensating Appellant for her contingent death benefit under the policy. View "United States v. Abell" on Justia Law

When an employee working a "one week on, one week off" schedule takes continuous leave, an employer may count both the on and off weeks against the employee's Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave entitlement. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Secretary in an action alleging that Alaska miscalculated the amount of FMLA leave that certain employees of the Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS) were entitled to take.The panel held that the term "workweek" in 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1) has the same meaning it carries under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The panel explained that it is a fixed, pre-established period of seven consecutive days in which the employer is operating. Under that reading of the term, when a rotational employee takes continuous leave, both his on and off weeks count as "workweeks of leave" under section 2612(a)(1). Thus, the panel concluded that Alaska may insist that rotational employees who take 12 workweeks of continuous leave return to work 12 weeks later. The panel also held that it need not defer to the Secretary's contrary interpretation of the statute under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). View "Scalia v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed an order of modification, holding that Appellant was not entitled to assign error to a consent judgment that reflected her negotiated agreement and that was entered at her request.In 2010, the parties' marriage was dissolved by the district court. Appellant was awarded sole legal and physical custody of the parties' two minor children, and Appellee was ordered to pay monthly child support. The decree was subsequently modified to approve a downward deviation in Appellee's child support. In 2016, the district court entered a stipulated order of modification approving the parties' agreement to increase the amount of Appellee's monthly child support obligation but continuing the existing downward deviation. In 2019, Appellant filed the current complaint to modify requesting that the downward deviation in child support be eliminated. The court entered an order of modification reflecting an agreement of the parties. Appellant appealed, arguing that the court erred in determining that Appellee was still entitled to a downward deviation in his child support obligation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the order of modification approved the parties' agreement on the disputed issues it was, in all respects, a consent judgment entered at the request of the parties, and therefore, Appellant could not complain of error on appeal. View "Mahlendorf v. Mahlendorf" on Justia Law

Ashley Bionte Johnson filed a petition for presumption of death and requested that the chancellor presume her father, Audray Johnson, dead. She claimed that her father, Audray, had been gone from his physical body for more than seven years and should be presumed dead. Audray suffers from mental illness and has been treated for dissociative identity disorder. In 2017, Audray changed his name from Audray Johnson to Akecheta Andre Morningstar. In February 2020, a hearing was held on Ashley’s petition. Morningstar was present at the hearing and testified regarding Audray’s death. According to Morningstar, Audray’s spirit expired more than seven years ago, and Morningstar occupied Audray’s physical body. Morningstar testified that he was “an ambassador . . . a hybrid . . . part angel, part human” who originated “from the heavens.” He explained that he was “dispatched” to earth “to save the world.” Although Morningstar admitted he occupied Audray’s physical body, he asserted he “shouldn’t have the responsibility of taking care of a dead man’s family.” The chancellor denied Ashley’s petition, and Ashley timely appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined Audray had not been absent from, and did not conceal himself in Mississippi for seven years, therefore the chancellor’s denial of the petition was affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Presumption of Death of Audray Johnson" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Mother's petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction for return of her son (Child) to Venezuela from the United States, holding that the district court properly exercised its discretion in refusing Mother's petition.Mother sought Child's return to Venezuela, alleging that Father abducted Child in contravention of The Hague Convention and a Venezuelan child custody order. The district court concluded that Father admitted to retaining Child in contravention of the Hague Convention but that Father had established that Child was a mature child such that the court should consider Child's stated desire to remain with Father in the United States. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not clearly err in rejecting Mother's claim that Father unduly influenced Child and in determining that Child was of the age and maturity to state his viewpoint that he should remain in the United States and not return to Venezuela. View "Avendano v. Balza" on Justia Law

The parties entered into a settlement agreement, in the form of a verbal stipulation, regarding the terms of their marital dissolution. The stipulation included an equal division of the community property portion of the wife's retirement plan without any mention of the plan’s survivor benefits. The parties could not agree as to whether the husband had survivor benefits under that retirement plan and asked the court to resolve their dispute. In the alternative, the wife asked the court to vacate the stipulation.The trial court ruled that the survivor benefits were an “omitted asset” (Fam. Code, 2556) subject to an equal division under section 2610(a)(2) and the wife was not entitled to an order vacating the stipulation. The court awarded the husband $800 in attorney fees and $180 in costs in the nature of section 271 sanctions. The court of appeal affirmed that the husband is to receive a survivor benefit related to his community property share of the retirement plan. The court reversed, in part; section 271 does not permit an award of fees to a self-represented party. The court denied the husband’s separate motion for sanctions for the filing of a frivolous appeal and to cause a delay. View "Marriage of Erndt & Terhorst" on Justia Law