Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating the parental rights of Mother to her daughter, holding that the trial court properly adjudicated the existence of grounds to terminate Mother's parental rights based on her neglect of the child.After a hearing, the trial court adjudicated the existence of two statutory grounds for terminating Mother's parental rights: Mother's neglect of the child and Mother's willful failure to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions leading to the child's removal from the home. The court then concluded that it was in the child's best interests to terminate Mother's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, although Mother identified some harmless inaccuracies in the trial court's adjudicatory findings of fact, the court's remaining findings of fact supported its conclusions of law that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights for her neglect of the child under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1). View "In re S.R.F." on Justia Law

Ian Baron appealed a Vermont magistrate decision declining to register and exercise jurisdiction over his petition to modify a Virginia child-support order. Baron argued that because the requirements of 15B V.S.A. sections 1602 and 1611 were met, the magistrate was required to register and exercise jurisdiction over his petition to modify. To this, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed, and remanded for further proceedings on whether the Virginia child-support order should have been modified. View "Baron v. McGinty" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal stemmed from a trial judge granting partial summary judgment, dismissing a claim of malicious prosecution. Richard and Victoria Wilbourn were in a longstanding domestic matter. Victoria accused Richard of misconduct towards their children, but the chancellor determined that the accusations were unfounded. Victoria went to the Ridgeland Police Department for help and filed an eight-page report against Richard, restating his alleged misconduct. The Ridgeland Police Department followed protocol, investigated, and referred the case to the district attorney’s office. The case was presented to a grand jury; the grand jury returned no bill. Notably, Richard was never charged, indicted, or arrested in connection with the investigation, and Victoria did not swear an affidavit against him. In the summer of 2016, Richard discovered the investigation and grand jury presentment and responded by filing suit, claiming malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In response, Victoria moved for summary judgment. And after a hearing, the trial judge granted partial summary judgment, dismissing Richard’s claim of malicious prosecution but retaining the others. Definitively, the trial judge found that “no criminal proceedings were instituted and therefore [Richard] cannot satisfy the first element of his claim.” With no arrest or indictment, or Richard otherwise being subjected to oppressive litigation of criminal charges for the report that Victoria gave to the Ridgeland Police Department, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in dismissing Richard's malicious-prosecution claim. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Wilbourn v. Wilbourn" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of individual employees of the Clark County DFS and the County in an action brought by plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, alleging that defendants wrongfully removed plaintiffs' infant daughter, M.M., from plaintiffs' home, wrongfully removed M.M. from her foster mother's home, and then placed her in a neglectful foster home that caused her death.The panel held that plaintiffs waived several appellate arguments where these arguments were either not raised before the district court, are inconsistent with positions employed there, or are presented without argument. The panel also held that each of plaintiffs' asserted factual disputes are either resolved by the record or are insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact on its claims. In this case, plaintiffs' third claim of failure to train has been waived whereas its fifth claim of state-law negligence was effectively dismissed. Furthermore, plaintiffs fail to present a genuine dispute that M.M. was wrongfully removed from their home or that defendants acted with deliberate indifference. Finally, the panel held that the district court properly decided the question of causation for the state negligence claim as a matter of law rather than a matter of fact, and that plaintiffs waived their wrongful death claim. View "Momox-Caselis v. Donohue" on Justia Law

In this termination of parental rights case, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court to admit drug reports, holding that the trial court properly found that the reports did not fit the records of a regularly conducted activity exception pursuant to Ind. R. Evid. 803(6).The Indiana Department of Child Services filed a petition to terminate Parents' parental rights to their four children. During the termination hearing and over Parents' objections, the trial court admitted drug test results for both parents. The court terminated the parents' parental rights. Parents appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting their drug test results. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the drug test results were properly admitted as records of a regularly conducted activity and that any error in their admission was harmless. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed, holding (1) the drug test records here fell under the records of a regularly conducted business activity; and (2) the trial court did not err in admitting the drug records. View "A.B. v. Indiana Department of Child Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the determination of the trial court finding Mother in contempt of court and ordering that Father have sole legal and physical custody of the parties' infant child, holding that the court abused its discretion by conflating Mother's contempt of court with the best interest of the child.Father filed a petition for rule to show cause alleging that Mother had violated a previous order by relocating the parties' child from Indiana. The trial court granted full relief to Father, finding Mother in contempt for relocating the child out of Indiana and for denying Father parenting time. The court then ordered that Father have sole legal and physical custody of the child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where Mother's alleged contempt appeared to be the catalyst for the trial court's order granting Father sole legal and physical custody, the trial court's order could not stand. View "Yanes-Mirabal v. Badasay" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the juvenile court relieving the State of Wyoming's Department of Family Services (DFS) from its statutory responsibility to make reasonable efforts to reunify Father with Child, holding that the juvenile court violated Father's due process rights by failing to give him reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard early in the child protection action.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) there were several due process violations in this case stemming from Father's lack of involvement in the juvenile court action, which colored the court's determination that it was appropriate to release DFS from its obligation to reunite the family, and under the circumstances, Father was materially prejudiced by the due process violations; and (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion when it ruled that the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that aggravating circumstances existed that would make reunification between Father and Child unlikely. View "RA v. State" on Justia Law

In April 2015, during marriage dissolution proceedings, plaintiff filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against defendant, her then-husband. The trial court granted a two-year DVRO. Defendant appealed. While that appeal remained pending, a little more than a month before the original DVRO was set to expire, plaintiff filed a request to renew the DVRO. After a hearing, the trial court granted plaintiff’s request, renewing the DVRO for five years. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the issuance of the original DVRO. Defendant, an attorney appearing in propria persona, appealed the grant of the renewed DVRO, asserting that: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to renew the DVRO while the appeal from the granting of the original DVRO remained pending; (2) the trial court erred in rendering its decision without reading the pleadings; (3) the trial court erred in excluding the witnesses and exhibits he offered; (4) the trial court erred in rendering its decision without considering the case law in the pleadings; (5) the trial court did not afford him sufficient time to present his defense; and, (6) in effect, substantial evidence did not support renewal of the DVRO. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the renewed DVRO. View "Marriage of Carlisle" on Justia Law

After a juvenile court places a child who has been declared a dependent with a relative and declares the relative to be a "de facto parent," when the social services agency later seeks to remove the child from the relative, Welfare and Institutions Code section 387 governs. Section 387 authorizes a juvenile court to "chang[e] or modif[y] a previous [placement] order by removing a child from the physical custody of a parent, guardian, relative, or friend and directing” a different placement.Although the juvenile court followed the incorrect procedures in this case, the Court of Appeal affirmed the removal orders because the error was not prejudicial. The court explained that the juvenile court's error in evaluating the Department's request under section 385 rather than section 387 was not prejudicial for two reasons. First, the Department's initial decision to follow all of the section 387 procedures up until its last-minute change of mind means that grandmother was effectively accorded all of the process she was due under section 387. Second, the juvenile court's modification order is supported by substantial evidence. View "In re Brianna S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order of the probate court ordering that a sixteen-year-old minor, who had been residing with his mother and his siblings in Mississippi for over a year, would start living with his grandparents in Maine one week after the order was issued, holding that the court did not have the authority to enter the order.The minor child's grandparents petitioned the probate court for full guardianship of the child. The grandparents also separately moved for appointment as guardians on an emergency basis. The court eventually issued a document entitled "Consent Order" providing that the petition for guardianship be continued. The mother filed an emergency motion to vacate the consent order and to dismiss the guardianship request, asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction over the case. The court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court did not have the authority to grant the requested relief and should have granted the mother's motion to dismiss. View "Guardianship by Joseph W." on Justia Law