Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Mary Orwig appealed and Steven Orwig cross-appealed a divorce judgment distributing the parties’ property and awarding Mary spousal support. Mary argued the district court erred in determining the value of certain property, distributing the parties’ assets, and failing to award her permanent spousal support. Steven argued the court erred by ordering him to pay Mary's attorney’s fees. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s property division and spousal support award, but reversed its attorney’s fees award. The matter was remanded for reconsideration of fees. View "Orwig v. Orwig" on Justia Law

Shannon Belgarde appealed an order denying her motion to vacate a divorce judgment, which was entered pursuant to a stipulation. Shannon Belgarde (formerly Paulson) and Kristofor Paulson married in 2013. They divorced on December 4, 2019 based on a stipulated settlement agreement signed by both parties and filed with the district court on November 12, 2019. Neither party was represented by counsel during the drafting or execution of the settlement agreement. Belgarde moved to vacate the divorce judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b), arguing the judgment should be vacated on the grounds of duress, newly discovered evidence, fraud, misrepresentation, misconduct, and because the divorce stipulation was so one-sided as to be unconscionable. Belgarde argued she relied on Paulson’s statements regarding future reconciliation when she signed the settlement agreement. She stated she did not realize these statements were false until she discovered evidence of an alleged affair. Belgarde also argued the divorce stipulation was so one-sided as to be unconscionable. Belgarde submitted affidavits and several exhibits in support of her motion. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Paulson v. Paulson" on Justia Law

Cory Davis appealed a district court order denying his motion for Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., relief from a judgment. In September of 2019 Tracy Davis served Cory with a summons and complaint for divorce. Cory did not prepare or serve a formal answer. On October 14, 2019, the district court issued an order for mediation. The parties attended mediation without final resolution of their case. After a mediation closing form was filed the court issued a scheduling order and notice of bench trial for January 23, 2020. On December 13, 2019, Tracy filed a motion for default judgment. That same day she served Cory with the motion by mail. On December 23, 2019, the district court issued an order granting default judgment, along with judgment by default. On January 8, 2020, Cory filed an answer and counterclaim, notice of motion for relief from judgment, and brief in support of motion for Rule 60 relief, arguing he did not receive the time required under N.D.R.Ct. 3.2 to respond to Tracy's motion for default. On appeal of the denial of relief, Cory argued the court erred in denying his motion because the judgment was entered prior to the expiration of his time to respond under N.D.R.Ct. 3.2(a). After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the default judgment and provide Cory an opportunity to respond consistent with N.D.R.Ct. 3.2(a)(2). View "Davis v. Davis, et al." on Justia Law

Kevin Willprecht appealed an amended judgment altering his child support and spousal support obligations. Kevin argued the district court erred in awarding spousal support without reconsidering the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, by failing to analyze Wendy Willprecht’s spousal need as reflected by her living expenses, and because the spousal support award exceeded Kevin's ability to pay. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the district court’s spousal support award for further proceedings: "Although the district court concluded a new income disparity arose because of step-down provisions being added to the child support obligation, it failed to adequately assess Kevin Willprecht’s ability to meet the new obligation for spousal support." View "Willprecht v. Willprecht" on Justia Law

Daniel Stoddard appealed a district court order and judgment amending the parenting plan between Stoddard and Christina Singer for their minor child, M.S.S. Stoddard presented twelve issues, contending the district court erred in its determination a change in primary residential responsibility was unwarranted. The North Dakota Supreme Court reduced Stoddard’s issues to the four arguments addressed in its opinion, and ultimately affirmed the district court’s order and judgment . Stoddard did not meet his burden of proof regarding: primary residential responsibility; not appointing a parenting investigator; and delaying the emergency hearing. The Court reversed the district court’s order preventing Stoddard from proceeding on a psychological parent claim related Singer's child from a previous relationship, J.B.G. View "Stoddard v. Singer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Petitioner's original action seeking a writ of mandamus against Jefferson Circuit Court Judge Tara Hagerty, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus.Petitioner sought the writ to compel Judge Hagerty to dismiss Petitioner's estranged wife's petition for dissolution of marriage, arguing that he and his estranged wife were already divorced under the laws of the Kingdom of Jordan when the petition for dissolution was filed. The court of appeals denied the writ petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to a writ under either the first class of writ or the second class of writ. View "Iqtaifan v. Hagerty" on Justia Law

Upon completion of an investigation of a report of child abuse, the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services (DHS) or its designated county children and youth agency (county agency) categorizes the investigated report as “indicated,” “founded,” or “unfounded.” When a report of child abuse was substantiated as either indicated or founded, or amended from indicated or founded, the named perpetrator is provided with notice of the status, including the effect of a substantiated report upon future employment opportunities involving children, and the individual’s name was added to the statewide child abuse database where it could remain indefinitely. On July 6, 2017, the county agency filed two identical indicated reports (CPS reports) identifying J.F. as a perpetrator of abuse of her fifteen-month-old twin children. While her administrative appeal of the CPS reports was pending, J.F. entered into an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) for both criminal counts of endangering the welfare of children. As a result of J.F.’s entry into ARD, the county agency changed the status of the CPS reports from “indicated” to “founded,” then filed a motion to dismiss J.F.’s administrative appeal, attaching the criminal court docket, and averring the factual circumstances of the ARD were the same as the CPS reports which authorized the county agency to change the reports’ status to founded. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to determine whether J.F., seeking to challenge the founded report, was entitled an administrative hearing. The Court held that in the absence of another appropriate forum to challenge DHS’s adjudication of child abuse in a recorded evidentiary hearing, a named perpetrator in a report designated as “founded” based upon the perpetrator’s voluntary entry into an accelerated rehabilitative disposition was entitled to an administrative hearing. View "J.F. v. Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

The petitioner in this appeal was attempting to enforce an oral agreement she entered into with her husband to exclude the couple’s retirement accounts and inheritances from being considered “marital property,” which was subject to equitable division in a dissolution proceeding. The district court found that an agreement existed, and that ruling wasn’t appealed. The issue this appeal presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether the agreement was valid despite being oral, and, alternatively, whether the parties’ partial performance could otherwise render the oral agreement valid. There were four statutory exceptions to the rule that property acquired during a marriage was generally considered "marital property." The only exception implicated here was property excluded from the marital estate by a "valid agreement" of the parties. Specifically, the issue was whether the parties' agreement to exclude their retirement accounts and inheritances from the marital estate had to be in writing and signed in order to be a "valid agreement." The Supreme Court held the parties' 2007 oral agreement was not a valid agreement because, at the time, Colorado statutory law required that all agreements between spouses be in writing and signed by both parties. Furthermore, the Court held the court of appeals correctly determined the parties’ conduct after entering into the oral agreement could not be treated as partial performance that satisfied the writing and signature requirements. Accordingly, the court of appeals’ judgment was affirmed and the case remanded with instructions to return the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "In re Marriage of Zander" on Justia Law

Following a divorce trial the superior court unevenly divided a marital estate. The smaller share recipient appealed several points related to findings about alleged marital waste, calculations concerning the parties’ future earning capacities, and consideration of federal disability benefits. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the court’s marital waste ruling, but remanded for further proceedings addressing its calculation of the parties’ earning capacities and its consideration of federal disability benefits. View "Jordan v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Mother's motion to set aside entry of default and vacate default hearing and modifying the parties' decree of divorce to award Father primary custody of the children, holding that the district court did not err.Father petitioned for an order modifying custody and support following Mother's relocation with the parties' minor children. Mother failed to respond, and the clerk of court entered default. Three days later, Mother moved to set aside the entry of default and to vacate the hearing. The court denied the motion and found that Father had met his burden of proving a material change in circumstances that warranted a modification in custody and support. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it (1) denied Mother's motion to set aside entry of default and vacate default hearing; (2) precluded Mother from presenting affirmative evidence during the default hearing; and (3) modified custody. View "Rush v. Golkowski" on Justia Law