Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the juvenile court terminating Mother's parental rights to her two children, holding that the juvenile court appropriately handled this case in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be returned to Mother and that termination was appropriate under Iowa Code 232.116(1)(f) and (h). The court of appeals affirmed, but a dissenting judge argued that the pandemic had thwarted Mother's efforts to demonstrate that her children could safely be returned to her. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the best interests of the children supported termination of Mother's parental rights; and (2) COVID-19 did not adversely affect Mother's ability to reunify. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's denial of Mother's motion for reinstatement of guardianship rights to a parent under Conn. Gen. Stat. 45a-611, holding that the trial court improperly denied Mother's motion for reinstatement of guardianship with respect to her minor son.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) under section 45a-611, once a parent demonstrates that the factors that resulted in the removal of the parent as guardian have been satisfactorily resolved, the parent is entitled to a presumption that reinstatement of his or her guardianship rights is in the best interests of the child; and (2) the party opposing reinstatement must rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) because it was unclear whether the trial court applied this presumption and because the court did not determine whether Mother had rebutted the presumption by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court erred in denying Mother's motion for reinstatement of guardianship. View "In re Zakai F." on Justia Law

Father and Mother lived together for a few years and are the parents of Minor, who was born in 2014. By 2018, Mother was raising her children—Minor and Minor’s three older half-siblings—on her own, and she did not know Father’s whereabouts. The Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of the children, listing Father’s name but stating his address was unknown. On November 12, 2019, the Agency filed a status review report for the six-month review hearing; 13 months after the original petition was filed, the Agency first listed an address for Father as the California State Prison. Father subsequently was deemed Minor’s presumed father and was released from custody. The juvenile court summarily denied his motion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to set aside prior findings, without a hearing.The court of appeal set aside the juvenile court’s order setting a hearing under section 366.26 to consider termination of parental rights, guardianship, or another permanent plan. Father sufficiently raised the possibility that the Agency failed to use due diligence to locate him and sufficiently stated a notice violation to warrant an evidentiary hearing. View "In re R.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the family court's order granting the Department of Human Services (DHS) foster custody and the subsequent order terminating Mother's parental rights, holding that the ICA erred when it failed to vacate the family court's order.On appeal, Mother argued that the family court erred in failing to appoint counsel for her prior to granting foster custody. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) Mother should have been appointed counsel at the time DHS filed its petition for family supervision; and (2) the failure to appoint Mother counsel at the time DHS filed its petition for foster custody was structural error that cannot be deemed harmless. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re L.I." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the termination of Mother's parental rights to her child, holding that the district court did not err in terminating Mother's parental rights under state and federal law.In terminating Mother's parental rights to her child the district court made the additional findings and used the heightened evidentiary standards required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) in failing to make specific findings under the Americans with Disabilities Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act when terminating Mother's parental rights; (2) when it terminated Mother's parental rights under Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-609 and 25 U.S.C. 1912; and (3) in terminating Mother's rights under federal and state law. View "Matter of K.L.N." on Justia Law

When Indiana officials determine that a child is suffering abuse or neglect, they initiate the Child in Need of Services (CHIN) process. Lawyers are automatically appointed for parents but not for children in the CHINS process. The plaintiffs, children in the CHINS process, claimed that they are entitled to counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, citing “Younger” abstention. While declining to decide that Younger would mandate abstention in all CHINS cases, the court reasoned that principles of comity entitle states to make their own decisions. Because children are not automatically entitled to lawyers, as opposed to the sort of adult assistance that Indiana routinely provides, it would be inappropriate for a federal court to resolve the appointment-of-counsel question in any of the 10 plaintiffs’ state proceedings. A state judge may decide to appoint counsel or may explain why counsel is unnecessary. View "Nicole K. v. Stigdon" on Justia Law

D.G.E.C. was born on June 1, 2016. Her biological parents were Rachel Coulter and Cody Jones. Coulter and Jones never married. On the evening of August 6, 2016, Jones took the nine-week-old baby to a room in their two-bedroom trailer to change her diaper. He noticed that her leg appeared limp. He told Coulter “her leg flopped over like it had no life in it” and expressed concern that it was broken. Eventually, Coulter and Jones took the baby to an emergency room. Coulter suggested that the baby might be suffering due to a reaction to her first round of vaccinations received three days earlier. X-rays of the leg revealed that it was fractured. The baby was transferred to University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC) for further evaluation and treatment. Upon admission to UMMC, medical professionals identified bruising to the baby’s forehead and cheek, acute posterior rib fractures on both sides of her chest, lateral rib fractures, an intertrochanteric femur fracture or hip fracture, corner fractures above and below both knees, and left ankle fractures. Given the baby’s medical condition upon admission, a UMMC social worker contacted the Jefferson Davis County Department of Human Services (DHS) to report the injuries. Coulter appealed a chancery court judgment terminating her parental rights. She challenged the chancellor’s finding of fact that she was the custodial parent of her daughter when her daughter was abused, and its conclusion of law that responsibility for abuse can be imputed to custodial parents. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s findings of fact, finding the judgment was supported by "ample evidence as is legally sound." View "Coulter v. Dunn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in all respects the district court's findings, conclusions, and decree of divorce in the proceedings between Father and Mother, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Mother physical custody of the parties' two children and in determining the child support award.After trial, the court entered its findings, conclusions, and decree of divorce. The decree awarded Mother physical custody, granting Father standard visitation rights, and ordered to pay Father child support. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Mother physical custody; and (2) the district court properly exercised its discretion in weighing the Wyo. Code Ann. 20-2-307(b) factors and in determining Father's child support obligation accordingly. View "Bruce v. Bruce" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed a divorce decree that awarded Rhonda Marlene Cherry permanent alimony and a subsequent order that found William Cherry in contempt for failing to pay the full amount of alimony ordered, holding that the circuit court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court (1) did not abuse its discretion by not reducing or eliminating the amount of alimony that Rhonda was to receive; (2) did not clearly err in holding William in contempt; (3) did not clearly err in finding that annuities from a personal injury settlement were not divisible as marital property; and (4) did not err in failing to order William to purchase a life insurance policy. View "Cherry v. Cherry" on Justia Law

After a domestic violence incident between mother and father that was witnessed by the children, DCFS started dependency proceedings on behalf of both children. The juvenile court found jurisdiction over the children under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and ordered I.R. removed from father and released to mother.The Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence does not support either of the findings necessary to justify removal under section 361, subdivision (c)(1). In this case, the record does not contain substantial evidence that I.R. would be in "substantial danger" in father's care, nor does it contain substantial evidence that there were no "reasonable means" to protect I.R. other than removing her from father. Given the lack of any connection between drug use and the domestic violence underlying the petition, the court concluded that the juvenile court was acting within its discretion in denying I.R.'s request that mother submit to more extensive drug testing. Accordingly, the court reversed the dispositional order against father and remanded. View "In re I.R." on Justia Law