Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff's mother married a U.S. citizen in 1999 and divorced him in 2004 because of his violent behavior. Plaintiff had run away the year before, when she was 15, to escape the abuse. At issue is whether, after the divorce, plaintiff remained a "child" of her mother's ex-husband. Plaintiff's mother died shortly after the divorce and could not file a petition under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) on plaintiff's behalf. Plaintiff had to petition on her own behalf, and the agency rejected her application because a self-petition may be filed only by someone who "is the child" of an abusive U.S. citizen. Because, in the agency's view, plaintiff lost stepchild status in 2004, and only a person who "is" a child of an abusive parent may seek relief, the agency denied her application. However, the agency and the district court, relying on Matter of Mowrer, 17 I&N Dec. 613, 615 (1981), both concluded that even after divorce, a person remains a stepchild as long as "a family relationship has continued to exist as a matter of fact between the stepparent and stepchild."The Seventh Circuit held that, in the context of VAWA, "stepchild" status survives divorce. The court explained that someone who is a stepchild during a marriage remains one after divorce, when termination of "stepchild" status would defeat application of the substantive rule that abused stepchildren are entitled to an immigration benefit. The court clarified that Mowrer does not interpret VAWA. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Arguijo v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Aaron W.'s requested writ of prohibition seeking to prevent Robert M. Montgomery, Judge of the Family Court of Kanawha County, from holding a hearing or otherwise deciding Evelyn W.'s motion to disqualify Aaron's counsel, holding that the family courts of this State have the authority to disqualify attorneys appearing before them.In this case that originated as a divorce proceeding, Evelyn filed a motion to disqualify Aaron's attorney from representing him in the divorce proceedings. Aaron filed a petition for writ prohibition in the circuit court seeking to prevent the family court from hearing or ruling on the motion, claiming that family courts lack jurisdictional authority to decide matters pertaining to the disqualification of attorneys. The circuit court denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the family court had the jurisdictional authority to hear and rule upon Evelyn's disqualification motion. View "Aaron W. v. Honorable Robert M. Montgomery" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court that denied Petitioner's appeal of an order of the family court modifying an infant guardianship order to prohibit Petitioner from having any contact with his child, J.B., holding that Petitioner's due process rights were violated.On appeal, Petitioner argued that the family court erred by failing to give him adequate notice or the opportunity to be heard at the final hearing in this matter. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the circuit court's final order, holding that Petitioner was not afforded his due process rights as the father of J.B. when he was not afforded the opportunity to refute the family court's assumption that he was unfit to have contact with his child. The Court remanded this case for a full evidentiary hearing before the family court. View "David C. v. Tammy S." on Justia Law

In this custody dispute, the Supreme Court vacated a settlement agreement reached by the parties during trial, holding that the family court's actions in reaching the settlement were improper, and thus the family court plainly erred.Father sought joint legal and physical custody of the parties' minor child, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. The parties settled during trial. On appeal, Father argued that the family court acted improperly in facilitating the settlement. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because the court spoke to Father alone without obtaining consent from counsel on the record, initiated settlement discussions, and strongly recommended specific terms on a hotly-contested issue after trial had commenced, the family court committed plain error. View "WW v. DS" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to her daughter, Nancy, holding that the trial court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction concerning Nancy under the plain language of the Juvenile Code.On appeal, Mother argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because neither Mother, Nancy, nor Father were residents of North Carolina and because any temporary emergency jurisdiction the trial court may have obtained had expired prior to the time the termination of parental rights petition was filed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court had exclusive, original jurisdiction over this case pursuant to the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1101. View "In re N.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated in part the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights in his minor child, holding that the trial court erred by determining that Father's parental rights in his child were subject to termination.The trial court terminated Father's parental rights in his child, finding that grounds for termination existed under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1) and (7). Father appealed, challenging the trial court's determination that grounds for terminating his parental rights existed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order in part and vacated it in part, holding (1) the trial court's determination that Father's parental rights were subject to termination on the basis of abandonment and neglect by abandonment lacked sufficient support; and (2) the trial court's determination that Father's parental rights were subject to termination on the basis of prior neglect and the likelihood of a repetition of neglect was based on a misapplication of the applicable law. View "In re Z.J.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to her child, holding that the trial court properly found that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(2).After a hearing, the trial court entered an order terminating Mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (3), (6), and (7), determining that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights based on neglect, willful failure to make reasonable progress, willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of her child's cost of care, dependency, and willful abandonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the findings supported the trial court's conclusion that Mother failed to make reasonable progress under the circumstances to correct the conditions that led to the child's removal. View "In re Q.P.W." on Justia Law

In this appeal of a no-answer default judgment in a divorce case the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial court erred in denying Husband's motion for new trial because the content of Husband's affidavit was sufficient to satisfy the standard set forth under Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939).After Husband defaulted, he filed a motion for new trial, arguing that equitable grounds existed under the Craddock standard and that legal grounds existed regarding improper service or notice of suit. The trial court sustained a hearsay objection to Husband's affidavit and other documents filed with his motion and then denied the new trial. The appellant court affirmed, concluding that formal defects rendered the affidavit inadmissible as sworn testimony, and therefore, Husband possessed insufficient proof of the required elements of Craddock. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Husband's affidavit was sufficient to satisfy the Craddock standard for obtaining a new trial; (2) the affidavit was not based on hearsay; and (3) because no formal defects were raised in the trial court, the appellate court erred in affirming based on a formal defect that was not preserved for review. View "In re Marriage of Sandoval" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court finding that the divorce decree in this case required Father to pay for his daughter's college education and automobile, holding that there was no merit to Father's arguments on appeal.In this contempt proceeding, the district court concluded that the decree clearly required Father to pay the automobile expenses and ordered him to provide Mother with documentation of the college savings account for his daughter. On appeal, Father argued that the district court order was punitive and thus wrong entered in a civil contempt proceeding, and that the district court should have found that he was not obligated to pay for the college and car expenses because his daughter had repudiated her relationship with him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in rejecting Father's arguments and requiring that he pay his daughter's college and automobile expenses. View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the juvenile court terminating Father's parental rights to his two-year-old daughter, holding that the phrase "the proceeding" in Iowa Code 232.114(3) includes the appeal from the order terminating parental rights.In a 2013 amendment to section 232.114(3), the statue applicable to terminations, the legislature provided that when the county attorney and the State disagree, the county attorney may continue to appear "in the proceeding" and present his or her position regarding the appropriate action to be taken. The Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS), the attorney general, and Father all favored restoring Father's parental rights and placing the child in his custody under supervision. The Polk County Attorney and the child's foster parents and guardian ad litem all favored termination. At issue was whether the county attorney may be heard in this appeal. The Supreme Court held (1) the county attorney was authorized to participate in this appeal; and (2) the grounds for termination were not proven by clear and convincing evidence in this case. View "In re C.Z." on Justia Law