Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Juvenile S.R. appealed a family division order granting the Department for Children and Families' (DCF) request to place him in a secure out-of-state psychiatric residential treatment facility pursuant to 33 V.S.A. 5926. In November 2019, mother stipulated that S.R. was CHINS. The stipulated merits order indicated that S.R. and mother were homeless, mother needed to undergo a medical procedure that would preclude her from caring for S.R., and S.R. had mental health and behavioral needs that needed continued treatment. The stipulated order included a statement that S.R. did not meet criteria for voluntary or involuntary mental health admission. Mother stipulated that she was unable to meet S.R.’s needs for stability, housing, and mental and behavioral health services. The COVID-19 pandemic struck, delaying court hearings. Over the following months, S.R. moved through a series of ten to twelve placements. The constant changes in placement prevented S.R. from establishing any therapeutic connections with service providers and also inhibited S.R.’s educational progress. S.R. was charged with delinquency several times after he reportedly became abusive during three of his placements. DCF, Mother and S.R.'s guardian ad litem eventually agreed on a placement in Harbor Point, Virginia. S.R. himself objected to placement at Harbor Point, and to any other placement out-of-state, unless a program could be found in New York, where his mother was living at the time of the hearing. The court ultimately granted DCF’s motion for out-of-state placement, finding that there were no equivalent facilities in Vermont, and that placement at Harbor Point was in S.R.’s best interest. On appeal, S.R. argued the court erred in granting the motion for out-of-state placement in the absence of any psychiatric or psychological evaluation supporting a conclusion that psychiatric residential treatment was necessary for him. He contended his placement was akin to the involuntary commitment of an adult, and that involuntary commitment decisions had to be supported by full psychiatric evaluations and expert testimony. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the order was not supported by sufficient evidence, and reversed. "While we have no doubt that everyone involved in the proceeding below was concerned with S.R.’s best interest and acted in good faith, and it may be that DCF’s position is ultimately adequately supported, the record simply does not contain the sort of expert evidence required to support long-term placement in a locked psychiatric residential treatment facility over S.R.’s objection." View "In re S.R., Juvenile" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the county court determining that it lacked authority to permit adoption by a same-sex married couple, holding that the plain language of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-101 permits a same-sex married couple to adopt a minor child.Kelly and Maria filed a petition to adopt Yasmin. The county court denied the request, determining that it did not have the authority to permit adoption by a "wife and wife." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the county court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to permit a same-sex married couple to adopt a child. View "In re Adoption of Yasmin S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court ordering Mother to allow grandparent visitation and finding Mother in contempt when she refused, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.Grandmother petitioned the district court requesting visitation with Child. The district court granted the request for grandparent visitation. The court later found Mother to be in contempt of court and ordered her to allow visitation between Grandparent and Child. Mother filed a motion to vacate and strike the visitation order, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court overruled the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) because the biological father was an indispensable party to the action but was not included in the proceedings the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order granting grandparent visitation; and (2) because the order granting grandparent visitation was void, the order finding Mother in contempt of the order was also void. View "Davis v. Moats" on Justia Law

In the pendency of divorce proceedings, Appellee and her husband entered into agreement governing the shared custody of their five-year-old child. Appellee repeatedly and intentionally violated this custody agreement, eventually absconding with the child ultimately to Florida, where the child remained for forty-seven days separated from her father. Appellee claimed the father was abusive, her attempts to secure assistance from the local children and youth agency had been rebuffed, and she had no option but to remove the child from the father’s care. Appellee was apprehended and charged with interference with custody of children. At trial, the Commonwealth presented testimony from the father, a clinical psychologist, a social worker, and a detective to the effect that Appellee’s allegations were false and/or unfounded. Appellee said she had been advised by a nanny the child had disclosed an incident of offensive touching by the father, and that subsequently the child repeatedly made statements to Appellee personally which were indicative of abuse. Appellee also presented the nanny’s corroborative testimony, and her cousin attested the child had apprised her of inappropriate touching too. The Pennsylvania Legislature prescribed that a defendant was innocent of the crime of “interference with custody of children” when he or she believed that intrusive actions were necessary to spare the subject child from danger. Appellee was convicted as charged and sentenced; in post-conviction proceedings, the Superior Court reversed sentence and ordered a new trial. The Commonwealth contended that the belief element of the offense should have been construed to encompass only beliefs that were held reasonably. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found Commonwealth’s arguments "are too tenuous to be credited." The Superior Court judgment was affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. H.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and vacated the judgment of the family court terminating Father's parental rights to S.A.A., his now sixteen-year-old son, holding that the court's findings were not supported by substantial evidence.Much of the case against Father was based upon his failure successfully to complete an Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC) home study. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment terminating Father's parental rights, holding (1) an ICPC home study shall not be required for a noncustodial parent who is not the subject of allegations or findings of child abuse or neglect pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 615.030; and (2) the trial court erred in terminating Father's parental rights. View "A.G. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order and judgment of the trial court terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father to their two boys, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) substantial evidence of abuse and neglect proved that termination was in the children's best interests; (2) the State's Cabinet for Health and Family Services proved it made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; and (3) admission and consideration of abuse of other children within the extended family did not unfairly prejudice Mother and Father. View "R.M. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Services" on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether, under the Pennsylvania Adoption Act, an attorney could act as both guardian ad litem and legal counsel for a minor child, in the context of a petition for termination of parental rights, where counsel did not expressly inquire into the child’s preferred outcome of the termination proceedings. In these unique circumstances, the Court found the attorney was able to fulfill her professional duties and act in both roles. Thus, the Court affirmed the Superior Court order, which affirmed the termination of parental rights in this case. View "In Re: P.G.F." on Justia Law

Dakota Bee appealed a criminal judgment entered on a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right to appeal a district court order denying her motion to suppress evidence. Burleigh County Social Services (BCSS) contacted the Bismarck Police Department requesting assistance in removing a child from Bee’s care. Officers accompanied BCSS social workers to Bee’s residence and informed her that they were there to remove her child. Bee refused, backing up into the home, picking up the child, and then running towards the rear of the home. Officers pursued Bee through the home and out the back door. Fleeing out the back, Bee fell while holding the child, and officers separated her from the child. After Bee had been detained outside the residence, a social worker entered the residence to obtain personal belongings for the child, and an officer followed. Once the officer was inside, the social worker pointed out a glass smoking pipe. Bee was subsequently charged with Child Neglect; Possession of Methamphetamine; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia; and Refusal to Halt. The district court found that the officers entered “the residence with BCSS to retrieve personal belongings for the child” after Bee had been detained and the child was in BCSS’s custody. The court further found that the officers observed the glass smoking device on a shelf in plain view. The court concluded the officers’ actions did not violate Bee’s Fourth Amendment rights. On appeal, Bee argued the court erred in concluding that her Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when the officers entered her home. The North Dakota Supreme Court found that during the first entry to the residence, the officers observed nothing that Bee sought to suppress. The second entry of the residence was justified only by a need to collect clothing and other personal items needed by the child. Because the search was concededly warrantless and no exception applies, the Court concluded Bee was entitled to claim the protection of the exclusionary rule. The district court erred by denying Bee’s motion to suppress the results of the warrantless search. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to allow Bee to withdraw her guilty plea. View "North Dakota v. Bee" on Justia Law

Ben Gerving appealed an amended divorce judgment and parenting plan. He argued the district court’s distribution of marital assets and debts was clearly erroneous. Janet Gerving argued the appeal was frivolous and she was entitled to costs and attorney’s fees. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the amended divorce judgment and parenting plan, and determined Ben Gerving's arguments on appeal were "not so groundless or devoid of merit that they were frivolous." Janet's request for fees was thus denied. View "Gerving v. Gerving" on Justia Law

Father, petitioner Michael Greenberg, appealed a circuit court order that modified his child support obligation pertaining to shares of vested restricted stock, and ordered him to pay child support arrearages of nearly $91,000 to mother, respondent Anne Greenberg. The shares of vested restricted stock were listed as “taxable benefits” on Father's paystub. Father testified that the restricted stock awards were “part of [his] total compensation,” and that the Internal Revenue Service treated his vested restricted stock as income. Since the parties’ December 2015 divorce, Father has netted $324,856.63 from the sale of vested restricted stock. Pertinent here, the parties’ final divorce decree awarded Father “any stock options he may have an interest in with [his current employer] free of any interest on the part of [Mother].” The uniform support order issued with the decree required Father to pay Mother “28% of any bonus he may receive within 3 days of receipt” as child support in addition to regular monthly child support. Neither the decree nor the uniform support order expressly referred to Father’s restricted stock awards. Father did not include the initial 5,000 shares of restricted stock he received on his financial affidavit submitted during the parties’ divorce proceedings; none of those shares had vested as of the time of the decree. Nor did he voluntarily disclose to Mother when he sold restricted stock. He also did not pay any portion of those proceeds as child support. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held Father's exercised stock options “must be included as income for the purposes of calculating child support” because “such options are analogous to a ‘bonus’” and “are also included within the phrase ‘all income from any source.’” To the extent that Father argued the trial court’s child support order impermissibly modified the parties’ divorce decree, the Supreme Court disagreed. "Even if we were to agree with him that the restricted stock awards were distributed to him in the divorce as property, doing so would not preclude the trial court from treating vested restricted stock as income for child support purposes." View "In the Matter of Michael & Anne Greenberg" on Justia Law