Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court terminating the parental rights of Father to his child and denying the State's petition to terminate Mother's parental rights and instead entering a permanency order appointing Grandmother of one of the boys as the guardian for both, holding that the juvenile court should have terminated Mother's parental rights.Father appealed the termination of his rights, but his notice of appeal was untimely filed. Mother appealed the permanency order, asking the Court to direct the State to continue reunification efforts. The State also appealed, challenging the juvenile court's disposition as to Mother. The Supreme Court reversed as to Mother and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) as to Mother, guardianship was not a proper permanency plan, and the juvenile court erred in denying termination; and (2) because Father's late filing of an appeal was beyond his control, this Court addresses his appeal, and the juvenile court did not err in terminating Father's parental rights. View "In re W.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the termination of parental rights as to Mother but not as to Father, holding that the juvenile court erred in finding each required element for a termination of Mother's custody under Iowa Code Ann. 232.116(1)(f) and (h).At issue was the termination of the parental rights of Mother to her three children and the termination of the parental rights of Father of one of the children. Both parties appealed, but Father filed his petition two days late. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) this Court recognizes delayed appeals in termination of parental rights cases under certain limited circumstances; (2) the State did not meet its burden of proving that the children could not be returned to Mother's custody at the time of the adjudication; and (3) the juvenile court properly terminated Father's parental rights as to his child. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings and disposition orders declaring mother's 16-year-old daughter J.S. and her 12-year-old son M.S. dependents of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and removing J.S. and M.S. from her custody under section 361, subdivision (c). Mother also contends the juvenile court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) did not comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act and related California law.In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that the Department conducted an appropriate further inquiry, as required by section 224.2, subdivision (e), and California Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4), into the children's possible status as Indian children, including with respect to the paternal relatives' ancestry.com results showing "Native American" ethnic origin. In this case, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's findings that there was no reason to know that the children were Indian children and that the ICWA did not apply. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

In this writ proceeding, the Supreme Court concluded that EDCR 5.518 required the district court, on remand from an earlier appeal and upon the request of Lynita Nelson, to reinstate a joint preliminary injunction (JPI) over the parties' respective spendthrift trusts.During their marriage, Lynita and Eric Nelson created two irrevocable self-settled spendthrift trusts. When the parties divorced, the district court issued a JPI. On remand, the Supreme Court vacated portions of the divorce decree regarding awards against the trusts. On remand, Lynita filed a motion under ECCR 5.518 to reinstate the JPI. The district court granted the motion in part and imposed a JPI over two trust properties. Lynita petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to impose a JPI under EDCR 5.518 over all property subject to a clam of community property interest. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that trust may be parties to a divorce action and that EDCR is mandatory, does not require the requesting party to make a prima facie showing of community interest, and applies on remand. View "Nelson v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, respondent Robert Blaisdell challenged a circuit court decision granting a motion to dismiss his cross-petition for divorce on fault grounds of adultery alleging sexual intercourse between petitioner Molly Blaisdell, and another woman based upon In the Matter of Blanchflower & Blanchflower, 150 N.H. 226 (2003), which limited the definition of adultery under RSA 458:7, II (2018) to sexual intercourse between persons of the opposite sex. The New Hampshire Supreme Court overruled Blanchflower and reinterpreted the term “adultery,” as it was used in RSA 458:7, II, to include sexual intercourse between a married person and someone other than that person’s spouse, regardless of either person’s sex or gender. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Blaisdell" on Justia Law

Massimo Medioli petitioned an Idaho magistrate court to change his minor child’s name. The child’s mother, Dena Hayes, objected. The magistrate court granted Medioli’s petition finding the name change to be “right and proper,” as provided by Idaho Code section 7-804. Hayes appealed to the district court, and the district court affirmed. The district court awarded Medioli attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121. Hayes appealed, arguing in part that trial courts were required to apply the best-interest-of-the-child standard in disputed name change cases involving minor children. The Idaho Supreme Court found no reversible error in the district court’s decision on the merits, but reversed the award of attorney fees. View "Hayes v. Medioli" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court reversing the family court's determination that Mother's child support obligation was $0, holding that the circuit court did not err.At the time of the parties' divorce Mother received custody of the two children, and Father was ordered to pay child support. The family court subsequently modified the custodial arrangement and granted primary custody of the children to Father. The family court determined that Mother's child support obligation was $0. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the family court erred in giving Mother credit for social security benefits received by the children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly applied W. Va. Code 48-13-603(a) in reversing the family court's determination that Mother, the nondisabled child support obligor, was entitled to credit for social security benefits paid to the children, who resided with Father, the disabled obligee. View "Amanda B. v. Hakeem M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Husband's petition for writ of prohibition challenging the circuit court's ruling on a motion to vacate and its authority to transfer the case to family court, holding that the court's decision to remand the case to the family court was not in excess of its jurisdiction.Husband, an attorney, filed a petition for divorce. Husband filed a signed property settlement agreement and financial statements that he drafted. Husband then filed the case in the circuit court pursuant to W. Va. Code 51-2A-2(b). The court entered a final divorce order without holding a hearing or giving notice to Wife. Wife later filed a motion to vacate and set aside the final divorce order. The circuit court granted the motion in part and transferred the case to the family court for resolution of issues involving support and equitable distribution. Husband then filed this petition for writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that court did not err in granting the motion to vacate in part and that the court had the authority to transfer the case to family court. View "State ex rel. J. William St. Clair v. Honorable Gregory L. Howard" on Justia Law

Debra Wilson and David Aubert married in September 2007. They separated ten years later, in June 2017. They had no children together, but each had adult children from prior marriages. Debra filed for divorce in July 2017. At Debra’s request, the court bifurcated the divorce from the property division. In July 2018 the court entered a decree of divorce and ordered that property and debt distribution would be determined at a later trial. A month after the divorce decree, but several months before the property division trial, David died. The personal representative of his estate, his daughter Laura Aubert, substituted as a party. After trial, the superior court divided the marital property 90% to 10% in favor of the wife. The husband’s estate appealed, arguing the court improperly classified, valued, and allocated various property. In particular, the estate challenged the unequal allocation of the marital property. The Alaska Supreme Court held that, as a general matter, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a disproportionate share of the marital property to the wife in light of her greater needs. But because the superior court erred in classifying several items, the Supreme Court reversed or vacated some of its rulings and remanded for further proceedings. View "Aubert v. Wilson, f/k/a Aubert" on Justia Law

Z.W.E., the alleged father of a child ("the child") of L.B. (Mother), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in Z.W.E. v. L.B., [Ms. 2180796, June 5, 2020] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2020), affirming the Jackson Juvenile Court's dismissal of the his petition to establish the paternity of the child. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to consider, as an issue of first impression, whether the term "child," as used in section 26-17-204(a)(5), Ala. Code 1975, a part of the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act ("the AUPA"), § 26-17-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, included unborn children. Z.W.E. and Mother were in a dating relationship and cohabited from February 2018 until August 2018, during which time the child was conceived. However, according to Z.W.E., beginning in mid-November 2018, Mother "refused to have any contact with the [alleged father] or his family." Subsequently, on November 14, 2018, the mother married Z.A.F. S.W.E. petitioned seeking to establish paternity of the child, born December 26, 2018. Mother moved to dismiss, arguing that Z.A.F. was the presumed father under section 26-17-204(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975. Accordingly, the mother argued, the husband's presumption of paternity could not be challenged. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Civil Appeals did not err in concluding that the plain language of the AUPA did not include unborn children within its definition of "child." Accordingly, Z.W.E. could not be considered a presumed father under section 26-17-204(a)(5) and, thus, did not have the capacity to challenge Z.A.F.'s status as a presumed father of the child. View "Ex parte Z.W.E." on Justia Law