Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant William Pullen appealed the family court’s denial of his Family Code section 2030 motion to compel respondent Windham Bremer, the trustee of the Elizabeth Anne Wendt Trust, to pay his attorney fees stemming from his successful motion to join the trustee as a third party to the dissolution action involving Pullen and his ex-wife Elizabeth Anne Wendt. Pullen contended the family court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion as it was based on legal error, and that it effectively precluded him from further litigating the matter. Bremer counters that under California law, a trustee could not be compelled to disburse money absent a showing of bad faith. He argued that Pullen’s claim was subject to Probate Code restrictions on claims against spendthrift trusts. He also claims that payment was barred under Indiana and Illinois law, and that appellant’s underlying claim was specious. The California Court of Appeal surmised the question presented involved the administration of the trust rather than interpreting its terms, Indiana law might apply, and Illinois law was inapplicable. "However, choice of law is immaterial as both Indiana and California follow the modern interpretation regarding the liability of trusts and trustees to third parties. This modern approach allows third parties to obtain relief from the trust for matters arising out of the trust’s administration, and is not limited by spendthrift provisions." The Court found section 2030 provided for the award of attorney fees against parties other than spouses, like the trustee. Since the award of attorney fees stemmed from the administration of the trust and did not involve a claim against the beneficiary, payment from a spendthrift trust was not contingent on the bad faith of the trustee. It was an abuse of discretion for the family court to make the award of fees contingent on such a showing and its judgment was reversed and remanded for additional proceedings. View "Marriage of Wendt and Pullen" on Justia Law

G.H. and J.H. married in 2006 and had two children, L.H. and B.H. The couple separated in August 2018. A dependency case was initiated for the children based on allegations that J.H. was abusing G.H. in their presence. In January 2019, upon stipulation of the parties, the juvenile court issued a final judgment in the dependency matter granting joint legal custody of the children but awarding G.H. sole physical custody. The court granted J.H. supervised visitation, noting the expectation that the family would “move toward less restrictive visits.” No restraining order was sought against J.H. as part of this judgment, and no such order was imposed. In October 2018, J.H. filed for divorce. In April 2019, J.H. filed a request for a custody evaluation and “family therapy” with the children, which the court granted.In August 2019, G.H. filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) in favor of herself and her children against J.H. The court granted a two-year DVRO, rather than the five-year DVRO requested by G.H. The court of appeal affirmed. The trial court did not err in excluding the parties’ children as protected parties in the DVRO nor in precluding their 12-year-old daughter from testifying at the contested hearing. View "J.H. v. G.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to Child, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.The Wyoming Department of Family Services filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child, but Mother failed timely to respond. The clerk of the district court proceeded to enter default against Mother. On appeal, Mother argued that the district court violated her due process rights by holding the evidentiary default hearing by video conference and by not giving her a meaningful chance to be heard regarding Child's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mother's due process rights were not violated when the district court held the default hearing by video conference or when it limited Mother's participation at the hearing. View "Herden v. State, ex rel. Department of Family Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the trial court adjudicating Mother's child a neglected and dependent juvenile and the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental rights in her child based on neglect and dependency, holding that the trial court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the evidence supported the findings of fact, and the findings supported the trial court's conclusion that the child was a dependent juvenile; (2) the trial court did not err in ceasing reunification efforts with Mother and failing to make reunification part of the child's permanency plan; and (3) the trial court did not err by adjudicating that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights. View "In re A.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights in his two minor children, holding that the trial court's findings of fact supported its conclusion that grounds existed for the termination of Father's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(2).After a hearing, the trial court terminated Father's parental rights on the ground that he had willfully left the children in an out-of-home placement for a period of at least twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to their removal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in adjudicating grounds for the termination of Father's parental rights. View "In re T.M.L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights in her three minor children, holding that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in terminating Mother's parental rights.On appeal, Mother challenged the trial court's adjudication of the existence of grounds to terminate her parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1) and (6). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's findings were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and were sufficient to support the trial court's determination that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1). View "In re M.J.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court terminating Respondents' parental rights to their child, holding that the trial court impermissibly failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act.After a hearing, the trial court entered an order in which it determined that grounds existed to terminate Respondents' parental rights and concluded that termination of Respondents' parental rights was in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a new hearing on termination of Respondents' parental rights, holding that the trial court did not comply with 25 C.F.R. 23.107(a) and therefore could not determine whether it had reason to know that the child was an Indian child. View "In re M.L.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to her two minor children, holding that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported at least one ground for the termination of Mother's parental rights and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of her children.After a hearing, the trial court found the existence of grounds to terminate Mother's parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (3) and concluded that it was in the children's best interests to terminate Mother's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly determined the existence of at least ground upon which to terminate Mother's parental rights; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court concluding that the parental rights of Father were subject to termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(7), holding that the trial court did not err.For his sole point on appeal, Father argued that his involuntary lack of communication with his minor child from the start of the period of his incarceration through the private termination of the parental rights hearing could not serve as the basis for the court's conclusion that grounds existed to terminate his parental rights due to abandonment because the evidence did not support a finding that Father's failure to contact his child was willful. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence showed that Father admittedly ignored his ability to contact his daughter or her caretaker. View "In re M.S.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this matter in which the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to her son, Liam, and from the trial court's earlier permanency planning order eliminating reunification from Liam's permanent plan, holding that the trial court failed to make written findings as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-906.2(d)(3). The termination order terminated Mother's parental rights to Liam under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1001(a1)(1)-(2) and terminated the parental rights of Liam's father, who was not a party to this appeal. The permanency order, however, lacked findings which addressed one of the four issues contemplated by 7B-906.2(d). The Court remanded this matter to the trial court for the entry of additional findings, and held that it was currently premature for the Court to consider the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental rights. View "In re L.R.L.B." on Justia Law