Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action. The Superior Court of Orange County granted Wolf's request and later compelled Mercado to undergo the evaluation. Mercado filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to order the evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request for a vocational evaluation and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the evaluation. Mercado opposed the request, arguing it was improper under the relevant statutes and that child support issues were being handled by the Department of Child Support Services (DCSS). The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it had the authority to order the evaluation.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Wolf did not establish entitlement to a vocational evaluation under any relevant statutory authority, including sections 3558, 4331, and 4058 of the Family Code. The court noted that section 3558 does not authorize vocational evaluations, section 4331 applies only to spousal support in dissolution or legal separation cases, and section 4058 requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation would be in the best interests of the children, which Wolf did not provide. The court also found that Evidence Code section 730 did not support the order as it pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court, not retained experts.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the Superior Court to vacate its orders requiring Mercado to undergo a vocational evaluation and to enter a new order denying Wolf's request. The stay order was dissolved, and Mercado was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In June 2019, the petitioner's 13-year-old daughter, T., disclosed to a friend, a teacher, a police officer, and a caseworker from the New York City Administration for Children's Services (ACS) that the petitioner had struck her with an extension cord. The caseworker took photographs of T.'s injuries, and a physician confirmed that the injuries were consistent with being struck by an extension cord. ACS initiated a Family Court article 10 neglect proceeding against the petitioner and her husband. The Family Court authorized an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD), and the case was dismissed in February 2020 after the petitioner complied with the court's conditions.The police officer reported the incident to the Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (SCR). In July 2019, ACS determined the report against the petitioner was indicated. The petitioner challenged this determination, but the New York State Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) upheld it after an internal review. A fair hearing was held in August 2020, and OCFS concluded that the allegations were substantiated by a fair preponderance of the evidence.The petitioner then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge OCFS's determination. The Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to the Appellate Division, which confirmed OCFS's determination, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding. The Appellate Division held that the petitioner had no constitutional right to assigned counsel during the SCR hearing and that the statutory changes to Social Services Law § 422 did not apply retroactively.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court held that the petitioner had no constitutional right to assigned counsel during the SCR administrative hearing. It also concluded that the statutory amendments to Social Services Law § 422 (8) (b) (ii) did not apply retroactively to OCFS determinations rendered before the effective date of the amendments. The Court further held that OCFS's determination was supported by substantial evidence. View "Matter of Jeter v. Poole" on Justia Law

Christian L. Gilbert filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against his former attorney, Christopher M. Johnson, and Johnson’s law firm, Cordell & Cordell, P.C. Gilbert had hired Johnson to represent him in a paternity action in the district court for Lancaster County, where the mother of his child sought to establish paternity and obtain custody and child support. The court issued a temporary custody order granting the mother custody and Gilbert parenting time every other weekend. Gilbert claimed he never agreed to this arrangement and wanted custody. He alleged that Johnson negligently or knowingly misadvised him that the court would not award him custody and failed to advocate for his interests. Gilbert eventually retained new counsel, but the court awarded the mother sole custody, subject to Gilbert’s parenting time. Gilbert claimed that Johnson’s negligence resulted in him not being awarded more than parenting time.The case was initially filed in state court but was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska. The federal court inferred that Gilbert was injured by the custody orders but not economically. Finding no Nebraska precedent on whether noneconomic damages are recoverable in legal malpractice actions, the federal court certified the question to the Nebraska Supreme Court.The Nebraska Supreme Court determined that noneconomic damages in a legal malpractice action arising from a child custody dispute, where no physical injury has been sustained, may be recoverable only if the attorney engages in egregious conduct or conduct intended to essentially destroy a parent-child relationship. This decision recognizes the intrinsic value of the parent-child relationship and the foreseeability of emotional harm from its loss, but limits recovery to the most serious cases of attorney misconduct. View "Gilbert v. Johnson" on Justia Law

M.M. and J.B., Sr. were once married and had a daughter, L.B. After their divorce, J.B., Sr. married P.B. L.B. gave birth to J.J.W.B. in May 2018, but the child was removed from her custody due to her drug addiction. In August 2018, L.B.'s brother sought custody of J.J.W.B., and temporary custody was placed with J.B., Sr. and P.B. M.M. sought visitation rights in September 2018. The court granted custody to J.B., Sr. and P.B. and visitation rights to M.M. in October 2018. In July 2019, custody was again placed with J.B., Sr. and P.B., with continued visitation for M.M.In October 2020, J.B., Sr. and P.B. filed for voluntary termination of parental rights and adoption of J.J.W.B., which was granted in December 2020 without notifying M.M. M.M. filed a petition for contempt in January 2021 for not being allowed visitation, and later, in February 2022, she filed a motion to set aside the adoption. The Smith County Chancery Court denied the motions to dismiss filed by J.B., Sr. and P.B., reasoning that M.M. should have been notified of the adoption proceedings and that her visitation rights were not terminated by the adoption order.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The court held that M.M.'s motion to set aside the adoption was untimely and that she was not a necessary party to the adoption proceedings. Therefore, the court reversed the denial of the motion to dismiss M.M.'s motion to set aside the adoption. However, the court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss M.M.'s contempt action, holding that the adoption did not extinguish her visitation rights. The case was remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings to determine visitation post-adoption. View "In Re The Adoption of J.J.W.B." on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of parental rights of S.D.P. and I.T.A. regarding their medically fragile child, I.T.A. Jr., who suffered a catastrophic brain injury at eight months old. The injury occurred while the child was in the care of his mother, S.D.P., and his maternal grandmother. The child was later diagnosed with numerous severe medical conditions, including blindness, deafness, and quadriplegia, requiring extensive and constant care. The parents provided inconsistent explanations for the injury, and the treating physicians found these explanations inconsistent with the child's injuries.The Harrison County Youth Court entered an emergency custody order, placing the child in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (MDCPS). The court found the injury resulted from nonaccidental trauma and that the parents failed to comply with service agreements designed to prepare them to care for their child's medical needs. Despite efforts by MDCPS to reunify the family, the parents did not substantially comply with the service plan, leading the court to change the plan to adoption.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the youth court's decision to terminate the parental rights of both parents. The court found clear and convincing evidence that the parents were unfit to care for the child due to their insufficient understanding and ability to manage the child's extensive medical needs. The court emphasized that the child's survival depended on specialized care that the parents were unable to provide, despite having been given ample opportunity to learn. The court also dismissed the parents' argument regarding the insufficiency of the guardian ad litem's investigation, noting that the parents had waived this argument by not raising it in the lower court. View "S.D.P. v. Harrison County Department of Child Protection Services" on Justia Law

Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action, which the Superior Court of Orange County granted. Wolf's request aimed to assess Mercado's ability to obtain employment and her earning capacity for determining child support. Mercado opposed the request, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to order a vocational evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute. She filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the vocational evaluation. Mercado appealed, arguing that the court's order was void due to lack of jurisdiction and statutory authority. She also contended that the order violated her constitutional rights and discovery rights. The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it had the authority to order a vocational evaluation under various statutes, including Family Code sections 3558, 4058, and 4331, and Evidence Code section 730.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that none of the statutes cited by Wolf or the trial court authorized a vocational evaluation in this context. Family Code section 3558 does not explicitly authorize vocational evaluations. Section 4331 applies to spousal support in dissolution or legal separation cases, not parentage actions. Section 4058 allows courts to consider earning capacity for child support but requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation is in the best interests of the children, which was not demonstrated. Evidence Code section 730 pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court, not retained experts like Wolf's consultant.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the trial court to vacate its orders requiring her to undergo a vocational evaluation and to deny Wolf's request for such an evaluation. The court emphasized that any future consideration of a vocational evaluation must be based on proper statutory authority and a showing that it is in the best interests of the children. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Christi and August Wohlt owned a company called Echo Systems, Inc., which dealt in cryptocurrencies. Upon dissolving their marriage, they agreed that August would retain all assets of the business, except for some personal electronics that Christi would keep. However, they both forgot that Echo Systems still owned some cryptocurrencies. The issue was whether this oversight made their agreement ambiguous regarding the ownership of these cryptocurrencies.The Delaware Circuit Court dissolved their marriage and incorporated their property settlement agreement. Later, August discovered the forgotten cryptocurrencies and informed Christi. Christi then filed a motion to address the omitted assets and requested the court to divide the cryptocurrencies and increase August’s child support obligation. August moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the agreement unambiguously awarded him all of Echo Systems’ assets, including the cryptocurrencies. The trial court denied his motion, finding factual issues regarding the parties' knowledge of the cryptocurrencies. After an evidentiary hearing, the court awarded Christi half the value of the cryptocurrencies, concluding the agreement was ambiguous.The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the property settlement agreement unambiguously awarded the cryptocurrencies to August. The court affirmed the trial court’s rulings on other issues, including attorney and expert fees.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeals that the agreement unambiguously transferred all of Echo Systems’ assets, including the cryptocurrencies, to August. The court emphasized that the term “all” was not ambiguous and that the parties’ agreement intended to settle all their assets with finality. The court reversed the trial court’s denial of August’s motion for partial summary judgment and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision on the remaining issues. View "Wohlt v. Wohlt" on Justia Law

Jason Bott and Suzanne Bott married in 2008 and have two minor children. In November 2022, Suzanne initiated a divorce action. They entered into a stipulated settlement agreement, and a judgment reflecting the terms was entered in June 2023. Jason was awarded all real estate, including the marital home and a rental property, and was required to pay Suzanne $425,000 in two installments. Shortly after the judgment, Jason asked Suzanne to alter the terms due to financial difficulties. They signed a handwritten document without their attorneys' knowledge, agreeing that Suzanne would retain the marital home and Jason would not have to make the cash payment. Suzanne later rescinded the agreement, moved out, and filed a motion for contempt against Jason for not making the first payment.The District Court of Cavalier County denied Jason's motion to amend the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6), finding that the parties intended to cancel the agreement. The court ordered Jason to make the cash payments as originally stipulated. Jason appealed, arguing the agreement was a valid contract and Suzanne failed to prove its rescission.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Jason's motion. The court noted that Jason did not argue the original stipulation was the result of mistake, duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, nor did he argue it was unconscionable. The court found that Jason did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances justifying relief from the judgment. The court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Jason failed to show the court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably in denying his motion. View "Bott v. Bott" on Justia Law

In September 2017, Attorney Karolyn Kovtun held a meeting with Jennifer Shenefield and her client Mark Shenefield, despite a criminal protective order prohibiting Mark from contacting Jennifer. During the meeting, Mark and Kovtun verbally and emotionally abused Jennifer, and Kovtun threatened to remove their daughter from Jennifer’s custody if she did not sign a custody agreement. Jennifer signed the agreement under duress and contacted the police. Kovtun continued to represent Mark, who was later convicted of violating the protective order. Kovtun then sued Jennifer for recording the meeting without consent, prompting Jennifer to file a cross-complaint against Kovtun.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Kovtun’s two anti-SLAPP motions and sustained her demurrer to two of Jennifer’s six causes of action. After a bench trial, the court found Kovtun liable for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, awarding Jennifer $50,000 in damages. Kovtun appealed, arguing that Jennifer’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the litigation privilege.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Kovtun waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to timely and properly plead it. Additionally, the court determined that the litigation privilege did not apply to Kovtun’s communications during the meeting, as they were not made in good faith contemplation of litigation. The court affirmed the judgment against Kovtun, upholding the $50,000 damages award to Jennifer. View "Shenefield v. Kovtun" on Justia Law

In this custody modification case, the parents, who divorced in 2012, initially agreed to joint custody of their two children. The father, Joseph Grungo, and the mother, Wendy Grungo-Smith, lived in close proximity in Fort Mill, South Carolina, but the mother subsequently moved multiple times, often living up to an hour and a half away. This led to deviations from the original custody schedule, with the mother having the children most of the time.In 2019, the mother filed for primary custody, citing the father's failure to utilize his full custody time. The father counterclaimed, citing several changes in circumstances, including the mother's unstable living situation, her second husband's criminal conviction involving one of the children, and the negative environment created by her third husband. The family court trial in 2020 included testimony from both parents and a guardian ad litem, who reported on the children's stressful experiences at the mother's home and their preference for the father's home.The family court awarded primary custody to the father, finding a substantial change in circumstances and determining that the children's best interests would be served by this change. The mother appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the family court's decision, reinstating the joint custody arrangement. The appellate court found that the family court erred in relying on the guardian's testimony and recommendation, asserting that such reliance was only appropriate in "extraordinary circumstances."The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the appellate court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the family court's procedure in eliciting the guardian's testimony and recommendation complied with the applicable statute, which does not impose an "extraordinary circumstances" standard. The Supreme Court found that the evidence supported the family court's decision, reinstating the family court's order awarding primary custody to the father. View "Grungo-Smith v. Grungo" on Justia Law