Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A married couple with three children separated after the husband retired from military service and the wife filed for divorce. During their marriage, the husband acquired several properties and vehicles, some of which were later transferred to a nonprofit entity he controlled. The wife had a history of alcohol use, including a DUI conviction, but had been sober for nearly two years before the divorce proceedings. The couple also had a family dog, which the husband claimed as his service animal. The wife obtained an ex parte protective order, which was later extended for one year after a hearing in circuit court, and was awarded joint custody of the children on an alternating week basis.The District Court of Park County, Wyoming, presided over the divorce trial. The husband filed a late motion for psychological evaluations of both parties under Rule 35, citing allegations of substance abuse and parental alienation, but the district court denied the motion as untimely and lacking good cause. The district court awarded primary physical custody to the wife, with the husband receiving substantial parenting time. The court also ordered the husband to pay the wife equitable sums for her share of the marital assets, including real property, financial accounts, and the value of vehicles transferred to the nonprofit during the divorce. Regarding the family dog, the court ordered that its custody be shared according to the children’s schedule, with the dog to remain with the husband if the wife declined responsibility for transporting it.The Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s decisions, holding that the denial of the motion for psychological evaluations was within the court's discretion due to its untimeliness and lack of good cause. The Supreme Court also held that the custody determination, property division, and the arrangement for the family dog were not abuses of discretion and were supported by the record. The judgment was affirmed. View "Ribera v. Ribera" on Justia Law

A man and a woman, previously in a romantic relationship, each sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against the other under California’s Domestic Violence Prevention Act. Their relationship began in 2022, involved cohabitation for several months, and ended in late 2023. Both accused each other of abuse—physical, emotional, verbal, and, in one instance, sexual assault. After their breakup, each claimed the other engaged in harassing behavior: the man cited over a thousand unwanted communications and visits to his family’s home by the woman, while the woman introduced evidence that the man posted derogatory messages and images about her on social media and made disparaging calls to her mother.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County held a combined hearing on both DVRO petitions. The judge focused on post-breakup events and declined to consider alleged abuse during the parties’ relationship or indirect contact (such as social media posts and calls to third parties) as relevant to the woman’s request. At the conclusion, the court denied the woman’s DVRO request, finding the man had not contacted her directly, and granted the man’s petition, reasoning the woman was unlikely to stop her attempts to contact him.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, held that the trial court erred by not considering evidence of indirect contact—such as social media posts and calls to the woman’s mother—as relevant under the DVPA’s broad definition of “abuse,” which includes disturbing the peace through direct or indirect conduct. The appellate court reversed both the denial of the woman’s DVRO and the issuance of the man’s DVRO, remanding for a new hearing on both requests. The court directed that, on remand, the trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the parties’ history, and properly apply the standards for mutual restraining orders. View "R.M. v. A.G." on Justia Law

The parties divorced by stipulated judgment, with the judgment awarding Jesse Clooten the marital home and requiring him to remove Stephanie Clooten’s name from the mortgage within ninety days. The judgment also made Jesse responsible for refinancing costs and an expected tax liability. Over a year after the deadline, Stephanie’s name remained on the mortgage. She filed motions for contempt and for redistribution of property. At an evidentiary hearing, Jesse admitted to missing the deadline, not promptly requesting necessary documents, and not completing the removal process even after Stephanie provided the needed signature. He offered no supporting bank documentation for his explanations or claimed obstacles.The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, found Jesse in contempt, determining he intentionally disobeyed the court order at least since the day after receiving the signed certificate of occupancy. The court found his justifications unpersuasive and unsupported by evidence. For sanctions, the court ordered Jesse to pay Stephanie’s attorney’s fees, the difference between her rent and a hypothetical mortgage payment due to her inability to purchase a home, and the amount representing lost principal reduction she would have accrued. The court denied her claim for home-value escalation as it was based solely on unverified Zillow data. On the motion to redistribute property, the court declined to rule, citing the lack of a final tax return, and directed the parties to cooperate to complete and file the return before considering further action.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the appeal. The court affirmed the contempt order, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Jesse in contempt or in the sanctions imposed, as its findings were supported by the record and rationally determined. The court dismissed the appeal from the redistribution order, concluding it was not a final, appealable order as it did not dispose of the motion. View "Clooten v. Clooten" on Justia Law

The case involved a mother whose parental rights to her youngest child were terminated by the Maine District Court. The Department of Health and Human Services initiated a child protection proceeding in June 2023, citing concerns about the mother's mental health, substance abuse, and neglect. The mother missed the preliminary hearing, and the child remained in the Department’s custody. Shortly before a scheduled jeopardy hearing, the mother’s attorney, without prior motion or notice to the mother, orally requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL) for the mother. The court, relying solely on representations of counsel and without a hearing or evidence, appointed a GAL with broad authority to make binding decisions on the mother’s behalf.Following this, several hearings took place, including a jeopardy hearing and judicial review hearings. There was ongoing confusion among the court and the mother’s attorneys regarding whether direction should be taken from the mother or the GAL, especially when their positions diverged. In August 2025, at the termination hearing, the mother’s GAL consented to termination of parental rights on the mother’s behalf, over the mother’s absence and without her knowledge of the GAL’s intent to consent. The District Court entered the termination order based on the GAL’s consent, and the mother appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It held that the process used to appoint the GAL violated the mother’s due process rights because she was not afforded notice or an opportunity to be heard before the GAL’s appointment and before her decision-making authority was delegated. The Court further concluded that this error was prejudicial and required the judgment to be vacated. The case was remanded for a proper competency hearing and new proceedings beginning with the jeopardy phase, ensuring the mother’s due process rights are protected moving forward. View "In re Child of Mindy P." on Justia Law

Several individuals who were non-custodial parents and owed more than $2,500 in child support had their driver’s licenses suspended by the Missouri Department of Social Services, Family Support Division (FSD), under a statutory scheme that, until 2023, did not require consideration of an individual’s ability to pay before suspending a license. The plaintiffs’ suspensions occurred in 2017 and 2018. Two plaintiffs’ suspensions were later stayed, and a third’s license was fully restored. They argued that the suspension policy violated their constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the fundamental right to travel, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and reinstatement of their licenses.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri first denied a preliminary injunction as moot and then partially dismissed the complaint. It rejected dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Younger abstention, finding that plaintiffs’ claims were independent and no ongoing state proceeding existed. The court allowed only the procedural due process claim to proceed, dismissing other constitutional claims and claims against the governor. Later, the district court dismissed the case sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their suspensions were stayed or lifted.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. It held that the plaintiffs lacked standing for declaratory relief because they did not allege ongoing or immediate injury, and their alleged harms were too speculative or unsupported. Any relief regarding Missouri’s prior statutory scheme was moot due to legislative amendments that now require consideration of ability to pay. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal regarding the preliminary injunction as moot. View "Bedford v. MO Dept of Social Services, Family Support Div." on Justia Law

A minor child was adjudicated neglected and committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families in Connecticut. After her removal from her parents, the child was placed with licensed foster parents in Connecticut, with whom she developed a strong bond and thrived. Despite this, the Commissioner later proposed a permanency plan for the child to be adopted by her paternal grandparents, who lived in Florida, and sought court approval for the child’s out-of-state placement. The child’s attorney objected, emphasizing her attachment to her foster parents and arguing that a move would not be in her best interests.The Superior Court, Juvenile Matters, granted the Commissioner’s motion for out-of-state placement, finding it in the child’s best interests and reasoning that it would maintain her connection to her paternal family. The court’s subsequent articulation stated that the same facts supporting its best interests finding also established good cause for out-of-state placement. The child appealed, but the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in finding good cause under the statutory standard.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the Appellate Court erred by not recognizing a statutory presumption in favor of in-state placement under § 46b-129 (j) (4). The Supreme Court clarified that out-of-state placement requires the proponent to rebut this presumption by proving good cause, which must be established independently from the child’s best interests. The Court also held that the trial court did not properly apply this good cause standard, as it conflated it with the best interests analysis and failed to address relevant statutory considerations. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings applying the correct legal standard. View "In re Dynastie D." on Justia Law

A mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to her child, M.F., after the child was removed from her care for the fourth time due to issues related to substance abuse, exposure to unsafe individuals, and neglect. The Montana Department of Health and Human Services had previously intervened with the family, and circumstances leading to the removal included the discovery of illegal substances and paraphernalia in the mother’s home, M.F.’s reports of fear and lack of academic progress, and repeated positive drug tests for both mother and child. Despite the Department’s efforts—such as developing and assisting with treatment plans, arranging for therapy, and seeking kinship placements—the mother was inconsistent in engaging with services and failed to address her substance abuse issues.The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, conducted multiple hearings, during which evidence was presented regarding the Department’s ongoing efforts to reunify the family. The court approved a treatment plan, but the mother did not meaningfully comply, and she failed to achieve or maintain sobriety. After a hearing, the District Court terminated the mother’s parental rights, finding clear and convincing evidence that the statutory criteria were met, including that the mother’s condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. The court also determined that termination, rather than guardianship, was in M.F.’s best interests.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. It held that the Department made the reasonable efforts required by statute to prevent removal and to reunify the family. The Supreme Court concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in terminating parental rights, and that it thoughtfully considered, but properly rejected, guardianship as a permanency option. View "In re M.F." on Justia Law

A mother removed her eight-year-old son, B.B., from Finland, where he had lived his entire life, to the United States, in violation of a Finnish joint custody agreement with the child’s father. The parents had previously separated amid the mother’s allegations of abuse, though those allegations were disputed and did not involve direct harm to B.B. After the mother settled in Ohio, the father filed a petition in federal court pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, seeking the child’s return to Finland.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio conducted a two-day hearing, including an in-camera interview with the child. The district court found that the father established a wrongful removal under the Convention. The court then examined the mother’s defenses under Article 12 and Article 13, rejecting claims of consent and grave risk of harm. Ultimately, the district court found that the age and maturity exception applied: B.B., though only eight, was found sufficiently mature for his views to be considered, and he clearly objected to returning to Finland for several particularized reasons. The court also found no clear evidence of undue influence by the mother over the child’s testimony.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err in finding B.B. sufficiently mature or in crediting his particularized objections to return. The court further found no clear error in the district court’s assessment of the absence of undue influence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition for return. View "Boa-Bonsu v. Owusu" on Justia Law

An infant, K.B., was removed from her mother’s care after a police officer witnessed the mother acting abusively toward K.B. and expressing suicidal thoughts. The Baltimore County Department of Social Services filed a petition alleging K.B. was a child in need of assistance (CINA) due to abuse, neglect, and the mother’s history of mental health issues and prior terminations of parental rights. At the adjudication and disposition hearing, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County declared K.B. a CINA, committed her to the Department’s custody, and established supervised visitation. The court’s order included a standard notice that the permanency plan of reunification could later be changed.At a subsequent initial review hearing, the Department recommended changing K.B.’s presumptive plan of reunification to a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption. A magistrate adopted this recommendation, and the juvenile court overruled the mother’s exceptions, ordering the concurrent plan. The mother appealed. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, holding that the juvenile court had improperly established a permanency plan before the required permanency plan hearing and without considering the statutory factors or providing proper notice.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed whether the juvenile court could change the permanency plan at the initial review hearing. It held that the presumptive plan of reunification established at disposition is not a permanency plan as defined by Maryland law. The court ruled that a permanency plan must be determined at a hearing that complies with statutory requirements, including consideration of specific factors and provision of reasonable notice to all parties about the date, time, and purpose of the hearing. The court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded the case for proper proceedings. View "In re: K.B." on Justia Law

A child, A.R.H., was born in November 2022 to Latisha H. and Redonn Malone. At birth, both the child and the mother tested positive for illegal drugs, and Malone was incarcerated on felony charges. As a result, the Jackson County Youth Court placed A.R.H. in the custody of Child Protection Services (CPS), appointed a guardian ad litem, and adjudicated the child as neglected. During subsequent hearings, the youth court found that Latisha was absent and that Malone’s paternity was confirmed. The court was presented with evidence of Malone’s extensive criminal history, including violent offenses, and his ongoing incarceration.The Jackson County Youth Court determined that Malone's criminal history constituted “aggravated circumstances” sufficient to bypass efforts to reunify the child with his father under Mississippi Code Section 43-21-603(7)(c). CPS recommended a service plan aiming for reunification, but the intake officer and guardian ad litem recommended bypassing reunification. The youth court ultimately ordered that reasonable efforts for reunification with Malone would not be required and moved toward termination of Malone’s parental rights. Malone appealed, arguing that the statute was misapplied because his criminal acts had not involved A.R.H. or any child. The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the youth court’s decision, applying a deferential standard of review and concluding the court did not err in its findings or reliance on evidence.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo and concluded that Section 43-21-603(7)(c)(i) requires the parent to have subjected the child to aggravated circumstances. The Court held that because Malone had not subjected A.R.H. to his past criminal conduct, bypassing reunification on this basis was not supported by the statute. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of both the youth court and the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Interest of A.R.H. v. Jackson County Department of Child Protection Services" on Justia Law