Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

K.A. and C.P. were married and had three daughters. Their marriage ended in divorce, and the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (ACDHS) initiated actions against K.A. regarding her relationships with her children, leading to the termination of her parental rights and several contempt judgments. K.A. attempted to appeal the termination, but the Colorado Court of Appeals denied it as untimely, and the Colorado Supreme Court declined review. She also sought to appeal a contempt sentence, but it was again deemed untimely.K.A. filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against Michelle Barnes, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Human Services (CDHS), in her official capacity; ACDHS; and Michelle Dossey, Manager of the ACDHS Division of Child and Adult Protective Services, in her official capacity. The Arapahoe County Board of Commissioners was initially named but later dismissed by K.A. The district court dismissed K.A.'s claims and denied her motion to amend her complaint. K.A. filed a timely appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear K.A.'s claims due to sovereign immunity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and lack of standing. The court found that K.A.'s claims for damages were barred by sovereign immunity, and her requests to reverse the termination of her parental rights and order a new hearing were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Additionally, her requests for declaratory relief were either barred by sovereign immunity or lacked standing. The court also upheld the district court's denial of K.A.'s motion to amend her complaint, as she failed to explain how the amendments would cure the jurisdictional defects. View "K.A. v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Nancy Karanja-Meek and Aaron Meek were married, and during their marriage, Aaron suffered severe work-related injuries from an explosion. Both received separate personal injury awards, with the remaining amounts placed in annuities. Nancy's award was for loss of consortium. Nancy filed for divorce, and the dispute centered on whether the annuities were marital property subject to equitable division.The Johnson District Court, relying on previous caselaw, held that the annuities were separate property and not subject to division in the divorce proceedings. Aaron appealed, arguing that Nancy's annuity should be considered marital property. The Kansas Court of Appeals agreed with Aaron, holding that both annuities were marital property subject to equitable division under the "mechanical approach," which considers all property owned by both spouses as marital property regardless of the source.Aaron petitioned for review, arguing that the Court of Appeals was wrong to exclusively require the "mechanical approach" and suggested that the "analytical approach" should also be considered. Nancy cross-petitioned, claiming Aaron failed to preserve his argument because he did not move to amend or alter the judgment at the district court level. The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed both petitions.The Kansas Supreme Court held that a party need only raise a legal issue to preserve it for appellate review and does not need to move to amend or alter the judgment. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, stating that all property of married persons becomes marital property upon the commencement of divorce proceedings. The case was remanded to the district court for equitable division of the marital estate, considering both annuities as marital property. View "In re Marriage of Meek " on Justia Law

A mother sought to modify an existing child custody order to change the school district her daughter attends after moving to a new residence. The father objected, arguing that changing schools would be disruptive and limit his time with the daughter. Unable to reach an agreement through mediation, the mother petitioned the court to modify the custody decree.The Iowa District Court for Worth County denied the mother's request, determining that changing school districts was not in the daughter's best interests. The mother appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Frazier. The Court of Appeals, interpreting Frazier, concluded that the district court lacked authority to hear the mother's petition because she was not seeking to alter the parents' status as joint legal custodians. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling without considering the merits of the mother's petition.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Frazier. The Supreme Court held that a court that entered a custody decree has the authority to modify it when requested, even if the modification does not relate to who has legal custody. The Supreme Court found that the district court had the authority to rule on the mother's petition since the decree specified the daughter's school district, and the mother sought to modify that based on a change of circumstances.On de novo review, the Iowa Supreme Court agreed with the district court's determination that changing school districts was not in the daughter's best interests. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision and affirmed the district court's order denying the modification petition. View "Venechuk v. Landherr" on Justia Law

A sixteen-year-old female, through her mother, filed a petition to change her legal name to a more masculine one as part of her gender transition. Both parents consented to the name change. The Mississippi State Board of Health (MSBH) was named as a respondent and acknowledged the petition, stating it would annotate the minor’s birth certificate if the court ordered the name change.The Hinds County Chancery Court held a hearing on the petition, where the minor and her parents were present. The chancellor decided to dismiss the petition without prejudice, stating that the minor needed to mature more before the court would consider the name change.The petitioner appealed the decision. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and upheld the chancellor’s decision. The court emphasized that under Mississippi law, a chancellor may only grant a minor’s name change if it is clearly in the best interest of the child. The court found that the chancellor did not manifestly err in determining that the minor needed to mature more before making such a significant decision. The court also noted that the chancellor’s decision was consistent with Mississippi’s public policy against children receiving life-altering gender-transition assistance due to their lack of maturity. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the chancellor’s dismissal of the name-change petition. View "In The Matter of The Petition of S.M.-B. v. Mississippi State Board of Health" on Justia Law

The State of Oklahoma moved to terminate a mother's parental rights due to her methamphetamine addiction and failure to provide a stable environment for her child. The child was placed in emergency custody in May 2022, and the mother entered and left multiple inpatient treatment programs without completing them. The State filed a motion to terminate her parental rights in April 2023, and a jury trial was set for August 2023. The mother failed to appear for the trial, and her attorney requested a continuance, which was denied. The trial court held a nonjury trial and terminated her parental rights.The mother appealed the decision, and the Court of Civil Appeals, Division III, affirmed the trial court's ruling. The mother argued that the statute allowing the trial court to deem her failure to appear as a waiver of her right to a jury trial was unconstitutional. The Court of Civil Appeals did not substantively address this constitutional claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and found that the statute in question is constitutional. However, the court emphasized that due process requires that the record must reflect that the parent received notice of the possible consequences of failing to appear for the jury trial. The court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion and remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the mother had received sufficient notice. The trial court is to hold the hearing within 30 days and submit findings of fact and conclusions of law to the Supreme Court within 15 days after the hearing. View "IN THE MATTER OF FB v STATE OF OKLAHOMA" on Justia Law

A.T. was born in May 2024 and tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine, as did her mother, M.T. The mother admitted to drug addiction and using methamphetamine throughout her pregnancy. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) was notified, and A.T. was placed with a relative caregiver, Gloria T. The father, W.M., had a history of domestic violence and substance abuse issues, and had previously been involved in dependency proceedings for his other children, Y.M. and J.G.The Superior Court of San Diego County found that A.T. was a dependent child under section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and ordered her removal from her mother's custody. The court also found that placing A.T. with her father would be detrimental to her well-being, citing his history of domestic violence, ongoing relationship with the mother, and lack of cooperation with the Agency.The father appealed, arguing that section 361, subdivision (d) should apply, which requires a higher standard of proof for removal, and that there was no clear and convincing evidence to support the finding of detriment. The Agency argued that section 361.2, subdivision (a) applied because the father did not have physical custody of A.T. at the time of disposition and sought to assume custody.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, concluded that section 361.2 applied because the father was the noncustodial parent seeking custody. The court found clear and convincing evidence supporting the juvenile court's finding that placing A.T. with the father would be detrimental to her safety and well-being. The court affirmed the juvenile court's dispositional order, maintaining A.T.'s placement with the relative caregiver and granting the father liberal unsupervised visitation. View "In re A.T." on Justia Law

Sarah Ann Miles and Jeffrey Gerstein entered into an oral traditional surrogacy agreement in which Miles agreed to conceive and carry a child using her ova and Gerstein's sperm, with the understanding that Gerstein would be the sole parent. The child, E., was born in December 2013, and both parties adhered to the terms of the agreement for seven years, with Gerstein acting as E.'s sole parent and Miles not assuming any parental role.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found that the oral surrogacy agreement was valid and enforceable, determining that Miles was not E.'s parent under the agreement. The court concluded that the parties had a clear understanding that Gerstein would be the sole parent and that Miles would not be involved in the child's upbringing. The court also found that it was not in E.'s best interest for Miles to enter her life as a parent.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that traditional surrogacy agreements do not need to be in writing to be enforceable under California law. The court found that the oral agreement between Miles and Gerstein was valid and that the parties' conduct over the years supported the existence of the agreement. The court also determined that the agreement did not violate public policy or constitutional principles, as Miles never intended to be E.'s parent and did not assume a parental role in E.'s life. The judgment was affirmed, and Miles was ordered to pay Gerstein's costs on appeal. View "Miles v. Gerstein" on Justia Law

A father, Travis W. Kalis, was ordered by a district court in 2013 to pay $1,145 per month in child support to the mother of his children, Leslie E. Sheehy Lee. In 2015, the parties discussed modifying this amount through a private agreement, but no written agreement was executed. Despite this, Kalis began making reduced payments of $1,000 per month via Venmo, which later decreased to $500 per month. In 2022, after Kalis stopped making prompt payments, Sheehy Lee sought enforcement of the original court order through the county child support agency, which notified Kalis that he owed over $30,000 in arrearages.A child support magistrate (CSM) concluded that the parties had reached an extrajudicial agreement to modify Kalis’s child support obligation and determined that Kalis did not owe any arrearages. Sheehy Lee sought review in the district court, arguing that the forgiveness of arrearages was an impermissible retroactive modification of the child support order. The district court declined to grant relief, and the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the parties had reached a fair and reasonable agreement.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that extrajudicial agreements to modify child support orders are invalid as a matter of law. The court emphasized that child support orders can only be modified by a court and within the limits set by Minnesota Statutes section 518A.39, subdivision 2(f), which prohibits retroactive modifications of child support orders except from the date of service of notice of the motion to modify. The court also clarified that the statutory exception allowing for an alternative effective date applies only to subsequent court-issued child support orders, not to extrajudicial modifications. The decision of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lee v. Kalis" on Justia Law

Sarah Shively initiated divorce proceedings against Kyle Shively, seeking primary residential responsibility for their three school-age children. The marital home, which was Kyle's family farmstead, is located in Pleasant Lake, North Dakota. During the separation, Kyle moved to Rugby, North Dakota. Both parties proposed different parenting plans, with Sarah seeking primary residential responsibility and Kyle seeking either primary or equal residential responsibility.The District Court of Benson County, Northeast Judicial District, held a two-day bench trial and awarded Sarah primary residential responsibility and the marital home. Kyle appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its decisions regarding residential responsibility, parenting time, and the distribution of the marital home.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and found that the district court failed to provide sufficient specificity in its findings to enable a reviewing court to understand the factual basis for its decisions. The Supreme Court noted inconsistencies in the district court's findings, particularly regarding the best interest factors for awarding primary residential responsibility. The district court's findings were contradictory, and it did not adequately explain why equal residential responsibility was not considered.Additionally, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not address summer parenting time for Kyle, despite acknowledging its importance. The district court also failed to explain its decision to award the marital home to Sarah, despite the sentimental value and origin of the property being significant factors.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration and a reasoned explanation of the court’s decisions regarding primary residential responsibility, parenting time, and property distribution. View "Shively v. Shively" on Justia Law

Sarah Knell and Catlin Kinden, who married in 2003 and have four children, divorced in October 2020. They initially agreed to share equal residential responsibility for their children, with the children spending most of the school year with Knell. Conflicts arose, particularly regarding the medical care of their two minor children, B.K. and P.K., who require medication. Kinden meticulously monitored P.K.'s diabetes care, often initiating conflicts with Knell over it. In July 2021, Kinden moved to modify residential responsibility, alleging Knell's disregard for the children's health. The district court ordered mediation, which was unsuccessful.In December 2021, Knell filed a countermotion to modify residential responsibility. The parties agreed to a parenting investigation, which did not recommend changing their equal residential responsibility. They signed a stipulation to modify the judgment, which the court adopted in September 2022. In 2023, Kinden moved to Bismarck, prompting Knell to seek primary residential responsibility, arguing that the two-year moratorium on modifications did not apply due to Kinden's relocation. Both parties made prima facie cases for modification, leading to an evidentiary hearing in July 2024.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case, affirming the district court's decision. The court found that N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6, which governs modifications of primary residential responsibility, did not apply as there was no prior order establishing primary residential responsibility. Instead, the court made an original determination based on the best interests of the children, weighing the factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). The court concluded that awarding Kinden primary residential responsibility was in the children's best interests, particularly due to his diligence in addressing their medical and educational needs. The Supreme Court found no clear error in the district court's findings and affirmed the second amended judgment. View "Kinden v. Kinden" on Justia Law