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At issue in this case was whether an agreement entered into during the course of the parties’ marriage made manifest by three deeds by which title was transferred to Wife by Husband was sufficient to exclude those properties from consideration as marital property under Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 8-201(e). The trial court concluded that the postnuptial agreement was not a “valid agreement” under the requirements of section 8-201(e). Before the court of special appeals, Wife argued that the circuit court judge had erred in classifying the property as marital property because there was a “valid agreement” under section 8-201(e) excluding the two pieces of real property from marital property. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) under section 8-201(e), a valid postnuptial agreement does not require language that reclassifies property as nonmarital in order to exclude that property from marital property in divorce; (2) there was a valid postnuptial agreement to exclude one property as the nonmarital property of Wife; and (3) with respect to the second property, the trial judge, on remand, must consider whether there was a valid agreement to exclude the property as nonmarital under section 8-201(e)(2). View "McGeehan v. McGeehan" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was whether an agreement entered into during the course of the parties’ marriage made manifest by three deeds by which title was transferred to Wife by Husband was sufficient to exclude those properties from consideration as marital property under Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 8-201(e). The trial court concluded that the postnuptial agreement was not a “valid agreement” under the requirements of section 8-201(e). Before the court of special appeals, Wife argued that the circuit court judge had erred in classifying the property as marital property because there was a “valid agreement” under section 8-201(e) excluding the two pieces of real property from marital property. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) under section 8-201(e), a valid postnuptial agreement does not require language that reclassifies property as nonmarital in order to exclude that property from marital property in divorce; (2) there was a valid postnuptial agreement to exclude one property as the nonmarital property of Wife; and (3) with respect to the second property, the trial judge, on remand, must consider whether there was a valid agreement to exclude the property as nonmarital under section 8-201(e)(2). View "McGeehan v. McGeehan" on Justia Law

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The notice of termination itself constitutes an adverse employment action, even when the employer later rescinds the termination. The Second Circuit held that plaintiff's notice of termination in this case was itself an adverse employment action, despite its later revocation; likewise, the court saw no reason to construe plaintiff's Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) claim differently from her Title VII claim with respect to whether the rescission of a notice of termination given to a pregnant employee establishes as a matter of law that the notice may not constitute an adverse employment action; the facts alleged were insufficient to establish constructive discharge nor a hostile work environment; plaintiff's retaliation claim was properly dismissed; and because plaintiff did state a plausible claim of discriminatory termination, and interference with her FMLA rights, the district court should reconsider on remand its decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state and city law claims. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and remanded, and affirmed in all other respects. View "Shultz v. Shearith" on Justia Law

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The notice of termination itself constitutes an adverse employment action, even when the employer later rescinds the termination. The Second Circuit held that plaintiff's notice of termination in this case was itself an adverse employment action, despite its later revocation; likewise, the court saw no reason to construe plaintiff's Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) claim differently from her Title VII claim with respect to whether the rescission of a notice of termination given to a pregnant employee establishes as a matter of law that the notice may not constitute an adverse employment action; the facts alleged were insufficient to establish constructive discharge nor a hostile work environment; plaintiff's retaliation claim was properly dismissed; and because plaintiff did state a plausible claim of discriminatory termination, and interference with her FMLA rights, the district court should reconsider on remand its decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state and city law claims. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and remanded, and affirmed in all other respects. View "Shultz v. Shearith" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Appellate Court dismissing Mother’s appeal from the judgment of the trial court terminating Mother’s parental rights as to her son and remanded the case with direction to affirm the trial court’s judgment. On appeal, Mother argued (1) the Appellate Court erred in concluding that Mother had failed adequately to brief one of the two independent grounds for reversing the trial court judgment, and that therefore her appeal was moot; and (2) the trial court incorrectly determined that the Department of Children and Families made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her son and that she was unable to benefit from those efforts. The Supreme Court held (1) the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Mother’s appeal as moot; but (2) the evidence supported the trial court’s determination that Respondent was unable to benefit from reunification efforts, and the resolution of this issue constitutes an independent basis for affirming the trial court’s judgment. View "In re Elijah C." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Appellate Court dismissing Mother’s appeal from the judgment of the trial court terminating Mother’s parental rights as to her son and remanded the case with direction to affirm the trial court’s judgment. On appeal, Mother argued (1) the Appellate Court erred in concluding that Mother had failed adequately to brief one of the two independent grounds for reversing the trial court judgment, and that therefore her appeal was moot; and (2) the trial court incorrectly determined that the Department of Children and Families made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her son and that she was unable to benefit from those efforts. The Supreme Court held (1) the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Mother’s appeal as moot; but (2) the evidence supported the trial court’s determination that Respondent was unable to benefit from reunification efforts, and the resolution of this issue constitutes an independent basis for affirming the trial court’s judgment. View "In re Elijah C." on Justia Law

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The juvenile court erred in using a per se rule that “[h]itting a child with a belt or strap or another object is abuse” because the rule is overbroad and alters the statutory meaning of “abuse” within the meaning of the Utah Code. This case involved four children. Mother was the mother of all four children, and Father was the biological father of the younger two. The State filed a petition seeking to adjudicate the children as abused and neglected under Utah Code 78A-6-105. The parties stipulated to a number of findings of fact. The juvenile court determined that Parents abused the children under section 78A-6-105. Parents appealed, arguing that the juvenile court erred when it concluded that spanking a child with a belt, without any additional proof of harm, constitutes abuse within the meaning of Utah law. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the stipulated facts did not support an abuse determination. View "In re K.T." on Justia Law

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At issue in this appeal was the status of a revocable trust that husband’s parents established in 1999. The parties married in 1984 and have two children (now adults); they divorced in 2014. The grantor amended the revocable trust that changed the beneficiary from husband to husband’s son, thereby keeping the trust property out of the marital estate and shielding it from wife’s claims. Wife appealed the family division’s final property division award. In particular, she challenged the trial court’s refusal to enforce a subpoena requiring grantor father to testify about the trust and his capacity to change its beneficiary and argued the family court should have included the trust assets as part of the marital estate. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Collins v. Collins" on Justia Law

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In an earlier action in which Florencia Garcia petitioned to dissolve her marriage to Juan Garcia (Dissolution Action), the family court found that Florencia did not meet her burden of establishing a valid marriage and quashed service as to Juan and dismissed the action. Florencia then filed the underlying action in which she petitioned for nullity of marriage (Nullity Action). In the Nullity Action, Juan appealed two family court orders: (1) one in which the court found that Florencia was Juan’s spouse or putative spouse, and she could proceed with the claims in her petition (Putative Spouse Order); and (2) one in which the court directed Juan to pay Florencia spousal support arrears, ongoing spousal support and attorney fees and costs (Support Order). In challenging the two orders, Juan raised a single legal issue for review on appeal: under res judicata, did the judgment in the Dissolution Action bar the relief Florencia sought in the Nullity Action? The Court of Appeal concluded the Dissolution Action and the Nullity Action involved different primary rights, and thus affirmed the Support Order. Because the Putative Spouse Order was not final, the Court dismissed Juan’s appeal. View "In re Marriage of Garcia" on Justia Law

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L.L. was a ten-year-old girl when the juvenile court issued an order finding B.S. was her presumed father pursuant to Family Code1 section 7611, subdivision (d), and also finding he was a third parent pursuant to section 7612, subdivision (c). T.L., another presumed father of L.L., and D.Z., L.L.'s mother (Mother), appealed that order, arguing: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that B.S. was a presumed father of L.L. under section 7611, subdivision (d); (2) the court erred in interpreting section 7612, subdivision (c), and by finding B.S. was a third parent under that statute; and (3) the court erred by not conducting the weighing process between the claims of the two presumed fathers that section 7612, subdivision (b), required. The Court of Appeal concluded there was substantial evidence to support the court's finding that B.S. was a presumed father of L.L., but the court erred in interpreting section 7612, subdivision (c), by finding B.S. was a third parent under that statute, and by not conducting the weighing process required under section 7612, subdivision (b). View "In re L.L." on Justia Law