Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

John and Sandra Davis, then-married, had two children in the 1980s. In 2018, John discovered the possibility that the children were not biologically his, but that they may have been the biological result of Sandra’s extramarital relations with Porter Horgan. Almost immediately after discovering this possibility, John sued Sandra and Horgan for fraud, alienation of affection, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. A jury ultimately awarded John $700,000 in damages. Because some of the claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and because John completely failed to request proper jury instructions on damages, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the jury verdict and rendered judgment in favor of Sandra and Horgan on John’s claims against them. View "Davis, et al. v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Grandparents' petition for visitation after concluding that one of the parents provided them with reasonable visitation, holding that the district court properly denied the petition for visitation.On appeal, Grandparents argued that the requirement set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.050 that "a parent of the child has denied or unreasonably restricted visits with the child" was satisfied in this case because one parent denied them visitation entirely and that the district court's finding that the visitation they received was reasonable was incorrect. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Grandparents' visits with the children must have been denied or unreasonably restricted to warrant relief in a petition for visitation; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Grandparents' visits with the children in this case were not denied or unreasonably restricted. View "Ramos v. Franklin" on Justia Law

Michael Brockmeyer appealed a district court order denying his motion to modify his joint residential responsibility to primary residential responsibility. He argued the district court erred: (1) as a matter of law by finding best interest factors a, b, d, f, g, and k favored neither party; (2) by applying the endangerment standard of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6 after the parties waived that provision in their stipulated divorce agreement; (3) by declining to modify residential responsibility because of facts unknown to the court at the time the court entered the original divorce judgment based on their stipulated agreement; and (4) by allowing various witnesses to assert their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at trial. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Brockmeyer v. Brockmeyer, et al." on Justia Law

Miguel Andrews appealed a divorce judgment dividing the marital estate between Candice Crichlow and him. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court conclude the district court clearly erred by including in the marital estate the value of Andrews’s financial accounts opened after the agreed upon valuation date. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Crichlow v. Andrews" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacating the family court's parental termination order in this case and remanding the action for a new trial, holding that Parents received a fundamentally fair trial and that due process was satisfied.During the underlying termination proceedings, the family court appointed attorneys for Parents, but Parents failed to appear at a court hearing and so the court discharged counsel. When Parents reappeared, the court reappointed counsel, and eventually, after a trial, the family court terminated Parents' parental rights. The ICA vacated the termination order and remanded for a new trial, finding structural error in the discharge of Parents' counsel. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, holding (1) a family court's discharge of counsel does not necessarily make a trial fundamentally unfair in Child Protection Act proceedings; and (2) Parents received a fair procedure in this case. View "In re JH" on Justia Law

Stephanie Owens appealed a district court’s order affirming the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the Ada County Board of Commissioners (the “Board”) in which it determined that Owens was an “applicant” under the Medical Indigency Act (the “Act”) and, therefore, required to pay reimbursement for the medical expenses incurred by her two children at public expense. In 2017, Owens’s children were involved in a serious car accident and suffered substantial injuries, which later resulted in the death of one of the children. Because the children’s father, Corey Jacobs, was unable to pay for the children’s medical bills, he filed two applications for medical indigency with the Board. Owens and Jacobs were never married and did not have a formal custody agreement for their children. At the time of the accident, the children resided with their father. The Board determined that Owens and her children met the statutory requirements for medical indigency. Although Jacobs filed the applications for medical indigency, the Board concluded that Owens was also an “applicant” under the Act and liable to repay the Board. As a result, the Board “recorded notices of statutory liens” against Owens’s real and personal property and ordered Owens to sign a promissory note with Ada County to repay the medical bills. Owens refused to sign the note and instead challenged the sufficiency of her involvement with the applications via a petition for reconsideration with the Board and a subsequent petition for judicial review. Both the Board and the district court ultimately concluded that Owens was an “applicant” and liable for repayment of a portion of the children’s medical bills. Owens timely appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed: because she never signed the medical indigency applications for her children and she did not affirmatively participate in the application process, Owens was not an "applicant" as defined by the Act. As a result, the Board acted outside its authority when it ordered Owens to reimburse Ada County for its expenses and when it placed automatic liens on her property. View "Owens v. Ada County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Mother's request for a jury trial in this termination of parental rights case, holding that the district court exercised sound judgment under the circumstances.The Department of Family Services brought an action to terminate Mother's parental rights to her son. Mother failed to make a timely demand for a jury trial pursuant to Wyo. R. Crim. P. 38 (Rule 38) and later requested that the district court grant a jury trial under Wyo. R. Crim. P. 39(b). The district court denied Mother's request and subsequently terminated her parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the order denying Mother's Rule 39 motion was not a final appealable order; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's request for a jury trial. View "Gipson v. State, ex rel. Dep't of Family Services" on Justia Law

In a custody dispute between Hadzi-Tanovic and her former husband, Pavlovich, an Illinois state court ordered that Hadzi-Tanovic’s parenting time with her children be supervised. She filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985 against her ex-husband, the children’s guardian ad litem, and the state court judge, alleging they conspired to violate her and her children’s rights to family association and her right to a fair and unbiased trier of fact. The district court dismissed her complaint on abstention grounds.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is well established that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review such state court decisions. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine imposes a “jurisdictional bar” that prohibits federal courts other than the U.S. Supreme Court from reviewing final state court judgments The state court order at issue is final, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s finality requirement is met. Allegations of state court corruption are not sufficient to avoid the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Hadzi-Tanovic has not argued that state law or procedures prevented her from raising her federal constitutional issues in state court. Parties may raise procedural and substantive due process challenges to custody orders in Illinois state court. View "Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson" on Justia Law

This is an international child custody dispute between Respondent and Petitioner over their minor children. While the family was residing in Germany, Respondent took the children to the United States and refused to return them. The Hague Convention generally requires children to be returned to the state of habitual residence so that the country’s courts may adjudicate the merits of any custody disputes. The Ninth Circuit previously vacated and remanded the district court’s first order to return the children to Germany. Because the Supreme Court issued its decision in Golan while the court was considering Respondent’s appeal of the second return order, the court also remanded that order for the district court’s reconsideration. The district court then granted the petition a third time.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting, on a second remand, Petitioner’s petition against Respondent for the return, pursuant to the Hague Convention, of the parties’ two children to Germany. Agreeing with other circuits, the panel held that, in cases governed by the Hague Convention, the district court has discretion as to whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing following remand and must exercise that discretion consistent with the Convention. The panel held that, on the second remand, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold a third evidentiary hearing when the factual record was fully developed. The panel held that, in making determinations about German procedural issues, the district court neither abused its discretion nor violated Respondent’s due process rights by communicating with the State Department and, through it, the German Central Authority View "BOGDAN RADU V. PERSEPHONE JOHNSON SHON" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court denying Wife's motion for relief filed under Wyo. R. Crim. P. 60(a) from a divorce decree entered in 2003, holding that the district court erred as a matter of law in denying Rule 60(a) motion.At issue was the provision in the parties' stipulated decree of divorce that granted Wife fifty percent of the marital portion of Husband's disposable retired pay under his military retirement plan and provided a formula to calculate the marital portion based on Husband's months of service. In her Rule 60(a) motion, Wife argued that the formula's use of the word "months" rather than the term "reserve points" prevented her from collecting her share of Husband's military retired pay. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the district court's denial of Wife's motion for relief, holding that the decree's use of "months" instead of "reserve points" was a clerical mistake requiring correction. View "Stone v. Stone" on Justia Law