Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Department of Health and Human Resources filed a petition alleging that S.N.M. abused and neglected her three children, K.A, Jr., N.A, and J.B. The circuit court found abuse and neglect had occurred and terminated S.N.M.’s parental rights as to all three children. S.N.M. appealed, and the case was remanded with directions to determine if the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction as to J.B. and to rule on S.N.M.’s motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period. After remand, the circuit court denied the motion and terminated S.N.M.’s parental rights to J.B. again.The circuit court found that J.B.’s paternal grandmother had sought guardianship due to the parents' substance abuse and other issues. The court also found that J.B. visited her mother’s home and was subjected to the same conditions as her half-siblings. However, the record lacked evidence of when these visits occurred or if the conditions existed at the time of the petition’s filing. The circuit court denied a post-adjudicatory improvement period for S.N.M., citing her continued drug use, association with violent partners, and failure to acknowledge her substance abuse issues.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court’s decision to deny a post-adjudicatory improvement period for K.A., Jr., and N.A., finding no abuse of discretion. However, it reversed the termination of parental rights as to J.B., concluding that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court found that the circuit court’s findings were insufficient to establish jurisdiction over J.B. and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the petition regarding J.B. for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "In re K.A., N.A., and J.B." on Justia Law

In this case, the mother (K.G.) and father (J.G.) were involved in a custody dispute following their divorce. The mother was a victim of domestic violence perpetrated by the father, which triggered a rebuttable presumption under Family Code section 3044 that awarding custody to the father would be detrimental to the child's best interest. Despite this, the parents initially agreed to joint legal custody.The Superior Court of El Dorado County initially found that the father had committed domestic violence but awarded joint legal custody based on the parents' agreement. Later, the mother requested a modification to award her sole custody. A second judge reviewed the case and denied the mother's request, stating that the presumption had been rebutted, although no specific findings were made to support this conclusion.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the lower court had erred by not making the required findings to rebut the presumption under section 3044. The appellate court noted that the lower court failed to address the statutory factors and did not provide reasons for its decision in writing or on the record. The appellate court emphasized that the presumption is mandatory and must be properly applied, with specific findings made to determine if it has been rebutted.The appellate court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for a new hearing to reassess custody in light of the current circumstances and the presumption set forth in section 3044. The court directed the family court to enter a new custody order after applying the presumption and making the necessary findings. The mother was awarded her costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of J.G." on Justia Law

Christine Stary and Brady Ethridge divorced in 2018 and agreed to share custody of their three children. In March 2020, Stary was arrested and charged with felony injury to a child, but the charges were dismissed in February 2025. Ethridge applied for a civil protective order a week after Stary's arrest, alleging family violence and seeking an order lasting longer than two years. The trial court issued a temporary order preventing Stary from contacting her children. At the hearing, Ethridge testified about instances of Stary injuring the children, supported by medical records. Stary denied the allegations and testified on her own behalf. The trial court found that Stary committed felony family violence and issued a lifetime protective order prohibiting all contact between Stary and her children.The trial court's decision was appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas affirmed the order. The appellate court held that a lifetime protective order prohibiting a parent from contacting her children is not equivalent to terminating parental rights and does not require heightened procedural safeguards. One justice dissented, arguing that the order effectively terminated Stary's parental rights.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that constitutional due process requires clear and convincing evidence to support a protective order prohibiting contact between a parent and her children for longer than two years. The court emphasized that such orders profoundly interfere with a parent's fundamental right to care, custody, and control of their children. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, requiring the trial court to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard and consider the best interest of the children. View "STARY v. ETHRIDGE" on Justia Law

A.M. and R.Y. were married in April 2019, separated in April 2023, and have a daughter born in August 2019. A.M. filed for divorce in April 2023, and the parties signed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) in December 2023, which was incorporated into an uncontested judgment of dissolution in February 2024. The MSA gave A.M. sole legal and primary physical custody of their daughter, with R.Y. having supervised weekend visitation. In May 2024, A.M. filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against R.Y., alleging psychological, verbal, and emotional abuse, as well as coercive control.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied A.M.'s request for a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO) on the same day it was filed, citing insufficient evidence of past abuse and lack of detail about recent incidents. The court scheduled a hearing for a permanent DVRO but did not grant a temporary order pending the hearing. A.M. appealed the denial of the DVTRO and requested a stay of further proceedings in the trial court, which was denied. The court set the permanent DVRO request for an evidentiary hearing in August 2024, later continued to August 2025.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and found that A.M. made a prima facie showing of abuse based on her declaration and accompanying evidence. The court concluded that the trial court erred in finding A.M.'s evidence insufficient and in denying the DVTRO without proper reasons. The appellate court held that the trial court has discretion to deny a DVTRO if it reasonably concludes that it is not necessary to protect the petitioner pending the noticed hearing. The appellate court reversed the order denying the DVTRO and remanded the matter for further consideration based on the totality of circumstances. View "Marriage of A.M. and R.Y." on Justia Law

A mother and father, who divorced in 2017, were involved in a contentious child custody dispute. Initially, the mother was granted primary physical custody of their two sons, with the father having visitation rights. The court ordered both parents to attend counseling and appointed a parenting coordinator to help manage their disputes. In 2021, the father sought to modify the custody arrangement, alleging that the mother had been dishonest and failed to comply with the court's orders, including attending counseling for her factitious disorder.The magistrate court held an eight-day trial and found that the mother had indeed been dishonest and had not complied with the court's orders, which negatively impacted the children. The court granted the father sole legal and physical custody of the children, with the mother having limited visitation rights. The mother was also ordered to attend counseling with a new therapist experienced in treating dishonesty.The mother appealed directly to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the magistrate court's findings were not supported by substantial evidence and that the court had abused its discretion in various ways, including denying her motion to interview the children and admitting her personnel file from a previous employer.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court's decision, finding that there was substantial and competent evidence to support the findings of the mother's dishonesty and its negative impact on the children. The court also held that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to interview the children, admitting the personnel file, or retaining the parenting coordinator. The Supreme Court awarded attorney fees and costs to the father, concluding that the mother's appeal was frivolous and without foundation. View "Stephens v. Buell" on Justia Law

In 2016, a divorce decree awarded Eric Van Genderen Sr. (Father) custody of his child, EVG, with visitation rights for Ekaterina Nicholaevna Pokrovskaya (Mother). In 2022, Mother sought to modify her visitation rights, alleging Father was alienating EVG from her and not adhering to the visitation terms. The district court found a material change in circumstances and modified the visitation schedule to include a graduated plan starting with supervised visits.The District Court of Teton County granted Mother’s request for modification, establishing a graduated visitation schedule due to Father’s refusal to allow meaningful contact between Mother and EVG. The court found it in EVG’s best interests to amend the visitation schedule, starting with supervised visits and potentially leading to unsupervised visits. Father was ordered to pay for Mother’s travel expenses during the transition period.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the district court had jurisdiction over the matter and that Mother’s appeal was timely. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s detailed and clear visitation schedule, which considered the best interests of EVG, including the quality of the parent-child relationship, the ability of each parent to provide care, and the geographic distance between the parents. The court also upheld the allocation of travel costs to Mother after the transition period, noting that the district court’s decision was reasonable and within its discretion. The Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that the district court’s findings were supported by the evidence and affirmed the modified visitation order. View "Pokrovskaya v. Van Genderen" on Justia Law

Vanessa Turner (formerly Vanessa Colley) and John S. Colley, III were divorced in 2012, with a marital dissolution agreement (MDA) and a permanent parenting plan incorporated into the final decree. Post-divorce, John filed a petition to terminate his transitional alimony obligation, alleging Vanessa was cohabiting with her fiancé. Vanessa defended the alimony award, and after extensive litigation, John nonsuited his petition before it was adjudicated on the merits.The Circuit Court for Davidson County awarded Vanessa $16,500 in attorney fees, finding it reasonably necessary for her to defend the alimony award. John appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that neither party was a "prevailing party" under the MDA or Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c) because the petition was nonsuited before a decision on the merits.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that Vanessa was the prevailing party under both the MDA and section 36-5-103(c). The Court reasoned that the MDA's language entitled Vanessa to attorney fees as the prevailing party because she successfully defended the alimony award, achieving her objective of maintaining the status quo. The Court also held that under section 36-5-103(c), a party defending against a petition to alter or modify an alimony award can be considered a prevailing party even if the petition is nonsuited before a decision on the merits.The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees to Vanessa, and awarded her attorney fees on appeal. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees for the appeals. View "Colley v. Colley" on Justia Law

Kateryna A. Bagrii sought to establish herself as a de facto parent of two children whose biological parents are John P. Campbell and Jie Chen. Bagrii claimed she had acted as a parent to the children since 2014, after Campbell brought them from China to Ukraine without Chen's consent. Bagrii and Campbell later married and moved to the United States with the children. Bagrii argued that she had taken on full parental responsibilities and that her relationship with the children was in their best interests.The District Court (Newport, Ociepka, J.) dismissed Bagrii’s complaint for lack of standing, finding that although she proved most elements required for de facto parentage, she failed to demonstrate that Chen had fostered or supported her relationship with the children or accepted her parental role. The court noted that Chen had not consented to the children's removal from China and had not known their whereabouts for several years.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's judgment. The court held that under the Maine Parentage Act, a person seeking de facto parent status must prove that all legal parents who appear and object to the petition have fostered or supported the relationship. The court found that Chen had not implicitly or explicitly consented to Bagrii’s parental role. The court also rejected Bagrii’s request to exercise parens patriae authority, stating that due process principles require proof of consent from all legal parents. Thus, the judgment dismissing Bagrii’s complaint for lack of standing was affirmed. View "Bagrii v. Campbell" on Justia Law

S.W., a minor, was placed with foster parents A.E. and Ann.E. by the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (CYF) shortly after her birth in September 2020. In August 2022, CYF filed a petition to remove S.W. from the foster parents' home. The foster parents attended the hearing but did not seek to intervene. The trial court granted CYF's petition, and S.W. was placed with another foster family. The foster parents later filed a motion to intervene, which the trial court denied, stating they did not have standing as they had not requested S.W.'s return and had not achieved the status of prospective adoptive parents.The foster parents appealed to the Superior Court, which vacated the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the foster parents had standing as prospective adoptive parents based on the precedent set in Mitch v. Bucks County Children and Youth Social Services Agency. However, the Superior Court panel was divided, with one judge expressing doubts about the standing of prospective adoptive parents under the current law and another judge suggesting legislative changes to grant standing to all foster parents.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and determined that the issue of standing for prospective adoptive parents was moot, as the foster parents had withdrawn their motion to intervene and for S.W.'s return. Despite this, the court addressed the substantive issue due to its public importance. The court concluded that the legislative enactment of 42 Pa.C.S. § 6336.1, which states that foster parents and preadoptive parents do not have legal standing in dependency proceedings unless they have been awarded legal custody, abrogated the judicially created standing for prospective adoptive parents established in Mitch. The court reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that preadoptive parents without legal custody do not have standing in dependency proceedings. View "In the Interest of: S.W." on Justia Law

A woman, acting as guardian for her elderly father, moved him out of the house he shared with his fourth wife and later filed for divorce on his behalf, citing that the couple had lived apart for more than three years. The trial court granted the divorce, and the wife appealed. The man died while the appeal was pending, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot but affirmed the divorce decree.The wife raised three issues before the Supreme Court of Texas: (1) the man's death did not moot her appeal, (2) Texas law does not permit a guardian to sue for divorce on her ward’s behalf, and (3) living apart is not a ground for divorce when neither spouse voluntarily lived apart from the other. The Supreme Court agreed that the man's death did not moot the appeal because whether the marriage ended by divorce or by death substantially affects the wife’s asserted property interests.The Supreme Court of Texas did not definitively decide whether Texas law permits a guardian to sue for divorce on behalf of a ward. However, it held that, to whatever extent the Texas Estates Code may allow a guardian to seek a divorce on her ward’s behalf, it requires the guardianship and divorce courts to find that permitting the divorce would promote the ward’s well-being and protect his best interests. Because neither court made that finding in this case and, due to the ward’s death, neither can do so now, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment, vacated the divorce decree, and dismissed the suit. View "IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF BENAVIDES" on Justia Law