Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A mother failed to obtain necessary follow-up medical care for her child, P.S., after ear surgery, resulting in the child’s hearing loss. The West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition alleging medical neglect of P.S. and broader neglect of all children in the home, including H.B., R.B., B.S., O.S., and I.S. The mother stipulated only to medical neglect of P.S. During the proceedings, she was granted a post-adjudicatory improvement period and initially made progress, but later tested positive for drugs, stopped participating in services, and ceased communication with DHS.The Circuit Court of Boone County adjudicated all the children as abused and neglected and terminated the mother’s parental rights to R.B., B.S., O.S., P.S., and I.S., and her custodial rights to H.B. The court found that the mother’s disengagement and substance abuse demonstrated an unwillingness to comply with the improvement plan, and that DHS had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. The court did not terminate the mother’s parental rights to H.B. due to his age and wishes.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the circuit court erred in adjudicating and terminating the mother’s rights as to H.B., R.B., B.S., O.S., and I.S. based solely on her stipulation to medical neglect of P.S., as neglect of one child cannot be automatically imputed to others under the statutory definitions. The court affirmed the termination of parental rights to P.S., finding no error in the adjudication or disposition as to her. The orders were vacated as to the other children and remanded for further proceedings, including reopening adjudication for those children. View "In re H.B., R.B., B.S., P.S., O.S., and I.S." on Justia Law

Petronella McKenzie sought a second extension of a Civil Protection Order (CPO) against her former husband, Paul Persaud, alleging ongoing fear and past abuse. The parties had previously lived together in Guyana, where Ms. McKenzie testified to experiencing sexual, physical, and emotional abuse. After relocating, she obtained a CPO on consent in February 2020, which was later modified due to threats and extended in 2021 following technical violations by Mr. Persaud. Ms. McKenzie argued that her continued fear, the contentious nature of an ongoing custody case, and changes in visitation arrangements for their child supported her request for another extension.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed Ms. McKenzie’s motion for a second extension. The trial judge considered transcripts from prior hearings, Ms. McKenzie’s testimony about her relationship with Mr. Persaud, and evidence from the custody case. The court acknowledged the history of abuse and threats, as well as Ms. McKenzie’s ongoing fear. However, it found that since the last extension, Mr. Persaud had not committed further violations or demonstrated a current danger to Ms. McKenzie. The court concluded that the evidence did not establish good cause for a second extension of the CPO.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the denial of the extension. The court held that the trial court did not misconstrue the legal standard for “good cause” under D.C. Code § 16-1005(d-1), properly considered the “entire mosaic” of the parties’ relationship, and made sufficient factual findings. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the second extension of the CPO. View "McKenzie v. Persaud" on Justia Law

A mother, referred to as D.V., had a history of violent behavior and drug use. After she allegedly assaulted her ex-boyfriend and one of her other children, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services took custody of her child, E.D., and filed a petition to terminate both parents’ rights. By the time of trial, the Department had decided to seek termination only as to the mother, but at trial, its designated representative twice stated unequivocally that the Department was not seeking termination of the mother’s rights, but instead sought to limit and restrict her rights, appointing the father as sole managing conservator. The Department’s live pleading still requested termination, but no party at trial treated that as the Department’s actual position.The case was first heard by an associate judge, who conducted a bench trial and ordered termination of the mother’s parental rights. The mother sought a de novo hearing in the district court, which adopted the associate judge’s ruling. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, reasoning that the Department’s abandonment of its termination request was not unequivocal when considering the totality of the circumstances, including recommendations from other parties and the Department’s live pleading.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals. It held that in parental-termination cases, a court may not terminate parental rights when the Department, through its designated representative, makes an unequivocal and unrepudiated statement at trial withdrawing termination as a requested form of relief. The Court rendered judgment in accordance with the Department’s stated position at trial and remanded the case to the district court to enter judgment consistent with this holding and to resolve any remaining issues. View "D.V. v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES" on Justia Law

A husband and wife, both real estate professionals, were married for 31 years and jointly owned several properties, including two farms, residential homes, and business assets acquired during the marriage. The couple had no children together but each had adult children from prior marriages. During the marriage, they operated a real estate business and were equal shareholders in a grain company that was dissolved before the divorce proceedings. The husband claimed certain assets as nonmarital property, including proceeds from a premarital business and an inheritance, and also sought to have debts incurred during the marriage, such as a COVID-related loan and loans taken to pay temporary spousal support, treated as marital debts. Additionally, a third party, J.E.M. Farms, LLC, intervened, claiming a one-half interest in one of the farms based on a prior agreement and financial contributions.The District Court for Antelope County conducted a bifurcated trial, first addressing the intervenor’s claim and then the dissolution action. The court entered a consent decree quieting title to half of one farm in favor of J.E.M. Farms, with all parties agreeing to pay their own attorney fees and costs. In the dissolution proceedings, the court found that the husband failed to adequately trace most of his claimed nonmarital assets, except for $260,000 from his inheritance that was used to purchase one farm. The court also found insufficient evidence to treat the COVID loan as an outstanding marital debt or to find dissipation by the wife. The court ordered both farms to be sold, with the proceeds divided equally after accounting for the nonmarital inheritance, and denied the husband’s request for attorney fees related to the intervention.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo for abuse of discretion. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that the husband did not meet his burden to trace additional nonmarital property, that the consent decree barred his claim for attorney fees related to the intervention, and that the order to sell the farms was reasonable under the circumstances. The court also found no error in the treatment of debts or in the division of property. View "White v. White" on Justia Law

A Greek and Australian citizen and a U.S. citizen, who married in Australia, had a child together and lived in Australia before relocating to Greece. In late 2022, the family traveled to Maine for a planned vacation. On the day before their scheduled return to Greece, the mother informed the father that she and the child would not return with him. The father returned to Greece alone, while the mother and child remained in Maine, where the child began receiving developmental services and became integrated into the local community. The child was later diagnosed with autism and enrolled in a therapeutic program. The mother filed for divorce in Maine, and the father subsequently sought the child’s return to Greece under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.The Maine District Court found that the mother wrongfully retained the child in Maine as of January 4, 2023, but that the father did not file a petition for the child’s return in a Maine court until April 19, 2024—more than one year later. The court also found that the child was well settled in Maine, with significant family support, stable living arrangements, and access to specialized services. Exercising its discretion, the court denied the father’s petition to return the child to Greece. The father appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court determined that the order was reviewable under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. The court held that the District Court did not err in finding the date of wrongful retention, nor in concluding that the father’s petition was untimely under the Hague Convention. The court also affirmed the finding that the child was well settled in Maine and held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for return. The judgment was affirmed. View "Xamplas v. Xamplas" on Justia Law

A couple divorced in 2019, with the husband required to pay monthly alimony to the wife under the terms of their agreement. After the sale of the marital home, the husband’s alimony obligation was set at $13,500 per month. In 2023, the husband relocated to Texas, left his previous employment, and experienced a significant decrease in income. He struggled to meet his alimony obligations, missing several payments, and ultimately sought a reduction in his alimony due to his changed financial circumstances. The wife, whose dental hygiene license had lapsed and who was not employed, relied primarily on alimony for her income and filed a motion for contempt based on the missed payments.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County, South Dakota, reviewed the parties’ motions. After considering testimony and financial documentation, the court found the husband’s account of his reduced income credible and determined that his move and employment changes were not made in bad faith or to avoid alimony. The court also found that the wife’s claimed financial needs were not fully credible, noting that some expenses were inflated or related to adult children. The court reduced the husband’s alimony obligation to $6,000 per month effective January 1, 2025, denied the wife’s contempt motion, and declined to make the modification retroactive, reasoning that the wife should have time to adjust to the reduced payments.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decisions. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the alimony obligation, did not clearly err in denying the contempt motion, and did not abuse its discretion in refusing to apply the modification retroactively. The court’s findings were supported by the evidence and were within the permissible range of judicial decisions. View "Peery v. Peery" on Justia Law

A child, X.D., was born in May 2022 and immediately placed with prospective adoptive parents, Cliff and Rebecca, after his biological mother, Jessica, relinquished him for adoption. Jessica had suffered repeated physical and emotional abuse from X.D.’s biological father, Raymon, including an incident where Raymon struck her in the face two weeks after learning of her pregnancy. Following this, Jessica left Raymon, sought refuge in a domestic violence shelter, and cut off communication. Raymon was unaware of X.D.’s birth and believed Jessica had miscarried after she told him the baby “is not here no more.” Throughout Jessica’s pregnancy, Raymon made sporadic attempts to contact her but did not provide support for the pregnancy or the child.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the adoption petition and Raymon’s opposition, in which he claimed status as a “Kelsey S. father”—an unwed biological father who is constitutionally entitled to block adoption if he promptly demonstrates a full commitment to parental responsibilities. The trial court found Raymon qualified as a Kelsey S. father, reasoning that Jessica’s actions prevented him from asserting his rights and that he had shown sufficient emotional and financial commitment. The court excluded key evidence—screenshots of Raymon’s threatening text messages—on authentication and hearsay grounds.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred in excluding the text message evidence, which was sufficiently authenticated and relevant. Upon considering the full record, including the excluded evidence, the appellate court found insufficient support for Raymon’s claim to Kelsey S. status. The court further determined that it was not in X.D.’s best interest for Raymon to retain parental rights. The judgment was reversed and remanded with directions to allow the adoption to proceed. View "Adoption of X.D." on Justia Law

Ashley McCall Hart and Steven Hart, who were married and have two children, became involved in a series of legal disputes following Ashley’s filing for dissolution of marriage in October 2017. On the same day, Ashley requested a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Steven, which the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted temporarily. Steven responded by filing his own DVRO request against Ashley, but after hearings, the court denied Steven’s request and granted Ashley a one-year DVRO. Ashley later dismissed a renewal request in accordance with a settlement agreement. In July 2023, Ashley again sought a DVRO, and the court issued a nine-month order. Before its expiration, Ashley requested renewal, which was granted for another nine months.Ashley appealed the renewal duration, arguing that Family Code section 6345 requires a minimum five-year renewal period for DVROs. The Superior Court had found Ashley demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of future abuse but believed it had discretion to renew the DVRO for less than five years.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that under Family Code section 6345, subdivision (a), a court may renew a DVRO only for five or more years, or permanently, at its discretion, but not for a period less than five years. The court found that the statutory language and legislative history clearly establish a mandatory minimum renewal period of five years, and the trial court’s discretion is limited to choosing between five years, a longer period, or permanent renewal. The appellate court reversed the lower court’s order to the extent it provided for a nine-month renewal and remanded with instructions to modify the order to provide for a five-year renewal. View "Hart v. Hart" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were in a long-term relationship and had two children together. During the relationship, the mother was a stay-at-home caregiver while the father was the sole wage earner. After their separation, the father initiated legal proceedings to determine residential responsibility, parenting time, and child support. The mother and children moved out in April 2024. The parties agreed on most issues, including that the mother would have primary residential responsibility and the father would pay $2,885 per month in child support. However, disputes remained regarding the effective date of the child support obligation and whether the father should receive credit for $9,150 in payments he made for the children’s needs after the separation but before the final judgment.The District Court of Stark County resolved the remaining issues based on written submissions. It set the child support obligation to begin on April 1, 2024, but denied the father credit for the $9,150 in voluntary payments. The court justified this by noting the father’s higher income and its discretion to set the commencement date for support. The father appealed, challenging only the refusal to credit his voluntary payments.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and held that, as a matter of law, a district court must credit voluntary child support payments made by the obligor during the pendency of the action when calculating past-due support. The court clarified that its prior decision in Richter v. Houser, 1999 ND 147, 598 N.W.2d 193, established this rule and that failure to provide such credit results in impermissible double recovery. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to reduce the father’s past-due child support obligation by $9,150. View "Sutherby v. Astanina" on Justia Law

Elena Kouvabina and Jacob Veltman, both attorneys, were married in 2010, had a child in 2012, and separated in 2017. Since their separation, Kouvabina, acting as a self-represented litigant, initiated a series of contentious legal proceedings related to their dissolution, custody, support, and related family law matters. Over a five-year period, she commenced, prosecuted, or maintained eleven appeals and writs in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three. Of these, nine—comprising five appeals and four writ petitions—were finally determined adversely to her, including repeated unsuccessful efforts to disqualify trial judges and appeals from orders on spousal support, child support, custody, visitation, and attorney fees.The San Mateo County Superior Court previously handled the underlying family law proceedings, issuing various orders and judgments that Kouvabina challenged through appeals and writs. In each instance, the appellate court either affirmed the lower court’s decisions or summarily denied her writ petitions. These adverse outcomes formed the basis for the appellate court’s review of her litigation conduct.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, on its own motion, reviewed whether Kouvabina met the statutory definition of a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391(b)(1). The court found that she had, within the preceding seven years, while self-represented, commenced at least five litigations that were finally determined adversely to her. The court rejected her arguments that appeals do not constitute “litigation” under the statute and that family law matters should be treated differently. The court declared Kouvabina a vexatious litigant and imposed a prefiling order prohibiting her from filing new litigation in California courts while self-represented without first obtaining leave from the presiding judge or justice. No costs were awarded. View "in re Marriage of Kouvabina" on Justia Law