Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

B.S. filed a petition for a domestic violence protection order against Carlos Lopez-Rangel on behalf of herself and the parties’ two minor children, alleging that Lopez-Rangel sexually assaulted her in her home. B.S. provided testimony and physical evidence of the alleged assaults, including medical findings and photographs of injuries. She also noted that the children were present in the home during the incidents but did not know if they were awake or aware of what had occurred. At the time, Lopez-Rangel faced related criminal charges, and no-contact orders were in place to protect B.S. and the children.The District Court of Dunn County, Southwest Judicial District, first issued a temporary protection order, then, after a hearing, entered a domestic violence protection order in favor of B.S. and the two minor children, with the order designated to last for an unlimited duration. The district court found that domestic violence had been committed against B.S. but made no specific findings of harm or imminent harm to the children. Lopez-Rangel appealed, contesting the inclusion of his children as protected parties and challenging the unlimited duration of the order.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that there was sufficient evidence to support B.S.'s inclusion as a protected party, affirming that portion of the order. However, the court found no evidence of domestic violence directed at or witnessed by the children and therefore reversed their inclusion as protected parties. The court also found the district court abused its discretion by imposing an unlimited duration without sufficient findings, reversed that portion, and remanded for the district court to set a reasonable duration supported by specific findings. View "B.S. v. Lopez-Rangel" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two parents, Khilyn Craig and Dwayne Vormestrand, over the primary residential responsibility for their minor child. Initially, both parties agreed to share equal residential responsibility, with a provision that Craig would gain primary responsibility and could relocate once the child reached school age. Over time, both parties failed to adhere to the parenting schedule, leading to court admonishments. In 2024, Craig relocated to Texas with the child before the court ruled on her motion to enforce the automatic modification provision. Both parties subsequently filed motions seeking primary residential responsibility.The District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, held a hearing in December 2024, where Craig represented herself. After hearing testimony from both parties and other witnesses, the court awarded Vormestrand primary residential responsibility in an amended judgment. Craig then moved for a new trial or reconsideration, arguing that there were procedural irregularities, insufficient evidence, and that the decision was against the law. The District Court denied her motion, concluding it had properly considered all relevant factors, especially Craig’s conduct in withholding the child and relocating without court approval.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying a new trial or reconsideration. Applying an abuse of discretion standard, the Supreme Court held that, despite a minor misinterpretation of the statutory domestic violence factor, the error was harmless because the District Court did not find credible evidence of domestic violence. The Supreme Court concluded the District Court’s findings were supported by the record, it gave proper weight to the parties’ conduct, and no procedural irregularities warranted a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed both the amended judgment awarding Vormestrand primary residential responsibility and the order denying a new trial or reconsideration. View "Vormestrand v. Craig" on Justia Law

A petitioner sought temporary custody of her nephew, a Guatemalan-born minor, after he entered the United States and was released to her care by the Office of Refugee Resettlement. The petitioner, the child's maternal aunt, resided with him in Central Falls, Rhode Island. She was granted guardianship by the Central Falls Probate Court and then filed a petition with the Rhode Island Family Court for temporary custody and special findings of fact, which were necessary for her nephew’s Special Juvenile Immigration petition. The petition was filed before the child’s eighteenth birthday but was not heard until after he turned eighteen. The biological parents consented to the proceedings and did not oppose the petition.The case was first considered by a magistrate of the Family Court, who, after noting that the child had turned eighteen before the hearing, determined that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because its statutory authority extended only to persons under eighteen. The magistrate dismissed the petition and found that the court could not issue an order nunc pro tunc to the petition’s filing date. On appeal to the Chief Judge of the Family Court, the decision was upheld, with the Chief Judge concurring that the court lacked jurisdiction once the child was no longer a minor under Rhode Island law.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the appeal. The Court held that, under the statutory framework in effect at the time of the hearing, the Family Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the individual was no longer under eighteen years of age. The Court also rejected the petitioner’s arguments for nunc pro tunc relief and for retroactive application of a subsequent statutory amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court’s dismissal of the petition. View "In re DDH" on Justia Law

A married couple with eight children began divorce proceedings after a long marriage during which the husband was a successful ophthalmologist and the wife primarily cared for the children at home. During the proceedings, the wife initially sought spousal support, child support, and an equitable division of property, while the husband sought joint custody and an equitable property division. The parties agreed, through counsel and with court approval, to divide the husband's income and a business account temporarily, avoiding a child support calculation at that stage. Once custody was resolved, the parties entered into two successive arbitration agreements, under which the wife waived spousal support in exchange for arbitration of all remaining issues, including property division and child support. The arbitrator awarded the wife 60% of the marital assets and retroactive child support.After the arbitration, the husband challenged the award in the Magistrate Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to refer divorce matters to arbitration and that the arbitrator exceeded authority by awarding retroactive child support and an unequal asset division. The magistrate court rejected these arguments and confirmed the award. On appeal, the District Court affirmed the magistrate court, holding that Idaho law permits arbitration of divorce issues and that the arbitrator acted within the scope of the agreement. The district court did, however, vacate part of the attorney fee award based on the arbitration award, but affirmed an award of appellate attorney fees to the wife, finding the husband's jurisdictional challenge was unreasonable.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The main holding is that Idaho law permits courts to refer divorce actions to binding arbitration if the parties agree, and such referral does not divest the court of jurisdiction. The court also held that the arbitrator did not exceed authority in awarding retroactive child support and an unequal division of property. The case was remanded for consideration of appellate attorney fees under Idaho Code section 32-704(3). View "Miller v. Miller" on Justia Law

A woman filed for a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) against her estranged husband, alleging incidents of sexual abuse, physical injury, and emotional mistreatment in the months before her complaint. She submitted a written statement detailing these allegations, which accompanied her unverified complaint. The parties had separated prior to the incidents described. An ex parte DVPO was initially granted, and after continuances, a hearing was held where both parties testified. The woman expanded upon her written allegations during her testimony, describing specific incidents and the emotional impact of her husband’s conduct. The husband denied any abuse or injury. The trial court reviewed the written statement, marking out portions it found unsupported, and entered a one-year DVPO, concluding that acts of domestic violence had occurred and that the woman was in danger of serious and immediate injury.After the DVPO was issued, the husband filed a motion under Rule 60 to set it aside, which was denied by the District Court, Durham County. He appealed, arguing that the trial court’s findings were insufficient, as they incorporated the wife’s written statement rather than independently setting out findings. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that competent evidence supported the findings and that the incorporation-by-reference method was permissible given the trial court’s credibility assessment and review of testimony. The dissent argued that the trial court failed to make specific findings as required by Rule 52 and would have vacated the DVPO.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the appeal. It held that the trial court’s method of incorporating the written statement—after hearing testimony and marking up the statement—complied with Rule 52. The trial court’s findings were sufficient in form, and competent evidence supported the issuance of the DVPO. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Jay v. Jay" on Justia Law

After more than two decades of marriage, a couple separated, and the wife filed for dissolution using a standard form petition that did not specify any particular assets or debts for division, instead stating “To be determined.” The husband was personally served but did not respond or participate in the proceedings. The wife, after retaining counsel, moved for default, and the court entered a default judgment that made detailed property divisions, including awarding the marital home to the wife and requiring her to make equalizing payments to the husband. The husband later claimed he did not have proper notice of the prove-up hearing or the relief ultimately awarded.The case was first heard by the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa. After the wife sought to enforce the property division, the husband, upon obtaining counsel, moved to set aside the default judgment. He argued that he lacked notice of the judgment and that the relief granted exceeded what was requested in the dissolution petition. The trial court, after extensive hearings, set aside the default judgment as to all issues except marital status, finding that the petition failed to provide adequate notice of the property division and that the husband was deprived of an opportunity to be heard. The court allowed the husband to file an answer and denied the wife’s request for a statement of decision, finding it unnecessary for the issues presented.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s orders, holding that the default judgment was properly set aside under both Code of Civil Procedure section 580, because it exceeded the relief sought in the petition, and under Family Code sections 2121 and 2122, due to mistake and lack of notice. The appellate court found no reversible error in the denial of a statement of decision and ordered that the petition be amended to identify all assets for division, allowing the husband to answer. View "In re Marriage of Jenkins" on Justia Law

A mother, Cassie S., was subject to a child protection proceeding after concerns were raised about her medical decision-making for her child, who had a complex medical history. Despite multiple recommendations from medical providers to remove the child’s tracheostomy and gastrostomy tube, the mother insisted on maintaining these interventions and sought further procedures. After a New York hospital visit revealed no medical basis for these interventions and the mother refused to allow further evaluation, the hospital reported suspected medical abuse to Maine’s Department of Health and Human Services, which then petitioned for a child protection order.The District Court in Portland initially struggled to serve the mother and obtain necessary medical records, in part because of the mother’s resistance. The court denied her request for appointed counsel after finding she was not indigent, but she eventually retained private counsel for the hearing. The court granted a continuance of the jeopardy hearing beyond the statutory 120-day deadline due to delays attributed to the mother and the complexity of the case. Following a hearing, the court found the child was in jeopardy, placed the child in the Department’s custody, and required steps toward demedicalization and psychological evaluation for the mother. The court also issued a broad order restricting the mother from discussing the case publicly. The mother’s motion for relief from judgment based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel was denied without a hearing.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the finding of jeopardy and the denial of the mother’s Rule 60(b) motion, holding that she was not entitled to appointed counsel, the continuance was justified for good cause, there was no error requiring recusal, and any negative inference regarding missing witnesses was harmless. The Court vacated the speech restriction order as overly broad and remanded for it to be narrowed and time-limited. View "In re Child of Cassie S." on Justia Law

After the dissolution of a domestic partnership, a dispute arose between the former partners over shared custody and visitation of a pet dog, Kyra. The parties’ initial judgment did not address pet ownership. When one partner sought a court order for shared custody and visitation, the other, represented by her cousin acting as counsel, opposed the request and cited fictitious case authorities purporting to establish legal standards for pet custody based on the emotional well-being and stability of the parties. These fabricated authorities were also referenced in declarations and written submissions to the court. Both parties’ counsel failed to verify the authenticity of the cases cited.The Superior Court of San Diego County held a hearing, took live testimony from both parties, and ultimately denied the request for pet custody and visitation. The court’s written order, which was drafted and submitted by counsel for the party seeking custody, cited the same fictitious cases. No objection to the use of fake authorities was raised at that time. On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial court’s reliance on non-existent legal authority required reversal and sought clarification of the applicable standard under Family Code section 2605. The appellate record did not include a transcript or settled statement of the hearing.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the order. The court held that although it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to rely on fabricated legal authorities, the appellant forfeited this claim by drafting and submitting the challenged order and failing to alert the court to the error. The court further found that the appellant failed to provide an adequate appellate record to support his arguments regarding legal standards for pet custody. Additionally, the appellate court imposed $5,000 in sanctions on respondent’s counsel for knowingly and repeatedly submitting fictitious legal citations, and ordered reporting of this misconduct to the State Bar of California. View "In re: Domestic Partnership of Campos & Munoz" on Justia Law

In this case, a divorced couple disputed the calculation of child support payments. The father was originally ordered to pay child support based on his salary and bonuses, with restricted stock units (RSUs) he received from his employer excluded as income but divided as marital property. After their divorce, the father began selling his RSUs, which he had not done during the marriage. The mother then sought to modify the child support order, arguing that the RSU sales represented a material change in circumstances and that future RSU income should be considered for child support purposes.After the Nebraska Court of Appeals dismissed earlier appeals for lack of jurisdiction, the mother filed a complaint to modify child support in the District Court for Douglas County. A child support referee found that the father’s post-divorce sales of RSUs constituted a material change in circumstances, justifying a recalculation of child support. The referee included the RSU income, along with salary and bonuses, in determining the father’s income, and recommended increasing the child support payments. The referee also recommended that the modification be applied retroactively to a date later than the mother requested and that both parties pay their own attorney fees. The district court adopted these recommendations in full.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the father’s sale of RSUs after the divorce was a material change in circumstances not contemplated in the original decree, making claim and issue preclusion doctrines inapplicable. The Supreme Court also found no abuse of discretion in including RSU income, averaging bonus payments, accounting for taxes, or in the district court’s decisions regarding retroactivity and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Kingston v. Kingston" on Justia Law

A married couple, both Jehovah’s Witnesses, separated after over twenty years together and had three children. In February 2023, Marcie filed for legal separation, later amending the petition to seek dissolution of marriage. Michael filed for custody and support, and both parties requested domestic violence restraining orders (DVRO) against each other. Multiple disputes arose during the proceedings, including issues over Michael’s refusal to stipulate to Marcie’s amendment of her petition, delays and deficiencies in Michael’s disclosure and discovery responses, and allegations of coercive control and harassment by both parties. Michael was found to have repeatedly accessed Marcie’s electronic accounts, tracked her vehicle, and appeared uninvited at her residence, while Marcie was found to have entered the former family home without permission, looked into Michael’s car, and appeared at a beach near Michael’s residence.The Superior Court of Orange County issued several orders: monetary sanctions against Michael under Family Code section 271 for refusing to stipulate to Marcie’s amendment, sanctions under section 2107(c) and Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.030 and 2031.310(h) for disclosure and discovery violations, and mutual DVROs requiring both parties to attend anger management programs. Both Marcie and Michael appealed, challenging the sanctions and the DVROs.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions on Michael under section 271 solely for refusing to stipulate to Marcie’s amendment of her petition, and reversed that sanction. The Court affirmed sanctions against Michael under section 2107(c) and Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.030 and 2031.310(h). The DVRO against Michael was affirmed, but the mutual DVRO against Marcie was reversed due to insufficient evidence and failure to conduct the required statutory analysis. The order requiring Marcie to attend anger management was also reversed. View "In re Marriage of Hoch" on Justia Law