Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A two-year-old child, M.B., was placed with foster parents who are members of an Old Order Amish community shortly after his birth. The foster parents had previously adopted M.B.’s three biological sisters, who also reside in their home. Concerns were raised by M.B.’s guardian ad litem regarding the suitability of this placement, primarily because the Amish foster parents would limit M.B.’s formal education to eighth grade, consistent with their religious beliefs. Additional concerns included the lack of regular pediatric care, limited vaccination, restricted exposure to technology, and the potential for racial non-acceptance within the Amish community, as M.B. is biracial.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County reviewed a motion by the guardian ad litem to remove M.B. from the foster home. The court considered evidence and testimony, including the foster father’s statements about education, medical care, and community acceptance. The court also reviewed a special commissioner’s report, which acknowledged the loving and stable environment provided by the foster parents but noted potential limitations related to education, healthcare, and cultural exposure. Ultimately, the circuit court denied the motion to remove M.B., finding that the foster home was stable, loving, and in the child’s best interests, and that the court could not discriminate against the family based on religion or lifestyle.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the Foster Child Bill of Rights does not mandate removal from a placement solely because one or more statutory rights may be limited, but instead requires a best-interest-of-the-child analysis considering all relevant factors. The court found that the circuit court’s findings were supported by the record and that M.B.’s placement with the Amish foster parents did not violate his statutory or constitutional rights. View "In re M.B." on Justia Law

A married couple owned a waterfront property in Canada, which was destroyed by fire during their divorce proceedings. The wife, who was living at the Canadian property, disclosed during discovery that there was a single insurance policy with a $2 million Canadian Dollar (CAD) limit covering the property. The parties entered into a stipulation and agreement, incorporated into the divorce decree, which awarded the wife the Canadian property and the related insurance proceeds. Several months later, the husband learned that the wife was actually receiving $4 million CAD in insurance proceeds, not the $2 million CAD previously disclosed. He alleged that the wife had concealed an additional insurance policy and sought relief from the divorce judgment on grounds of fraud.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, reviewed the husband’s motion for relief under SDCL 15-6-60(b)(3). After a hearing based on affidavits and documentary evidence, the court found that the wife had committed fraud by intentionally concealing the additional insurance policy. The court ordered the wife to produce all insurance policies in effect at the time of the fire and directed that any insurance proceeds exceeding $2 million CAD be split equally between the parties, in accordance with their agreement and SDCL 25-4-77. The court also awarded attorney fees to the husband and issued a stay allowing the wife to use the insurance proceeds to rebuild the property, with any excess to be held in trust.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota held that the circuit court’s finding of fraud was not clearly erroneous and affirmed the grant of Rule 60(b) relief. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the appropriate division of assets under the current circumstances, given the stay and use of insurance proceeds for reconstruction. The Supreme Court also awarded appellate attorney fees to the husband. View "Trumble v. Trumble" on Justia Law

The case concerns two children who were removed from their parents’ care in 2018 due to concerns including unmet medical and educational needs, substance exposure, and a history of domestic violence and substance abuse by the parents. The children were placed with their grandparents, who were later appointed as guardians. The parents had supervised visitation, which increased to unsupervised visits after the father’s release from incarceration and the mother’s progress toward sobriety. In 2022, the parents sought to terminate the guardianship, while the grandparents requested recognition as third-party parents. A Guardian ad Litem (GAL) recommended the children remain with the grandparents and that visitation with the parents remain supervised.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, previously granted the grandparents a third-party parental interest and adopted a parenting plan requiring the parents to remain sober and address safety concerns to obtain unsupervised visitation. In early 2025, the grandparents moved to suspend visitation due to new safety concerns and the parents’ failure to continue counseling. The court suspended visitation, held a hearing, and heard testimony from the children’s therapists, who described the children’s anxiety and PTSD symptoms related to time spent with the parents. The court found a change in circumstances and amended the parenting plan to maintain the children’s primary residence with the grandparents and limit the parents to supervised visitation.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the parents’ appeal, which raised procedural and substantive challenges to the district court’s orders. The Supreme Court held that prior decisions regarding the third-party parental interest and related issues were binding under the law of the case doctrine. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s amendment of the parenting plan, concluding that a change in circumstances existed and that the amendment served the children’s best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Parenting of L.M.A.R. & N.R.R." on Justia Law

The case concerns a mother whose three children were removed from her care after the West Virginia Department of Human Services filed a petition alleging abuse and neglect. The Department asserted that both parents abused substances, failed to provide adequate food, clothing, supervision, and housing, and exposed the children to unsanitary and unsafe living conditions. The eldest child, though living primarily with her grandmother, was still exposed to the parents’ home environment. Law enforcement and expert witnesses described the home as cluttered, with animal feces present, and testified to the children’s significant developmental, nutritional, and medical issues, which were attributed to environmental neglect.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County held a series of hearings, during which evidence was presented by both the Department and the mother. The court found that the children were in imminent danger and ratified their removal. After multiple adjudicatory hearings, the court found the children to be abused and neglected, though it initially failed to enter a written order with specific factual findings. At the dispositional hearing, the court denied the mother’s request for a post-adjudicatory improvement period, citing her continued drug use, lack of acknowledgment of the children’s conditions, and failure to take responsibility. The court then terminated her parental rights, finding no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be corrected in the near future.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia addressed whether the absence of specific factual findings at adjudication deprived the lower court of subject matter jurisdiction to proceed to disposition. The court held that while specific findings are a statutory prerequisite for moving to disposition, they are not a requirement for subject matter jurisdiction. The court also affirmed the denial of an improvement period and the termination of parental rights, concluding that the lower court did not err under the facts presented. The judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed. View "In re R.M., B.M., and H.M." on Justia Law

A mother was involved in two separate abuse and neglect proceedings concerning her three children. In the first case, both she and the children’s father were alleged to have engaged in domestic violence in the children’s presence, and the father was also accused of abusing one child. After participating in services, the mother regained custody, but the father’s parental rights were terminated, and a no-contact order was issued against him. In the second case, the Department of Human Services alleged that the mother violated the no-contact order by allowing the father back into the home, continued to engage in domestic violence with him, and failed to protect the children. The mother claimed that the father forced his way into her home and that she was afraid to call law enforcement due to his threats.The Circuit Court of Nicholas County found probable cause to remove the children and, after a contested adjudicatory hearing, determined that the mother was an abusive and neglectful parent. The court did not make findings regarding the mother’s assertion that she was a “battered parent” under West Virginia law, despite her testimony and request for such a determination. The court subsequently terminated her parental rights, finding no reasonable likelihood that she could correct the conditions of abuse and neglect and that termination was in the children’s best interests.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that when a parent asserts “battered parent” status before the conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court must allow evidence on that issue and make specific findings as required by statute. Because the circuit court failed to do so, both the adjudicatory and dispositional orders were vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "In re J.F.-1, C.F., and L.H." on Justia Law

A mother failed to obtain necessary follow-up medical care for her child, P.S., after ear surgery, resulting in the child’s hearing loss. The West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition alleging medical neglect of P.S. and broader neglect of all children in the home, including H.B., R.B., B.S., O.S., and I.S. The mother stipulated only to medical neglect of P.S. During the proceedings, she was granted a post-adjudicatory improvement period and initially made progress, but later tested positive for drugs, stopped participating in services, and ceased communication with DHS.The Circuit Court of Boone County adjudicated all the children as abused and neglected and terminated the mother’s parental rights to R.B., B.S., O.S., P.S., and I.S., and her custodial rights to H.B. The court found that the mother’s disengagement and substance abuse demonstrated an unwillingness to comply with the improvement plan, and that DHS had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. The court did not terminate the mother’s parental rights to H.B. due to his age and wishes.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the circuit court erred in adjudicating and terminating the mother’s rights as to H.B., R.B., B.S., O.S., and I.S. based solely on her stipulation to medical neglect of P.S., as neglect of one child cannot be automatically imputed to others under the statutory definitions. The court affirmed the termination of parental rights to P.S., finding no error in the adjudication or disposition as to her. The orders were vacated as to the other children and remanded for further proceedings, including reopening adjudication for those children. View "In re H.B., R.B., B.S., P.S., O.S., and I.S." on Justia Law

Petronella McKenzie sought a second extension of a Civil Protection Order (CPO) against her former husband, Paul Persaud, alleging ongoing fear and past abuse. The parties had previously lived together in Guyana, where Ms. McKenzie testified to experiencing sexual, physical, and emotional abuse. After relocating, she obtained a CPO on consent in February 2020, which was later modified due to threats and extended in 2021 following technical violations by Mr. Persaud. Ms. McKenzie argued that her continued fear, the contentious nature of an ongoing custody case, and changes in visitation arrangements for their child supported her request for another extension.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed Ms. McKenzie’s motion for a second extension. The trial judge considered transcripts from prior hearings, Ms. McKenzie’s testimony about her relationship with Mr. Persaud, and evidence from the custody case. The court acknowledged the history of abuse and threats, as well as Ms. McKenzie’s ongoing fear. However, it found that since the last extension, Mr. Persaud had not committed further violations or demonstrated a current danger to Ms. McKenzie. The court concluded that the evidence did not establish good cause for a second extension of the CPO.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the denial of the extension. The court held that the trial court did not misconstrue the legal standard for “good cause” under D.C. Code § 16-1005(d-1), properly considered the “entire mosaic” of the parties’ relationship, and made sufficient factual findings. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the second extension of the CPO. View "McKenzie v. Persaud" on Justia Law

A mother, referred to as D.V., had a history of violent behavior and drug use. After she allegedly assaulted her ex-boyfriend and one of her other children, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services took custody of her child, E.D., and filed a petition to terminate both parents’ rights. By the time of trial, the Department had decided to seek termination only as to the mother, but at trial, its designated representative twice stated unequivocally that the Department was not seeking termination of the mother’s rights, but instead sought to limit and restrict her rights, appointing the father as sole managing conservator. The Department’s live pleading still requested termination, but no party at trial treated that as the Department’s actual position.The case was first heard by an associate judge, who conducted a bench trial and ordered termination of the mother’s parental rights. The mother sought a de novo hearing in the district court, which adopted the associate judge’s ruling. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, reasoning that the Department’s abandonment of its termination request was not unequivocal when considering the totality of the circumstances, including recommendations from other parties and the Department’s live pleading.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals. It held that in parental-termination cases, a court may not terminate parental rights when the Department, through its designated representative, makes an unequivocal and unrepudiated statement at trial withdrawing termination as a requested form of relief. The Court rendered judgment in accordance with the Department’s stated position at trial and remanded the case to the district court to enter judgment consistent with this holding and to resolve any remaining issues. View "D.V. v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES" on Justia Law

A husband and wife, both real estate professionals, were married for 31 years and jointly owned several properties, including two farms, residential homes, and business assets acquired during the marriage. The couple had no children together but each had adult children from prior marriages. During the marriage, they operated a real estate business and were equal shareholders in a grain company that was dissolved before the divorce proceedings. The husband claimed certain assets as nonmarital property, including proceeds from a premarital business and an inheritance, and also sought to have debts incurred during the marriage, such as a COVID-related loan and loans taken to pay temporary spousal support, treated as marital debts. Additionally, a third party, J.E.M. Farms, LLC, intervened, claiming a one-half interest in one of the farms based on a prior agreement and financial contributions.The District Court for Antelope County conducted a bifurcated trial, first addressing the intervenor’s claim and then the dissolution action. The court entered a consent decree quieting title to half of one farm in favor of J.E.M. Farms, with all parties agreeing to pay their own attorney fees and costs. In the dissolution proceedings, the court found that the husband failed to adequately trace most of his claimed nonmarital assets, except for $260,000 from his inheritance that was used to purchase one farm. The court also found insufficient evidence to treat the COVID loan as an outstanding marital debt or to find dissipation by the wife. The court ordered both farms to be sold, with the proceeds divided equally after accounting for the nonmarital inheritance, and denied the husband’s request for attorney fees related to the intervention.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo for abuse of discretion. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that the husband did not meet his burden to trace additional nonmarital property, that the consent decree barred his claim for attorney fees related to the intervention, and that the order to sell the farms was reasonable under the circumstances. The court also found no error in the treatment of debts or in the division of property. View "White v. White" on Justia Law

A Greek and Australian citizen and a U.S. citizen, who married in Australia, had a child together and lived in Australia before relocating to Greece. In late 2022, the family traveled to Maine for a planned vacation. On the day before their scheduled return to Greece, the mother informed the father that she and the child would not return with him. The father returned to Greece alone, while the mother and child remained in Maine, where the child began receiving developmental services and became integrated into the local community. The child was later diagnosed with autism and enrolled in a therapeutic program. The mother filed for divorce in Maine, and the father subsequently sought the child’s return to Greece under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.The Maine District Court found that the mother wrongfully retained the child in Maine as of January 4, 2023, but that the father did not file a petition for the child’s return in a Maine court until April 19, 2024—more than one year later. The court also found that the child was well settled in Maine, with significant family support, stable living arrangements, and access to specialized services. Exercising its discretion, the court denied the father’s petition to return the child to Greece. The father appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court determined that the order was reviewable under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. The court held that the District Court did not err in finding the date of wrongful retention, nor in concluding that the father’s petition was untimely under the Hague Convention. The court also affirmed the finding that the child was well settled in Maine and held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for return. The judgment was affirmed. View "Xamplas v. Xamplas" on Justia Law