Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Three children were removed from their mother’s care after one of them, a one-month-old infant, presented at the hospital with unexplained bone fractures. Medical staff and Child Protective Services raised concerns about possible abuse and neglect, noting the family’s prior involvement with child welfare authorities. The Department of Public Health and Human Services placed the children with their maternal aunt and later with their mother’s former foster parent. Over the next three years, the Department developed and monitored treatment plans for the mother, who made some progress but struggled with consistent engagement, parenting skills, and ensuring safe environments for her children. The children exhibited significant behavioral challenges, and allegations of sexual abuse by the mother’s partner further complicated visitation and efforts at family reunification.The Department initiated proceedings in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, seeking emergency protective services, adjudication as youths in need of care, and temporary legal custody. The District Court extended the Department’s custody multiple times, citing ongoing concerns. While the mother completed aspects of her treatment plan, service providers testified about her ongoing difficulties in safely managing her children and prioritizing their needs. Ultimately, the Department changed its permanency plan from reunification to guardianship with the children’s previous caregiver, S.H. The mother objected, arguing the Department had not made reasonable reunification efforts and had failed to prove her unfit as a parent.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s order granting the Department’s petition for guardianship. The Montana Supreme Court held that substantial evidence supported the findings that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunite the family and that further efforts would likely be unproductive. The court clarified that the Department was not required to prove the mother’s parental “unfitness” under the guardianship statute and that a clear and convincing evidence standard does not apply. The District Court’s order granting guardianship was affirmed. View "In re L.D." on Justia Law

Robert Rinker and Cindi Rinker, formerly married and sharing custody of their son, W., have a history of contentious interactions related to custody and visitation. After their separation, Robert was granted primary physical custody with monitored, and later unmonitored, visitation for Cindi. Beginning in late 2023, Robert alleged that Cindi’s behavior had deteriorated, including stalking him and W., entering his home and car without permission, making persistent and unwanted contact, and threatening communications. He claimed these actions caused fear for his and his son’s safety, prompting him to seek a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) and a return to monitored visitation for Cindi.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Family Court, held a hearing on Robert’s DVRO request. Both parties testified, with Robert detailing incidents of obsessive and alarming behavior, and Cindi admitting much of the conduct but denying malicious intent, attributing her actions to concern for her son and her mental health issues. The court found evidence of obsessive behavior by Cindi but concluded that Robert had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that her conduct constituted abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), focusing on whether her actions were intentionally threatening. The court denied the DVRO but ordered professional monitoring of Cindi’s visitation due to the “alarming” nature of her behavior.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It found that the trial court had applied an incorrect legal standard by narrowly focusing on Cindi’s intent rather than considering the totality of her conduct and its impact, as required by the DVPA. The appellate court held that Robert had met his burden to show past acts of abuse, including stalking and disturbing the peace, regardless of Cindi’s intent. The court reversed the denial of the DVRO and remanded with instructions to enter the restraining order as requested. View "Rinker v. Rinker" on Justia Law

The parties were married in 2004 and separated in April 2023. They initiated divorce proceedings, and after a hearing in April 2024, the family division of the Superior Court approved stipulated agreements on parental rights, contact, and some marital assets. The court then heard evidence on contested issues, including the division of the husband’s retirement accounts and spousal maintenance. In May 2024, the court issued a final divorce order, finding the current balances of the husband's three retirement accounts and providing for an equitable division of marital property, with the wife to receive 50% of the value of the husband's accounts as of the date of separation.After the final order, both parties filed motions to amend: the husband sought credit for maintenance payments under Rule 59, which the court granted. Later, the wife moved under Rule 60, arguing that the property division reflected an intent to use the balances as of the date of the final hearing, not separation. The husband responded, challenging the motion's timeliness and arguing that the wife failed to comply with the dispute-resolution procedure. The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Family Division, granted the wife's motion and amended the order to reflect the values as of the date of the final hearing, reasoning this correction merely conformed the order to the court’s intent.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the lower court erred in amending the divorce order under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a). The Supreme Court held that the court’s correction was proper under Rule 60(a), as it reflected the court’s original intent and was a clerical error rather than a substantive change. The Supreme Court affirmed the amended divorce order and found any alleged procedural errors in handling the wife’s motion harmless, given the court’s authority to correct such errors at any time. View "Warner v. Warner" on Justia Law

A husband and wife entered into a premarital agreement before their 2018 marriage, which set forth a comprehensive division of assets in case of divorce. The agreement categorized both parties’ assets and anticipated inheritances as separate property, except for their marital home. It specified that, upon divorce, the wife would receive 50% of the increase in the appraised value of the marital home, paid by the husband in installments. The agreement also required proportional contributions to living expenses, allocation of taxes, and provided for attorney’s fees if either party breached the agreement.After their separation in 2021, the husband filed for divorce in 2023. Both parties sought enforcement of the premarital agreement in the Vermont Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Family Division. The wife moved to enforce the agreement, including her share of the marital home’s appreciation and attorney’s fees, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction over the home designated as separate property. The husband claimed offsets for damages the wife allegedly caused to the home and for her failure to pay household expenses and taxes. The family division granted the wife’s motion, enforced the agreement in her favor, and awarded attorney’s fees, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the husband’s counterclaims, which it said belonged in civil court.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the family division had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the premarital agreement—including claims of breach—within the context of divorce proceedings under Vermont statutes. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case to the family division to determine whether the wife materially breached the premarital agreement and to consider appropriate remedies, if any, consistent with principles governing such contracts. View "Gade v. Gade" on Justia Law

Lily and Nikhil Patel were married in 2002 and have two children, both born in Georgia. The family moved to California in late 2019, and then to Georgia in July 2023, where the children attended school and the family searched for a new home. In December 2023, Lily took the children to California to visit her family, with plans to return to Georgia, but a disagreement arose regarding the children’s return. This led to conflicting claims by each parent about the circumstances of their separation.In January 2024, Lily filed for a domestic violence restraining order and requested custody of the children in the Superior Court of Orange County, California, which issued temporary orders. She also filed a petition for legal separation in California, requesting custody. Meanwhile, Nikhil filed for divorce in Georgia. Nikhil moved to dismiss Lily’s custody request on jurisdictional grounds under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), and separately moved to dismiss Lily’s petition for legal separation, arguing that California Family Code section 2345 requires the consent of both spouses for legal separation and he did not consent.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three reviewed the family court’s dismissal of Lily’s petition for legal separation. The appellate court held that, under Family Code section 2345, a judgment of legal separation cannot be rendered without the consent of both parties unless the judgment is taken by default. The court found that the family court had inherent authority to dismiss the petition when the statutory consent requirement could not be met. The order dismissing Lily’s petition for legal separation was affirmed, and the court clarified that the family court did not err in dismissing the petition under the record presented. View "In re Marriage of Patel" on Justia Law

The case involves a parent, D.A.D., whose parental rights regarding his child, G.M.H., were challenged following a period of incarceration. D.A.D. and the child’s mother, K.R.H., separated in June 2022. Shortly after, D.A.D. was arrested and later convicted of possessing child pornography, resulting in nearly three years of incarceration. During his imprisonment, D.A.D. made limited attempts to communicate with G.M.H., sending only a few letters and making a small number of phone calls. The divorce judgment provided for supervised parenting time after his release, contingent on D.A.D. providing specific information to K.R.H., which he failed to do.A petition for termination of parental rights and for adoption was filed by K.R.H. and her spouse, D.A.H., in April 2025. The District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District, held a hearing and found by clear and convincing evidence that D.A.D. had abandoned G.M.H. and that his conduct, faults, and neglect justified termination of his parental rights. The court cited his lack of meaningful contact and support, both before and during his incarceration, and concluded that there was no reasonable expectation his behavior would change.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its discretionary decision for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s finding of abandonment was supported by the evidence and not clearly erroneous. The court also determined that the statutory definition of abandonment, as applied, did not violate D.A.D.’s constitutional rights, as it required consideration of whether failures to communicate or support were without justifiable cause, including incarceration. The order terminating D.A.D.’s parental rights was affirmed. View "Adoption of G.M.H." on Justia Law

Brian Jessop and Lisa Combs are the parents of a young child, B.J.J. After their relationship ended, Lisa moved with B.J.J. from Utah to Rapid City, South Dakota. Brian filed a petition seeking parenting time consistent with the South Dakota Parenting Guidelines, while Lisa opposed unsupervised visitation and requested sole custody and only supervised contact for Brian, citing concerns about his alleged ties to the Fundamentalist Church of Latter-Day Saints (FLDS) and claims of past abuse. Throughout the proceedings, Lisa maintained that Brian’s involvement with the FLDS posed risks to B.J.J., and she also alleged that Brian had raped her, resulting in the child’s conception. Brian denied the allegations of abuse and FLDS involvement, asserting that he had left the church years earlier.The custody matter was heard in the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County, South Dakota. Prior to trial, Lisa unsuccessfully sought a continuance due to an unavailable witness and later moved to exclude rebuttal testimony from Brian’s wife, which was also denied. After a bench trial, the circuit court rejected Lisa’s rape allegations and found insufficient evidence that Brian was a current member or follower of the FLDS. The custody evaluator recommended primary physical custody to Lisa but supported unsupervised visitation for Brian. The court awarded joint legal custody, primary physical custody to Lisa, and unsupervised parenting time to Brian, following the Parenting Guidelines.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s rulings. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lisa’s motions for continuance and exclusion of rebuttal testimony, nor did it err in its findings regarding Brian’s lack of FLDS involvement and the rape allegation. The Supreme Court also affirmed the denial of Lisa’s request for attorney fees and declined to award appellate attorney fees. View "Jessop v. Combs" on Justia Law

Kolstad and Claussen are the unmarried parents of two minor children, having lived together for about four years before separating in early 2024. Claussen also has primary residential responsibility for a child from a previous marriage. After their separation, Kolstad initiated a legal action seeking primary residential responsibility and child support for their two children, while Claussen counterclaimed for the same relief. The district court held a bench trial in October 2024, during which Claussen requested either primary or equal residential responsibility.Following the trial, the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, awarded Kolstad and Claussen equal residential responsibility for their children and ordered Claussen to pay Kolstad $157 per month in child support. The district court found that Claussen’s change in employment was motivated by a desire to parent his children and not to reduce his child support obligation. Kolstad appealed, arguing that the district court failed to make adequate findings regarding two statutory best interest factors: the developmental needs of the children and evidence of domestic violence.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and applied the clearly erroneous standard to the district court’s factual findings. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s determination that Claussen’s employment change was not intended to reduce his child support obligation. However, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment in part, finding that the district court did not make sufficient findings or provide adequate explanation regarding best interest factors (c) (the children’s developmental needs and the parents’ ability to meet those needs) and (j) (evidence of domestic violence). The Supreme Court remanded the case for further findings and clarification on those factors, instructing the district court to explain its reasoning and to clarify whether the statutory presumption regarding domestic violence applies. View "Kolstad v. Claussen" on Justia Law

The essential facts of this case involve an individual who was convicted in Mississippi state court for failing to pay child support, an offense punishable by up to five years in prison but for which he ultimately received only probation. After repaying the owed child support and completing probation, the individual was later indicted under federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by anyone previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. The predicate offense for the federal charge was the non-payment of child support.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, the defendant twice moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him, among other constitutional challenges. The district court denied both motions. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that preserved his right to appeal the Second Amendment issue, leading to this appeal before the Fifth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that, under the historical inquiry required by the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, there is no historical tradition supporting the permanent disarmament of a person convicted solely of non-payment of child support, particularly where the debt had been repaid and probation completed. The court rejected the government’s analogy between debtors and thieves, noting that founding-era practices treated debtors differently, allowing for temporary disarmament only until the debt was paid. The Fifth Circuit therefore held that the application of § 922(g)(1) to the defendant violated the Second Amendment and reversed the conviction, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Cockerham" on Justia Law

A married couple in Montana accumulated substantial assets and debts over a 31-year marriage, primarily through farming and related businesses. When the marriage ended, disputes arose over the valuation and distribution of assets, especially a 25% interest in a family ranch partnership held by the husband. The wife, who had managed bookkeeping, sought full financial disclosure, which the husband resisted. The court ultimately found the wife’s expert valuation of the partnership more credible and ordered an equalization payment schedule requiring the husband to pay the wife monthly installments over 17 years, with a provision allowing transfer of the partnership interest if payments were not made.Following the initial decree, the husband failed to make any payments, attempted to unilaterally transfer the partnership interest, and also moved funds from accounts awarded to the wife. During post-judgment proceedings in the Seventh Judicial District Court, the wife uncovered delays, asset transfers, and changes in the partnership agreement that reduced the value and control associated with the 25% interest. The husband argued he had a choice between payments or the transfer, but the court found his actions obstructive and not in compliance with its orders. The court found the partnership interest had been materially altered, making it inequitable for the wife to accept in satisfaction of the judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s rulings, holding that the husband was properly found in contempt for failing to comply with the decree and for obstructive conduct. The Supreme Court also upheld the District Court’s modification of the property distribution, striking the provision allowing transfer of the partnership interest and ordering restoration of funds to the wife. The Court concluded these actions were within the District Court’s equitable powers and supported by the evidence. View "In re Marriage of Steinbeisser" on Justia Law