Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

by
A sixteen-year-old female, through her mother, filed a petition to change her legal name to a more masculine one as part of her gender transition. Both parents consented to the name change. The Mississippi State Board of Health (MSBH) was named as a respondent and acknowledged the petition, stating it would annotate the minor’s birth certificate if the court ordered the name change.The Hinds County Chancery Court held a hearing on the petition, where the minor and her parents were present. The chancellor decided to dismiss the petition without prejudice, stating that the minor needed to mature more before the court would consider the name change.The petitioner appealed the decision. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and upheld the chancellor’s decision. The court emphasized that under Mississippi law, a chancellor may only grant a minor’s name change if it is clearly in the best interest of the child. The court found that the chancellor did not manifestly err in determining that the minor needed to mature more before making such a significant decision. The court also noted that the chancellor’s decision was consistent with Mississippi’s public policy against children receiving life-altering gender-transition assistance due to their lack of maturity. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the chancellor’s dismissal of the name-change petition. View "In The Matter of The Petition of S.M.-B. v. Mississippi State Board of Health" on Justia Law

by
The State of Oklahoma moved to terminate a mother's parental rights due to her methamphetamine addiction and failure to provide a stable environment for her child. The child was placed in emergency custody in May 2022, and the mother entered and left multiple inpatient treatment programs without completing them. The State filed a motion to terminate her parental rights in April 2023, and a jury trial was set for August 2023. The mother failed to appear for the trial, and her attorney requested a continuance, which was denied. The trial court held a nonjury trial and terminated her parental rights.The mother appealed the decision, and the Court of Civil Appeals, Division III, affirmed the trial court's ruling. The mother argued that the statute allowing the trial court to deem her failure to appear as a waiver of her right to a jury trial was unconstitutional. The Court of Civil Appeals did not substantively address this constitutional claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and found that the statute in question is constitutional. However, the court emphasized that due process requires that the record must reflect that the parent received notice of the possible consequences of failing to appear for the jury trial. The court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion and remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the mother had received sufficient notice. The trial court is to hold the hearing within 30 days and submit findings of fact and conclusions of law to the Supreme Court within 15 days after the hearing. View "IN THE MATTER OF FB v STATE OF OKLAHOMA" on Justia Law

by
A.T. was born in May 2024 and tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine, as did her mother, M.T. The mother admitted to drug addiction and using methamphetamine throughout her pregnancy. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) was notified, and A.T. was placed with a relative caregiver, Gloria T. The father, W.M., had a history of domestic violence and substance abuse issues, and had previously been involved in dependency proceedings for his other children, Y.M. and J.G.The Superior Court of San Diego County found that A.T. was a dependent child under section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and ordered her removal from her mother's custody. The court also found that placing A.T. with her father would be detrimental to her well-being, citing his history of domestic violence, ongoing relationship with the mother, and lack of cooperation with the Agency.The father appealed, arguing that section 361, subdivision (d) should apply, which requires a higher standard of proof for removal, and that there was no clear and convincing evidence to support the finding of detriment. The Agency argued that section 361.2, subdivision (a) applied because the father did not have physical custody of A.T. at the time of disposition and sought to assume custody.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, concluded that section 361.2 applied because the father was the noncustodial parent seeking custody. The court found clear and convincing evidence supporting the juvenile court's finding that placing A.T. with the father would be detrimental to her safety and well-being. The court affirmed the juvenile court's dispositional order, maintaining A.T.'s placement with the relative caregiver and granting the father liberal unsupervised visitation. View "In re A.T." on Justia Law

by
Sarah Ann Miles and Jeffrey Gerstein entered into an oral traditional surrogacy agreement in which Miles agreed to conceive and carry a child using her ova and Gerstein's sperm, with the understanding that Gerstein would be the sole parent. The child, E., was born in December 2013, and both parties adhered to the terms of the agreement for seven years, with Gerstein acting as E.'s sole parent and Miles not assuming any parental role.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found that the oral surrogacy agreement was valid and enforceable, determining that Miles was not E.'s parent under the agreement. The court concluded that the parties had a clear understanding that Gerstein would be the sole parent and that Miles would not be involved in the child's upbringing. The court also found that it was not in E.'s best interest for Miles to enter her life as a parent.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that traditional surrogacy agreements do not need to be in writing to be enforceable under California law. The court found that the oral agreement between Miles and Gerstein was valid and that the parties' conduct over the years supported the existence of the agreement. The court also determined that the agreement did not violate public policy or constitutional principles, as Miles never intended to be E.'s parent and did not assume a parental role in E.'s life. The judgment was affirmed, and Miles was ordered to pay Gerstein's costs on appeal. View "Miles v. Gerstein" on Justia Law

by
A father, Travis W. Kalis, was ordered by a district court in 2013 to pay $1,145 per month in child support to the mother of his children, Leslie E. Sheehy Lee. In 2015, the parties discussed modifying this amount through a private agreement, but no written agreement was executed. Despite this, Kalis began making reduced payments of $1,000 per month via Venmo, which later decreased to $500 per month. In 2022, after Kalis stopped making prompt payments, Sheehy Lee sought enforcement of the original court order through the county child support agency, which notified Kalis that he owed over $30,000 in arrearages.A child support magistrate (CSM) concluded that the parties had reached an extrajudicial agreement to modify Kalis’s child support obligation and determined that Kalis did not owe any arrearages. Sheehy Lee sought review in the district court, arguing that the forgiveness of arrearages was an impermissible retroactive modification of the child support order. The district court declined to grant relief, and the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the parties had reached a fair and reasonable agreement.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that extrajudicial agreements to modify child support orders are invalid as a matter of law. The court emphasized that child support orders can only be modified by a court and within the limits set by Minnesota Statutes section 518A.39, subdivision 2(f), which prohibits retroactive modifications of child support orders except from the date of service of notice of the motion to modify. The court also clarified that the statutory exception allowing for an alternative effective date applies only to subsequent court-issued child support orders, not to extrajudicial modifications. The decision of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lee v. Kalis" on Justia Law

by
Sarah Shively initiated divorce proceedings against Kyle Shively, seeking primary residential responsibility for their three school-age children. The marital home, which was Kyle's family farmstead, is located in Pleasant Lake, North Dakota. During the separation, Kyle moved to Rugby, North Dakota. Both parties proposed different parenting plans, with Sarah seeking primary residential responsibility and Kyle seeking either primary or equal residential responsibility.The District Court of Benson County, Northeast Judicial District, held a two-day bench trial and awarded Sarah primary residential responsibility and the marital home. Kyle appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its decisions regarding residential responsibility, parenting time, and the distribution of the marital home.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and found that the district court failed to provide sufficient specificity in its findings to enable a reviewing court to understand the factual basis for its decisions. The Supreme Court noted inconsistencies in the district court's findings, particularly regarding the best interest factors for awarding primary residential responsibility. The district court's findings were contradictory, and it did not adequately explain why equal residential responsibility was not considered.Additionally, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not address summer parenting time for Kyle, despite acknowledging its importance. The district court also failed to explain its decision to award the marital home to Sarah, despite the sentimental value and origin of the property being significant factors.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration and a reasoned explanation of the court’s decisions regarding primary residential responsibility, parenting time, and property distribution. View "Shively v. Shively" on Justia Law

by
Sarah Knell and Catlin Kinden, who married in 2003 and have four children, divorced in October 2020. They initially agreed to share equal residential responsibility for their children, with the children spending most of the school year with Knell. Conflicts arose, particularly regarding the medical care of their two minor children, B.K. and P.K., who require medication. Kinden meticulously monitored P.K.'s diabetes care, often initiating conflicts with Knell over it. In July 2021, Kinden moved to modify residential responsibility, alleging Knell's disregard for the children's health. The district court ordered mediation, which was unsuccessful.In December 2021, Knell filed a countermotion to modify residential responsibility. The parties agreed to a parenting investigation, which did not recommend changing their equal residential responsibility. They signed a stipulation to modify the judgment, which the court adopted in September 2022. In 2023, Kinden moved to Bismarck, prompting Knell to seek primary residential responsibility, arguing that the two-year moratorium on modifications did not apply due to Kinden's relocation. Both parties made prima facie cases for modification, leading to an evidentiary hearing in July 2024.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case, affirming the district court's decision. The court found that N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6, which governs modifications of primary residential responsibility, did not apply as there was no prior order establishing primary residential responsibility. Instead, the court made an original determination based on the best interests of the children, weighing the factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). The court concluded that awarding Kinden primary residential responsibility was in the children's best interests, particularly due to his diligence in addressing their medical and educational needs. The Supreme Court found no clear error in the district court's findings and affirmed the second amended judgment. View "Kinden v. Kinden" on Justia Law

by
An unmarried couple, K.L.T. and M.O.J., filed a petition on September 27, 2024, to adopt three children who had been in their care since early 2022. The Cass County District Court denied their petition on October 8, 2024, citing North Dakota Century Code § 14-15-03(2), which the court interpreted as not permitting unmarried couples to jointly adopt. The case was subsequently dismissed.Following the dismissal, K.L.T. and M.O.J. moved for reconsideration on October 14, 2024. Although the district court found them to be suitable adoptive parents, it denied the motion for reconsideration. The court then certified a question to the North Dakota Supreme Court, asking whether an unmarried couple can adopt children under N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03(2), noting the absence of controlling precedent in North Dakota.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed whether to answer the certified question. Under Rule 47.1 of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court has the discretion to answer certified questions of law if they are determinative of the proceeding and if there is no controlling precedent. However, the court determined that answering the certified question would be purely advisory since the petition had been dismissed and the time to appeal had expired. Consequently, there was no existing case that could be resolved by answering the question.The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to answer the certified question and dismissed the proceeding. View "K.L.T. v. NDDHHS" on Justia Law

by
A couple, married in 2001, had three children and lived in Cheyenne, Wyoming. The husband worked in his family's steel business and later managed his own company, while the wife initially stayed home with the children and later took over her father's consulting firm. They separated in October 2020, with the husband moving to Colorado and the wife staying in the marital home with the children. The wife filed for divorce in September 2021, and the husband counterclaimed. By May 2022, their eldest child turned 18, and by July 2022, their middle child began living with the husband.The District Court of Laramie County held a two-day bench trial in January 2024. The court granted the divorce, awarded shared legal custody of the children, and split physical custody. The husband was ordered to pay $67.79 in monthly child support. The court divided the marital property, valuing the husband's business interests and awarding the marital home to the wife, along with all associated debts. The husband was ordered to pay the wife $400,000 to achieve an equitable distribution of assets. The wife appealed, challenging the denial of retroactive child support and the valuation of the marital home.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying retroactive child support, noting that both parties had jointly provided for the children's needs during the separation. The court also upheld the district court's valuation of the marital home, affirming that the mortgage was accounted for in the property division. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decisions. View "Lewis v. Lewis" on Justia Law

by
Christopher Shelton, Vicky Costa, and Todd Costa appealed two orders from the First Judicial District Court dismissing their claims against the State of Montana, Susan Ridgeway, and Axilon Law Group. The case arose from the adoption of L.S., Shelton's biological child, by a Utah couple. Melissa Surbrugg, L.S.'s biological mother, arranged the adoption before L.S. was born. After L.S.'s birth, Surbrugg and L.S. tested positive for drugs, leading to a report to the Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS). Surbrugg relinquished her parental rights, and the adoptive parents took temporary custody of L.S. The Utah court later terminated Shelton's parental rights and finalized the adoption.The District Court dismissed the claims against Ridgeway and Axilon, ruling that they owed no duty to the plaintiffs as they represented Surbrugg, not the plaintiffs. The court also granted summary judgment to the State, finding that the Utah courts had already determined that Montana complied with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC), thus precluding the plaintiffs' claims.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the claims against Ridgeway and Axilon, agreeing that they owed no duty to the plaintiffs. The court also upheld the summary judgment in favor of the State, applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. It concluded that the Utah courts had already decided the issue of ICPC compliance, and the plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue in Utah. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claim, as the alleged misrepresentation related to a future event, not a past or existing fact. View "Shelton v. State" on Justia Law