Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Jay Bryant initiated an action to partition a 40-acre parcel of land, originally conveyed in 1978 to his parents, Lenora and Paul Bryant, as joint tenants. Upon their divorce in 1991, a property settlement stipulated that Paul would receive the parcel as his own, and Lenora would receive a different property. Although the divorce decree incorporated this agreement, Lenora never deeded her interest in the 40 acres to Paul. Paul subsequently transferred his interest to a third party, who then conveyed the property to Jay and his brother Jed. After Paul’s death in 2021 and during probate, a title report revealed that Lenora still legally owned an undivided one-half interest in the property.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Meade County, allowed Jay to amend his complaint to add Lenora and bifurcated the quiet title and partition actions. At trial, the court took judicial notice of the divorce file and stipulation and reviewed the chain of warranty deeds. After considering testimony and evidence, the circuit court found that Jay and Jed had a legal interest in the property and that Lenora’s claim was inconsistent with her prior agreement. The court applied judicial estoppel to preclude Lenora from asserting a continuing interest, extinguished her claim, and quieted title in favor of Jay and Jed. The court issued a final judgment on the quiet title action under SDCL 15-6-54(b).The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the appeal. It held that Jay had standing under SDCL 21-41-1 to pursue a quiet title action and that the claim was not barred by the 20-year statute of limitations in SDCL 15-2-6. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s application of judicial estoppel, concluding Lenora was precluded from asserting an ownership interest after accepting the benefits of the stipulated property settlement. The circuit court’s judgment quieting title in favor of Jay and Jed was affirmed. View "Bryant v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Richard Marschner and Roxane Marschner divorced in 2016 after reaching a settlement agreement dividing their marital property. Richard received a lump sum from Roxane’s retirement account, and Roxane was to receive a portion of Richard’s Army National Guard pension and Federal Employees’ Retirement System benefits upon his retirement. The divorce judgment included provisions that if Richard took action to prevent or reduce Roxane’s share of his military retirement pay—including by waiving retirement pay in favor of disability pay—he would be required to indemnify Roxane. Both parties waived spousal support in the original settlement.After Richard was separated from the National Guard for medical reasons, he began receiving military disability retired pay and waived all his retirement pay. When Roxane attempted to collect her share, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service denied her request, stating that disability pay was not divisible under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act. Roxane then sought an amended judgment or redistribution of the marital estate from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District. The district court awarded Roxane spousal support equivalent to her lost share of Richard’s retirement pay, relying on the indemnification provision and reasoning that federal law did not prevent enforcement of the parties’ agreement.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether federal law preempts enforcement of the indemnification provision. The court held that federal law, as interpreted in Howell v. Howell, prohibits state courts from dividing military disability retired pay or enforcing indemnification provisions, even if contractually agreed upon. The district court’s award of spousal support was deemed an impermissible division of disability pay. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the amended judgment. View "Marschner v. Marschner" on Justia Law

A couple residing in Kansas held a wedding ceremony in Washington state without a marriage license and subsequently celebrated their marriage with family and friends in Kansas. After the ceremony, they began living together, consistently presented themselves as a married couple both in person and on social media, maintained joint financial accounts, filed joint tax returns, and were recognized as married by family, friends, and business associates. The wife began using her husband's surname in public and business settings. Despite this, several government agencies refused to recognize her name change due to the lack of a government-issued marriage document, preventing her from updating identification and financial records.Seeking a legal resolution, the couple filed an uncontested petition in the Wyandotte District Court for a declaratory judgment to recognize their common-law marriage and for the wife’s legal name change. At an evidentiary hearing, both parties and supporting witnesses testified, and no opposition appeared. The district court found that the couple had the capacity to marry, entered into a present marriage agreement, and held themselves out as husband and wife to the public, thus meeting all requirements for a Kansas common-law marriage. The court also granted the legal name change.The couple appealed for certification purposes, recognizing that federal agencies require a ruling from the state's highest court to be bound by such determinations. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case, confirming its jurisdiction for this purpose. The court held that substantial competent evidence supported the district court’s findings that the elements of a common-law marriage were satisfied and affirmed the district court’s judgment recognizing both the marriage and the wife’s name change. View "In re Common-Law Marriage of Kelley " on Justia Law

A mother’s parental rights were terminated after her child was born drug-affected, prompting the Department of Health and Human Services to seek a child protection order. The mother, struggling with opioid use disorder, spent significant periods in jail and various treatment facilities. Despite participating in an Adult Treatment and Recovery Court program, she experienced multiple relapses and did not complete her treatment programs. At the time of the termination hearing, she remained in treatment with no clear plan for when she could care for her child.The District Court (Springvale) conducted a hearing on the Department’s petition to terminate parental rights. The court received evidence that the mother had a long-standing substance use disorder and inconsistent participation in treatment. The guardian ad litem (GAL) assigned to the case did not meet several statutory obligations, including meeting the mother in person, observing visits, attending family meetings, and filing timely reports. Nevertheless, the court found the mother unfit based on statutory criteria and concluded that termination was in the child’s best interest. The mother appealed, arguing that the court misunderstood addiction and that deficiencies in the GAL’s performance undermined the best interest determination.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case for clear error and abuse of discretion. The court held that the evidence supported a finding of parental unfitness under at least one statutory ground, and deficiencies in the GAL’s performance did not prevent the trial court from independently determining the child’s best interest. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision not to explicitly consider a permanency guardianship. Accordingly, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights. View "In re Child of Danielle H." on Justia Law

The parties in this case have two minor children. Following their divorce in 2018, the mother was awarded primary residential responsibility based on agreement, and the father received limited parenting time. In February 2021, the father sought primary residential responsibility, leading to the appointment of a parenting investigator and subsequent hearings. Ultimately, the district court awarded equal residential responsibility, but after appellate review, the judgment was reversed due to insufficient findings. In February 2024, the father again moved for increased parenting time, which led to another evidentiary hearing. During this hearing, the court conducted an in chambers interview with one child over the mother’s objection and considered evidence from a prior parenting investigator’s report.The District Court of McLean County, South Central Judicial District, initially denied the father’s request for primary residential responsibility but granted an evidentiary hearing to consider modifying parenting time. After the hearing, the court found sufficient grounds for modification based on the mother’s interference with the parenting plan, the children’s desire to spend more time with their father, and uncertain exchange times. The court ordered increased parenting time for the father. The mother objected to the in chambers interview and the use of the parenting investigator’s report, arguing procedural errors and lack of proper notice.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s finding that a material change in circumstances justified modifying parenting time. However, it reversed the district court’s actions in conducting an in chambers interview without both parents’ consent and considering the parenting investigator’s report without notice and opportunity for cross-examination. The Supreme Court held that both errors were not harmless and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to conduct a new best interests analysis without considering the improperly admitted evidence, or to hold a supplemental evidentiary hearing if requested. View "Goetz v. Goetz" on Justia Law

The parties, following their divorce, entered into a stipulated judgment that set out how they would share expenses for their three children, including extracurricular activities, school events, and medical costs. The judgment required equal sharing for listed traditional activities, certain forms of communication about new or related expenses, and equal division of out-of-pocket medical expenses. Communication provisions specified that if a question was posed through their shared application and no response was received within five days, consent was presumed.After the judgment, the plaintiff moved the District Court of Stutsman County to hold the defendant in contempt for failing to pay his share of these expenses. The court found the defendant in contempt, rejecting his arguments about the form of communication required and about whether certain expenses were his responsibility. The court held line-by-line hearings on the expenses, found the plaintiff had met her burden for most items, and awarded remedial sanctions and attorney’s fees. This included some expenses that had not been previously submitted to the defendant, some for which there was no clear obligation under the judgment, and mileage for transporting children to therapy. The defendant appealed, also arguing that the plaintiff’s motion was frivolous and that he was entitled to his own attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant in contempt. However, it reversed the award of remedial sanctions and attorney’s fees in part, finding that some sanctions were for expenses already paid, not required under the judgment, or not properly supported by findings. It remanded for further proceedings to recalculate the proper amount of sanctions and attorney’s fees. The District Court’s order was thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Bedgar v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the primary residential responsibility and parenting time for a child born in 2024 to two unmarried parents. The father sought an interim order for custody, and after several reschedulings, a hearing was held where only the father's counsel and the mother's attorney appeared; the mother herself was absent. Subsequently, the court granted the father primary residential responsibility and gave the mother supervised parenting time. The mother’s attorney later withdrew, and the court set further hearings, but it was unclear if the mother received proper notice of these dates.When the mother failed to appear at the scheduled pretrial conference, the District Court of Stark County, Southwest Judicial District, sanctioned her by barring her from presenting any evidence at trial, except regarding her income for child support purposes. At trial, she appeared without counsel and was only allowed to testify about her income, while the father and his mother provided testimony on other issues. The district court then entered judgment awarding primary residential responsibility to the father, continuing supervised parenting time for the mother, and ordering her to pay child support. The mother appealed, arguing she was denied due process due to improper service and that the sanction was excessive.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It declined to address the mother’s due process arguments, finding her appellate briefs did not comply with procedural rules. However, it held that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an evidentiary sanction that prevented the court from considering evidence relevant to the child’s best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed the monetary sanction for attorney’s fees but reversed the evidentiary sanction, remanding for a new trial where sanctions, if imposed, must not interfere with the court’s ability to evaluate the child’s best interests. View "Kostelecky v. Erickson" on Justia Law

A husband and wife married in 1989 and separated in 2023. They had a long marriage, shared two adult daughters, and owned a marital home on twenty-six acres near Casper, Wyoming, as well as other real and personal property, including an undeveloped plot in Alaska. The marital estate included several vehicles, campers, tractors, snowmobiles, retirement and investment accounts, and pensions. The husband filed for divorce, seeking dissolution of the marriage and division of property. At trial, the main disputes involved the valuation of the marital home and the wife’s pension accounts. Both parties presented expert testimony on these values, with differing appraisals and methods.The District Court of Natrona County held a bench trial and divided the marital property, awarding the husband the marital home, the Alaska property, and most of the vehicles and equipment. The wife was awarded her pensions, a smaller share of personal property, and an $850,000 equalization payment from the husband, to be paid within ninety days. Neither party requested special findings of fact regarding the valuations. The husband appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by accepting higher valuations for the marital home and lower valuations for the wife’s pensions, resulting in an excessive equalization payment.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case for abuse of discretion. It held that, because neither party requested special findings of fact, it must presume the district court made all factual findings necessary to support its judgment. The Supreme Court concluded that sufficient evidence supported the district court’s valuation choices, that the distribution reflected consideration of the statutory factors, and that the overall property division, including the equalization payment, was not so unfair as to shock the conscience of the court. The court affirmed the district court’s decree. View "Allen v. Allen" on Justia Law

J.S. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former fiancé, D.A., alleging ongoing abuse that included physical violence and threatening communications while D.A. was incarcerated. J.S. described several incidents of abuse during their relationship and stated that she was fearful of further harm upon D.A.’s eventual release from prison. After J.S. filed for a DVRO, the Superior Court of San Diego County issued a temporary restraining order, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing to decide on a permanent order. D.A., still incarcerated, responded to the court by requesting an opportunity to appear telephonically at the hearing, citing his inability to attend in person.The Superior Court of San Diego County continued the initial hearing but did not address D.A.’s request to appear telephonically. At the rescheduled hearing, D.A. was not present, and the court did not document any attempt to facilitate his participation or check his custody status. Based on J.S.’s testimony and the evidence on file, the court issued a five-year DVRO against D.A. Afterward, D.A. filed motions seeking discovery, an expert, and assistance for telephonic appearance, but there was no indication the court acted on these filings. D.A. then appealed, arguing he was denied meaningful access to the court.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering and ruling on D.A.’s request for telephonic appearance, depriving him of his right to meaningful access to the courts as an indigent inmate in a bona fide civil action. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, ordering the trial court to ensure D.A. is provided with meaningful access. The temporary restraining order remains in effect pending further proceedings. View "J.S. v. D.A." on Justia Law

Two women, who were never married, were granted joint guardianship of twin girls when the children were very young. After their relationship ended, they continued to share custody through the guardianship. Several years later, both women filed competing adoption petitions. The circuit court granted one woman’s petition, making her the adoptive parent and terminating the guardianship. The other woman’s appeal of the adoption was unsuccessful.While that appeal was pending, the non-adoptive woman filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Jackson County seeking third-party custody or, alternatively, visitation rights under section 452.375.5(5). The adoptive parent moved to dismiss the petition, arguing her former partner lacked standing under the statute. The circuit court denied the motion, and the parties later appeared to reach a settlement, resulting in a proposed judgment granting third-party visitation. The adoptive parent objected before the judgment was entered, but the court signed the judgment granting visitation. When the adoptive parent was found to have violated this judgment, the court awarded compensatory visitation and attorney’s fees to the other woman. The adoptive parent appealed both rulings. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding the non-adoptive woman had standing and that consent to the visitation agreement was binding.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and held that section 452.375.5(5)(a) does not create an independent cause of action for third-party custody or visitation when custody is not otherwise at issue in an underlying proceeding. The Court determined that a third party may only seek custody or visitation under the statute as part of an already pending custody dispute, not as a stand-alone action following an adoption. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the lower court’s judgments and dismissed the petition and related family access motion. View "In re A.L.P. and S.H.P." on Justia Law