Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A non-Indian woman and a member of the Prairie Island Mdewakanton Dakota Indian Community married in Minneapolis and resided with their children in Edina, Minnesota, outside the reservation. Their marriage was supported financially by the husband’s “per capita payments” from the Community, and the wife received tribal insurance benefits, but neither spouse lived or owned property on the reservation. After more than thirteen years, both spouses filed for divorce on the same day—he in the Community’s Tribal Court, she in Minnesota state court. The state court stayed proceedings in favor of the Tribal Court, and after a trial, the Tribal Court dissolved the marriage, divided assets, awarded joint custody, and set child support. It did not award the wife spousal maintenance because under Community law, per capita payments are not marital property. The Community’s Court of Appeals affirmed the Tribal Court’s order.The wife then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, seeking a declaration that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction and an injunction against enforcement of the order. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the husband, holding that the Tribal Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the divorce under the “consensual relationship exception” from Montana v. United States, based on the marriage and the wife’s connections to the Community.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The Eighth Circuit held that the Tribal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a divorce between a tribal member and a nonmember spouse who resided outside the reservation, because the consensual relationship exception did not apply in these circumstances. The court concluded that neither the marriage nor the wife’s limited connections to the Community provided a sufficient nexus to tribal lands or property, nor was tribal jurisdiction necessary to protect self-government or internal relations. The case was remanded with instructions to enjoin enforcement of the Tribal Court’s divorce order. View "Tix v. Tix" on Justia Law

A married couple accumulated significant assets during a nineteen-year marriage, including a successful business started by the husband prior to the marriage. The wife, an accountant, worked for the business during the marriage but let her CPA license lapse. Upon dissolution of the marriage, the husband retained ownership of the business, and the wife received a large cash equalization payment to offset the division of assets. The wife’s request for substantial monthly spousal support was based on the disparity between her potential income and the husband’s anticipated future income from the business.The Iowa District Court for Audubon County presided over the dissolution trial. After valuing the assets, it awarded the husband the business and other properties, and the wife the lake house and a cash equalization payment exceeding $3 million. The court concluded the wife’s ability to earn investment income from the equalization payment, combined with her earning capacity as an accountant, was sufficient for her to maintain her marital standard of living. It denied her request for traditional spousal support. On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the property division but modified the decree to award the wife $3,500 per month in spousal support, reasoning that the income gap and business growth potential justified support.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed both parties’ challenges. It adopted the Court of Appeals’ analysis on property valuation but vacated the appellate court’s award of spousal support. The Supreme Court held that when a property division provides the spouse seeking support with sufficient assets and income to maintain her predivorce lifestyle, an additional award of traditional spousal support is not warranted. The focus is on need, not income equalization or duplicating business value already considered in property division. The district court’s denial of spousal support was affirmed. View "In re the Marriage of Owen and Brinker" on Justia Law

A divorced couple with two children entered into a stipulation to resolve their dissolution proceeding, agreeing to joint legal custody, physical care with the mother, and visitation for the father. The stipulation also detailed the children’s school arrangements. Shortly after the decree was entered, the father expressed regret about its terms and, just fifty-one days later, filed a petition to modify the custody, care, visitation, and support arrangements. During discovery, the father admitted there had been no material change in circumstances since the decree, conceding the petition was motivated by dissatisfaction with the decree’s terms rather than new facts.The Iowa District Court for Delaware County found that the petition was filed in violation of Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413, which requires pleadings to be well-grounded in fact and not filed for improper purposes. The court found the father’s claims of changed circumstances not credible and concluded the petition was an improper attempt to relitigate the decree. As sanctions, the district court dismissed the petition and ordered the father to pay the mother’s attorney fees. On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that the rule was violated and upheld the monetary sanction but reversed the dismissal sanction, holding that dismissal was not an appropriate remedy under rule 1.413.On further review, the Supreme Court of Iowa addressed only whether rule 1.413 authorizes dismissal as a sanction. The court held that, while the rule allows for various sanctions, including attorney fees, it does not itself provide an independent basis for dismissal of a petition. The court affirmed the imposition of attorney fees but reversed the district court’s dismissal, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re the Marriage Kraus" on Justia Law

After marrying in July 2014, a husband and wife executed a postnuptial agreement two days after their wedding, intending to keep their respective properties separate during the marriage. Prior to marriage, they jointly purchased land, with the wife contributing a down payment and the remainder financed by a mortgage. After marriage, they constructed a home and acquired several vehicles, with the husband contributing substantially more toward improvements and purchases. The couple separated in late 2020, and the husband filed for divorce in early 2021. Disputes arose concerning the enforceability and interpretation of the postnuptial agreement, as well as the division and valuation of marital assets, especially the marital residence.The District Court of Albany County first granted summary judgment, finding the postnuptial agreement enforceable, rejecting the wife’s arguments of unconscionability and unilateral mistake due to lack of sufficient evidence. However, the court denied the husband’s subsequent request for summary judgment on the property distribution, interpreting the agreement to allow equitable division of assets acquired during the marriage. After a bench trial, the court divided the vehicles and the marital residence between the parties, awarded credits for their respective contributions, and ordered a current appraisal to determine the property’s value for final division. The court ultimately set the marital residence’s value at $925,000 and split the remaining equity equally after accounting for the parties’ contributions.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that the postnuptial agreement was enforceable, that its terms required the court to exercise discretion in distributing property acquired during the marriage, and that there was no abuse of discretion in the court’s valuation and division of the marital residence. The Supreme Court found the lower court’s findings and application of the law to be proper and supported by the record. View "Young v. Jones" on Justia Law

After the birth of G.W., he resided with his mother at her parents’ home, and the father was frequently present. DCYF investigated an earlier incident involving the child rolling off a couch and closed it as unfounded. When the child was approximately five weeks old, he was seen by his pediatrician after his parents reported bleeding in his mouth, but no cause was identified. Later that day, following an argument, the mother witnessed the father throw the child onto a bed but left him in the father’s care overnight. The next day, the mother noticed the child’s left arm was immobile; she delayed seeking medical care despite advice from a pediatric nurse, only taking the child to the emergency room after further prompting. Medical examination revealed a broken left humerus, healed oral injuries, and a minor eye hemorrhage, with no medical explanation other than trauma.The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed petitions alleging abuse and neglect against both parents. At the 9th Circuit Court-Goffstown Family Division, a hearing was held on these petitions. The mother moved to suppress her statements to child protective service workers, arguing statutory violations during the investigation. The trial court denied the motion and, after hearing testimony from both parents, medical experts, and other witnesses, found by a preponderance of the evidence that the mother had both abused and neglected the child.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether there was sufficient evidence for both findings and whether the statutory violations by DCYF required exclusion of certain evidence. The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the mother committed an abusive act under circumstances indicating harm or threatened harm to the child’s life, health, or welfare, and reversed the abuse finding. However, it found sufficient evidence of neglect and determined that any statutory violations by DCYF were harmless error. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire thus affirmed the neglect finding and reversed the abuse finding. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

A woman filed for dissolution of her marriage after six months, seeking a permanent domestic violence restraining order against her husband. The parties share a young daughter, S.R., and the wife has two other daughters, K.R. and D.R., from a prior relationship. The wife alleged that K.R., age 13, had disclosed incidents of sexual abuse by the husband. K.R. described being touched inappropriately by the husband on two occasions, one occurring recently and one two years prior. These allegations were relayed to law enforcement and a school counselor, and the wife filed a declaration detailing K.R.’s statements as part of her restraining order request.The Superior Court of Orange County held an evidentiary hearing in which the wife testified about K.R.’s statements. The trial court admitted these statements over the husband’s hearsay objections, found the wife credible, and granted a restraining order protecting the wife, K.R., D.R., and S.R. The order included sole legal and physical custody of S.R. to the wife, with the husband permitted professional monitored visitation with S.R. once a month, citing concerns that the monitor could not understand Spanish, S.R.’s primary language. The trial court also took judicial notice of pending criminal charges against the husband, and subsequently entered judgment dissolving the marriage.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that K.R.’s out-of-court statements were admissible for their truth under the child dependency hearsay exception recognized in In re Cindy L., and clarified that this exception applies in domestic violence restraining order proceedings involving sexual abuse of a minor. The court found error in the trial court’s reliance on pending criminal charges as substantive evidence, but determined the error was not prejudicial. The appellate court reversed the part of the restraining order limiting visitation with S.R., concluding the trial court misapplied the law regarding professional monitors’ language requirements, and remanded for reconsideration of visitation. The restraining order was otherwise affirmed. View "Marriage of M.P. and M.C." on Justia Law

Venticinque and Lair, long-term romantic partners living in Savannah, decided to start a family together in 2018. They selected a sperm donor resembling Lair, with Venticinque to be the biological mother. Lair contributed to fertility treatment costs, participated in events marking the pregnancy, and was involved in the child’s birth and early care. Both women were publicly identified as parents of the child, L.V., in birth announcements and social media posts. However, after L.V.’s birth in July 2021, Venticinque’s behavior changed, and in November 2022, she left Savannah with L.V., ceased contact between Lair and the child, and alleged abuse by Lair.Following this, Lair filed a petition in the Superior Court seeking equitable caregiver status under OCGA § 19-7-3.1. Venticinque opposed the petition and challenged the statute’s constitutionality. The trial court denied Venticinque’s motion to dismiss and held that the statute was constitutional, relying on precedent from Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587 (2001). The trial court found that Lair met the statutory requirements for equitable caregiver status and awarded her joint legal custody, visitation, and ultimately primary physical custody of L.V. after a subsequent bench trial. Venticinque appealed the final order, and the Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia due to the constitutional questions involved.The Supreme Court of Georgia determined that the trial court had applied the wrong legal standard under OCGA § 19-7-3.1 by placing the burden of proving harm to the child on Venticinque, rather than on Lair, the petitioner. The Supreme Court vacated both the equitable caregiver and custody orders and remanded the case for the trial court to apply the correct statutory standard. The constitutional issues were not addressed, as resolution of the statutory issue was dispositive. View "VENTICINQUE v. LAIR" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were divorced in 2018. Following the divorce, one party, Mr. Dasler, repeatedly attempted to relitigate matters that had already been resolved by final court orders, filing numerous motions for reconsideration and appeals, most of which were denied for lack of new arguments or facts. He also made unsubstantiated allegations against his former spouse, Ms. Knapp, and initiated related litigation in multiple courts over substantially similar issues. Based on this conduct, a trial court found that Mr. Dasler engaged in abusive litigation intended to harass or intimidate Ms. Knapp and issued an order restricting his ability to file further litigation against her without meeting certain conditions.Ms. Knapp then requested attorney’s fees and costs under Vermont’s abusive-litigation statute, 15 V.S.A. § 1184(b)(1), submitting detailed billing records to support her claim. Mr. Dasler objected, arguing that some fees were unrelated, excessive, and that he could not afford to pay them. The Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Family Division, reviewed the fees, applied the lodestar method, and limited the award to fees connected to the abusive litigation proceedings. The court found the fees reasonable, declined to adjust the amount based on Mr. Dasler’s financial circumstances, and awarded $5940 in attorney’s fees plus $30 in costs. Mr. Dasler’s motion for reconsideration, which argued the court was required to make specific findings regarding his ability to pay, was denied.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that when awarding attorney’s fees under 15 V.S.A. § 1184(b)(1), the proper standard is reasonableness and there is no requirement for individualized findings regarding the litigant’s ability to pay. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s analysis or fee award. The judgment in favor of Ms. Knapp was affirmed. View "Knapp v. Dasler" on Justia Law

Four minor children were placed in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (the Department) by the Warren County Youth Court in 2015. The children were subsequently placed in the care of their maternal aunt, Lesley Prince. In 2018, Prince and the children moved to Florida, where the Florida Department of Children and Families monitored them under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. After parental rights were terminated in 2019 and adoption packages were issued in 2023, Prince sought to adopt the children but was unable to secure a court to adjudicate the petitions due to confusion over whether Mississippi or Florida had jurisdiction.Prince initially submitted adoption petitions to the Warren County Chancery Court, which declined to set a hearing, stating that Florida had jurisdiction since the children resided there. After efforts to find Florida counsel proved unsuccessful and receiving conflicting advice from the Florida authorities, Prince filed the petitions in Hinds County Chancery Court, which transferred the cases to Warren County. The Warren County Chancery Court again refused to set a hearing, maintaining it lacked jurisdiction. Prince then sought a permanency hearing in Warren County Youth Court to create a record for appeal. The Youth Court granted an interlocutory order, effectively ruling it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the adoptions.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the interlocutory appeal from the Warren County Youth Court. The Court held that exclusive jurisdiction over adoptions lies with the chancery courts under Mississippi law and statute, and not with youth courts. Therefore, it affirmed the Warren County Youth Court’s ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to finalize the adoptions. The Supreme Court did not address the merits of the adoption petitions or issue a directive to the chancery court, as only the jurisdictional question from the youth court’s order was properly before it. View "In The Matter of L.L.T." on Justia Law

The parties in this case are the parents of a ten-year-old daughter and share equal residential care for her. Their original 2016 order set a child support obligation for the father, but a 2020 amended agreement reduced this obligation to zero, reflecting their arrangement of equal parenting time. In December 2023, both parties filed motions seeking modification of the parental rights and responsibilities order. During the pendency of these motions, the father had a son with another person, but the son was not covered by the child support order at issue.Following a hearing, the Maine District Court (Biddeford) ordered the father to resume paying child support to the mother and denied his request for a downward adjustment based on his obligation to support his new son. The District Court reasoned that under Maine’s statutory scheme, only a nonresidential parent—rather than a coresidential parent like the father—could receive such an adjustment. The court subsequently denied the father’s motion to alter or amend the judgment.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the statutory interpretation of 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(5)(A) de novo. The Court held that when both parents provide substantially equal care, neither is the “primary care provider” referenced in the statute. Therefore, the statutory provision allowing a child support adjustment for a parent who is not the primary care provider applies. Because the father was legally obligated to support his son in his household and neither party was the primary care provider for their daughter, the Court determined he was entitled to the statutory adjustment. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the District Court’s child support order and remanded the matter for recalculation consistent with its interpretation. View "Waterman v. Wheeler" on Justia Law