Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A mother filed a petition for protection from child abuse on behalf of her two minor children against their father, following allegations of threats, mental injury, and physical abuse. An ex parte hearing in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County resulted in a temporary protective order and referral to the Department of Social Services (DSS) for investigation. The DSS report, completed before the final hearing, corroborated the children’s accounts of abusive behavior. At the final hearing, the mother was unrepresented and the father had counsel; after hearing testimony, the court granted a final protective order awarding custody to the mother and supervised visitation to the father.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s grant of the final protective order. It found that the circuit court had sufficient basis to extend the temporary protective order pending the DSS investigation, that the father’s right to procedural due process was not violated by not being served with the petition, and that the circuit court’s negative credibility determination of the father’s testimony was enough to support the finding of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed three issues. First, it held that the father did not preserve for appellate review the question of whether the circuit court erred by not stating on the record whether good cause existed to set the final hearing beyond seven days of service of the temporary order. Second, the Court held that service of a temporary protective order, which includes factual allegations and notice of the hearing, generally satisfies procedural due process requirements; thus, the father was not entitled to service of the petition in addition. Third, the Court held that the Appellate Court erred by affirming the final protective order solely on the basis of the circuit court’s negative credibility finding; lack of credibility alone does not satisfy the petitioner’s burden of proof. The judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Clarke v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Kyle Wardner and Tamara Porath were the parents of a minor child, E.M.M.W., who was born in 2017 while the parents resided in different countries—Wardner in North Dakota and Tamara Porath in Canada. After Tamara Porath’s death in November 2020, her sister, Rebecca Porath, sought legal guardianship of the child in Canada. Wardner opposed the application, and the Canadian court ultimately awarded him primary residential responsibility for E.M.M.W., who then moved to North Dakota. In May 2022, both parties stipulated to a final Canadian order that established Wardner’s custody and the Poraths’ visitation rights. Wardner registered this order in North Dakota in May 2024.Subsequently, Wardner filed a motion in the District Court of McLean County, South Central Judicial District, seeking to modify the Canadian visitation order. After a hearing in January 2025, during which both sides testified, the district court denied Wardner’s motion. The court found that Wardner had not demonstrated a material change in circumstances required for modification under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6, the statute it applied to the case. The Poraths also argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction but conceded North Dakota was the child’s home state.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), and that it erred by applying the wrong statutory standard. The Supreme Court determined that N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-14, governing modification of nonparent visitation, was the correct statute to apply to Wardner’s motion, rather than the statute for modifying primary residential responsibility. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with instructions for further proceedings under the proper law. View "Wardner v. Porath" on Justia Law

Evan Markestad and Joy Markestad, who divorced in early 2023, share two minor children. Joy was awarded primary residential responsibility, while Evan received parenting time. In summer 2024, Evan agreed that Joy and the children could temporarily reside in Bismarck. Joy later decided to remain in Bismarck permanently and enrolled the children in school there. In March 2025, Evan moved to modify parenting time due to the changed circumstances. Joy partially agreed, asking the district court to alter the school-year schedule but not the summer and holiday arrangements. The district court held a hearing and issued an order and amended judgment modifying parenting time.In the District Court of Ramsey County, Northeast Judicial District, the court examined both parties’ proposals for summer parenting time. Evan requested the entire summer, whereas Joy proposed alternating weekends and two additional weeks. The court considered their respective work schedules, finding Joy, as a teacher with summers off, more available and able to transport the children. The court also considered Evan’s farming obligations, noting his work frequently interrupted the prior parenting schedule. The court ultimately awarded Evan two consecutive weeks in July, Father’s Day, and an additional two-week vacation period, rather than adopting either party’s full proposal. The court also considered the conduct of both parties, including Joy’s lack of candor regarding her move and Evan’s demeaning language, but concluded the record supported its findings.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s decision under the clearly erroneous standard and affirmed both the order modifying parenting time and the amended judgment. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not misapply the law or prioritize Joy’s wishes over the children’s best interests, and its findings were supported by the record. Requests for attorney’s fees by both parties were denied, and the Supreme Court found the appeal was not frivolous. View "Markestad v. Markestad" on Justia Law

Ashley Brito and Jennifer Salas, a same-sex couple, sought to have a child using Angel Rivera’s sperm, which Brito used via an at-home artificial insemination kit. After Brito became pregnant, she and Salas married. The birth certificate listed both women as parents. They raised the child together for over a year before separating, with Brito taking the child. Rivera subsequently sought to be recognized as the child’s legal father.The Circuit Court denied Rivera’s petition for paternity, relying solely on section 742.14 of the Florida Statutes, which it interpreted to mean that a sperm donor—unless part of the commissioning couple or having executed a preplanned adoption agreement—automatically relinquishes all parental rights. The court determined that Rivera was a donor and did not fit either exception. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding Rivera was “obviously the donor” and that the statute’s relinquishment provision applied irrespective of whether assisted reproductive technology (ART) was involved.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case, addressing the certified conflict with Enriquez v. Velazquez, a Fifth District Court of Appeal decision holding section 742.14 only applies when a child is conceived using ART, not at-home artificial insemination. The Supreme Court held that section 742.14 applies exclusively in contexts involving ART, as defined by laboratory handling of human eggs or preembryos. Since the child in this case was not conceived through ART, Rivera’s parental rights were not automatically relinquished by operation of section 742.14. The Supreme Court quashed the Second District’s decision, disapproved A.A.B. v. B.O.C., and approved Enriquez v. Velazquez. View "Brito v. Salas" on Justia Law

Three children were removed from their mother’s care after one of them, a one-month-old infant, presented at the hospital with unexplained bone fractures. Medical staff and Child Protective Services raised concerns about possible abuse and neglect, noting the family’s prior involvement with child welfare authorities. The Department of Public Health and Human Services placed the children with their maternal aunt and later with their mother’s former foster parent. Over the next three years, the Department developed and monitored treatment plans for the mother, who made some progress but struggled with consistent engagement, parenting skills, and ensuring safe environments for her children. The children exhibited significant behavioral challenges, and allegations of sexual abuse by the mother’s partner further complicated visitation and efforts at family reunification.The Department initiated proceedings in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, seeking emergency protective services, adjudication as youths in need of care, and temporary legal custody. The District Court extended the Department’s custody multiple times, citing ongoing concerns. While the mother completed aspects of her treatment plan, service providers testified about her ongoing difficulties in safely managing her children and prioritizing their needs. Ultimately, the Department changed its permanency plan from reunification to guardianship with the children’s previous caregiver, S.H. The mother objected, arguing the Department had not made reasonable reunification efforts and had failed to prove her unfit as a parent.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s order granting the Department’s petition for guardianship. The Montana Supreme Court held that substantial evidence supported the findings that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunite the family and that further efforts would likely be unproductive. The court clarified that the Department was not required to prove the mother’s parental “unfitness” under the guardianship statute and that a clear and convincing evidence standard does not apply. The District Court’s order granting guardianship was affirmed. View "In re L.D." on Justia Law

Robert Rinker and Cindi Rinker, formerly married and sharing custody of their son, W., have a history of contentious interactions related to custody and visitation. After their separation, Robert was granted primary physical custody with monitored, and later unmonitored, visitation for Cindi. Beginning in late 2023, Robert alleged that Cindi’s behavior had deteriorated, including stalking him and W., entering his home and car without permission, making persistent and unwanted contact, and threatening communications. He claimed these actions caused fear for his and his son’s safety, prompting him to seek a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) and a return to monitored visitation for Cindi.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Family Court, held a hearing on Robert’s DVRO request. Both parties testified, with Robert detailing incidents of obsessive and alarming behavior, and Cindi admitting much of the conduct but denying malicious intent, attributing her actions to concern for her son and her mental health issues. The court found evidence of obsessive behavior by Cindi but concluded that Robert had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that her conduct constituted abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), focusing on whether her actions were intentionally threatening. The court denied the DVRO but ordered professional monitoring of Cindi’s visitation due to the “alarming” nature of her behavior.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It found that the trial court had applied an incorrect legal standard by narrowly focusing on Cindi’s intent rather than considering the totality of her conduct and its impact, as required by the DVPA. The appellate court held that Robert had met his burden to show past acts of abuse, including stalking and disturbing the peace, regardless of Cindi’s intent. The court reversed the denial of the DVRO and remanded with instructions to enter the restraining order as requested. View "Rinker v. Rinker" on Justia Law

The parties were married in 2004 and separated in April 2023. They initiated divorce proceedings, and after a hearing in April 2024, the family division of the Superior Court approved stipulated agreements on parental rights, contact, and some marital assets. The court then heard evidence on contested issues, including the division of the husband’s retirement accounts and spousal maintenance. In May 2024, the court issued a final divorce order, finding the current balances of the husband's three retirement accounts and providing for an equitable division of marital property, with the wife to receive 50% of the value of the husband's accounts as of the date of separation.After the final order, both parties filed motions to amend: the husband sought credit for maintenance payments under Rule 59, which the court granted. Later, the wife moved under Rule 60, arguing that the property division reflected an intent to use the balances as of the date of the final hearing, not separation. The husband responded, challenging the motion's timeliness and arguing that the wife failed to comply with the dispute-resolution procedure. The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Family Division, granted the wife's motion and amended the order to reflect the values as of the date of the final hearing, reasoning this correction merely conformed the order to the court’s intent.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the lower court erred in amending the divorce order under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a). The Supreme Court held that the court’s correction was proper under Rule 60(a), as it reflected the court’s original intent and was a clerical error rather than a substantive change. The Supreme Court affirmed the amended divorce order and found any alleged procedural errors in handling the wife’s motion harmless, given the court’s authority to correct such errors at any time. View "Warner v. Warner" on Justia Law

A husband and wife entered into a premarital agreement before their 2018 marriage, which set forth a comprehensive division of assets in case of divorce. The agreement categorized both parties’ assets and anticipated inheritances as separate property, except for their marital home. It specified that, upon divorce, the wife would receive 50% of the increase in the appraised value of the marital home, paid by the husband in installments. The agreement also required proportional contributions to living expenses, allocation of taxes, and provided for attorney’s fees if either party breached the agreement.After their separation in 2021, the husband filed for divorce in 2023. Both parties sought enforcement of the premarital agreement in the Vermont Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Family Division. The wife moved to enforce the agreement, including her share of the marital home’s appreciation and attorney’s fees, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction over the home designated as separate property. The husband claimed offsets for damages the wife allegedly caused to the home and for her failure to pay household expenses and taxes. The family division granted the wife’s motion, enforced the agreement in her favor, and awarded attorney’s fees, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the husband’s counterclaims, which it said belonged in civil court.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the family division had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the premarital agreement—including claims of breach—within the context of divorce proceedings under Vermont statutes. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case to the family division to determine whether the wife materially breached the premarital agreement and to consider appropriate remedies, if any, consistent with principles governing such contracts. View "Gade v. Gade" on Justia Law

Lily and Nikhil Patel were married in 2002 and have two children, both born in Georgia. The family moved to California in late 2019, and then to Georgia in July 2023, where the children attended school and the family searched for a new home. In December 2023, Lily took the children to California to visit her family, with plans to return to Georgia, but a disagreement arose regarding the children’s return. This led to conflicting claims by each parent about the circumstances of their separation.In January 2024, Lily filed for a domestic violence restraining order and requested custody of the children in the Superior Court of Orange County, California, which issued temporary orders. She also filed a petition for legal separation in California, requesting custody. Meanwhile, Nikhil filed for divorce in Georgia. Nikhil moved to dismiss Lily’s custody request on jurisdictional grounds under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), and separately moved to dismiss Lily’s petition for legal separation, arguing that California Family Code section 2345 requires the consent of both spouses for legal separation and he did not consent.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three reviewed the family court’s dismissal of Lily’s petition for legal separation. The appellate court held that, under Family Code section 2345, a judgment of legal separation cannot be rendered without the consent of both parties unless the judgment is taken by default. The court found that the family court had inherent authority to dismiss the petition when the statutory consent requirement could not be met. The order dismissing Lily’s petition for legal separation was affirmed, and the court clarified that the family court did not err in dismissing the petition under the record presented. View "In re Marriage of Patel" on Justia Law

The case involves a parent, D.A.D., whose parental rights regarding his child, G.M.H., were challenged following a period of incarceration. D.A.D. and the child’s mother, K.R.H., separated in June 2022. Shortly after, D.A.D. was arrested and later convicted of possessing child pornography, resulting in nearly three years of incarceration. During his imprisonment, D.A.D. made limited attempts to communicate with G.M.H., sending only a few letters and making a small number of phone calls. The divorce judgment provided for supervised parenting time after his release, contingent on D.A.D. providing specific information to K.R.H., which he failed to do.A petition for termination of parental rights and for adoption was filed by K.R.H. and her spouse, D.A.H., in April 2025. The District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District, held a hearing and found by clear and convincing evidence that D.A.D. had abandoned G.M.H. and that his conduct, faults, and neglect justified termination of his parental rights. The court cited his lack of meaningful contact and support, both before and during his incarceration, and concluded that there was no reasonable expectation his behavior would change.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its discretionary decision for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s finding of abandonment was supported by the evidence and not clearly erroneous. The court also determined that the statutory definition of abandonment, as applied, did not violate D.A.D.’s constitutional rights, as it required consideration of whether failures to communicate or support were without justifiable cause, including incarceration. The order terminating D.A.D.’s parental rights was affirmed. View "Adoption of G.M.H." on Justia Law